Counter Terror Business - Transport Security

Testing �鶹�� at London City Airport

Polly Jones — Tue, 17 Jun 2025 16:00:20 +0000

Polly Jones recently tried out the new security scanners at London City Airport to see if they bring benefits for passengers, while maintaining high levels of security.

On their website, London City Airport boasts a smooth, swift security check.

Next Generation Security Checkpoints (NGSC) have been introduced at some airports around the country, with early adopters including Leeds Bradford, Aberdeen, Southend, Teesside, Birmingham, and London City. Gatwick completed installation of the new Computed Tomography (CT) scanners at the beginning of April, joining Edinburgh, Luton, Newcastle, Bournemouth, Bristol, Cardiff, East Midlands, Inverness, Liverpool and Newquay airports.

However, several airports, including some major UK hubs have not yet installed the new tech: Glasgow, Glasgow Prestwick, Heathrow, Norwich, Southampton and Stansted.

The government initially instructed all UK airports to upgrade to �鶹�� by 2022, but the deadline was later postponed to 1 June 2024. Major airports were eventually permitted to miss the 1 June implementation date.

At some airports, �鶹�� — which are larger and heavier than previous models — necessitated physical modifications to security areas, including, in some cases, the reinforcement of floors

How it works

The new scanners detect prohibited items with greater accuracy, meaning security staff can work more efficiently and passengers no longer need to take items out of their hand luggage.

By utilising advanced technologies, primarily Computed Tomography (CT) scanners, to provide 3D images of baggage, �鶹�� allow for more precise threat detection without requiring the removal of items like laptops.

Traditional X-ray scanners generate static 2D images that lack a layered view of a bag’s contents, which can make it harder to detect complex threats. When image detail is limited, the effectiveness of automatic threat detection is reduced. To address this issue, Computed Tomography (CT) — a technology widely used in the medical field — has been introduced to baggage screening. CT scanners produce high-resolution 3D images, allowing operators to more accurately assess the contents of a bag.

With CT technology, operators can zoom in, zoom out, and rotate 3D scanned images, allowing for a more detailed inspection of a bag’s contents.

It is hoped that with enhanced on-screen inspection and resolution capabilities, the need for rechecks and physical inspections is significantly reduced, leading to a smoother flow of passengers through security and lower security operating costs. The new technology also eases the workload on operators, increasing their efficiency and ultimately contributing to improved security outcomes, a better passenger experience, and greater overall operational efficiency.

It was initially announced that passengers using �鶹�� would no longer have to adhere to 100ml rules for liquids, but this restriction was ‘temporarily’ reintroduced in June 2024.

At the time, the Department for Transport said reintroducing restrictions would "enable further improvements to be made to the new checkpoint systems" and was not in response to a specific threat. The restrictions are expected to be lifted in June 2025.

Scanners in use

From a security point of view, passengers are reassured that threat detection levels are just as good as with traditional scanners and no incidents have been reported with �鶹��.

From a passenger point of view, getting through security at City airport was incredibly straight forward. City airport itself has its own benefits, besides the security. It’s the closest airport to me, has free drop off and I got from the car to departures in half an hour. There are several reasons for the speediness, besides the new technology. The airport is small, with fewer flights, meaning there’s just fewer people to get through security. Due to the nature of the airport, there were several people who seemed to be travelling on business flights, which presumably means they were familiar with the procedures and quick at passing through security. There were fewer families than you would normally encounter at an airport, who understandably, do take longer to get through.

However, �鶹�� did noticeably make a difference. The fact that you can just put your bag straight on the belt, without having to remove electronics and liquids, means you just naturally get through quicker. This multiplied by the hundreds of passengers means that everyone gets through quicker and the queues are shorter.

My friends who went to Gatwick (with new scanners) to travel to meet me at the destination said it was ‘super quick’ to get through security.

My return flight, from a Spanish airport, was not so speedy. There were more scanners, so fewer people per queue, but I did get stuck behind a group of people who had not yet removed their liquids and electronics from their bag and so held me up. My friends in another queue got through much quicker, despite having the same scanner – they were just not behind a slow group. However, presumably had this Spanish airport had the new technology, though they may have delayed me anyway, I would not have been held up by the group emptying their liquids and electronics.

There were other reasons for the slow transition at the Spanish airport, with my friend waiting half an hour to check her baggage in, a slightly slow delivery from a ‘fast food’ outlet and Spanish border control before I could go to the departure gate. However, at least I didn’t spend £13 on a drink and a baguette like I did at City airport.

Of course this is not a direct comparison, there are many reasons why it took me different lengths of time at each airport. Had I gone to different airports at either end of the holiday, I’m sure I would have had different experiences, regardless of which scanners were in use.

Hopefully, the introduction of �鶹�� across UK and European airports will speed up the airport journey for everyone, and reduce some of the anxiety that comes with airport delays, while at the same time, keeping the same standard of aviation security that we have become accustomed to.

Working towards a unified aviation security

Robyn Quick — Thu, 02 May 2024 15:40:24 +0000

Transport Security

Matthew Vaughan, director of aviation security and cyber at the International Air Transport Association (IATA) investigates the evolving security needs in the age of global aviation.

Flying is secure. Yet, the threat to civil aviation from terrorism is dynamic and unyielding.

This risk demands a dynamic and forward-thinking approach to security. Since the tragic events of 9/11, the focus of aviation security has progressively shifted from countering large-scale hijackings to preventing more nuanced threats, such as the smuggling of explosives and the movement of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) as defined by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014).

These evolving threats highlight the complex and adaptive nature of those targeting civil aviation, necessitating an equally adaptive response from the aviation security sector.

Rationale for a public utility model

Traditional methods of aviation security, which are reactive and fragmented, have become inadequate. Airport security checkpoints appear similar to those in the 1970s, now with more threat-based restrictions and use of technology.

Ever since the 2006 liquid terrorism plot in the United Kingdom, 17 years ago, a fragmented mix of passenger restrictions persist. These lack a cohesive international strategy, despite the rarity of such threats repeating. This absence leaves governments without guidance on how to phase out liquid-related security measures based on risk assessment.

In the International Air Transport Association’s (IATA) Annual Security Report, we argue for viewing differing security approaches as opportunities for change. Focusing on protective outcomes can enable a shift to more risk-based security protocols, especially evident in how domestic aviation systems handle passenger volumes at screening checkpoints. Not all passengers need constant screening. Demographic and technological advancements offer benefits.

However, the current government approach often unintentionally hinders innovation and stakeholder confidence in addition to raising operational costs. Aviation security, pitted against terrorism threats, becomes a “zero-sum game”.

As a result, we suffer from governmental responses to past terrorism acts and live with reactive preventative measures. Passengers are frustrated. IATA’s Global Passenger Survey consistently places security processes among the top three inconveniences. Many have expressed willingness to share more personal information for a seamless travel experience.

The concept of treating aviation security as a public utility is rooted in the understanding that the safety of aviation is a common good that benefits all segments of society. This approach advocates for a unified, standardised system that prioritises the collective security and convenience of passengers while optimising operational costs.

Vision for the future: reimagining aviation security

Envisioning aviation security as a public utility leads to a conceptual framework where security is not just a series of checkpoints and screenings but a comprehensive, cohesive, and adaptive system that prioritises the safety, efficiency, and convenience of the global traveling public.

This vision encompasses the development of a standardised security protocol that leverages demographic and technological innovations to streamline passenger processing, without compromising on safety.

The integration of automated screening lanes, biometric identification systems, and AI-driven analytics for risk assessment can revolutionise the passenger experience, allowing for a more seamless journey from curb to cabin. This approach not only addresses the operational challenges posed by rising passenger volumes but also mitigates the risk of complacency and human error in security operations.

Furthermore, the digital age has highlighted technology’s impact on global safety. Improvements in data sharing and intelligence, facilitated by international cooperation with organisations like the ICAO, have been instrumental in enhancing threat assessment and risk management. However, technological advancement and the adoption of new methodologies in security operations have been uneven, leading to disparities in security standards across regions and airports.

While challenges in balancing effectiveness, privacy, and passenger convenience remain, the continuous advancements in technology and international cooperation provide a strong foundation for the future. IATA envisions a passenger security experience where travellers can journey with all allowed items packed in their bags without having to remove them, undergo a physical and/or digital screening only once, irrespective of subsequent travel destinations.

With 2024 marking the ICAO Year of Facilitation, any aviation security strategy ought to be focusing on enhancing the passenger experience, reducing airport congestion, optimising cost across the supply chain, and ultimately be encouraging air travel and tourism.

Operationalising the vision

Operationalising this vision requires innovation, collaboration, and transparency. By fostering a risk-based approach, encouraging technology investment and pilot programs, aviation security can surpass the limitations of the current approach. This transformation also necessitates reevaluating passenger security fees and funding, ensuring investments enhance security effectiveness and passenger convenience.

Conclusion: charting a path forward

As the aviation industry stands at a crossroads, the shift towards a public utility model for aviation security represents a bold step forward. This approach not only promises to address the evolving spectrum of threats in a more effective and efficient manner but also aligns aviation security practices with the principles of accessibility, reliability, and public service.

By embracing this model, the aviation sector can ensure that it remains a pillar of global mobility and safety, prepared to meet the challenges of the future head-on. By challenging preconceived notions and embracing a culture of continuous reform and adaptation, we can strengthen our collective resilience against terrorism, and safeguard the future of civil aviation.

Let us not underestimate the critical role of aviation security in the broader fight against terrorism, as we strive for a future where safety, security, and convenience converge in our skies.

How transport organisations can build resilience against terrorist attacks

Robyn Quick — Tue, 13 Feb 2024 16:40:08 +0000

Transport Security

Tracy Reinhold, chief security officer at Everbridge, looks at what transport organisations can do to build resilience against an attack.

Emergencies can impact any transport operator at any time. Infrastructure failings, disruption caused by extreme weather, or accidents, can have an immediate and disruptive effect. However, it is rare for any critical event to have quite the impact of a terrorist attack on a public transport service. These are the events that make news worldwide with long-term ramifications not just for the transport operator, but for all staff, passengers and emergency services involved, the wider community and even the country in which the attack took place.

Most critical incidents involving public transport can be resolved reasonably quickly and are contained within the groups directly affected. A terrorist attack is more likely to see lives lost or threatened. But there are counter measures that transport organisations can put in place to build resilience. These encompass assessing risk factors, anticipating how a terrorist incident might unfold and implementing practices to reduce the impact of an attack on their operations and safeguard employees and passengers.

Several factors need to come together to create operational resilience, and corporate culture is at the core. Organisations are only as resilient as their people, so public transport companies should invest in training, mentoring, and resources that promote the well-being and mental health of their employees. Contented employees are better positioned to cope with crises and are more engaged in managing them. Collaboration is also important. This happens when companies recognise their successes, encourage employees to learn from their mistakes, and foster their collaboration.

Employees then develop a strong sense of community and stick together in times of crisis. Leaders can set a good example. By implementing clear guidelines, setting realistic expectations and always being available, they create trust and stability among employees, which pays off in critical situations such as a terrorist attack.

Assessing the risk of an attack

Proactive risk management together with continuously updated contingency plans are essential. A priority list of experts, technicians and helpers from within the transport operator needs to be agreed in advance. They will initiate the critical incident plan and begin necessary and informed communications. This is important because control during an emergency can so easily be lost, leading to chaos. Aligning specific actions to specific people ensures that messages are clear, rumours and panic are quickly allayed and employees, passengers and those helping have accurate and timely information. Avoiding misinformation, particularly in the wrong hands, is vital for a quick resolution of the incident. Transport operators need a critical incident communications plan.

It should detail responsibilities and processes, who talks to whom and when, and what information they share. In addition to internal contacts, there may be external groups, such as passengers, partners of employees, or the public that will require communications and updates. As public transport companies operate critical infrastructure, there may also need to report to authorities such as the police. When companies prepare templates for messages ahead of time, it helps them communicate efficiently and accurately during an emergency. Different audiences will need different information, but key messages must be consistent and not contradictory to keep everyone on the same page.

Transport companies should plan for multimodal communication. The more channels they use, the more likely they are to reach all audiences. Ideally, recipients should receive information through all of today’s channels including SMS texts, push messages, email, and voice messages on both personal and work landlines and mobile phones. Companies should then practice their planned procedures without the pressure of an emergency. This will give them the confidence that everything will work in the event of a terrorist attacks and allow them to identify and address any weaknesses in their plans.

Building resilience with technology

Organisational resilience can be enhanced immeasurably with the use of technology. Transport operators will benefit from an integrated critical event management (CEM) software solution that allows them to connect business continuity, disaster recovery, and risk management tools. By doing this, they can assess the risk of an attack, seamlessly disseminate information across teams, and avoid disruptions that get in the way of responding quickly to a critical event. At the core of a CEM platform is a data hub that collates all the information relevant to an emergency and manages all the necessary processes.

Data from a wide variety of sources can flow into such a platform, including information from publicly available sources such as police channels, media reports, and social channels across which discussions are monitored. The platform brings this data together and visualises it clearly. As a result, public transport agencies can be alerted to impending dangers early, understand the impact on their own systems, and respond quickly. Crisis teams can coordinate all response activities, teams, and resources within a single application. Everyone involved, from management to emergency services can work from a common, up-to-date, and consistent view of the situation.

The processes that public transport operators have defined in their emergency plans can be implemented and managed in a CEM solution in the form of rules, guidelines, and templates. In the event of a terrorist attack, the software can then automate many processes using a workflow system. This eliminates the time lost to manual activities and the human errors that occur under the pressure of a critical event. In particular, the communication to warn those affected and to inform emergency services on the ground, or at the site, should be automated. Ideally, the CEM platform supports two-way communication. In case of doubt, crisis teams know who is safe or whether they need to initiate the next escalation level through feedback or lack of feedback. In addition, the communication system should be able to scale quickly if needed - for example, if transportation companies need to inform a very large number of employees or passengers at short notice, which is likely in an extreme emergency such as a terrorist attack.

What effect will the new liquid restrictions have?

Robyn Quick — Tue, 13 Feb 2024 09:09:52 +0000

Transport Security

Generally, there are restrictions on the amount of liquids one can take in their hand luggage, this includes all drinks, liquid foods, cosmetics and toiletries, sprays, pastes, gels and anything similar.
These restrictions were introduced in 2006 after a plot to blow up planes was uncovered. The would-be attackers had planned to hide explosives inside soft drink containers.
The initial restrictions were introduced with very little notice and passengers were told they could only take a purse or wallet on board. Only milk for babies was allowed through, on the grounds that the accompanying parent tasted it in front of security staff.
These restrictions lasted three months and were then relaxed to what we know now.
If a flier does take liquids on to a plane, the containers must hold no more than 100 ml and be in a single, transparent, resealable bag which holds no more than a litre and measures approximately 20cm x 20cm. Only one bag is allowed per person.

New technology

Teesside and London City Airport have both introduced new technology, which means that these restrictions no longer apply at these airports. Major airports including Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Manchester, Newcastle and Edinburgh have been given until 2024 to invest in the new technology.
New advanced CT scanners have the ability to create 3D-layered images that can be tilted and rotated, so security staff are better able to identify the contents of bags. Current machines are only able to produce 2D images.
The CT scanners use the same technology as their medical siblings and can analyse the molecular structure of the contents of a bag.
They also have updated explosive detection capability.
The new scanners also mean that laptops, cameras and tablets can remain inside hand luggage when it comes to security checks.
It is hoped that the new security will cut the amount of time passengers have to wait in security queues.
The new technology reduces the amount of time that security staff spend searching bags – time which some argue can be spent looking at the person instead.

New rules

At airports which have installed �鶹��, passengers will be able to carry up to two litres of liquid in their hand luggage and this will not need to be carried in a clear plastic bag.
At the end of 2022, the transport secretary Mark Harper announced that the rules would change by 2024, with the installation of new technology. He pointed out that most major airports would install the technology by 2024 and highlighted the greater convenience and improved security.
He said: “The tiny toiletry has become a staple of airport security checkpoints, but that’s all set to change. I’m streamlining cabin bag rules at airports while enhancing security.
“By 2024, major airports across the UK will have the latest security tech installed, reducing queuing times, improving the passenger experience, and most importantly detecting potential threats.
“Of course, this won’t happen straight away – this is going to take 2 years to be fully implemented. Until then, passengers must continue following the existing rules and check before travelling.”
He also announced that airports had until June 2024 to upgrade their systems. In the meantime, passengers are reminded that usual rules apply unless they are told otherwise in relation to the airport they are travelling from.
Christopher Snelling, policy director at The Airport Operators Association (AOA), said: “This investment in next-generation security by the UK’s airport operators will provide a great step forward for UK air travel, matching the best in class around the world.
“It will make the journey through the UK’s airports easier and air travel itself more pleasant.”

Information delay

There is a concern that the information has not been widely or adequately explained to passengers. Some people may have heard the headlines and expect the new restrictions to apply to all airports and turn up to airport security not meeting the restrictions. Of course airport security is not the same all over the world, so if a passenger is flying out of London City Airport, the restrictions will not apply on their outbound journey, but may very well do when they fly back out of an airport abroad.
It is also important to consider restrictions at any airport where a passenger may be transferring, as the rules may not be the same across all legs of the journey.
When the technology was introduced at London City Airport back in April, chief operating officer Alison FitzGerald told the BBC: “The level of processing now through the X-ray is even more secure than it was previously and the machine has the ability to differentiate between a non-dangerous and a dangerous liquid.”
The technology was installed at Jersey Airport in July. Jersey Airport’s Head of Security, Maria Le Tiec, told ITV: “We are pleased to have installed two of the three X-ray machines in time for the airport’s peak summer period.
“Work will continue to install the remaining X-ray machine, which should go live in mid-August. Full body scanners are scheduled for introduction by October 2023.”
The day after the installation, issues with one of the machines meant some passengers had to use the old machines, and therefore the old restrictions as well.
Edinburgh Airport has made an order for new scanners, which are set to be installed in 2024. Edinburgh Airport chief operating officer Adam Wilson told the BBC: “Safety is always paramount and by moving forward with these innovative and next generation scanners, we will maintain those high security standards while helping passengers move through the airport quicker.”
Willie Walsh, director-general of the International Air Transport Association said: “Implementing this technology should not come with a big bill. In fact, simplified processes should deliver significant efficiencies.”
“Speedy deployment should be possible. The technology has already been used successfully and for a long time at various airports across the world with measurable improvements to the passenger experience.”
It is hoped that even more technological developments in the future will greatly reduce the need for lengthy and time-consuming security checks.

Airport security solutions

Freya — Tue, 03 Oct 2023 13:57:11 +0000

Transport Security

Shannon Airport presents a rather complex situation when it comes to security. CTB takes a look at the problems the airport was facing and how these have been addressed

Shannon Airport is the third-busiest airport in Ireland and an important destination and transit point for both passenger and military aircraft. As well as an airport and associated buildings, the site also contains engineering works and is therefore both busy and complex.

Special case
The airport has a particular need for perimeter security because its use by the US military has led to it being a target for incursions and protests. It needed a comprehensive, future-proof perimeter surveillance solution that would also provide real-time situational awareness. The solution also had to scale and grow with the airport’s needs and with advances in technology.

The system that Shannon Airport chose uses high-definition scanning radars and intelligent rules-based software to protect both sides of the perimeter. Management and engineers at the airport worked with the supplier to design a long-term perimeter surveillance system with room for growth. The system is based on the supplier’s wide-area surveillance solution that combines high-definition radars and intelligent rules-based software. The solution can handle complex, active sites where legitimate and illegitimate activity may occur together. It can also handle all weather and light conditions – including fog, snow, bright sunlight and darkness, as well as extreme temperatures.

At Shannon Airport, the original installation was set up to surveil the airport grounds and around 10 metres beyond the perimeter. Three radars were used, which provided perimeter protection and a comprehensive overview of site activity. Over the years, the system has been extended to introduce additional capabilities, such as ‘friend or foe’ – which uses a tagging system to tell the technology whether an activity or vehicle is legitimate or not and to trigger an alarm (or not) accordingly.

False alarms
The system has also been adapted to avoid the problem of alarms being triggered by wildlife. By specifying the size and source location of objects to be detected in specific areas, the number of nuisance alarms has been reduced – though some alarms do remain to provide ongoing ‘proof of life’ for the system.

The system installed at Shannon Airport is AdvanceGuard, provided
by Navtech.

Shannon Airport’s chief security officer John Francis said: “Securing the perimeter is not just about perimeter protection but also about being able to verify whether your perimeter has been breached – and then dealing with it as efficiently and effectively as possible.

“One of our biggest problems has been nuisance alarms – we want to know that if we do have a breach, we can verify it very quickly. The system is integrated with our CCTV system, so it gives us the ability to resolve alarms remotely very quickly and very efficiently. The nearest camera will respond to that alarm and will highlight the type of alarm – which means that you’re not spending an awful lot of time rushing around dealing with false alarms.”

He added: “Beyond the fence, we want to see or have as much advance notice as possible that we may have a potential breach. Occasionally, for example, animals come up beside the perimeter. The system gives us the ability to see what’s approaching the perimeter so as to give us that much advance notice that we can go out and see what’s going on.

“We use beyond-the-perimeter capability just to give us as much advance warning as possible so if we had a potential breach our patrol can go out and see who or indeed what is approaching the perimeter fence. So the system gives us the ability to, I suppose, put in a response – an early warning system, if you like – and to see if we’ve got a potential issue.”

John said: “We were sufficiently impressed that it works in all weathers, whether it’s fog, heavy rain or even snow – and the product is not affected by the elements of the weather. That is a significant advantage, especially if you’re dealing with other technologies, such as night vision, infrared or other technologies that wouldn’t be as effective or would be affected by atmospherics.”

Has the risk profile to airports changed post pandemic?

Freya — Fri, 21 Oct 2022 16:05:45 +0000

Transport Security

As key players within the UK economy and vital aspects of the UK’s Critical National Infrastructure, it is unsurprising that airports remain high value targets for terrorist attacks. The Pool Re Solutions latest Aviation Sector Risk Report - an analysis of open source information and interviews with senior security officials from UK airports - examines what’s changed Traditionally, malicious actors have primarily targeted aircraft. However, significant security improvements and mitigations have shifted the threat onto airports themselves and in particular landside areas. While low complexity methods have dominated the terrorist threat landscape in the UK in recent years, and would undoubtedly cause significant costs if used to target airports, the threat posed by terrorist use of explosives against airports remains. Despite strict airside security measures, landside areas are at an increased risk due to their status as Publicly Accessible Locations (PALs) and increased crowding as a result of the current staffing crisis. The staffing crisis has also caused an increased risk of insider threats resulting from mass recruitment to combat the crisis. As a result, it is assessed that there is a moderate terrorist threat towards airports in the UK. Despite the vital mitigations already in place within airports, there is space for improvement with regards to landside areas, particularly as the terrorist threat will remain in the long term. See the key findings in the panel opposite. Purpose Civil aviation forms a significant part of the UK’s Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) and contributes considerably to the British economy both directly and indirectly. In 2019, the entire aviation industry contributed almost £22 billion to the UK economy with UK airports handling almost 300 million passengers each year. Furthermore, following the fall in passenger numbers as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) expects global passenger numbers to reach four-billion in 2024, exceeding pre-pandemic levels. As key economic players and vital CNI sites, airports therefore make attractive targets for terrorists. The continuing terrorist threat to the UK, combined with the recent staffing shortages and significant queueing witnessed at many of the UK’s major airports, has further increased the threat to airports. This underlines the continuing importance of appropriate threat awareness, understanding of possible vulnerabilities, and implementation of risk mitigation measures to protect airports. Context Historically, UK airports have witnessed plots carried out by a variety of actors, including the 1994 IRA mortar attacks at Heathrow airport and the 2007 Glasgow airport attack. However, security advances following the 9/11 attacks have made aviation security more stringent and attacks on aircraft more difficult. Consequently, the threat to airports and landside areas has increased as terrorist actors still seek high-value and high-profile targets. Airports are currently at a heightened risk in the UK as a result of a staffing crisis. As the media continues to report on understaffing and long queues at airport terminals, it is possible that malicious actors will seek to exploit airport deficiencies highlighted by the media in order to carry out an attack. Furthermore, the current fast-tracked recruitment to combat staff shortages increases the risk of lowered recruitment standards, and/or inadequate background checks and training – increasing the ‘insider threat’. Threat Assessment The threat of a terrorist attack targeting an airport in the UK is currently assessed as moderate. Terrorist targeting of airports is powerful and symbolic, with the potential for significant economic and societal consequences. The landside areas within airports also provide a publicly accessible alternative to targeting aircraft and highly secured airside areas, whilst inflicting a similar impact. Therefore, airports will remain a targeting priority for malicious actors in the long term. Threat actors based in Great Britain, regardless of their ideological motives, have relatively limited capabilities. This is largely due to the difficulty in obtaining weaponry, ammunition, or explosive precursor materials as a result of strict regulations, purchase monitoring, and strong counter-terrorism capabilities within the security services. As a result of restrictions on weaponry and precursor materials, terrorists are most likely to use low complexity methods to target an airport such as attacks using bladed weapons or using Vehicles. As a Weapon (VAW). While less likely, Islamist extremists continue to demonstrate a desire to employ Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (PBIEDs) which could cause mass casualties, property damage, business interruption and economic losses. There is a realistic possibility that extremists will use cyber-attacks or drones within future plots. In the UK, we are yet to see a viable attempt at weaponising drones for destructive purposes; however, based on previous drone usage, it is more likely they will be used to disrupt airport operations or air travel. Environmental extremist groups and activists, though not yet officially designated as terrorist organisations, have demonstrated a desire to use drones disruptively towards airports in protest against the aviation industry’s impact on climate change. Such disruption would unlikely lead to property damage or casualties, unless a drone was the cause of an aircraft crash, but this cannot be ruled out in the future. Tactics Different tactics are explored below that might be deployed against airports and outline their potential effects: Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (PBIED) - Research based upon the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database found portable explosives to be the most frequent and deadly mode of attack from a sample of 75 airport attacks worldwide since 1980. Terrorist use of PBIEDs in attacks against UK airports remains a realistic possibility in the medium term, with passengers in check-in zones and landside areas being the likely targets. The damage caused by such an attack is likely to increase if there are multiple transport hubs within a single location, such as a bus station, train/tube station and airport. A PBIED attack would require a high level of planning, access to explosive materials and a level of reconnaissance. This tactic if successfully deployed would be likely to result in significant casualties, costly property damage and long-term business interruption. Low Complexity Methods (Bladed Weapons or Vehicle As a Weapon (VAW) - With experts estimating that there will be approximately six billion aviation passengers annually by 2030, airports increasingly present crowded places, which terrorists could successfully exploit using lower complexity methods. A bladed weapons attack would require minimal prior planning or preparation and could easily target landside areas, including airport check-in and arrival zones. Despite the panic and hysteria this method would cause, these attacks would likely result in relatively few casualties and limited to no property damage or long-term business interruption. Equally, a VAW attack requires minimal planning and capability but has the ability to cause significant human casualties, high levels of property damage and business interruption. Drones - The use of multi-drone displays has been recently seen in celebrations such as the Queen’s platinum jubilee. It is therefore possible that terrorists could be inspired by these displays and attempt to use drone swarms for disruptive purposes or to target aircraft. Whilst evidence is yet to be seen of the ability to arm drones with explosives within the UK, this cannot be ruled out in the long term. Potential Impact A terrorist attack on an airport would likely result in economic losses and business interruption. Higher complexity terrorist attacks would likely cause moderate to significant physical damage dependent on the tactic used. However, lower complexity methods or even hoaxes have the potential to cause a huge economic impact through non-damage business interruption (NDBI), regardless of any physical damage. Following discussions with senior security officials at several UK airports it is estimated that the NDBI costs could amount to between £125,000 and £600,000 for a 7-hour evacuation, irrespective of the cause of the evacuation. These costs would obviously be dependent on the time of day, time of the year, passenger profile, and airport size. Following a successful attack requiring longer periods of evacuation and site closure, NDBI costs alone could reach millions of pounds. Mitigation The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) have international baseline standards for areas - including design and security regulations - which airports across the globe are required to follow. Most nations also have their own additional standards alongside the requirements outlined by the ICAO. In the UK these are set by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), whose standards are more stringent than those set by ICAO and place the UK as one of the most proficiently regulated bodies with regards to airport regulation, safety, and security. The Aviation Security in Airport Development (ASIAD) guidance was implemented by the UK Department for Transport in 1996 and revised in 2018 to mandate particular design elements and standards that will improve resistance to bomb blasts; including multi-laminated glass and post-blast retained structural barriers to protect against physical attacks. ASIAD requires those planning, designing and developing airports and terminals to mitigate the impact of a large-scale terrorist attack on airport infrastructure. However, this does not account for unprotected queues outside airport buildings and, as such, these areas need further security considerations. UK airports also require all airside staff to carry out General Security Awareness Training (GSAT), with some airports including this requirement for landside staff. While this is the baseline training required, airports typically also provide bespoke in-house training to ensure airport-specific security standards are maintained. The forthcoming Protect Duty legislation will further enhance the requirement to protect the public at airports; airport operators will need to demonstrate that they have proportionate mitigation measures in place. However, potential issues about standards of staff training, missed or skipped procedures due to crowd pressures, insider threats from inadequate vetting or failure to protect crowds queueing in more vulnerable areas, including outside terminals, could raise questions over liability where insurance cover bought is traditionally lower for terrorism than other forms of liability such as health and safety. Enduring Issues Despite the mitigations in place, there are a several enduring issues which require further attention to reduce the risks they pose. Insider Threat- The insider threat to airports comes from an individual with authorised access to information, facilities, people or resources within the airport. An insider threat could include the use of access to facilitate an act of violence, cybercrime, sabotage, or destruction of property. The insider threat to airports is consistently a concern to airport security officials with the current staffing crisis emphasising the risk. As airports attempt to re-establish sufficient workforces, it is possible that malicious actors could gain employment as recruitment standards are relaxed to meet demand. A leaked letter from the UK aviation minister in April this year revealed the Government’s plans to relax vetting rules, permitting new employees to access landside areas and begin their training before security checks are completed. Allowing un-vetted individuals into the airport and issues regarding access to training increases the risk of these processes being exploited by insider threats. The mass recruitment of individuals uninterested in their jobs also presents terrorists with a potential pool of easily impressionable airport employees who may be willing to share inside information in exchange for monetary rewards. Therefore, sacrificing the wait for completion of security checks prior to training to counter the backlog of vetting poses a significant risk to airports. Consequential impact of the terrorist threat to aircraft - A consequence of stringent security measures within airports with regards to accessing airside and aircraft is to transfer risk from aircraft to airports. Threat actors wishing to target aircraft may be prevented from accessing airside areas of the airport and instead the threat to the airport itself increases as terrorists make a last resort effort to conduct an attack. A further consequential threat to airports comes from an attack on an aircraft taking place shortly after take-off or before landing whilst the aircraft is above the airport footprint. Pool Re Solutions composed this report in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of threat landscape surrounding UK airports and the current risk mitigation measures put in place to protect against them

Inflight Security: are hijackings now passé?

Michael Lyons — Thu, 28 Apr 2022 08:49:32 +0000

Transport Security

The hijacking of aircraft may seem to be somewhat passé; they are certainly not as commonplace as they were in the 1960s, 70s and 80s. Blank Panthers no longer seize aircraft and divert them to Cuba; Palestinian revolutionary groups have realised that their actions did little to engender support for their cause; and, even those lone asylum-seeking individuals wishing to hijack aircraft in order to reach pastures greener now recognise that there are easier ways to achieve their goals.

The act of hijacking – whilst never laudable – was brought into further disrepute by the suicidal acts perpetrated by 19 hijackers on 11 September 2001. Those who might have hijacked aircraft to make a political point, secure the release of imprisoned colleagues or obtain funding, no longer wished to be seen in the same vein as those who had wrought devastation on population centres.

Can we claim success in terms of protecting aircraft from inflight attacks perpetrated by those on board? The simple answer is ‘yes’….to a certain extent! The array of technologies we are currently deploying at airport security checkpoints do enable screeners to identify traditional weaponry and terrorists have realised that they do not need to board aircraft to effect mass casualty incidents; marauding firearms attackers and suicide bombers have demonstrated that they can just as easily target airport terminal buildings without having to worry themselves about being detected during the security process.

Yet the aforementioned 9/11 attacks also illustrate the perils of complacency and the preparedness for those who still view the seizure of aircraft as a means to create maximum fear to conjure up new attack methodologies. If we consider the post-9/11 environment, weapons and explosives have been infiltrated onto aircraft in very creative ways. Most notably, Richard Reid concealed his explosive device in his shoes, whilst Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab opted for to use his underwear. Less well known, in August 2004 two Chechen ‘black widows’ targeted two Russian airliners departing Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport with IEDs, paying bribes to get through the airport security system, and airport insiders facilitated the bombing of the Metrojet flight, operating from Sharm el-Sheikh to St. Petersburg, in 2015, and provided the laptop device to the bomb-carrier - after the security checkpoint - which detonated on a Daallo Airlines flight from Mogadishu to Djibouti in 2016. In China, airport security was bypassed by members of ETIM by means of crutches, which were passed over the top of an X-ray machine, belonging to an individual feigning disability; the crutches contained the weapons used to hijack the Tianjin Airlines flight.

If we focus exclusively on the terrorist threat, one could be forgiven for adopting a ‘problem solved’ attitude. Incidents are fortunately exceptionally rare. However, aviation security is not just about counterterrorism and our preventative measures are supposed to protect us from all unlawful attacks against civil aviation, be they perpetrated by terrorists or petty criminals, industry insiders or those with poor mental health.

Mental health issues are often branded a safety issue rather than a security concern. This is the result of budgets being approved off the back of the terrorist threat and by those tasked with security management being more in tune with the risk analysis within the political arena. After all, when it comes to mental health, there is no such thing as a low-risk route; poor mental health poses a challenge to every airline wherever they operate. The classic example of this is the attempted hijacking, in 2003, of a Qantas domestic flight, en route from Melbourne to Launceston, by a passenger with paranoid schizophrenia armed with two home-made wooden stakes shaped into knives; the wooden weapons could, of course, not be detected by the archway metal detector.

As we emerge from the pandemic and return to the skies, we bring with us the legacy of Covid-19. Passengers and crew alike have been impacted in many ways – loss of loved ones, loss of income and loss of status to name but a few – and the results of this can impact passenger behaviour. All the indications are that unruly passenger incidents have risen in frequency despite the downturn in passenger numbers; disputes over the wearing of face masks, frustration over the amount of time it takes to get through under-staffed checkpoints and changing flight schedules as crews call in sick, all add to the anxiety of air travel. Whilst most incidents are manageable, it only takes one extreme incident to have catastrophic consequences. And aviation is in the business of identifying needles in haystacks…

I often ask crew trainers if they can identify the last time an aircraft ditched at sea. After all, not only are they trained to managing a ditching, evacuate an aircraft and utilise the life rafts, so are all the passengers in the pre-flight safety briefing. I am not arguing against it. As a reasonably frequent flyer, I am delighted they know what to do! However, I find it disturbing that trainers are unable to provide any recent examples of life raft usage – something that they spend hours learning how to use – but, when it comes to application of unruly passenger restraints, it is a subject that is addressed superficially and most crewmembers are not actually tested as to whether they can actual effect a restraint. Restraints, meanwhile, take place every day.

Pilot, or aircraft-assisted, suicide is, whilst not a frequent occurrence, certainly a cause for concern. It was not just Germanwings. In November 2013, we know that it was the pilot of a LAM Mozambique Airlines flight who crashed his own aircraft in Namibia, and there is considerable speculation that the missing Malaysia Airlines flight 370 was the result of intentional actions taken in the cockpit. Add in Royal Air Maroc, SilkAir, Egyptair and the significant number of incidents involving general aviation and we can appreciate that this is a security concern that cannot be written off as isolated incidents.

Last, but by no means least, we have to consider the implications of the current war Russia is waging against Ukraine on inflight security. Chemical and biological weapon detection capability is not part of our security apparatus, but crewmembers are expected to know how to respond to a chem/bio incident should it occur on board…and there is every indication that such substances might be used inflight. Indeed, they have been.

The 2018 usage, by Russian agents, of the Novichok nerve agent to try and assassinate Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in Salisbury, UK, had, on the surface, no industry context – except, of course, how the agent was brought into the United Kingdom in the first place. But, how many crewmembers are cognisant of the details of the attempted assassinations of Alexei Navalny and Anna Politkovskaya or the actual assassination of Alexander Litvinenko?

Litvinenko was intentionally contaminated with the radioactive isotope Polonium-210 when his assassins introduced the deadly toxic substance to his tea in a London restaurant in 2006. Approximately 700 people were identified as having been exposed to radiation as a result, but from an aviation perspective it is important to note that three British Airways aircraft were identified to have had small traces of Polonium-210 on them. In excess of 33,000 passengers had the potential to have been exposed to contamination, let alone the impact to aircrew and ground staff who had serviced the aircraft. Fortunately, there were no further deaths.

On 20 August 2020 Alexei Navalny, Russia’s opposition leader, was contaminated with Novichok. Navalny fell ill on a domestic S7 airlines flight from the Siberian city of Tomsk to Moscow. As his health deteriorated, and given that he was screaming in agony, the crew elected to divert to Omsk where he was hospitalised; two days later he was sent to Berlin for specialist treatment. Whilst Navalny was filmed drinking tea at Tomsk Airport prior to boarding his flight, it is believed that he was poisoned at the Xander Hotel he had been staying at in Tomsk; traces of Novichok were found on a bottle from the mini bar in his room.

Less well known is the case of human rights activist and Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya. US-born Politkovskaya, eventually shot dead in a lift in her apartment block in 2006, had previously been poisoned on an Aeroflot flight from Moscow Vnukovo to Rostov in September 2004; she was travelling to the Caucasus to cover the Beslan school siege.

Suffice to say that current political events cannot be divorced from the threat to civil aviation.

Whilst hijackings may not be as frequent as they were in the past, inflight incidents continue to occur with frightening frequency. For flight attendants, there is little that they can do about MANPADS, drones or cockpit laser illumination, nor can they be expected to respond to acts of cyber terrorism. That does not mean we can scale back our security training.

Quite the opposite. With prohibited and restricted items which might pose a threat to a flight being far smaller than the guns, grenades and knives of yesteryear, airlines need to be adapting their aircraft search protocols, embellishing their physical restraint training and drilling all their staff in behavioural analysis techniques. After all, flight attendants are the best profilers in the industry; they know how to identify problematic passengers and their lives are on the line!

Written by Philip Baum, managing director of Green Light Ltd., Visiting Professor of Aviation Security at Coventry University and chair of Behavioural Analysis 2022. He can be contacted at editor@avsec.com

CTB Q&A: Pool Re and security in the aviation industry

Michael Lyons — Mon, 25 Apr 2022 14:11:04 +0000

Transport Security

CTB talks to Mark Susca, Senior Risk Consultant at Pool Re, and former Head of Resilience at Manchester Airport, on current challenges, vulnerability in the aviation sector and fundamental risk management principles

Mark, you recently joined Pool Re as a Senior Risk Consultant. Tell us a little about your background, your previous role and why you were attracted to Pool Re.

I recently joined Pool Re from Manchester Airport where I was Head of Operational Resilience, responsible for emergency planning, business continuity and crisis management. Before that, I spent eleven years as an airline pilot flying both regional and long-haul routes including VIP operations before diversifying into areas of preparedness, response and recovery. I was first introduced to Pool Re as the sponsor of my MSc course in Counter-Terrorism, Risk and Resilience at Cranfield University. I was impressed by Pool Re’s mission of building resilience against terrorism risk so when a position opened up, I leapt at the chance.

How would you say your previous experience feeds into your new role at Pool Re?

My operational background affords me a unique perspective on the challenges faced by Pool Re Members and their policyholders and allows me to explain things in a way they understand and is relevant to them. In my experience, one of the biggest challenges faced by risk, security or resilience managers is how to balance commercial business, regulation, and operations. Additionally, stakeholder management and development is crucial to ensure that resilience against terrorism is embedded within the culture, much like health and safety or conventional crime prevention. I’ve also seen first-hand how implementing terrorism risk mitigation strategies can have unintended but welcome consequences for the wider organisation. From improved crisis management, whether terrorism related or not, to more effective health, safety and crime prevention, and more efficient ways of operational working. Investing in an organisation’s resilience not only protects the business but support its growth, which is exactly what I tell businesses in my role at Pool Re.

Recent terrorist attacks in the UK have favoured lower complexity methodologies, for example the bladed weapon attacks at Borough Market, London Bridge and the murder of David Amess. Is aviation a realistic target for terrorism given this shift in methodology?

Yes, aviation will sadly always remain a target for terrorists as it provides so many attractive opportunities. Our expert threat analysts are currently working on a sector-specific risk report for the Aviation industry so I won’t give too much away but simply put, terrorists will always desire strive for spectacular attacks with the resultant mass casualties. There are many reasons airports and aircraft make such attractive targets: any site that is widely considered to be safe and secure will be seen as an opportunity for terrorists to demonstrate their capability to circumvent risk mitigation and security measures, often by using innovative and creative methodologies. This coupled with the guaranteed media attention offers the exposure and infamy terrorists often seek. As crowded places that attract large volumes of people, airports also offer a setting for lower complexity methodologies and non-conventional attacks too. Examples of this include the plots to use chemicals onboard aircraft in Australia or the effective use of drones to ground aircraft as seen with effectiveness at Gatwick in 2019 – albeit that wasn’t terrorism. There is often a belief that ‘it won’t happen to us’ but, as demonstrated with the attacks at Zaventum Airport in Brussels in 2016 and the foiled ink cartridge plot at East Midlands, it became very clear that this isn’t the case. I can certainly say the one thing keeping me up at night in my role at Manchester Airport was the threat of terrorism.

The aviation industry has clearly been very heavily impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic. Do you think the aviation sector is more vulnerable to terrorism as a result of the pandemic?

It goes without saying that Covid-19 has had a devastating impact on the aviation sector but two years on we are finally seeing a return to growth and almost pre-covid levels of travel. This, however, presents its own challenges as whilst airports have thankfully survived the pandemic, now they must manage the risk that comes with rapid and unprecedented growth. Like so many businesses, many airports had to reconsider their resourcing requirements during the prolonged lockdowns. As a result, the aviation sector is now dealing with greater exposure to vulnerability but doing so with an inexperienced workforce having replaced a lot of the experience and expertise lost during the extended lockdowns with inexperienced staff hastily recruited to cope with the peak in demand. It goes without saying that terrorists may seek to capitalise on this short-term vulnerability. In the more medium-to-long term, one of the biggest risks for aviation is the insider threat: the impact of the pandemic on people’s livelihoods and the soaring cost of living means the manipulation or radicalisation of vulnerable people is a very real prospect and one which the aviation industry is acutely aware off and working hard to manage. Whilst I’m pleased to say aviation has an extremely positive counter-terrorism culture it would be easy for this to slip as the priority of business survival and recovery becomes the focus for managers and leadership teams. The need to remain aware, cognisant and vigilant has never been greater.

And finally, from your experience, what are the fundamental risk management principles you would recommend to any risk manager?

When embedding resilience and risk management within an organisation, I found that working to six key principles helped focus not only the work but also the stakeholders, who are fundamental to the success of any risk management strategy. The six principles of resilience work to strengthen the business through supporting growth, identifying risk and opportunities, and enhancing the ability to respond to disruptive events:

•   Anticipate – this is about horizon scanning and examining 'the what if’s'.
•   Assess – understand the business, what is its appetite and approach to risk.
•   Prevent – implement mitigation measures, minimum standards, processes etc.
•   Prepare – have plans in place for the events you can’t prevent or mitigate against.
•   Respond – ensure you can respond to incidents and events e.g., crisis management teams.
•   Recover – have recovery and business continuity plans in place which are practical.

You can read an exclusive publication of Pool Re’s Aviation Sector Risk Report in the next issue of Counter Terror Business. Sectoral Risk Reports for the Public Transport and Retail and Hospitality sectors are available to view now.

www.poolre.co.uk

Commercial vehicles: the new weapon of choice in terror attacks?

Michael Lyons — Mon, 19 Aug 2019 14:31:49 +0000

Transport Security

Vehicles were used in three of the five terror attacks that took place in London and Manchester in 2017. To tackle this worrying trend, the Department for Transport (DfT) has released guidance for transport operators to prevent their vehicles being used as a weapon

In the last five years, commercial vehicles have become one of the deadliest weapons used by terrorists across Europe.

In 2017, vehicles were used in three of the five attacks which took place in London and Manchester. It is therefore vital that transport businesses adopt a responsible approach to security.

To support transport operators to mitigate the threat of their vehicles being used in an attack, the DfT has worked alongside security experts from Counter Terrorism Policing to create a guidance document.

The guidance outlines the steps organisations can take to prevent their vehicles being used in a terror attack and covers all aspects of vehicle and site security, including a checklist for vehicle security for commercial drivers.

What is a Vehicle as A Weapon attack?
A vehicle can be used as a weapon intentionally to injure and kill people. This is referred to as a ‘vehicle as a weapon (VAW) attack’. VAW is a low complexity methodology requiring little or no training. With a plentiful source of vehicles on UK roads, it is therefore within the capability of individuals to try and steal one and use it in an attack.

Crowded public spaces are targeted by this type of attack. There are a range of online terrorist and extremist materials aimed at inspiring terrorists to carry out VAW attacks and previous attacks have encouraged copycats, who now see VAW as a successful means to cause terror. Lorries and vans pose an increased risk if used in VAW attacks because of their size, profile and weight, all of which increase the potential impact.

Embedding a security culture
Being vigilant and reporting suspicious behaviour increases the likelihood that people with hostile intentions will be detected or deterred. An organisation therefore needs to have procedures in place for reporting any unusual behaviour.

The National Counter Terrorism Policing (NCTPHQ) Action Counters Terrorism (ACT) campaign urges people to report anything that could suggest a terrorist threat to the UK. Suspicious activity can be reported to the police by calling confidentially on 0800 789 321 or through the campaign page: https://act.campaign.gov.uk.

Security responsibilities should be allocated to a staff member who has appropriate authority to make security related decisions and implement them.

The risks posed by an organisation's vehicle operations should be assessed with the involvement of customers, shippers, freight forwarders, carriers, security service providers, and insurance experts, if possible. Identify possible solutions that will prevent one of your vehicles being used in an attack and get feedback from drivers. Any security plans should be reviewed regularly.

Countering the insider threat
An insider is a person who exploits, or has the intention to exploit, their legitimate access to an organisation’s assets for unauthorised purposes.

Insiders with access to an organisation's processes and assets can be a source of threat. An insider could be a full time or part-time employee, a contractor or even a business partner. They could deliberately join an organisation to gain access to its assets to mount an attack, or they may be triggered to act at some point during their employment.

Consideration should be given to using British Standard 7858 (or equivalent) for security screening of employees. This standard involves conducting basic identity, financial, employment and criminal records checks.

The guidance also recommends that a driver’s references and previous employment history (minimum of five years) is checked and that the employer speaks to previous employers. It suggests informing applicants that false details on application forms may lead to dismissal.

Driving licences should be checked for validity and then at six-monthly intervals afterwards. Drivers should inform employers of any changes to their licence. Check if the applicant has any prosecutions pending or is waiting for sentencing by a court. For agency drivers, ensure that the agency has carried out all of these checks including criminal records checks. What's more, only reputable recruitment agencies that are affiliated with a recognised UK trade organisation should be used.

Site security
Effective security measures at operating centres and maintenance facilities can help to create a controlled environment to prevent vehicles being stolen and potentially used in terrorist attacks.

Organisations can consult their local Counter Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs) to agree a system for reporting and dealing with suspicious vehicle incidents, and liaise with them regarding securing their sites. CTSAs work with businesses and the community to identify and assess sites that may be vulnerable to terrorist or extremist attack. They also work with trade organisations and professional bodies to ensure counter terrorism protective security advice is incorporated into general crime prevention advice and guidance.

Basic security measures can help to ensure that an item is not concealed on board a vehicle when in maintenance centres. Having clear signage in place can discourage unwanted access by vehicles and people.

Other site security measures include fitting locks or tamper proof seals to lockers and equipment boxes. Access to operating centres should be controlled with appropriate security arrangements i.e. fences, gates, security codes. What's more, vehicle keys should be stored in a secure locker with security codes. Keys should not be left in vehicles or on hooks in the office easily accessible to anyone

All visitors and contractors accessing the premises should be required to report to reception or an individual in authority to notify their arrival.

Visitors should sign-in, be issued visitor passes and have a legitimate reason for their visit. These identification passes should be worn and ‘be visible’ at all times, anyone not wearing a pass should be asked by a member of staff why they are not wearing a pass. Visitors should be escorted at all times when not in public areas.

This process provides audit information, including sign in/out times and the purpose of the visit, and can be crucial in the event of an emergency evacuation of the premises.

Visitors and contractors should be given a security awareness briefing, explaining that passes are displayed prominently at all times, and that anyone without a pass or in an unauthorised area will be challenged. They should be told that all doors should be properly closed when leaving, particularly doors leading to non-public areas, and to report any suspicious activity.

If an organisation's vehicles are repaired and maintained off site, site security must be appropriate. Maintenance staff, including sub-contractors should be made aware of your company’s vehicle security policies and procedures. The maintenance agreement between the vehicle operator and the vehicle maintenance company should include a duty to secure the vehicles and keys correctly.

CCTV is central to most modern security systems. Its primary purpose is to detect suspicious activity and act as a verification system for other security measures. CCTV can be a single or combination of systems and technologies to form the overall security solution.

The DfT recommends using an electronic detection system assured by CPNI, which can be sourced from the CPNI Catalogue of Security Equipment (CSE). Most of these work on the five-minute rule. This assumes that each part of a perimeter or sensitive asset is viewed by either a guard or CCTV once every five minutes. This limits the potential time for an unauthorised activity and forces an attacker to act rapidly, making them more likely to trigger an electronic detection system.

Vehicle security
Drivers should visually check their vehicle at the beginning and end of their journey, looking for any signs that something has been concealed or tampered with. At the start and end of a journey, during a comfort break or whilst parked as securely as possible, drivers should ensure that all the doors and windows are closed, engine switched off and ignition keys are taken with them. For vehicles not requiring ignition keys, drivers should ensure that they secure the vehicle appropriately before leaving.

For vehicles that require the engine running to operate auxiliary equipment, the driver should take appropriate measures to ensure against theft of the vehicle; this could include the provision of a second key to lock the cab doors.

Security features that keep the driver and vehicle safe and secure should be considered during the vehicle procurement process.

The decision will depend on what type of operations are being undertaken. A vehicle being used to multi-drop in a town centre might need to be fitted with an ignition immobiliser, while an international haulage operator might need to think about load space monitoring.

The operator must decide what security and safety equipment is most appropriate for their vehicles, from sophisticated electronic engine immobilisers and in-cab cameras to simple steering locks: anything that deters the theft of the vehicle should be considered.

If a vehicle is stolen, the driver should call 999 and explain the circumstances of the vehicle being stolen and a description of the vehicle including company name, registration details, aerial roof markings and any tracking software fitted in the vehicle. If the driver suspects that the vehicle has been stolen for a terrorist attack then make sure this is made clear to the call handler.

Drivers should also immediately alert the company who will have procedures in place for stolen vehicles.

Security tips for goods vehicle drivers
Avoid talking about loads or routes with unauthorised persons (including over radios and telephones). Do not post information about your route or location on social media, be aware of your ‘digital footprint’, and take care to avoid unwitting disclosure of route/location through mobile phone security settings and geolocation of pictures. Discuss high risk routes with you transport office.

Lock and secure your vehicle whenever you leave the cab and keep the keys secure, including when unloading and loading, always follow company security policies and instructions.

Carry out visual walk around checks when leaving and returning to the vehicle to make sure it has not been tampered with. Report any irregularity in loading, locking, sealing or documentation to your company.

When conducting walk around checks, think security as well as safety.

Never carry goods for anyone, other than the authorised load.

If you are forced to change your route, inform your Transport Office immediately.

If someone is acting suspiciously or something ‘doesn’t feel right’ either at the depot or on the road, report it to ACT, call 0800 789 321 and contact your company.

Do not allow unauthorised passengers into the cab.

Keep your phone fully charged and on you at all times. Store important phone numbers.

Be mindful of your personal security. Keep ID documentation and wallets secure and out of sight.

Beware of attempts to deceive, such as by bogus Police and DVSA Officers.

Protecting airports against vehicle attacks

Michael Lyons — Wed, 14 Nov 2018 11:33:10 +0000

Transport Security

With the threat of vehicle-related attacks on the rise, Gavin Hepburn, director at ATG Access, discusses best practice for airport security officials looking to upgrade their retrospective solutions

International airports unfortunately have been, and continue to be, a key target for acts of vehicle-related terrorism. This is largely due to the fact that airports have always had to remain as public spaces, accommodating both vehicle and pedestrian accessibility. Airports are classed as critical national infrastructure and so represent a severe blow to society, both economically and symbolically, if successfully attacked.

Among the first recorded instances of such an act occurred in 2007, wherein a Jeep Cherokee – loaded with deadly explosives – was driven directly at the doors of Glasgow Airport and set ablaze. A far more recent example occurred in Lyon last September, when a man drove a stolen car into the local airport’s terminal doors before speeding onto the runway.

While casualties were minimised in these instances, there have been a string of similar vehicle-ramming incidents across a range of public spaces over the past decade.

Vehicle attacks can cause major damage in a very short period of time, can come from virtually nowhere, and have thus become an increasingly common feature of violent terrorist acts throughout the West. Preventing this type of attack has therefore naturally become a key concern for security officials.

However, the act of protecting airports is rather different to other public spaces, such as sports arenas or concert venues. After all, airports are open and frequented by the public 24/7 and this means that operational disruption must be kept to a minimum. However, thanks to advancements in technology, there are a wealth of options available for fast and effective deployment of security measures to minimise operational disruption. With this in mind, let’s take a closer look at how airports can upgrade their security solutions.

Build on existing systems
Key to minimising the disruption caused by installing security measures is first assessing the solutions which are already in place, and subsequently building upon these foundations. The aim should not be to completely replace existing systems, but rather to take a close look at how they can be adapted or augmented to better suit each airport’s individual security needs.

Therefore, the first stage of implementing any new hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) strategy should be to determine exactly what the aims of the project will be and the realistic level of threat, as well as how it will integrate with incumbent solutions.

Security officials must think carefully about exactly when, where, why and how traffic needs to access different areas of the airport at any given time, in order to ascertain the most suitable security methods to deploy, and decide which locations will need extra protection. For example, given that runways are vulnerable to vehicle access – as we recently saw in Lyon - extra protective measures, such as strategically-placed bollards at different access points, should be an important part of any airport security solution.

Eradicating the threat – not just moving it
Of course, an airport is far more than just the terminal itself. Protecting one area of the airport in isolation – at the cost of other areas such as the runway or the airport exterior - would not actually eradicate a terror threat, but simply move the area of impact.

For this reason, it’s important to not forget about other locations not directly part of the airport, such as the outer perimeter. These places are also likely to be a prime target for attack considering the volume of pedestrians that gather outside the terminal for additional transport and transfers.

To ensure that airports are sufficiently protected requires a multi-layered approach which encompasses all areas. This could be through a combination of physical security measures and human factors – such as more security staff inside the terminal, and a greater emphasis on physical measures to protect the perimeter - to effectively safeguard all areas of the airport.

Discretion is key
Disruption is by no means the only consideration when it comes to security solutions. While visible measures such as armed security officers, concrete barriers and bollards certainly minimise damage, to civilians they can also be a disquieting reminder of the threat terrorism can have.

Therefore, a balance must be struck between access and aesthetics, in order to ensure that the public feel as safe as possible. Security solutions have now advanced to the point wherein discretion no longer needs to be sacrificed for quality or overall effectiveness. Some examples of solutions which could be implemented to balance protection with discretion are crash test certified street furniture items, which can blend seamlessly into the background, and stainless-steel bollards, which can be retracted when not needed. Changi Airport and Dubai Airport are both fantastic examples of aesthetically pleasing security schemes being completed to protect international airport infrastructure.

In an airport context, shallow mount bollards, deployed at multiple areas throughout the airport, work particularly well. These bollards can be deployed quickly and discreetly, without any extensive foundation preparation work required or need to disrupt airport operations.

Prevention is the best cure
If recent incidents such as Lyon have taught us anything, it is that even ostensibly secure spaces, which have been the subject of constant security attention for decades, are still not safe from attack, highlighting a need for constant vigilance.

For security measures in and around airports to remain one step ahead of any future attacks, the highest of standards must always be maintained. We must look at the likes of Lyon and Glasgow as a crucial reminder of the need for continual investment in our airport security, ensuring that these public spaces are never the ‘soft’ targets so favoured by terrorist organisations.

After all, airport security protects the safety of thousands of people daily – and one misstep could prove fatal.