Counter Terror Business - Terrorism

Missed opportunities: Manchester Arena Inquiry volume 3

Polly Jones — Tue, 07 Mar 2023 09:32:49 +0000

Nick Aldworth of Risk2Resolution on volume 3 of the Manchester Arena Inquiry As I review the implications of Sir John Saunders’ third and final part of his inquiry into what happened on that awful night, I first want to pay tribute to all those affected by it. I’ve met several, and a few have become friends. Each has reacted to in their own way. Some have become ‘public property’ and others have grieved quietly in anonymity. There is no right or wrong way to deal with the events of that night, only the way that is right for them. All of them, are the best of us and we should hold them close to our hearts forever. As always, I refuse to give this terrorist a name. He lived his life as a nobody and deserves to be treated as such in death, along with his perverted beliefs. The first duty of every state is to protect its citizens from harm. On 2 March 2023, Sir Ken McCallum, the director general of MI5, made a public apology, acknowledging that his organisation had failed to do that. It was a good apology and while I’ve never met him, it felt honest and genuine. I think people needed to hear that. Conversely, the press statement from counter-terrorism policing felt uncomfortably self-serving. 2 March was about upfront apologies, not about describing how righteous you were by visiting the glade of light before receiving His Honour’s report. Understandably people’s focus will be on the headlines and, I dare say, disproportionately focussed on ‘the secret stuff’, such is the way of things. But the genesis for this terrorist’s attack was seeded a decade or more before 2017. The first failing was owned by many organisations. In 2010, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, an office within MI5, produced a regional report that highlighted that young men of Libyan heritage in the north-west were at risk of being radicalised by older men. Many of these older men had been fighting for extreme Islamist beliefs in Libya, and one such person was the father of the Arena terrorist, although the report did not name individuals. I have seen many of these JTAC reports and while they are commonly marked as Secret (which automatically reduces their distribution), they are commonly so vanilla as to be less helpful than something you might see in a good Sunday paper centre-spread or a Panorama exposé. Such reports become wallpaper, and nobody chooses to own them. The inquiry failed to find evidence of any action being taken. That doesn’t surprise me, I can’t even imagine that it was even seen by the right people, who might have had the vision to create actions from it. Counter-radicalisation starts in the community, it starts in education, and it starts in social society. However, in 2010, the Arab Spring had started, and the world was glad to see the back of despots and dictators. I suspect that few in authority felt that the terrorist’s father, who had been fighting Gaddafi, was on the wrong side, after all the West had been seeking Gaddafi’s demise for decades. Perhaps that tainted people’s thinking about the threats that the terrorist’s family posed. His father subsequently moved to Libya and the inquiry saw extensive evidence of familial association with fellow extremists, as well as public expressions of support for such aberrations as suicide bombings. There is a good deal in the report about the terrorist’s route to radicalisation that time and space does not allow for, but the conclusion is that he was almost certainly radicalised, in great part, by his family. From 2010 onwards, the inquiry found that the terrorist had multiple direct and indirect contacts with subjects of interest. It’s fair to say that of themselves none of these contacts seemed to be of significance. Witness J, a senior MI5 manager, presented evidence that said they didn’t consider the accumulation of such contacts, presented any likely increase in threat from the Arena terrorist. That might be true, but what seems to have been lacking is a coherent inquisitiveness across the agencies. After the first contact, there was an imprint of the terrorist in MI5’s records, and I still fail to understand why at every subsequent contact, someone didn’t look backwards and question why this name kept coming up. Witness J was questioned repeatedly about whether MI5 had sufficient resources for the task that it had across these years, and their repeated answer to that question was, yes. One of the principal contacts that the terrorist had, was with a friend who had been convicted of facilitating travel to Syria. He was known to have visited this person in prison but, what was not identified until after the attack, was the extent of contacts that had occurred between the two on a contraband phone held by the prisoner in prison. A failure by CT Policing to properly interrogate phone data, that might have identified the was extraordinary, in my opinion. In 2015, the Arena terrorist briefly became a subject of interest in relation to a terrorist investigation, not focussed on him, as the principal. The investigation only lasted a matter of weeks before being closed. At this point, there was more than enough information on the terrorist to justify them being referred to the Prevent Scheme. However, Witness J reported that at this time, referrals were at the discretion of the investigation officer, in collaboration with the police. There is no record of whether such consideration was ever given, but the terrorist was certainly not referred. I didn’t find Witness J to be a particularly believable witness. As Sir John subsequently highlighted, what you get from a corporate witness is sometimes different to what you get when you speak to front-line operatives. I’ll hazard a guess that if you submitted a FOIA request about how many closed SOI were referred to Prevent between 2010 and 2017, the answer will be few, if any. My experience of investigators is that it’s not in their culture to think about disruptions. They are too often focussed on preserving intelligence sources or pursuing best evidence by letting the case develop. Again, Sir John was clear that the terrorist may not have engaged with Prevent, his brother didn’t, but research does show that terrorists are deterred when they believe they are being observed; more of that later. In the open hearing, Witness J, referred to two pieces of intelligence that he wasn’t prepared to discuss. He stated that at the time of their receipt, they were not seen to be relevant, but after the May 2017 attack, it was obvious that they were highly relevant. These two pieces of information became the centre of the closed hearings considerations. Sir John reported back on these two pieces of information and referred to them as Piece of Intelligence 1 and Piece of Intelligence 2. The advantage of the closed hearing is that it allowed Sir John to hear evidence from more junior staff to Witness J. They presented a different perspective to the senior manager, with both having been considered as relevant at the point of receipt. Piece of intelligence 1 was not passed to the police, and Sir John offered criticism of this, but felt that it was unlikely to have affected the outcome. Piece of intelligence 2, similarly was not passed to the police, even though the receiving officer believed it was of pressing national-security concern. Nor was the information progressed inside MI5 as swiftly, and with the right amount of context that it should have accompanied it. Other officers did seek to progress the information, but by then it was too late. Sir John concludes that had Piece of Intelligence 2 been processed in a timely and effective way, it might have led investigative actions being taken. These could have been surveilling the terrorist to a car in which explosive were contained, of undertaking a stop and search of them at the airport, when they returned from Libya only four days before the attack. The significance of this latter action is that it is more probable than not, that the terrorist had the bomb’s initiator switch on them when they came through the airport, having acquired it during their visit to Libya. It was these omissions that Sir Ken apologised for. Like so much of this inquiry, Part 3 is full of ifs, buts, and maybes, but without any certainty that any of them would have stopped the murder of 22 people on 22 May 2017. It is of course completely understandable that those who were so brutally affected by this attack, will see more certainty than perhaps the reports project. Similarly, there is little in this inquiry that says those missed opportunities wouldn’t have stopped the attack; history is written as it is, not how it could have been, and we must accept the reality of what happened and be brave enough to recognise it could happen again. Like Andrew Roussos, the father of the attack’s youngest victim Saffie-Rose, I dislike the hackneyed phrase ‘lessons will be learned’. When a corporate leader downplays the significance of intelligence at a public inquiry, only to be corrected by their junior staff, you’re not left with confidence that the need for learning has even been recognised. Sir John has been fearless in his pursuit of the truth, I worry about whether the intelligence services and the police will be as fearless in their pursuit of sustainable and enterprise-wide improvement. The scale of failure identified in Part 2 of the inquiry is such that I genuinely struggle to have confidence that the improvement that is needed, will reach every corner of policing in the UK. I do trust Sir John’s pursuit of improvement, and I hope that this retired judge’s reach, and involvement stays with us for a long time to come. My critique of this part of the inquiry has been less detailed than other article I’ve written, the inner workings of MI5 are not my specialist subject, but there is also something about failure fatigue getting the better of me. If you’ve lived and breathed the last, almost, 6 years, as I have, you are probably as tired and as frustrated at having our collective failings laid bare, seemingly without any light at the end of the tunnel. I don’t feel hope for the future as far as policing is concerned. It is so riddled with issues now, that it’s hard to see it being able to focus on much more than its existential existence. I suspect the same is true for some elements of the other emergency services. I don’t know about MI5 but, as I say above, senior leaders who deny problems, don’t generate confidence. But there is a glimmer of hope in the private sector. The hope that Martyn’s Law will bring meaningful and sustainable reform to a sector that needs it. Martyn’s Law won’t stop terrorist attacks, but it is going to reduce their likelihood of success. That must be something to celebrate out of all this darkness. Alison Howe Angelika Klis Marcin Klis Chloe Rutherford Liam Curry Courtney Boyle Eilidh MacLeod Elaine McIver Georgina Bethany Callander Jane Tweddle John Atkinson Kelly Brewster Lisa Lees Martyn Hakan Hett Megan Joanne Hurley Michelle Kiss Nell Jones Olivia Paige Campbell-Hardy Philip Tron Saffie-Rose Roussos Sorrell Leczkowski Wendy Fawell

"A litany of failure" - Nick Aldworth on the Manchester Arena inquiry report

Polly Jones — Mon, 07 Nov 2022 15:39:53 +0000

Terrorism

"Enough is enough.... Saffie's life is not a practice exercise…. if we're still learning lessons on terrorism in 2020, nothing will ever change" These were the words of Andrew Roussos at the start of the Manchester Arena Inquiry in September 2020. Andrew is the father of the Manchester Arena attack’s youngest victim, Saffie-Rose. She was 8 years old when she died. Last week, Andrew and his family learned that there was a ‘remote’ chance that Saffie might have survived if she had received specialist trauma care earlier. I’ve met Andrew and his family and we remain in touch; I know how strongly he believes that Saffie was a fighter and could have survived. I can only imagine how painful, and enduring, carrying that thought will be. I don’t know John Atkinson’s family, but the inquiry also found, with greater certainty, that his were survivable injuries with earlier intervention. When you read the detail of his treatment, or lack of it, in The City Room (where the attack happened) and beyond, a lay person is likely to be deeply concerned about how this man came to die. What Went Wrong At a thousand pages long, I’m not sure I even know where to start commenting on this report. It’s taken me the better part of three days to read it, and even then I’ve had to skip through some parts. It will need to be read again and again to fully comprehend its totality. Every page is a litany of failure, across all three emergency services, their leadership, their processes, and their absorption of learning. In the middle of it, there are failures by individuals to be bold, to be inquisitive and, frankly, to apply even a modicum of common sense. There are some who have excelled, been brave and made positive contributions but, as individuals, were not going to change the outcome. Saffie and John didn’t get the help they deserved because they found themselves in the middle of an emergency services response full of catastrophic failures of well-established processes and command structures. At some points, I can’t even see the most basic of Gold, Silver and Bronze (GSB) command structures being implemented in a way that provides coherence and compatibility. Everybody seems to have forgotten the first principle of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Procedures (JESIP), colocation, and throughout my read of the document I found my inner-self screaming to everybody, ‘for the love of God, just get some people to a forward control point’. I’m genuinely shocked at the failure to implement even the most basic principles of incident management, the most basic communication practices, and an abject lack of competence among some. Some of the individual failures are so profound, they are close to being malfeasance. This wasn’t failure of resolving a terrorist incident, this was a failure of core policing. I’m not qualified to comment on what core competence looks like in the ambulance or fire services, but as a casual observer, it’s hard to see leadership and processes that would match my expectation. Sir John Saunders, chairman of the inquiry and author of the report, has been more compassionate than me by saying that he recognises that people he has named found themselves in the most awful and extreme of circumstances but qualifies this by saying that taking on such responsibilities should come with a requirement to be able to execute them effectively. He is correct and repeatedly highlights that some of those individuals were let down through lack of training. He is of course right. The seeds of failure were not sown on the night, they had been germinating for years and are systemic across policing. They are fertilised by the inadequate implementation of learning, promotion processes that rely on story telling not competence, and budget. The fact that a significant number of recommendations have been referred to national bodies such as the College of Policing, CTPHQ and the �鶹�� Office is indicative of this being systemic national failure. After the report was published, I received an email from a renowned journalist that said, “My biggest worry is that Manchester may well have improved things, but I bet many others haven’t”. Looking at how basic many of these failings were, I sense that their concern is valid. Preparation One of the alarming things I read in this report was that Greater Manchester Police (GMP) had conducted over 100 relevant exercises in the two years leading up to 22 May 2017. One exercise, about 12 months before the bombing and named Winchester Accord, highlighted that there were weaknesses in how the emergency services in Manchester worked together. Importantly, Winchester Accord highlighted that the Force Duty Officer (FDO) became overwhelmed, but because they were testing whether that role could work from their force HQ and not their control room, they chose not to recognise that this was likely to happen in any environment. That is a lack of common sense and experience. During Winchester Accord, Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) considered that GMP forgot to include them in a deployment to help evacuate the injured. GMP dispute this, but the evidence in this inquiry suggests otherwise. Winchester Accord, and its failures, have chilling resonance with what happened on the night of 22 May 2017. The GMP planning team had been decimated by funding cuts, and revisions to important documents, like PLATO plans were done at pace and without the consultation and scrutiny that might make them more likely to succeed. GMP had been one of the worst hit forces, losing roughly 25 per cent of its officers and budget. How can that be right? The GMFRS consistently failed to include North West Fire Control (NWFC) in exercising and testing thereby missing opportunities to identify weaknesses, especially in how tri-service communication takes place. GMFRS’s approach to incident command didn’t map directly into the standardised GSB structure, but the greatest failure is probably their practice of not having tactical commanders who operated away from the scene. Had this happened, a tactical commander might have gone to GMP force HQ and obtained situational awareness much earlier than was the case. I’ve worked with many fire services, they are rigid on the rules and procedures that exist and operate to the most hierarchical governance of all three services. You can see this throughout this inquiry. North-west Ambulance Service (NWAS) are not without fault; they didn’t even have a site-specific incident plan for what is one of the largest arenas in the country. Crucially, they operated a non-discretionary policy that non-specialist responders should never go into a PLATO warm zone. On the night this became critical, for despite knowing that some NWAS responders were operating in the City Room, they failed to provide support until much later in the evening. There is so much more in the report indicating failures to learn, prepare, and engage effectively through the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum (GMRF), that it would be impossible to cover all of it in this article. Needless-to-say, the old 6-Ps saying of ‘prior preparation and planning prevents poor performance’ was never truer. Command and Control The GMP Force Duty Officer, Inspector Dale Sexton, is singled out for significant criticism. It is right and justifiable criticism, well evidenced by Sir John. It becomes even more significant because the police were the lead agency for this incident. He failed at so many different stages, it is difficult not to sympathise with the families who believe that he was wrongly awarded for his contribution on that night. But he is not alone in this failure. He was leading a response in a control room where there was insufficient support for him, excessive access to him while he was trying to coordinate the response, burdened with firearms command for an excessive period, and unsupported by his tactical (Silver) commander, T/Supt Arif Nawaz. T/Supt Nawaz was so out of his depth that he had to be replaced, but by that time, the conditions that he and Sexton had created were probably irrecoverable. An added complication was the division of responsibilities between BTP and GMP, although I cannot see that this was the greatest contribution to failure, and those BTP officers deployed to the City room, the seat of the explosion, were brave and did their best. The starting point for command failures were set by GMP failing to declare events at Manchester Arena as a Major Incident. BTP declared it as such but didn’t inform GMP or GMFRS. Emergency service professionals will know that by declaring a major incident, you immediately create awareness among the other emergency services, and other responders and receivers, such as hospitals and local authorities, all of whom can significantly add to the overall effectiveness. Operation Plato, the response to a marauding terrorist firearms attack (MTFA) was declared quite quickly by Inspector Sexton and this was described as a right and proper decision, by Sir John Saunders. However, Sexton did not inform the other services of this decision nor undertake the critical element of Plato, zoning. If Plato is to be declared, the creation of Hot, Warm and Cold zones is vital as it is these classifications that define what emergency service works can enter each area. Sexton was not alone in failing to do this. He was subsequently relieved by a ground-assigned firearms commander who also failed to grasp the importance of this. In his evidence, Sexton maintained that he deliberately decided to not inform the other services that he had declared Plato. His grounds for this are not clear, and Sir John highlights many inconsistencies in this, especially the fact that it was being openly referred to in telephone calls and radio messages, and became known to those in the Arena environs. Failure to notify the other services of Plato, was another missed opportunity to get a joint enterprise underway. The inquiry found that critical medical support was denied to those inside the City Room because there was a perception that it was a warm zone, which limits the nature of NWAS staff who can enter. In reality, the GMP firearms team had boldly taken control of the area very quickly and the area was in fact a cold zone. There was a residual concern of a secondary device being present and it took an excessively long time for an EOD search dog to be deployed. However, the fact that NWAS paramedic Patrick Ennis was allowed by his tactical controller to move in and out of the City Room, suggests a significant inconsistency in the risk assessment. Joint Working My view is that the single biggest failure of the night, and one repeatedly referenced in the inquiry, was a failure of the emergency services to follow the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) principles. JESIP sets out 5 principles that underpin working together. While not mandated, there is an expectation that they work best in the following order: Collocate; Communicate; Coordinate; Jointly Understand Risk; and Shared Situational Awareness. All of the failings that led to inadequate casualty management on 22 May 2017, would have been overcome if all three emergency services had attended a single rendezvous point (RVP) and sent commanders to a forward control point (FCP). So much of this was inhibited by the failure to set the Plato zoning, however it was also set by individuals who failed to exercise sufficient attempts, and persistence, to get JESIP working effectively. There is also a strong indication that the failures in joint preparedness meant that GMP and NWAS didn’t fully appreciate the role that GMFRS could play in casualty management. This included supporting evacuation with stretchers carried on each appliance. GMFRS has been subject to significant, justified, criticism both in this inquiry and in the earlier Kerslake report. What this inquiry has shown is that their failures are shared by others and, to a significant degree, created by them. Recommendations Sir John has identified 149 individual recommendations, a great many of which are then clustered into 21 monitored recommendations. The implication of this is that he will require updates on his recommendations in 3 months’ time followed by witness statements from individuals tasked with making progress, 3 months after that. In summer of next year, he will ask some of those witnesses to give live evidence. This scrutiny is to be welcomed but I don’t believe it goes far enough. Many of the recommendations are organisation-specific. For example, recommendation 2 states: “BTP should ensure that all its Inspectors are trained to undertake the Bronze Commander role in the event of a major incident”. When I revert to my journalist friend’s concerns, I wonder how many other police services have the same deficiencies as BTP and would benefit from the application of such learning. The �鶹�� Office, The College of Policing and the National Police Chief’s Council will be unwise to not recognise that these were failures waiting to happen in many places. There is nothing in the evidence that would imply these are problems unique to the North West. Failure to nationalise the opportunities presented by this inquiry would be indicative of how I think learning is treated now inside policing. There is a pervasive attitude of ‘it wouldn’t happen here’ and the implementation of learning is seldom sustained. If it was, the same mistakes wouldn’t keep occurring. Final Thoughts While my summary of the evidence is as harsh as the inquiry’s, I do recognise that at the heart of every disaster are people who don’t intend to fail. There are people who fail to rise to the occasion, and others who exceed all expectations. Some of the public compassion and bravery on the night brought a tear to my eye. Many people will have been adversely affected by the events of 22 May 2017. Some will have experienced physical and mental pain, some will have experienced unbearable grief, and many will carry scars forever. Some will have suffered vicariously, that is the nature of stress. The best that we can do to honour those who have suffered so much is to not waste the opportunities that this inquiry has identified. This inquiry shows that so much of what prevented the saving of lives, or the reduction of trauma in those that survived, was entirely avoidable. I can only imagine how some victims and survivors will feel about that. While we continue to absorb this report, we must also brace ourselves for more bad news to come. Both the intelligence and police services could have done more to manage the threat posed by the attacker and his conspirators. Part 3 of the report is unlikely to be comfortable reading. Image: By G-13114 - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=79239409

A look at terrorist financing

Polly Jones — Mon, 26 Sep 2022 15:06:13 +0000

Terrorism

Hear from Debbie Rafferty, counter terrorism consultant and PhD student, Abertay University (Dundee), speak at International Security Expo 2022, 28th September, 10:30 – 12:30 on Mitigating Security in the North Sea. There is one inexorable circumstance which relates to terrorism, the prerequisite for financing and the proviso of a continuous stream of substantial funds (Yousif, 2009). From a structural viewpoint, terrorist organisations ought to be contrasted to major corporations. Therefore, in this context, it is useful to deliberate a terrorist organisation as a business and evaluate the success, or otherwise, of the approaches adopted to secure funding (investment). Further, against this backdrop, terrorist groups require a paradigm to plan how revenue can be generated and sustained (Byrne, 2012). Consequently, terrorist organisations must continuously generate funds to cover expenses in order to sustain their operations. From an organisational perspective, terrorist organizations should be likened to major corporations and cash inflow is the lifeblood (Bush, 2001) of any terrorist or establishment, to survive and develop (Schneider, 2017). In this context, how an organisation makes revenue and how it incurs cost, is central to the organisation’s efficiency and effectiveness and is influenced by many factors. Consequently, these units must continuously generate funds and distribute sufficient money in order to sustain operations (Jamwal, 2007). Vittori, (2011, p.15) describes these as “Life’s necessities”. Therefore, a terrorist organisation requires extensive capital, and a balanced revenue of funds from the point of origin to the point of distribution. Deprived of cash, terrorists are confronted with risk that could result in the demise of the group. To begin, terrorists utilise diverse strategies to acquire funds and there are innumerable often untraceable variations (Neumann, 2018). To complicate matters, there are clear links between terrorist groups and organised crime, the connection between these entities is primarily driven by financial profit and gain (Stanojoska, 2011). Much like a corporation, a terrorist organisation must establish reliable funding streams that adequately meet and ideally surpass fixed and variable costs. Therefore, in general, terrorist organisations must expedite the acquisition of aforesaid funds at a relentless pace and central to this are sources of reliable funds. Hence, terrorists use extensive methods to move money within and between organisations, including the financial sector and the transfer of cash by carriers, and goods through commerce (Lormel, 2018). Charitable trusts and payment systems have been used to conceal the terrorist movement of funds. The flexibility and resourcefulness exhibited by terrorist organisations means global finance and processes are at risk to illegal activities (Financial Action Task Force, 2018). Some terrorist organisations have started using organised crime conduits, therefore the links between transnational (Sedgwick, 2007), organised crime (TOC) and foreign terrorist organisations (FTO), are tangible, as are the escalating alliances between them. The need for finance of the terrorist goals means terrorist organisations continue to involve criminal business. Theorists like Makarenko, have referred to this phenomenon as “the crime-terror nexus.” (Makarenko, 2000 p. 259). Further, the imperative to raise finance has given birth to many hybrid funding strategies, on a local, national or global scale. Capital and the terrorist mission and support can be expensive and the variety of money-making schemes have become essential elements of the terrorist fund-raising repertoire (Abuza, 2003). Each component of the terrorist funding sequence (raise, move, store and spend) avails a means to strive to understand the complicated and elaborate process of terrorist financing. In an ideal world, it should be uncomplicated to trace funds from origin to the end user. Unfortunately, the myriad of financial sources, methods of movement and access points make identifying and tracing terrorist financing extremely difficult (Tavares, 2004; Indridason, 2008; Gross et.al. 2016) and laborious, given the seemingly infinite funding variations (Von Lampe, 2014). In general, it is problematic to ascertain trends in money laundering and terrorist financing (FATF-GAFI, 2005). Moreover, corrupt money is netted through various criminal activities, like drug, weapon and human trafficking. Baker (2005) estimates the illegal money to range between US$ 1.0 and 1.6 trillion a year. Further, the IMF calculates that the total sum of corrupt finance through the fiscal system is between 500 billion USD and 1,500 billion USD a year, which amounts to 3 per cent and 5 per cent of the aggregate world product, however this is an estimate. A broad sweep reveals that organisational revenue streams include, however are not confined to, revenue from business activity; locally raised revenue; and revenue from conventional terrorist financing. In general, funds are either generated through internal sources, taxation of people, enterprises and transport routes; income from kidnap and ransom; and profits from trade. Also, external funding is given by donors supportive to the cause (zakat) (as cited in Benda-Beckmann, Franz von, 2007), often affluent followers, Gulf state countries called the Golden Chain (1989) or affiliates of the movement. Each terrorist organisation accesses finance using unique methods, often there are similarities, however significant differences are present. In reviewing the aforesaid, it is sensible to understand the philosophy which motivates these violent organisations, this provides a lens to examine the innumerable sources of funding in respect of terrorist organisations. Hezbollah, as an example, receives money from Emdad committee for Islamic Charity, Hezbollah Central Press Office, Al Jarha Association, and Jihad Al Binaa Developmental Association, while a second exemplar, Boko Haram accepts funds from foreign Islamic charities (UK and Saudi Arabia) (Agbiboa, 2013). Although it is difficult to identify the main characteristics in Boko Haram’s funding and the group has a decidedly differentiated financing strategy, often opportunistic and impromptu micro fundraising operations (Appendix 3) support many of its operations by lawless activity, including bank theft, abductions (Chibok girls, 2014) assassinations for hire, smuggling, livestock theft and extortion (�鶹�� Office, 2019). There appear to be interconnections between transnational organised crime and transnational terrorism, ‘legitimate’ businesses, levying taxes, trafficking (drugs, goods and humans), flora and fauna poaching, forced donations, counterfeit, and misappropriation of humanitarian subsidises and commercial profits (Rose, 2018). A significant difference between the groups can be found when they have the ability to “live off the land” (Zenn and Cristiani, 2016). These “shell states” (Napoleoni, 2005, p. 65) are exploited allowing a capitalizing on the impoverished and fragile areas like the north of Nigeria in order to extract money from civilians. Money laundering is a source of funding employed by many terrorist organisations. Non-conventional money transferring systems like Hawala system/transactions allow funds to be transferred without actual currency movement (Razavy, 2005; Perkel, 2004), defined as ‘underground banking’ (Bunt, 2007). Levitt and Jacobson (2008) illuminate bankrolling as a product of glocalisation, globalisation and scientific developments, which have permitted terrorist groups to solicit, deposit, reassign, and disseminate funds for operations. Trilateral drug trafficking in Latin America, Africa and Europe accounts for over 2 billion US dollars annually. The channels include, mass cash running operations and Lebanese exchange firms. Originating in South Asia access to the system is world-wide, this makes it popular with groups like Hezbollah, who launder narcotics proceeds via the Halawi Exchange Co. (Halawi) (FAFT Report, 2013). Actions including re-routing benevolent donations, the manipulation of non-governmental establishments (NGOs), participation in illegitimate activities and smuggled goods bring about large dividends. Finally, terrorist groups operate in a complicated global arena and data discloses the intricate and international trade and finance routes, illegal and legal. Astute sponsors are adept at using a variety of processes to perform transactions, regardless of location, so as to hide the source of the funds received. This highlights the reliance of these groups on not only criminal proceeds, but also revenue from proxy sources and funding campaigns. Finally, the fundraising apparatus of both organisations is intricate and obscure, as are the elusive militants themselves. Sources: Abuza, Z. 2003, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: crucible of terror, Lynne Rienner Publishers. Agbiboa, D. 2013, "The ongoing campaign of terror in Nigeria: Boko Haram versus the state", Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, vol. 2, no. 3. Ajakaye, R. 2009, "Credible Elections Lies in Attitudinal Change Not INEC Chirman, Ezeani", Daily Independent. Ammani, A.A. 2010, Boko Haram uprising: Not seeing the Woods for the Trees. Azani, E. 2013, "The hybrid terrorist organization: Hezbollah as a case study", Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 36, no. 11, pp. 899-916. Baker, P. 2010, "Representations of Islam in British broadsheet and tabloid newspapers 1999–2005", Journal of Language and Politics, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 310-338. Baker, R.W. 2005, Capitalism's Achilles heel: Dirty money and how to renew the free-market system, John Wiley & Sons. Bush, G.W. 2001, We will starve the terrorists. Byman, D. 2005, Deadly connections: States that sponsor terrorism, Cambridge University Press. Cristiani, D. & Zenn, J. 2016, "AQIM’s resurgence: Responding to Islamic state", Terrorism Monitor–The Jamestown Foundation, vol. 14, no. 5. DeVore, M.R. 2012, "Exploring the iran-hezbollah relationship: A case study of how state sponsorship affects terrorist group decision-making", Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 6, no. 4-5. Flanigan, S.T. & Abdel‐Samad, M. 2009, "Hezbollah's social jihad: Nonprofits as resistance organizations", Middle East Policy, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 122-137. Gupta, D.K. 2005, "Exploring roots of terrorism" in Root causes of terrorism Routledge, pp. 34-50. Harik, J. 1994, The public and social services of the Lebanese militias, Centre for Lebanese studies Oxford. Hoffman, B. 1998, "[BOOK REVIEW] Inside terrorism", Survival, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 204-205. Indridason, I.H. 2008, "Does terrorism influence domestic politics? Coalition formation and terrorist incidents", Journal of Peace Research, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 241-259. International Crisis Group 2014, "Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency", Crisis Group Africa. Iyekekpolo, W.O. 2016, "Boko Haram: understanding the context", Third World Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 12, pp. 2211-2228. Jamwal, N. 2002, "Terrorist financing and support structures in Jammu and Kashmir", Strategic Analysis, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 140-150. Koh, J. 2006, Suppressing terrorist financing and money laundering, Springer, Berlin. Makarenko, T. 2000, "Crime and terrorism in Central Asia", Janes Intelligence Review, vol. 12, no. 7, pp. 16-17. Napoleoni, L. 2004, Terror incorporated: tracing the dollars behind the terror networks, Seven Stories Press. Norton, A.R. 2014, Hezbollah: A Short History-Updated Edition, Princeton University Press. Phillips, B.J. 2017, "Deadlier in the US? On lone wolves, terrorist groups, and attack lethality", Terrorism and political violence, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 533-549. Robbins, J.S. 2002, "The jihad online", National review online, vol. 30. Rose, G. 2018, "Terrorism Financing in Foreign Conflict Zones", Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 11-16. Rudner, M. 2010, "Hizbullah terrorism finance: fund-raising and money-laundering", Studies in conflict and terrorism, vol. 33, no. 8, pp. 700-715. Schneider, F. 2017, "Macroeconomics: The financial flows of islamic terrorism" in Global Financial Crime Routledge, pp. 107-134. Stanojoska, A. 2011, "The Connection between Terrorism and Organized Crime: Narcoterrorism and other Hybrids". Tavares, J. 2004, "The open society assesses its enemies: shocks, disasters and terrorist attacks", Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 51, no. 5, pp. 1039-1070. Tofangsaz, H. 2012, "A new approach to the criminalization of terrorist financing and its compatibility with Sharia law", Journal of Money Laundering Control, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 396-406. Vittori, J. 2011, Terrorist financing and resourcing, Springer. Von Lampe, K. 2014, "Recent publications on organized crime", Trends in Organized Crime, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 342-344. Woodford, I. & Smith, M.L.R. 2018, "The Political Economy of the Provos: Inside the Finances of the Provisional IRA—A Revision", Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 213-240. Yousif, B. 2009, "Jeanne Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas, eds. Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007. xi 384 pages, endnotes, index. Paper US $24.95 ISBN 978-0-8047-5566-3.", Review of Middle East Studies, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 86-88.

Tackling lone actors with behavioural threat indicators

Polly Jones — Wed, 07 Sep 2022 13:50:29 +0000

Terrorism

Philip Grindell, Threat Intelligence Specialist, CEO and Founder, Defuse® will be speaking on Countering Fixated and Lone Actor Threats at the International Security Conference on Tuesday, 27th September at 15:15-16:00 at International Security Expo in London. Here he talks about tackling the threat from lone actors.

In 2007, research suggested that people who pursue public figures pose a greater risk of death or serious injury to their targets than do terrorist groups or criminals.

Much has changed since then. Whilst the threat from terrorism is as prominent as ever, it is less focused on ‘terrorist groups’ such as the IRA and even AQ, with the primary focus now on lone actors.

When I was tasked with setting up and running the investigative unit to protect UK MPs after the assassination of Jo Cox MP, one of my key tasks was to prevent the next attack. To do so, I researched how public figures were targeted and attacked.

Much of the research base that I introduced into our processes emanated from the US Secret Service’s Exceptional Case Study Research Project (ECSP) and was subsequently advanced by some of the most well-recognised thought leaders. That research was based on various behavioural and linguistic warning behaviours that may be associated with a physical threat. The indicators were prevalent in cases of people fixated on public figures. It is unlikely that all of these indicators will be seen in a single case, with some being more commonly observed that others.

I assessed these indicators against the attacks on UK MPs attacked since 2000, identifying a clear pattern. What was clear was that ‘Lone Actors’ could also be considered fixated individuals and mirrored many of the behaviours of stalkers and those researched by the ECSP when targeting the prominent, powerful or wealthy.

This is witnessed as a ‘pathological fixation’ which effectively means that these people are focussed on a person or issue from the minute they wake up to when they go to bed. This fixation can be evidenced by any behaviour that indicates an increasing preoccupation with the target individual or issue, such as talking of nothing else and a deteriorating social or occupational functioning.

One evening in 2017 I was passed a note with five lines on it. It recorded a third-hand threat directed at Rosie Cooper MP. Based on the behavioural and linguistic indicators I was now familiar with, I assessed that threat to be genuine, which I then communicated to the head of national CT. Their investigation successfully prevented the attack on Ms. Cooper resulting in a life sentence for the National Action member Jack Renshaw.

One of the key elements of this methodology is that such individuals don’t snap, they plan and prepare and often follow a process, referred to as ‘The Pathway of Targeted or Intended Violence’. (See above image)

This process is initiated by a grievance which may be personal or ideological. Once they decide that the grievance cannot be resolved, they develop violent ideation, which means that they believe that the only way to solve their grievance is through violence. This is where they form the intent necessary for any threat to be genuine.

Research tells us that those who make directly communicated threats, such as death threats, rarely pose a genuine threat. Dr Reid Meloy, one of the world’s preeminent experts stated on Defuse’s podcast, The Online Bodyguard, (https://www.buzzsprout.com/1253126) that a directly communicated threat resulted in violence in less that five per cent of cases.

However, ‘last resort’ or ‘end of tether’ language may be an indication that a person of concern was escalating along ‘The Pathway’. This may be evidenced by such phrases as “You leave me no other choice” or “I have no other option”. This may be a sign of distress or desperation and can be an indicator of time imperative of an impending attack. In the case of Renshaw’s threat, it was evidenced when his plan included him describing his desire to martyr himself by ‘suicide by cop’. Another example concerns Khalid Masood who attacked Parliament and murdered my colleague, Keith Palmer. A few days before the attack and after many years of being estranged from his family, Masood visited his parents one last time. He left that last meeting, telling his mother, “They will say I am a terrorist – but I am not.”

Another commonly witnessed indicator is termed ‘identification’. A common factor witnessed in lone actors is their associating themselves with a terrorist group, such as ISIS. Very often there is no evidence of any such association, however the group will often corroborate this as it supports their cause. This is to identify oneself as an agent to advance a particular cause or belief. It has also been described as pseudo commando or warrior mentality. This is evidenced by the person identifying with the military or law enforcement or studying and copying previous assassins. A good example of this is Anders Breivik who dressed up in uniforms.

Another example is the possession of the book, Catcher in the Rye. After Chapman murdered John Lennon, he remained at the scene reading The Catcher in the Rye until he was arrested by the police. Hinckley also had a copy when he attempted to assassinate Reagan, as did Robert Bardo who stalked and murdered Rebecca Schaeffer.

Very often when law enforcement is researching a potential person of concern, they look at their previous convictions or arrests. Often dismissed are unrelated or random acts that don’t immediately appear to be relevant. This can be an indicator of novel aggression. This is best described an act of violence or aggressive behaviour via which the subject is testing their ability to act in such a way. It is usually not directly related to the ‘pathway’ on which they are travelling and can be totally out of character.

On October 22, 2014, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau murdered a Canadian soldier and injured three others. He then attacked the Canadian Parliament and was killed by law enforcement. In December 2011, he walked into the Police Station and confessed to an armed robbery he committed a decade earlier; no such recorded crime existed. The next night, he attempted to rob a McDonald’s restaurant with a pencil, then waited for the police to arrive, possibly testing their response and to gain an understanding of the processes.

Any surveillance or research may also identify a sudden burst of activity, known as energy burst. This is a key indicator that the intention is escalating and can occur in the hours, days or weeks before the actual event. It is characterised by an increase in pre-attack activity and can be signs of final preparations, purchasing equipment or conducting hostile reconnaissance or internet activity. A decrease in their usual social media activity may also be an indicator, a sign of them further preparing.

Prior to Choudhary attacking Stephen Timms MP, she demonstrated such behaviour by taking a bus to the bank. She paid off her student loan and closed her account and sorted her financial affairs. She also purchased knives for her attack. Her rationale was because she didn’t want the state to have any hold over her family after her attack. She was preparing for the end.

As has been described, some of the indicators may be contrary to common sense and all too often direct threats are seen as a sign of a genuine threat resulting is assets being wasted such as additional security measures or close protection being deployed. They will always need to be taken seriously, but with the recognition that they are a low probability indicator.

The lesson is that fixated people, stalkers and lone actors follow a process and they can be identified by behavioural and linguistic indicators. Without knowledge of these indicators, the best researchers will either miss or misinterpret them.

Defuse’s one day Behavioural Threat Assessment Programme titled ‘Countering Fixated and Lone Actor Threats’ has been accredited for CPD by The CPD Standards Office.

For further details email Defuse® at enqs@defuseglobal.com

Philip Grindell, Threat Intelligence Specialist, CEO and Founder, Defuse® will be speaking on Countering Fixated and Lone Actor Threats at the International Security Conference on Tuesday, 27th September at 15:15-16:00 at International Security Expo in London. For more information about this year’s event or to register to attend visit: https://ise-2022.reg.buzz/pr-counter-terror-business

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/specialists-in-protecting-prominent-people-a...

Email: philip@defuseglobal.com

More info

Q&A with Ed Butler, Chief Resilience Officer at Pool Re

Michael Lyons — Fri, 04 Feb 2022 11:14:32 +0000

Terrorism

Following our exclusive publication of the Pool Re SOLUTIONS Annual Review 2021, CTB shares an exclusive interview with Ed Butler concerning contemporary threats, the impact of climate change on the terrorism and the importance of collaboration

Ed, your annual review certainly made for an interesting albeit daunting read. Is our current security situation really that bleak?

Yes and I’m sorry not to be more positive but I think my review does paint a pretty realistic picture of the current and future security situation. We are facing a perfect storm of possible nation state conflict in Ukraine, Chinese seizure of Taiwan, an accelerating nuclear programme in Iran and an evolving, complex and confusing terrorist threat landscape. From my perspective, the global terrorism landscape is more dangerous and diverse than it was pre 9/11. Wrap around this the long term consequences of a global pandemic, climate change, fiscal and financial pressures on the global economy and growing malicious cyber activity and you are left with a pretty uncertain and challenging future.

A major theme of your report was the diversification of terrorist threat actors, targets and methodologies seen over the last 20 years. Which of these changes poses the greatest challenge for CT professionals and governments?

I think the main challenge is probably the diversification of methodologies. As the range of attack methodologies continues to broaden, the Counter Terrorism Police (CTP) and MI5 can’t take their eyes off legacy threats, such as large truck bombs (VBIEDs), as they could still happen. In simple terms; ‘nothing falls off the plate’ while the resources to deal with the scale and breadth of the threat remain the same. In addition, I am concerned that in these resource constrained times, coupled with the current focus on unsophisticated methodologies, that we are not investing enough time in looking at high-impact, so called ‘spectacular’ events.

The strategic challenge facing governments is how to address the underlying causes and drivers of terrorism, be they political polarisation, social inequalities, economic hardship, or growing extremism between left wing, right wing and Islamists. These are fundamental challenges which cannot be resolved by the CT Police and security services alone; they require long term, and very sizeable investment to address the core problems within our society and our communities.

Which contemporary threats do you think represent the greatest risk and what steps can we take to better understand and mitigate them?

From my perspective it has to be CBRN, terrorist use of drones followed by cyber. In early 2001, when I was in charge of the UK’s leading military CT capability, I was hosting a discreet conference on the terrorist use of CBR material and I remember summing up that we would see the terrorist use of a WMD (Weapon of Mass Destruction) in our lifetimes. None of us thought that only nine months later Al Qaeda would fly two aircraft into the Twin Towers and achieve catastrophic, WMD, effect. Here we are now, 20 years on, with the chilling statement in last year’s Integrated Review stating that a terrorist group will successfully use a CBRN weapon by 2030.

That’s why we at Pool Re, the only terrorism pool to provide reinsurance cover for CBRN events, are investing heavily in research and modelling to fully understand not just the impact but also future frequency of these types of events. We work very closely with a range of academic institutions, including the Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies and Cranfield University, and we value very highly the ground breaking collaboration we have undertaken with them over the last 5 or so years. More still needs to be done and that’s why we are encouraged by the closer partnership we are developing with the �鶹�� Office in understanding and mitigating this strategic risk.

Early evidence of climate change’s aggravating impact on terrorism has started to emerge. Do you see this as an important area for research and development?

Absolutely. Climate change is now very much on the political agenda as seen at last year’s COP 26 and in the PRA’s Climate Change Adaptation report 2021. Back in 2019 we commissioned Professor Andrew Silke, at Cranfield University, to undertake some research in this area: Horizon Scanning the Terrorism Threat. In his paper, Andrew identified climate change as one of the three macro-drivers of terrorism and that most states are increasingly recognising it as a growing strategic security concern. More recently, we have teamed up with START, at the University of Maryland, to look more closely at how climate change is becoming one of the key drivers of terrorism. This work will be one of the principle discussion topics at the International Federation of Terrorism Reinsurance Pools (IFTRIP) conference in Washington this May.

What did you mean when you wrote we should be ‘threat actor agnostic’ when devising risk management and resilience strategies?

When I talk of the need to be threat actor agnostic I mean that security professionals and risk managers should not be fixated on whether a perpetrator is an Islamist extremist, right/left wing terrorist or a serious, organised criminal as well-designed, planned and resourced risk management plans will prevent and protect against the vast majority of attackers, regardless of their ideology and motivations. This is particularly the case in the cyber domain where, for example, the adoption of NCSC 10 Steps to Cyber Security will prevent all but the most sophisticated attacker from breaching your IT system.

Improved awareness and better training are perhaps the best tools for deterring any attack or at least mitigating the impact. It’s how you prepare and respond that will limit the severity of an attack, enable a speedy recovery and improve long term resilience to a broad array of risks.

In the report, you mention a need for greater collaboration between public and private sectors. Why is this important and what might this look like in practice?

This is now so important especially as the threat continues to rapidly evolve and we need to keep up, innovate, overhaul old structures, technological advancement and be more agile in our collective responses to the threat. The CT Police and government do not have sufficient resources, and as acknowledged recently by the Head of MI6, the skills and experiences to keep up with all the emerging technologies. We need to think, act and respond differently to the full spectrum of terrorist threats.

To achieve this, business, academia and government need to work together in a genuine partnership and collaboration. This needs to be underpinned by a cross sector and inter-disciplinary response from all sectors of society, building a ‘community of responsibility’ where businesses and sector groups come together to build on awareness and resilience. A good example of this is the partnership, known as the ‘CT Alliance’, between the �鶹��land Security Group, CT Police and Pool Re and the development of an information sharing platform, called Protect UK, which will be launched at the Security and Policing Conference in March this year. We have also just launched a new private public research consortium with the Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies, focusing on how best to protect society from future systemic risks such as pandemics, cyber threats, geopolitical change, financial crisis and climate change.

You mention Protect Duty, what do you think the impact of this legislation will be on businesses and the insurance industry?

As I wrote in the Review, Protect Duty will be the single biggest change to the terrorism risk landscape for a generation and will impact over half a million businesses, most of whom have never formally considered the risk of terrorism on their businesses, employees and customers. Over 2,700 businesses responded to the government’s consultation on the proposed Duty which demonstrates the high level of interest and concern by owners and operators of Publicly Accessible Locations. The impact of the legislation of the business community is likely to be as significant as the introduction of the 1974 Health and Safety and Work Act, although it is still not clear exactly what the compliance and enforcement measures will be. From an insurance perspective, business owners and operators will need to consider the impact on their terrorism liability cover for both Employers’ Liability and Public Liability.

And what role will Pool Re play?

Pool Re, through its consultancy division SOLUTIONS, has already been approached by its Members for advice on how the Duty will impact on their insureds. We have written a number of briefing notes, held webinars and stand-by to provide further guidance as detail on the legislation becomes apparent.

When it comes to terrorism, what should be on the top of every risk manager’s agenda in 2022 and beyond?

That’s a difficult but good question. There is so much for a risk manager to consider and, more importantly, prioritise in these resource challenged times. I think that from a C-Suite and Board perspective more attention needs to be paid to the identification and management of strategic tail risks as well as supply chain vulnerabilities. The bottom line question to consider is whether you have the appropriate insurance cover in place to cover the full spectrum of terrorist risks out there.

Closer to home, and certainly for the next couple of years, the focus for every risk manager, business owner and operator, should be on the forthcoming Protect Duty and how this will impact on their day to day operations and liabilities.

And finally, Ed, what would you say is the most important lesson from the last 20 years when deciding how we respond to future terrorist threats?

For me, having spent over 35 years in the counter terrorism space, as a practitioner, risk consultant and now in the terrorism reinsurance sector it has to be greater collaboration between the private and public sector and the sharing and fusing of all sources of intelligence. As Lucy D’Orsi, the former Deputy Assistant Commissioner in the Met Police, said the police and security services need to ‘dare to share’ more information and data with business and security professionals. Business is very much up for this two way exchange as its people, assets and customers are very much on the terrorist front line.

www.poolre.co.uk

The role of symbolism in terrorist attacks

Michael Lyons — Fri, 07 Jan 2022 12:23:00 +0000

Terrorism

Imagine for one minute that you are a terrorist. Perhaps you belong to a known group like Al Qaeda (AQ) or Islamic State (ISIS) or Al Shabaab. Perhaps you see yourself as part of these organisations or are just ‘inspired’ by them.

Imagine also that you have been planning for the ‘big one’ for some time now. This plan will end in a spectacular attack that will capture the attention of the world. You may die in the process but you will be famous (or should that be ‘infamous’?).

Why go to that length? After all, any terrorist can carry out a small-scale act with nothing more than a knife or a car or even a golf club (as ISIS wannabe Rehab Dughmosh did in Toronto in 2017). As these are much easier deeds to plan and execute why risk something more complicated and more time-consuming? Such an operation opens you up to detection, infiltration (with a human source or surveillance or intercepted communications), and interdiction. Why not settle for less?

The answer is an easy one. Not only will your success get you on the front page of every news source in the world and every Web page but it will strike a chord as well as fear in the hearts of all (or at least you hope it will). There is nothing like seeing an iconic building or statue falling to the ground to tug at our emotions: this is why every dystopian sci-fi movie shows the Statue of Liberty in New York keeling over. If the symbol falls because of the actions of terrorists it is even more memorable.

What is the evidence for this desire by terrorists to hit symbolic targets? Here are a few examples:

Algerian GIA terrorists planned to explode a hijacked plane over the Eiffel Tower in Paris in 1994; in 2014 a French jihadist was plotting to bomb both the Louvre and the Eiffel Tower;
The 9/11 hijackers chose to fly the aircraft they had commandeered into the World Trade Center towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington (the fourth airliner which crashed in Pennsylvania may have been headed for the White House);
Canadian jihadi Michael Zehaf-Bibeau tried to breach the Centre Block of Parliament Hill after killing a soldier at the National War Memorial in October 2014;
Paris’ Stade de France, that country’s national sports stadium, was one of the targets of the 2015 jihadist cell which killed 137 people;
The 2002 Bali bombings by Jemaah Islamiyah targeted largely Australian citizens in one of Indonesia’s most important tourist sectors.

One would think that the security in place around such highly symbolic venues would deter terrorists and lead them to aim for ‘softer’ targets. The sheer importance and high visibility of these spots may override any doubts about success. In addition, security protocols may not be as effective as assumed. The 6 January 2021 riot at the US Capitol (which I am NOT calling a terrorist incident) demonstrated that even the American Senate was open to a breach by a semi-organised mob. Zehaf-Bibeau’s 2014 attack on the Canadian Parliament showed that a lone actor could get that close to elected leaders (the Prime Minister was in a caucus meeting metres away from Bibeau when he was killed by Parliamentary security).

To these events we have to add assassinations by terrorists. A few examples will suffice:

In 1984 Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was killed by two of her Sikh bodyguards in the aftermath of the decision by her government to storm the Golden Temple in Amritsar, the holiest shrine for Sikhs;
In May 1991 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) claimed the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi;
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries anarchist terrorists killed several world leaders including Russia’s Tsar Alexander II (1881), Spanish Prime Minister Antonio Canovas de Castillo (1897), Italy’s King Umberto (1900) and US President McKinley (1901).

Assassinations are, by definition, acts of political violence against high level public figures and, hence, highly symbolic.

In short, while we will continue to see low level terrorist attacks against targets of opportunity by a variety of groups with a range of motivations – the so-called ‘Nike’ brand of terrorism (‘Just Do It’) – there will also be the periodic symbolic act. It is as if terrorists too want their ’15 minutes of fame’.

Written by Phil Gurski, CEO of Borealis Threat and Risk Consulting Ltd.

Pool Re SOLUTIONS Annual Review 2021 - Special Edition

Michael Lyons — Tue, 21 Dec 2021 11:43:18 +0000

Terrorism

In this Special Edition Annual Review, which marks the 20th anniversary of 9/11, Ed Butler CBE, DSO, Chief Resilience Officer at Pool Re, explains how two decades of disruption has shaped todays’ fight against terrorism and extremism.

This timely review looks at the world’s response to terrorism since 9/11 and how it might be improved, identifies outdated solutions and hierarchical structures, and examines the current threat landscape. In the year that saw the US and other forces withdraw from Afghanistan, it also looks at the long-term consequences of this, as well as other sources of concern such as terrorist use of biological weapons in the post pandemic era, the continual growth of right wing extremism, and how climate change is influencing the drivers of terrorism.

It feels appropriate, a couple of months after the twentieth anniversary of 9/11, to pause and consider whether the world is more, or less, secure from terrorism than in the latter part of the previous century. I fear not. We are living in unprecedented times, in a new paradigm where ‘Cold War’ has been replaced by ‘Hot Peace’. A paradigm where we have gone from a bi-polar world to one of multiple asymmetric conflicts and threats, where war is now indistinguishable from peace. Where the distinction between acts of war, hybrid war, terrorism, and serious organised crime, in particular in the cyber domain, is becoming increasingly blurred. The build-up of Russian forces on the Ukrainian border, coupled with destablisation operations by Belarus, could well see the first outbreak of a global ‘conventional confrontation’ in the 21st Century. Tensions over Taiwan, and the Iranian pursuit of a nuclear weapon add to global uncertainty and unpredictability.

We inhabit a world where traditional terrorist threats, which tended to be localised and focused on the destruction of property and killing servicemen, policemen and public figures, feel somewhat primitive. Our new world is populated by Jihadis and extremists who buy ‘one-way tickets’ on route to martyrdom and mass casualty events. The new world is characterised by remarkable digital and information sharing advances, where information (good and bad) can pass at the speed of photons and is largely ‘unseen’, hidden in a virtual cloud. Concerns over ‘bedroom radicalisation’ continue to grow.

At the time of 9/11, we had technological superiority over terrorists, through the use of Global Positioning Systems (GPS), Night Vision Systems (NVS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and precision strike weapons and across most, if not all, IT networks. Now, Daesh, Al Qaeda (AQ) and most, if not all, threat actors use state of the art GPS, NVS, drones, the dark web and encrypted messaging to plan and execute their attacks. The latter is of significant concern for our intelligence and security services and, to quote a former Director of the FBI, we are going ‘dark and dumb’ at just the wrong time.

The growing capabilities of terrorists raises concerns around the ability and capacity of our military, security and intelligence services to continually deliver success against a rapidly evolving spectrum of threats. Can our counterterrorism operations keep pace with the rapid technological changes? The diversity of threat actors? New, dynamic threats, especially in the information domain? And lastly the evolution of the ‘digital terrorist’?

Outdated solutions and hierarchical structures
If we are to believe terrorism has entered a new dimension with growing sophisticated capabilities, this is likely to have a significant impact on businesses and our infrastructure, especially those which operate in complex environments. Therefore, we will almost certainly need greater collaboration between the public and private sector in order to improve our economic and societal resilience to terrorism.

We have seen how threat actors, be they traditional terrorists, radical extremists, militias, hybrid fighters, serious organised and/or narco or cyber criminals, use any means to harm, attack and avoid us. My concern is that we are using outdated methods. Our capabilities and corporate security solutions are configured in traditional hierarchical structures, and conventionally equipped, often led by too many people who still think and operate in a classical, [Western] conventional way. In my view, we need to re- think, plan, operate, lead, and deliver terrorism security and risk solutions. As TE Lawrence described it, while fighting the Ottomans, asymmetric operations are ‘like eating soup with a knife’. We need to eat more soup with knives and try and ‘synchronise this asymmetry’.

Before looking at how we might better prepare and mitigate against all forms of extremism and violent action, I’d like to review our current situation. We are both recovering from, and adjusting to, the global pandemic. In the light of a global pandemic we are slowly waking up to the increased threat of terrorist use of Chemical, Biological and Radiological (CBR) weapons. We are dealing with the ‘forever consequences’ of the humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the increasing radicalisation and disaffection across our communities, coupled with the consequences of climate change influencing and fuelling the drivers of terrorism. It is a bleak landscape.

What has been our response and how do we improve it?
Back in the 80s and 90s, it was very much a long-term game. There were relatively few active members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), we knew who they were, where they lived, and we had extensive data bases on them and their networks. We undertook intensive surveillance operations, through active and passive means and relied heavily on human sources and technology to provide us with the edge. We took down the hierarchy – difficult with today’s Islamist terrorists which operate on a decentralised approach – disrupted their supply chains and focused on their finances and supporters.

In the 1990s radical Islam, and the growth of Al Qaeda (AQ), was not seen as a problem facing the UK. I think it’s important to make the distinction here between our understanding and response to the threat of radical Islam pre and post 9/11, when the scale of the potential threat became clear. The French intelligence services did warn us of the growing threat and coined the term ‘Londonistan’ because of the presence of a large number of radical Islamists, mostly from Algeria and some who had served in Bosnia, who were living in London. But these individuals did not pose a direct threat to the UK where PIRA was still considered the primary terrorist threat. But even in 2001, the threat of Islamic terrorism against the UK was still seen as low, and it remained so until the first successful attack in 2005 (although there had been a ricin plot interdicted in Wood Green, with the Islamist perpetrators intending to attack the London Underground in 2003).

CT operations became more challenging and more global in the late 90s and early 2000s, as opposed to localised campaigns, primarily because of the safe havens in Afghanistan and Iraq (although international terrorism, vide Palestinian terrorism, had always been global.) There were a large number of suspects, with only a small handful known to the authorities. We lacked the necessary ‘human sources’, and AQ was more alert to our surveillance techniques and methodologies. They went ‘off-grid’ and were able to plan catastrophic attacks, in the late 90s, such as the USS Cole, the US embassy in Dar Es Salaam and, of course, 9/11.

In 1993, MI5 had only 2000 staff and 70 per cent of its efforts were focussed on terrorism, much of it targeted towards the activities of the IRA and domestic terrorism. 25 per cent was devoted to counter-espionage and counter-proliferation - the latter against the growing threat from ‘weapons of mass destruction . . . nuclear, chemical and biological.”

MI6 was still coming out of the shadows of fighting the Cold War and, despite having more overseas stations than it does today, Islamist terrorism was not seen as a threat. The CT agencies – MI5, MI6, GCHQ, DIS and Special Forces (SF) - were also very stove-piped and we did not share intelligence and knowledge about the threat. MI5 now has 4000+ staff and is funded as part of the Single Intelligence Account (£3.02 billion in 2017–2018 financial year, which includes the budget for GCHQ).

There is a now national network of MI5 agents, with a significant proportion focussed on Islamist terrorism, based out of the Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs), but still with a reasonable proportion leading the efforts against Northern Ireland related terrorism. More significantly, our domestic and international CT policy and operations are combined, taking into account the global, physical and virtual nature of the threat.

9/11 was a huge wake up call for our CT agencies, and the start of a more coordinated international collaboration across the 5 Eyes community (UK, US, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada). Although the challenge of sharing timely and accurate intelligence still existed, and our US partners were in the early years, in my opinion, determined to win the War on Terror on their own terms and often under their own steam. The major challenge in the aftermath of 9/11 was that the so called ‘war on terror’, which was the political cover for regime change in Iraq, became conflated and confused with a ‘neocon’ political agenda. Notwithstanding, collaboration across the UK CT communities improved, albeit slowly. This was enhanced with the implementation of CONTEST, and the four pillars of Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. This was the first CT policy of its kind, and it endures, with little change, today.

The game changer, in my view, was the creation of the CTUs and (then a network of CT Intelligence Units - CTIUs) in London, Manchester, Birmingham and Leeds that fused Police, MI5, MI6, GCHQ and SF Liaison Officers) under the direction of Assistant Commissioner Special Operations (ACSO) and the oversight of Association of Chief Police Offices Terrorism and Allied Matters (ACPO TAM) with a new �鶹�� Office department, the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT, now named the �鶹��land Security Group), to provide the policy lead. The attacks in London in July 2005, ‘7/7’ and ‘7/21’, created another strategic shock. This saw the coming of age of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), formed in 2003, which brought all the CT agencies together, fusing all source intelligence and full inter-agency cooperation. JTAC is an exemplar organisation, envied by our European partners and has done much to keep the threat of terrorism to the level it is.

Current Threat Landscape
Since 9/11 we have witnessed a huge amount of chaos and uncertainty and the current terrorist threat landscape continues to evolve, remaining complex and confusing, recently highlighted by still unexplained motivations of the perpetrator who, based on what we know, tried to attack the Liverpool Women’s Hospital. The threat from all terrorist constituencies is arguably more dangerous and diverse than in 2000. This concern was recently highlighted by Richard Moore, the new head of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), who stated that countering international terrorism is now one of the ‘Big Four’ priorities for MI6.

The emergence of the ‘self-initiated terrorist’, i.e. one who acts relatively alone and is informed and radicalised via the internet, appears to be the main threat to the UK. This has changed over the last five to six years when terrorist attacks were a combination of those directed from abroad, frustrated ‘travellers’ who could not get out to the so-called Caliphate and those who simply acted on their own.

The continuing rise of Right Wing extremism is increasingly of concern. This trend is well recognised but during 2021 it certainly saw no sign of slowing, especially in Europe and North America – as illustrated by the riots in Washington in January 2021. Previously confined to the US and Europe it now poses a more transnational and global threat. Right Wing extremism used to be characterised, by some, as ‘hapless and hopeless’. Now a more cellular structure, often portrayed as a political movement with a clear vision and mission, Right Wing extremists have more connectivity and coordination than they did 5 years ago, and, as with Islamist extremism, they have shifted ‘online’ with access to the same suite of highly effective ‘virtual’ tools and resources at their disposal.

However, the chaotic threat landscape does not necessarily mean we are likely to face more frequent or sophisticated attacks, it may simply lead to a broader range of attacks. Experience tells us that terrorists are persistent, and they will continue to plan for mass casualty attacks using the full spectrum of technologies and methodologies available – be they sophisticated devices or those which are more readily to hand and off the shelf.

I would argue that we need to deal with terrorism end to end, looking at both the drivers of terrorism as well as its consequences. The involvement of businesses and the private sector is crucial to our success. As Neil Basu, senior lead for CT in the UK, commented at a Pool Re conference in 2019, ‘there can be no prosperity without security and that every business needed to be a counter terrorism business’. The forthcoming Protect Duty legislation will put more requirements on businesses, especially those operating in publicly accessible locations to protect their customers and the public from terrorist attacks.

Post Pandemic and biological weapons?
The Covid-19 pandemic impacted (and continues to do so) on all societies and economies, exacerbating many of the divisions which are exploited by extremist groups. Many commentators and CT professionals predicted a post pandemic surge of terrorist attacks as the country came out of lockdown. This is yet to manifest itself at scale, as witnessed in 2017, but the murder of Sir David Amess and the failed attack on the women’s hospital in Liverpool, both within a month of each other, may herald the start of a series of further incidents.

The consequences of the pandemic on terrorism are still unfolding, but early signs indicate increased levels of radicalisation. Of significant concern is the impact on CT (and related) budgets. The pandemic has left a serious economic scar on the global economy. Will we face further cuts, and budget reviews? How will this affect the international CT infrastructure and our preparedness to prevent or minimise the effects of an attack? We have already witnessed many countries scaling back on their international commitments (for example the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan) which is already reducing the pressure on a wide range of terrorist groups.

The pandemic has also demonstrated the potency and scope a biological attack could pose. We now need to consider to what extent terrorists are likely to invest time and effort in exploring this as a serious means of destruction. It is generally believed that a sophisticated weaponised virus would be difficult to produce and deploy successfully, not least because when released it becomes so difficult to control and is indiscriminate in its effect. Covid-19 will most likely have resurrected terrorist interest in developing biological and chemical weapons. Five years of experimentation of novel weapons, in particular chemical IEDs, in Iraq and Syria during the time of the so-called Caliphate, will have contributed to their knowledge of using them. They will be well versed in the psychological impact of ‘terror’ weapons. Whether they have the appetite and means to deploy a biological weapon is not something to be ignored, especially when the 2021 UK Integrated Review warned of a successful chemical, biological or radiological device being used by a terrorist group before 2030.

The forever consequences of the withdrawal from Afghanistan
Much has already been written about the calamitous withdrawal of US and other forces from Afghanistan - what Presidents Trump and Biden called the ‘forever war.’ Afghanistan continues to spiral into a humanitarian, economic, security and political crisis, exacerbated by splits between the Taliban movement, which is likely to lead to a civil war and further chaos which will be exploited by state, non-state, and terrorist groups. The withdrawal of US and coalition troops cannot be discussed as either the right or wrong decision, rather an unnecessary and poorly timed one, with massive and forever consequences. The mass exodus of Afghans from their homeland will add to further pressures of a migrant population in Europe and the UK which, will in turn, increase tensions within some elements of society. This is likely to be exploited by both Islamists and the Far Right. What is certain is that the Taliban victory in Afghanistan has provided a major morale boost for Jihadist groups around the world, which will no doubt be of benefit to AQ and its affiliates. The West will be less safe, with increased probability of another 9/11 style attack being planned and prepared from Afghanistan.

A counter narrative to the negative consequences of the withdrawal from Afghanistan is the potential for this decision to lead to an inflexion point in the ‘war on terror’. Whilst random and seemingly isolated incidents and self-initiated terrorists will continue to be a problem, the fundamental rationale for the Islamist extremists’ call to arms, namely our presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, has now disappeared. No longer can the West be blamed for interfering in Muslims’ lives as both countries are now being run by Islamic governments albeit with very different political and religious hues. The call to arms expressed so successfully by AQ and then by Daesh was predicated on Western interference in Iraq and Afghanistan will be much more difficult to substantiate and justify. What we may see instead is a struggle for power and control between various Islamic groups in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and the Sahel, with less focus on fermenting extremism and launching attacks in the West.

Sadly, the attraction of the so-called Caliphate spreading to western Europe will likely continue. The narrative will resonate amongst some of the many disenfranchised and disillusioned young men and women in the disaffected and economically depressed areas of the UK, France, the Low Countries and across much of the sub-Sahara and Sahel.

Time will tell.

Climate change
Despite climate change starting to inform the political dialogue in 2001, very few experts could have foreseen the serious consequences climate change would have on the impact of the drivers of terrorism. Clear evidence is now emerging that climate change is becoming an indirect contributor to terrorism as opposed to just a security concern (for example, inter- and intra-regional disputes over water). Climate change is viewed as a threat multiplier, exacerbating existing problems, causing massive social dislocation and migration, be it in the Sahel or Afghanistan, which provides opportunities for terrorists to coerce or recruit foot soldiers amongst disgruntled or displaced people. More often than not this has the effect of solidifying support around local issues as much as ideological ones. In some instances, climate change rhetoric may be adopted as the primary ideology of a terrorist group or the embracing of terrorist tactics by environmental extremists and Left-wing groups as societies become more vulnerable to radicalisation and extremist mobilisation.

Protect Duty: A response to new and changing threats
More recently, the findings of the 2021 Manchester Arena Enquiry have paved the way for the forthcoming Protect Duty legislation which emanated from Martyn’s Law and is expected to come into effect in the latter part of 2022. The legislation is intended to provide clear guidance on a range of requirements as well as placing legal expectation on businesses and organisations who own property or operate in publicly accessible places, such as arenas, shopping centres and the high street. Protect Duty will be the single biggest change to the UK terrorism risk landscape for a generation and is likely to affect at least 650,000 (�鶹�� Office estimate) businesses in the UK, many of which will never have considered the risk of terrorism to their people or property. This will no doubt be challenging for all but the largest and more sophisticated businesses, with business owners and operators facing the largest change to their terrorism liability cover for both Employers’ Liability and Public Liability.

What does the future hold?
Having reflected on my early days patrolling the streets of West Belfast, through to leading and conducting high intensity CT operations, then into the quagmires of Iraq and Afghanistan, and now in the post (so-called) Caliphate era, let me share a few thoughts for the future of countering terrorism.

• In my view, we will never again fight an enemy who tries to fight against our own strengths. The last person to do this was Saddam Hussein in 1991 when he laid out the Iraqi Army in drill like formations on the desert plains. Therefore, we need to combine technological advantage, cunning, and boldness into a winning combination that can defeat an opposition who are comfortable with asymmetry and exploit the flow of technological change as opposed to being constrained by it. It is also possible that state sponsored actors
will conduct asymmetric attacks rather than a state engaging in open warfare.

• The major groups such as Daesh AQ, Al Shabaab, Hezbollah and Boko Haram are still very much alive. They have adapted their tactics and business models to changing circumstances. These actors are also having an impact in emerging and frontier markets, threatening many of the West’s global supply chains within the ‘Global Village’.

• The humiliating withdrawal of Western forces from Afghanistan has increased the threat of terrorism to Europe and the UK. The possibility of another 9/11 being planned and prepared from Afghanistan cannot be discounted.

• Terrorism is now moving with greater velocity and increasing volatility, exposing our vulnerabilities – be they resource, legal or policy driven. We need to adapt our CT business models in response and make them more dynamic.

• We discussed the rise of Right Wing extremism, often based on white supremacist groups. These groups are now carrying out more attacks in the United States than the jihadists and constitute 20 per cent of cases under investigation by the FBI. Recent statistics for Prevent, the UK government’s counter-extremism programme, showed that for the first time in the programme’s history, referrals made in relation to Right Wing extremism outstripped those for Islamist extremism.

• The trouble is that terrorists and extremists will continue to use tactics, techniques and procedures that exploit gaps and weaknesses in our state and corporate security architecture, as well as divisions in our communities. They will continue to move up the technology curve, and they will succeed until there is an antidote. Part of this solution, as acknowledged by the new Director of MI6, is that his Service is no longer independently capable of staying competitive at a time of rapid technological development. Consequently,
he envisages MI6 working alongside technology companies and other private sector organisations to increase the former’s capabilities presented by newly emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence and advanced computing. Genuine collaboration between the public and private sector is now needed if we are to successfully contain the enduring threat posed by extremism and terrorism.

• Next is the growing number of targets of terrorist violence. It is no longer the state or its representatives in diplomacy, police or the military that are the primary target. Rather any group in society that can be stigmatised, such as Jews, Hispanics, LGBT activists or pro-EU liberals and where hatred can be whipped up by conspiracy theories in the social media, are all potential targets.

• Terrorism is linked to armed conflicts and social breakdown within countries. Domestic violence is running at four times the number of war deaths globally and 75 per cent of terrorist casualties occur in just eight countries. These are among the most violent, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Somalia. The macro drivers of climate change, migration, immigration, and population growth are all contributing to a worrying security situation.

• As the definitions of state and state sponsored terrorism, hybrid warfare and terrorism become increasingly blurred it will become progressively harder for CT agencies to counter and constrain physical and virtual attacks against our democratic values, people, and assets. The ambiguity surrounding the definition of terrorism will create further, significant challenges to Pool Re and the broader terrorism (re)insurance market, particularly with resultant protection gap issues.

• In response, we need to be threat actor and peril agnostic in devising security, risk management and resilience plans. In particular, we need to increase the resilience of our physical and virtual supply chains.

• Finally, everyone should acknowledge that there has been a paradigm shift in risk management as a result of Covid-19, and organisations will need to recognise that they have to adapt as they look at implementing new strategies and plans to protect their people, assets, reputation and share value. This includes focussing on strategic tail risk management, as well as the day-to-day risk management activities and asking the question whether they have the appropriate insurance cover in place for the full spectrum of perils out there.

To close
In conclusion, especially after recent events in Afghanistan, I would argue that the threat from global terrorism and extremism to the UK and West is now greater than it was pre 9/11. The threat is now more diverse, persistent, complex, and moves and evolves at a pace not seen before. I strongly believe that in order to prepare for, and become more resilient to terrorism, all sectors of society need to think differently, act differently, and respond differently to the threats facing us today and for the foreseeable future.

I have witnessed a real appetite in the private sector to engage with and level up to these new threats, seeking more frequent collaboration with the CT Police and Security Services. Collaboration across sectors, public and private, is crucial for our safety and security, where all of us have a ‘community responsibility’ for our individual and collective security. Government cannot contain the threat on its own. At the end of the day, this is about looking after our people, duty of care, protecting the bottom line and improving our resilience against extremism and terrorism.

I don’t believe the current situation will improve for some time; we can and should expect more attacks in the UK and further afield. We all have a duty, and I would suggest public responsibility, towards our employees, communities, families and the next generation to better understand the context of today’s uncertain, unstable and asymmetric world. Paraphrasing TE Lawrence again, we need to learn to eat more soup with knives and try and ‘synchronise this asymmetry’, using all ways and means to defeat those who are intent on doing us harm.

About the author
Ed Butler is the Chief Resilience Officer at Pool Re, the government backed terrorism reinsurance scheme as well a Senior Independent Advisor to the Board of EDF Energy Generation.

He has extensive experience spanning nearly 40 years of international relations, counter terrorism, intelligence, security and risk management much of which was gained during 24 years on front line service with the British Army.

He was privileged to command 22 SAS over 9.11 and was Commander of British Forces Afghanistan in 2006, before retiring as a Brigadier in 2008.

www.poolre.co.uk

Why it is not a good idea to conflate hate and terrorism

Michael Lyons — Tue, 21 Sep 2021 10:08:44 +0000

Terrorism

All terrorists commit crimes that are based on some degree of hate: not all hate constitutes terrorism.

US pop star Taylor Swift, in her song Shake It Off, crooned 'And the haters gonna hate, hate, hate, hate, hate'. I am not a fan of her music but even I have to admit that particular hit was catchy.

Humans are capable of incredible heights - or depths - of hatred. Recent examples in human history include the Holodomor in Ukraine in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Holocaust under the Nazis in the 1940s and the Rwandan genocide in 1994. If you look through Canadian linguist/psychologist's 2011 book The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined however, you would see that things were actually much worse on that front historically (thankfully, violence is going down, not up as many assume).

Nevertheless, hatred is still a part of the human condition and will most likely always be so. At times that hate manifests itself as invective and nasty words: at others in acts of heinous violence as the horrendous examples above note.

As societies we have a natural interest in undermining hate before it leads to deaths and injuries. When those efforts fail, however, we resort to arrests, trials and incarceration to deal with the assailants and the consequences of their actions.

In most nations the crimes with which hatemongers can be charged range from assault to murder, or conspiracy to commit both offences. In some jurisdictions, like Canada, judges have the leeway to impose stiffer sentences when it is shown that the actions were motivated by hate (section 319 of the Canadian Criminal Code).

What does this have to do with terrorism? Simply put, there are some who want to conflate hate crimes with terrorist ones: that to my mind is a mistake and likely to lead to unwanted consequences.

Terrorism is a subset of hate, not a synonym. Terrorists and terrorist movements are ideologically-driven to commit serious acts of violence, whether that underlying ideology is religious, political or other in nature. These ideologies usually, if not always, have a hate element if they are not completely riven with hatred towards an identifiable group (or in the case of Islamist extremism many such groups: women, the West, LGBTQ, other Muslims, etc.).

Many hatemongers are not, however, tied to an ideology: they just really, really hate. Combining the two groups and prosecuting them identically is a bad idea. Proving that a given individual targeted someone for his/her actions is relatively straightforward: proving that a deep-seated ideology was the primary reason is much more complicated.

Nevertheless, there are calls for more crimes to be treated as acts of terrorism. The leader of Sweden's centre-right opposition has called for the country to use its far-reaching terror legislation against gang criminals. A London (Ontario) court charged a man who appears to have deliberately run over a family of Muslims, killing four and wounding one, with terrorism, despite the lack of publicly-available information indicating that an ideology was at the root of the act.

To this we have to add the call for violent 'incels' ('involuntary celibates') to be treated as 'terrorists'. Some see conspiracy theorists (like QAnon) in the same boat. To my mind this is muddling what is and what is not terrorism (fully recognising that the definition has changed over time).

One aspect that is lost in this debate is the question of which organisation will be tasked with investigating and preventing these violent acts. Law enforcement? Security intelligence agencies? Where will the resources come from? What priorities will these investigations be accorded? What other priorities will be shunted aside?

How long is it before some demand that spousal (or child) abuse be labeled acts of terrorism? After all, these are clearly hate-filled violent incidents. If so, where does this all end?

What if court cases fail when the Crown/prosecution is unable to prove terrorism beyond a reasonable doubt? Will ne'er-do-wells walk free? Will this undermine real terrorism cases?

In my way of seeing things we need to use the terrorism moniker LESS not MORE frequently. We have 'terrorism on the brain' and see it as an expanding scourge with existential implications despite evidence to the contrary.

We have the laws and means to go after those who strike out in hateful ways. We do not need to call all these individuals 'terrorists'. When everything is terrorism in effect nothing is.

Phil Gurski is the President and CEO of Borealis Threat and Risk Consulting in Canada and a 32-year Canadian intelligence veteran. His latest book The Peaceable Kingdom: A history of terrorism in Canada from Confederation to the present is available on his website.

www.borealisthreatandrisk.com

How terrorists get their victims where they want them

Michael Lyons — Fri, 02 Jul 2021 08:49:26 +0000

Terrorism

Terrorists look for the big spectacular, they know the effects of a massive attack. This usually means loss of life and the destruction of buildings and infrastructure. Generally, their aim is to cow the general population or goad a government into action in ways they deem beneficial to their cause. Journalist Lawrence Wright was one of the first to suggest that bin Laden's goal all along was to lure the United States into Afghanistan, which had long been called 'The Graveyard of Empires’.

If you visit the MI5 website, they itemise the many different methods of attack; many of which are wearyingly familiar. But the security service also talks about the terrorist’s ability to innovate and goes on to cite the Paris attacks which involved a complex plot deploying ‘multiple attackers and a range of weapons’.

Terrorists are agile and are constantly searching for new ways to manipulate their victims to get them where they want them to inflict the greatest amount of harm.

US embassy attack
In 1998 terrorists attacked United States embassy buildings in two East African cities. More than 200 people were killed when truck bombs exploded in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. At the time I was working for ABC News and was despatched by their London bureau to go to Kenya to help cover the story.

Twelve Americans died in the attacks, but the vast majority of casualties were African citizens. The explosion in Nairobi damaged the US embassy but far greater devastation was done to the nearby Ufundi Building. Thousands were injured in the attack and while covering the story we visited local hospitals where they were taken. Many of the victims had terrible facial wounds and were blinded. We soon found out why.

When the terrorists drove their bomb laden truck to the embassy, they opened fire on the security guard at the gate to gain entry. They also threw a stun grenade at other guards and this small explosion was heard by those in surrounding buildings, bringing many people to the windows. Moments later the truck bomb detonated and windows within a half mile radius were shattered causing terrible injuries to people’s faces. Whether this was the assassin’s intention it’s impossible to know but the small blast followed by the huge explosion had terrible consequences.

For the moment at least, and I may be tempting fate here, the spectaculars seem to be in obeyance. Perhaps this can be linked to Covid and the subsequent lockdowns which has led to atomised working. Terrorists like their victims in tightly packed groups.

Credit should also go to the security services who are now far better at uncovering large, sophisticated plots. However, once again, terror groups have innovated and now often rely on individuals to carry out their atrocities.

Lone actors
In London we endured the 2005 attacks on the tube and bus networks when 52 people were killed and hundreds more were injured in explosions on three Underground trains and a bus. It happened the day after London was awarded the 2012 Olympic Games. Since them we’ve seen a string of terror attacks in the capital largely perpetrated by lone actors.

In March 2017 five people were killed and many more injured by a man targeting pedestrians as he drove across Westminster Bridge. Aside from jumping into the Thames, there was no avenue of escape. He went on to crash into the gates of Parliament before fatally stabbing PC Keith Palmer.

In June of the same year three terrorists drove a van at people walking over London Bridge before staging an attack in nearby Borough Market. Eight people were killed including the attackers who were shot dead by police.

Unrepentant fanatic
The most recent, most egregious example, of a fanatic manipulating the system to put his intended victims in extreme jeopardy was another attack on London Bridge perpetrated by convicted terrorist Usman Khan.

In 2012, Khan pleaded guilty to preparing an act of terror and was sentenced to a 16-year prison term. He was released halfway through his sentence and had been living in Stafford following his release on licence in December 2018.

While in prison Khan is reported to have written a letter asking to take part in a de-radicalisation course. In the letter, obtained by ITV News, Khan wrote: “I would like to do such a course so I can prove to the authorities, my family and soicity [sic] in general that I don't carry the views I had before my arrest and also I can prove that at the time I was immature, and now I am much more mature and want to live my life as a good Muslim and also a good citizen of Britain.” Unfortunately, he was taken at his word.

In November he travelled, unescorted, by train, to attend a prisoner rehabilitation initiative run by Cambridge University at Fishmongers Hall on London Bridge.

He gamed the system which allowed him to go on a deadly rampage among an entirely unprotected group of people who were all gathered to help benefit his life and others like him. He repaid that trust by taping knives to his wrists and killing two young people: Saskia Jones and Jack Merritt.

Members of the public subdued Khan with a fire extinguisher and an ornamental Narwal tusk before police, fearing he was about to detonate a suicide vest, shot him dead. The vest was a fake.

To combat these opportunist attacks the security services, and the public must be on their guard to respond to new attack vectors. Anyone walking over the bridges of central London will see that barriers are now in place stop attackers driving at pedestrians.

Similarly, we are constantly being reminded of the See it, Say it, Sorted mantra which is designed to keep the public on their guard. Authorities often struggle to tread that fine line between keeping the public safe and aware without unnecessarily alarming them.

Tech innovation
From a terrorist’s point of view these attacks have often proved successful perhaps because of their low-tech nature. Security services inevitably find it difficult to track individuals acting alone brandishing knives or driving cars. Where terrorists are anything but low-tech is when it comes to their use of social media.

An article on the Lawfare website points out that at its peak, ‘Islamic State operated more than 46,000 Twitter accounts and could push content to millions of people’. Largely, because of their ability to manipulate social media, they were able to draw more than 40,000 foreign fighters from 120 different countries to their theatre of operations in Iraq and Syria.

The group also used social media to plan and coordinate terror attacks. Discussions could become virtual and removed the need for face-to-face meetings between those planning an attack and the operative who was to carry it out.

Their approach coincided with a huge rise in the numbers of people using social media. In 2010 Facebook had roughly 600 million monthly users. By 2014 that number stood at 1.4 billion. What was once niche had become mainstream.

WhatsApp and other similar applications offering end-to-end encryption played into their hands and allowed inaccessible communications between jihadists.

On 24 July 2016 Mohammed Daleel detonated a suicide bomb at a German music festival. The plot was kept from the authorities and the bomber was the only fatality though fifteen others were injured.

The Lawfare website quotes a discussion between the bomber and his handler that took place over social media just prior to the attack. It’s quite clear that Daleel was very fearful, and the attack might not have happened at all had the handler not been online.

Daleel: [The music festival] will be over soon, and there are checks at the entrance.
Handler: Look for a suitable place and try to disappear into the crowd. Break through police cordons, run, and do it.

Daleel: Pray for me. You do not know what is happening with me right now.
Handler: Forget the festival and go over to the restaurant. Hey man, what is going on with you? Even if just two people were killed, I would do it. Trust in God and walk straight up to the restaurant.

Social media companies have faced pressure to remove jihadi and other extremist material but as this chilling dialogue indicates apps can have many uses.

So how are we best placed to avoid putting ourselves in danger? How can we escape being put where terrorists want us?

Vulnerable muster points
Just before the pandemic and the subsequent lockdowns forced us to work from home, I was at a meeting at the offices of a client in one of the newer skyscrapers in the City of London. The fire alarms sounded and although it was clearly a drill, all those inside had to quit the building and assemble at a muster point nearby.

The building boasts more than thirty floors, so it took more than an hour to clear the site as we weren’t allowed to use the lifts and had to walk down the emergency staircases. Everyone was told that the muster point was Leadenhall Market, which is where we all went to be accounted for.

Perhaps it’s my over fertile imagination but I’m sure I wasn’t the only one thinking what a vulnerable group we all were standing in large groups waiting to have our names checked. Nothing happened but as offices start to be repopulated and work moves away from home perhaps it’s this kind of drill that needs looking at. Was it a good and effective exercise or could it have played directly into the hands of terrorists?

Terrorists are agile, innovative, and as has been said many times have only to be lucky once whereas security services are charged with keeping the public safe at all times. We may have been lulled into a false sense of security during the pandemic with its concurrent drop in terror activity. Unfortunately, we can be quietly confident the threat has not gone away.

Written by Jim Preen, YUDU Sentinel Crisis Management director.

Jim designs and delivers crisis simulation exercises and is responsible for the company’s written material. Formerly a journalist, he worked at ABC News (US) where he covered the Gulf War and the Bosnian conflict. He won two Emmys while working at ABC.

Mass shootings are terrifying, but are they all ‘terrorism’?

Michael Lyons — Fri, 30 Apr 2021 08:17:41 +0000

Terrorism

We have ‘terrorism on the brain’ and vested interests are using any excuse to label all acts of violence committed by any group as terrorist, writes Phil Gurski

Our continued difficulty in defining what terrorism is and what it is not is not helpful.

If I am not mistaken most people probably have a good, if not a very good, impression of New Zealand. Far off in the South Pacific and hence hard to get to (trust me, I’ve been there four or five times and it takes forever!) it is nevertheless a beautiful land full of amazing scenery and very nice people.

It is also a relatively peaceful nation with a relatively low crime rate. As one Website put it: “You’re more likely to get hurt while participating in an extreme sport than by a criminal down here”. Sounds good to me.

And yet, a few years back New Zealand was the scene of a horrific mass murder. A right-wing extremist from Australia, Brenton Tarrant, entered two mosques in Christchurch in the South Island in March 2019 and opened fire. By the time he had finished shooting 51 people were dead and another 40 wounded. In August 2020 he was sentenced to life in jail without parole – the first person in the country’s history to receive the sentence. One of the counts on which he was found guilty was terrorism, again a first in NZ.

By all accounts New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinta Ardern put in an extraordinary performance in the aftermath of this tragedy. She said and did the right things and in essence was the true leader everyone looks for when things of this nature happen. Unlike certain heads of state in recent history who shall remain nameless.

New Zealand reverted to its usual low key self afterwards. Not all places are so lucky.

Fast forward to last week and the land which experiences more mass shootings than any other witnessed yet another one. On 15 April a 19-year old former FedEx employee entered a facility near Indianapolis and killed eight and wounded several more before taking his own life. The FBI is rightly cautioning against jumping to conclusions on a motive for the crime. During an earlier investigation into the shooter – his mother was concerned he would try to get killed in what is known as ‘suicide by cop’ – the FBI noted 'no Racially Motivated Violent Extremism (RMVE) ideology was identified during the course of the assessment'.

So, where does this leave us?
In a phrase, in the realm of uncertainty.

Tarrant’s spree was definitely an act of terrorism as he was known to espouse anti-Islamic and pro RWE ideas. In other words, his actions were a) extremely violent and b) ideologically-motivated which makes them terrorist in nature. The Indianapolis shooter’s reasons are as yet unknown and may never be discovered as he is not cooperating with police (on account that he is dead). Despite our hunger for why we may have to satisfy ourselves with 'we do not know'.

Alas, this information gap has not stopped some from leaping to conclusions. As four of the dead were Sikh an advocacy group has already urged a probe of possible racial or ethnic hatred as a factor, despite a grand total of zero clues in that regard. It is nevertheless likely that conclusions have been drawn and some of these will be hard to undermine regardless of whether new information surfaces in the weeks and months to come.

The bottom line
The unnecessary deaths of eight FedEx workers may be nothing but a terrible act of violence by a messed up young man (there is some possible link to mental illness here). That the act was terrifying is not in question. That it was terrorism is, despite New Zealand‘s unfortunate decision to include ‘fear incitement’ in its revised definition of terrorism, most definitely still at issue. I am sure that the criminal ‘incited fear’: that does not make him a terrorist.

I once again see that we are losing the thread when it comes to what is and what is not terrorism. The ‘court of public opinion‘ rather than the real court has already ruled and there is no room for appeal. We continue to have ‘terrorism on the brain’ and a whole slew of vested interests (ethnic and other socially-structured groups, lobbies, academics, etc.) are using any excuse to label any act of violence committed by an identifiable gathering as terrorist (hello incels!).

This is neither necessary nor productive. If those making these noises succeed and end up influencing governments to make policy and operational decisions to expand the terrorism remit we will see organisations responsible for countering it end up with way too much on their plates (which are already overfull in an all-you-can-eat buffet way). That ain’t good.
Let’s come to an agreement shall we?

Let’s refrain from calling just about everything ‘terrorism‘ before the facts – any facts! – are in. And let’s stop classifying every brain fart produced by every Tom, Dick and Harriet as an ‘ideology'. Let’s keep terrorism where it belongs: a thankfully rare event (in most places that are not Afghanistan) that does not need more attention than it deserves.

Please?

Phil Gurski is the President and CEO of Borealis Threat and Risk Consulting Ltd. and Programme Director for the Security, Economics and Technology (SET) hub at the University of Ottawa’s Professional Development Institute (PDI). Phil is a 32-year veteran of CSE and CSIS and the author of five books on terrorism.

This article first appeared here.