Counter Terror Business - Event Security

Ensuring safe cities, stadiums, and public viewing events at mega-events

Meghan Shaw — Mon, 06 Jan 2025 16:00:09 +0000

A summer filled with sports in 2024 has now come to an end. The Olympics and the European Football Championship packed stadiums and drew hundreds of thousands of fans into city centres and to large public viewing areas. In this review, Christian Schneider explores where spectators were particularly well-protected and how we might further enhance the resilience of public spaces using proven security strategies.

Security risks at large events

When over 300,000 people gather nearly every day in packed flocks, grouped by their nationality at pre-defined locations to celebrate, it unfortunately may become more than just a cheerful party; it also represents a luring opportunity for extremists to attack those soft targets. Terror organisations worldwide eagerly welcome such occasions, as highlighted in
the call “To the stadiums”, by the Islamic State, in April 2024. Here, attackers can, with minimal effort and low detection risk, ram vehicles into dense crowds in single or
multiple waves in a manner reminiscent of attacks that already proved fatal and famous in Nice, France and Berlin Christmas market, Germany.

Crowded city centres and public viewing sites are particularly attractive targets, and the crowds at publicly accessible locations and surrounding stadiums are especially at risk.

The threat of vehicle ram attacks

The disproportionate rise in vehicular attacks in recent years (RAND, 2022) is both trivial and pragmatic: Large Goods Vehicles are the most efficient terror weapon (Al Qaida 2011, Islamic State 2016). Not only on the continent, vehicles are advantageous over the use of other deadly weapons in terror attacks, employing a known guerrilla warfare tactic (Gaynor, B. 2002) called the prevention paradox. The guiding principle for such terrorist actions is simple: an asymmetrical risk-resource-benefit ratio that favours the attackers.

In essence, using vehicles as weapons is cheap (resources), simple (detection risk), and effective (benefit). Such attacks require neither complex planning (resources, risk) nor high-level expertise (resources) to inflict significant injury or even fatalities, attracting widespread media attention (benefit). In contrast, effective protection measures are hindered by the prevention paradox, which works to extremists’ advantage. Since, “There is no glory in prevention” (Rose, G. 1985), effective protective measures, require considerable application expertise (resources), well-designed organisational systems (resources), and effective vehicle security barriers (resources). Reliable countermeasures are neither trivial to plan nor to implement (resources). Moreover, with tight prevention budgets and widespread disaster fatigue, the often-unseen benefit of reliable protection efforts must be argued for through time-intensive justification procedures (cost, proficiency, resources).

Positive trends in Hostile Vehicle Mitigation

Fortunately, the good news is that most cities, stadiums, and public viewing events surveyed on the continent have shown notable improvements in terms of Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) in recent years! This could be attributed to tireless and foresighted awareness campaigns published by the NPSA, NaCTSO, UNOCT and the media following the more than 140 hostile vehicle attacks around the world since 2014 (NPSA, 2024), which are now bearing fruit, albeit with room for improvement.

Fortunately, the once-popular yet highly hazardous concrete blocks are increasingly being replaced by properly certified (ISO22343-1, ISO IWA 14-1, PAS68) Vehicle Security Barriers (VSB) barriers. Yet, eight years after the Nice and Berlin attacks, still, more often than not proven application expertise (ISO22343-) carried out by suitably qualified and experienced persons, e.g. certified HVM-Specialist Security Advisors (RSES), keeps on to be the exception. Even worse, a rising number of new businesses are making money by lulling event organisers and spectators into a false and, in some cases, fatal promise of security.

The main challenge: professional planning and implementation of measures

Why, it must be asked, is HVM still considered in many places as a form of event technology? Is it possibly to avoid informing mostly public clients of the applicable civil engineering and built environment regulations? Why are increasing numbers of unqualified “experts” entering the market, aiming to make quick money with glossy brochures and bold promises despite lacking peer reviewed expertise in construction, physics, HVM, and engineering?

This dangerous mix poses significant risks and liability also for these clients, especially if courts may soon have to address issues of deficiencies or, in the worst case, fatalities. HVM may not be rocket science, but still it is far from a trivial undertaking. Internationally, it is well recognised that HVM is not a product range but a subfield within civil engineering and counter terrorism (CPNI 2013, UNOCT 2022, NPSA, RIBA & CPI 2023). In short, protecting against global terrorist groups requires relevant experience in engineering and specialised civil construction, coupled with in-depth knowledge of HVM and global networks.

This holds true especially with the noticeable shortcomings of portable vehicle security barriers applied in Europe this summer. These portable VSBs were often deployed so unprofessionally wrong that, in the event of a serious attack, they could not have the slightest chance to fulfil their protective function.

Especially portable VSBs must not only be properly certified but, further importantly, suited to their intended containment capacity, the surface they are placed on and their mode of function. Both the installers of these barriers and the often-unqualified planners better ought to critically assess their own engineering background in physics, mechanical engineering, and technical standards, before continuing to promote uninformed decisions and installations of VSBs.

Qualification and experience are essential

Quality stems from qualification! What is a given in other areas of daily life has yet to fully establish itself in HVM (or would you go to seek medical advice from a pharmaceutical manufacturers sales outlet rather than from qualified doctors and pharmacists?).

There is no way around it: those planning and implementing HVM must have solid technical training in the field of HVM, a strong foundation in construction and mechanical engineering, and stay up-to-date with international standards (CPD). The globally recognised gold standard not only for peer reviewed HVM specialists is the relevant list of experts administered by the Register of Security Engineers and Specialists (RSES). Clients seeking HVM are strongly advised to accept no less in the interest of security.

Best practices in professional security architecture can be found worldwide in projects where impartial planners from construction engineering work alongside certified RSES specialists to plan, specify, tender, and implement protection measures according to the relevant standards and guidelines.

German Best Practice: Stuttgart “Neckar Stadium”

The HVM measures applied for Stuttgart’s Euros Stadium deserve special mention. Stuttgart’s HVM measures protected the stadium at the highest level, doing so both economically and innovatively.

The most state-of-the-art HVM barriers at Stuttgart’s Neckar Stadium provide high level certified resilience. Even unbraked 30-tonne lorries ramming into the VSBs at a speed of 80 km/h (50mph) would barely damage these barriers. The project and planning team achieved this impressive level of protection cleverly by not only deploying the latest generation of barriers but even more importantly, by following the international HVM norm (ISO 22343-2) and the relevant guidelines published by the NPSA, ensuring compatibility with sustainability, discreet aesthetics, and accessibility for public transport, cyclists, and pedestrians, while also considering Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) and vandalism resistance considerations.

Thus, high-performance VSBs that allow greenery, tamper-proof control cabinets, and affordable sliding beams are contemporary features at the Neckar Stadium. The interdisciplinary project team designed the protective zone around the stadium with foresight, ensuring that visitors will continue to be also optimally protected at future Bundesliga football matches to come and future mega-events within the well-protected apron surrounding the stadium.

Conclusion with confidence

The 2024 Euros was not only a major sporting event but also a stress test for security architectures. While some weaknesses became apparent, there were also highly commendable strengths. When it comes to protecting soft targets from vehicular attacks, it became clear that HVM is a demanding, physical-technical discipline of construction and should therefore ideally be handled by experienced specialist security advisors and civil engineers following established construction plan of work. The example of Stuttgart’s Neckar Stadium and many others demonstrate this.

Whether for temporary or permanent HVM measures, quality and security do not emerge from colourful brochures but from the fundamental principles, regulations, and processes inherent in the construction industry. With the right preparation and interdisciplinary, impartial project teams, we can integrate urban future challenges and HVM in such a way that we create broad and most economic synergies previously barely considered.

All systems go for the new season

Robyn Quick — Fri, 16 Aug 2024 14:38:52 +0000

Event Security

Peter Houghton, director of operations at the Football Safety Officers Association (FSOA) sets out some of the risks that could be experienced during the new football season and what can and is being done about them.

As the players are returning for their pre-season training, our safety officers are returning from holiday to see what challenges 2024-2025 will present.

With the Euros over, the EFL is already underway and the Premier League is not far behind.

Pitch Incursions

During the Euros, we saw an above average number of “lone wolf” pitch incursions with individuals trying to get a “selfie” with certain footballers, but apart from that, the German local authorities and police appear to have carried out an excellent operation and delivered an excellent competition.

Pitch incursions and invasions are never far from the headlines and our safety officers, the Premier League and EFL have collaborated extensively designing methods of trying to avoid them. “Lone wolf” incursions are always difficult to predict and the point where the perimeter barrier is breached can never be anticipated. Invasions are easier to predict, but no matter how many stewards a club can parade around the pitch perimeter, they are always outnumbered by the people jumping the fence, meaning that we have to have an equal concern for steward safety. I do like the perimeter wall patrol system they use at Rangers Ibrox Stadium which appears to be quite effective.

An individual running on to the field presents us with additional dangers as we don’t know their intentions, and it could have terrorist overtones.

Safety officers are aware of this and have written their risk assessments and their mitigation strategies.

Martyn's Law

Martyn’s Law was shelved at the end of the last government, but it was included in the King’s Speech and new prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer has committed to making this law by the end of 2024. Clubs have concerns about their stadia and what has come to be known as “Zone-Ex” – the spaces immediately outside a stadium and on its approaches which inadvertently becomes a “crowded place” on the way to the match.

Grounds that access directly on to busy roads have to implement traffic management programmes which involve road closures and in view of vehicles-borne attacks have taken the decision to acquire additional portable structures to help with the closures and help prevent an attack of this nature. Even a stadium that enjoys an island site may have to put in road closures as part of its egress safety policy.

Our Association has teamed up with key provider, Crowdguard whose kit is visible pretty much all over the country, not only around sports stadia, but also where local authorities have open-access events, an example being the Durham Miners “Big Day” which is attended by close on 30000 people and involves a march through the streets of Durham to the parade grounds.

Counter-terrorism remains a massive focus in terms of risk to creating safe spaces for our supporters to watch and enjoy sporting and other events, especially as clubs seek to grow the size of their stadium to accommodate more spectators and in the case of one club, having a brand new 23,000 capacity arena constructed on one of its car parks and therefore affecting the crowd movement around the stadium itself.

Our clubs will be carrying out their risk assessments in respect of this and seeking the advice and help they need to keep their supporters safe. Our Association has a special incentive available to help them with these threat, vulnerability & risk assessments through its sponsorship arrangement with Crowdguard. Needless to say, the demand for this will increase rapidly now clubs are aware that the time for the implementation of the legislation is now closer than the horizon. Searching All venues, be they sports stadia, arenas or theatres are seeking to reduce the amount of things people take with them to events.

Gone are the days when you can turn up with a rucksack full of food and beverage hoping to avoid the prices being charged at the venue. Attendees should only take with them what they need – a small bag containing bank cards, cash, match ticket, car keys and mobile phone. This is primarily to ensure that the access control timeline is as short as possible.

Stewards have to ensure that flow rates are maintained in order to get everyone in on time and the more “stuff” a spectator has to be checked, the longer it takes and as the vast majority of people attending arrive in the last half hour, it creates log jams at the point of entry. So, the message is… don’t take too much with you. The need to search will not go away, so it important that spectators adhere to the policy in order to get people to their seats as quickly as possible.

What supporters don’t often realise is that the same strategy applies to stewards themselves and catering and hospitality staff. Often a stadium doesn’t have a spare room for match day workers belongings, so it is important that they, too, don’t bring in anything they don’t need to complete their work shift.

Stewarding

Stewarding itself still remains a challenge. The industry has just about recovered numbers-wise after Covid. Clubs have to meet minimum requirements as stated in the Green Guide, their own dot maps and Local Authority requirements.

Clubs feel it is preferable to have their own stewards, but, especially in the Premier League, this is rarely possible, so there is a dependency on supply security companies to provide for the clubs. Many have companies they have used for a while, but with the onset of additional responsibilities, need more and more and it is interesting to see that one of our own major sponsors, IPM Group UK Ltd, is being asked by an increasing number of clubs if they can help. This demand has seen them grow their portfolio to around 15 clubs now at all levels of the football spectrum.

Our other security partners are also receiving similar demands and thankfully our clubs can safely ensure their fixtures are fulfilled by parading sufficient safety and security staff. The industry is in the process of “smartening-up” stewarding with a view to creating a career pathway.

Additional education and knowledge standards are being created as well as a registration and CPD process with the ultimate view of increasing their pay to better reflect the responsibilities they now have, especially following the Manchester Arena atrocity. This is great news for the stewards, who week after week ensure that the full programmes of sports fixtures can go ahead and are responsible for keeping hundreds of thousands of people safe every week.

Sports grounds have certain positions that can be fulfilled by “safety stewards” and others that need to be fulfilled by “security stewards” and it is a case of “never the twain shall meet” and each steward type requires a different skill set. This can be overcome by training stewards in both sets of skills and this is something the industry is looking at, although the costs involve are quite prohibitive when you take into account the churn of people working in this area.

Drugs and pyrotechnics

In the post-Covid era the use of cocaine has become an increasing problem around our stadia and in other sorts, notably horse racing and F1 – big full-day outdoor events, where detection is more difficult. Working in days where the relative cost of this particular drug is manageable, we can see some evidence of its use where we didn’t previously.

In “normal” society, “snorting a line” is no longer the domain of hidden away areas. Individuals can be see doing this in plain sight across our city centres and indeed in sports grounds. It is difficult to manage as most stewards are not trained in this area as they are only trained to deal with the consequences.

Pyrotechnic devices, especially smoke canisters and flares continue also to be of concern as excessive smoke can often obliterate the view temporarily from the event control room and can provide cover for other misdemeanours.

Clearly in the cases of both drugs and pyros, the preventative measures begin at the entry point to the stadium, often the turnstile queue. A spectator wouldn’t know whether a detection dog was looking for drugs, pyros or other explosive devices. Generally, around these areas there are likely to be amnesty bins which could collect both drugs or pyros.

The person trying to smuggle them in knows the outcome which is likely to be a football banning order, so, a pyro-carrying spectator might put his pyros in the bin thinking it is a pyro dog and a drug-carrying spectator likewise thinking it is a drug detection dog.

In the event detection dog world, there simply aren’t enough dogs to go round. As Martyn’s Law approaches, there will be an increased demand for dogs, not only in a sports grounds context, but in more or less every walk of life. Handling companies are working flat out to train as many as possible, but increased demand from, for example, the Border Force, is taking a lot of dogs out of the sporting arena and into the more public service domain.

So, pre-season is just as busy as in-season…and the pre-season friendlies have already started.

Learn more

2024's summer of sports

Robyn Quick — Thu, 02 May 2024 14:52:01 +0000

Event Security

2024 will see the men’s Euros and the Olympic and Paralympic games take place in neighbouring countries over the space of a couple of months. These are some of the world’s biggest sporting events and will need detailed and effective security planning.

Previous events of the last few years should serve as a learning platform of what to do and more importantly what not to do, when it comes to stadium security, with a few high-profile events standing out.

The threats to large-scale sporting events are varied, and include ineffective policing and security planning, terrorist attacks, large numbers of ticketless fans and supporter violence.

Euro 2020, Wembley, 11 JULY 2021

The men’s Euros are due to take place in Germany in July.

The previous competition was delayed due to Covid, with the final taking place at Wembley on 11 July 2021. England’s first final appearance was marred by crowd disorder and racist abuse of players.

The home final at Wembley came after a year of, and amid still ongoing Covid restrictions.

Thousands of England fans collected at Wembley, well in advance of the game, and many without tickets. Police were forced to request that those without tickets did not travel to Wembley. Ticketless fans fought with stewards and police and tried to get into the stadium – and some achieved this. 86 people were arrested that day, including 53 at Wembley for offences including public order breaches, assault, drunk and disorderly conduct, and criminal damage.

Others were arrested later, including two men who were arrested on suspicion of stealing items that helped ticketless fans storm Wembley Stadium ahead of the final. Nineteen police officers were injured, as was Harry Maguire’s dad.

Following the game, which England lost to Italy on penalties, some members of the England team were racially abused online.

Just after the event, Deputy Assistant Commissioner Laurence Taylor said: “Throughout the course of the Euros tournament, the vast majority of people have watched the matches responsibly and safely, and enjoyed the build up to last night’s final.

“However, the unacceptable scenes we saw yesterday were a small number of people intent on using the football as an excuse to behave appallingly towards other members of the public and officers.

“The reports of online hate crime abuse are utterly abhorrent and totally unacceptable. We have launched a post-event investigation and will actively pursue and investigate offenders and criminal offences.

“This behaviour is not welcome in London and I urge anyone who is being subjected to any abuse, both online and in person, to contact police and report it so the police can investigate thoroughly and accordingly.”

It was reported that about 2,000 people were able to get in illegally and there were 17 mass breaches of disabled access gates and emergency fire doors.

Casey report

A 129-page report looking into the report was later published by Baroness Louise Casey. She concluded that there was a “collective failure” of organisations involved in the planning of the game and said the incident was “a source of national shame”. It was highlighted that the Met deployed 553 officers, however, they were not deployed until 3pm. Crowds had been gathering since 9 o’clock in the morning.

Casey found that the stewards recruited for the match were lacking in experience and authority. The main entrance area to the stadium is owned by property group Quintain and discussions over how to manage it included six separate parties. However, Casey found that no one was deemed responsible for safety.

Brent council’s chief executive Carolyn Downs had previously expressed concerns about increasing disorder as the competition progressed.

Ticketless fans had previously tailgated their way into the semi-final against Denmark. Drugs are also believed to have played a significant role in the day, with 45 per cent of ticketed fans saying they had seen someone snorting drugs at Wembley that day.

Casey remarked: “If it had only been alcohol I’m not sure if people could have sustained themselves for that period.” It was also highlighted that the “hollowing out” of police resources over the last decade led the crowd to believe that there was less chance of them being stopped. Those that were involved in the disorder also knew that due to Covid restrictions, about 25,000 of the 90,000 seats would be empty.

CEO of the FA, Mark Bullingham, said: “We planned for this event in a bigger way than any event that’s ever been held at Wembley. We absolutely had more stewards, we had more security. What the review said is that rather than planning for it as an incremental event and learning lessons from previous events at Wembley, you’ve got to step back and almost view these events as a completely different nature.”

Recommendations

Baroness Casey recommended empowering authorities to act more strongly against drug use, flares and smoke bombs and people entering without a ticket. She also recommended an FA campaign to change attitudes, better communication between agencies overseeing the match and a new category for football matches of national significance.

In her review, Baroness Casey said: “The events of Sunday 11 July 2021 (Euro Sunday) at Wembley Stadium were a ‘near miss’. I am clear that we were close to fatalities and/or life-changing injuries for some, potentially many, in attendance. That this should happen anywhere in 21st century Britain is a source of concern. That it should happen at our national stadium, and on the day of our biggest game of football for 55 years is a source of national shame.

“I want to be very clear from the outset that responsibility for that risk to human life lies with the individuals without tickets – nearly all men, it has to be said – who attacked the stadium, successfully or otherwise. The drunkenness, drug taking, irresponsibility, criminality, and abuse of innocent people – including staff, families, and disabled ticket holders – was shocking and intolerable. I hope the police and other authorities continue to prosecute as many of the perpetrators as possible and the courts and football authorities apply the toughest possible punishments.

“Nevertheless, some of what happened was sadly foreseeable, even if the scale of it was not. And even if it had not been predictable, there are always wider lessons to be learned from such events. That is the opportunity of a near miss.”

She continued: “There is no question, however, that the day was spoiled by a horde of 6,000 or more ticketless fans, many of whom were no more than mindless thugs. The outpouring of vile racist abuse that followed in the days after only made this worse. These men may wear England shirts but they can’t be allowed to represent us.

I choose instead to be represented by the England team, and by organisations like the Football Supporters’ Association, who support all decent law-abiding football fans, England supporters or otherwise, and were on the ground to assist visiting Italian fans that day.” UEFA ordered England to play one match behind closed doors and the FA was fined 100,000 euros. Since then, phase one of improvement works related to Baroness Casey’s recommendations has been completed.

This includes making turnstiles and accessibility entrances more secure and having locks on all perimeter doors strengthened. There is also a new command and control centre, with more than 50 new CCTV cameras.

Champions League, Stade de France, 28 May 2022

The 2022 final of the men’s Champions League between Liverpool and Real Madrid made the headlines for the wrong reasons. Large numbers of fans were unable to gain access to the stadium in the build up to the game and French police used tear gas and pepper spray on Liverpool fans.

After the game, large groups attacked and mugged supporters of both teams as they left the venue. There were also widespread reports of sexual assault.

Blame Game

Though some attempted to blame fans for the chaos, an ‘independent’ report by UEFA, found that as event owner, UEFA was responsible for the failures that led to the “disaster”.

The report found that early on, congestion had built up around a narrow pedestrian underpass on the way to the turnstiles.

Police were requested to divert people away from here, but they were slow to act and fans remained trapped, whilst others joined them at the other end. According to the report, by 19:45, 75 minutes before kick off, police abandoned this area and withdrew along with stewards.

Thousands more people entered the space and the report concluded that there was “a clear and immediate danger of a fatal crush”. The decision was made to delay kick-off, though those outside the stadium did not know this and therefore fans still desperately tried to enter.

Police used tear gas and pepper spray and the report says: “It is remarkable that no one lost their life”. Announcements were made on the big screens and therefore to broadcasters around the world, that the delay was due to supporters arriving late. The report states that this claim was objectively untrue.

The report also points out that several entities, including French ministers, UEFA and others blamed Liverpool supporters trying to enter without valid tickets for the events that unfolded. Again, this report indicates that this was not true.

The report states: “It has been a feature of our investigations that several key stakeholders have not accepted responsibility for their own failures but have been quick to attribute blame to others. Some have continued to make allegations – in particular against supporters – based upon ‘facts’ for which there is no evidence.

Assertions that late, ticketless supporters were either the primary cause or contributed to the dangerous events have a particular resonance with Hillsborough where similar allegations were made 33 years ago and persisted for decades before being comprehensively disproved.” The similarities with Hillsborough are hard to ignore.

Conclusions

The report concluded that there were two organisational failures at the route of what went wrong.

This is that the UEFA model for organising the event was defective as there was an absence of overall control or oversight of safety and security – similar to what was pointed out at the Wembley incident.

The second failure is that the safety, security and service model which is laid out in the Saint-Denis Convention, was put aside in favour of a security approach “inappropriately based on incorrect assumptions that Liverpool FC supporters posed significant threats to public order.”

The report pointed out that the police “adopted a model aimed at a non-existent threat from football hooligans”. Intelligence from UEFA, Liverpool, Real Madrid and police forces from both countries indicated that there had been no significant incidents of football-related violence from either club in recent years.

These assumptions led to an ineffective policing model. Defective policing was also highlighted when discussing the attacks by locals in the aftermath of the game. Aside from security measures, defective route planning was also highlighted as a contributing factor with too many people being directed to take a single train line which led to congestion. The panel also concluded that despite some reports, there was not an extraordinarily large number of people trying to access the game without tickets.

The report also highlighted two years of Covid restrictions and a late change of venue away from St Petersburg, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as possible contributing factors. The report makes 21 recommendations. These recommendations include creating internal compliance mechanisms within UEFA and constructing a process to ensure that the recommendations from the panel are implemented.

It is recommended that host stadiums have well managed security perimeters, welcome services & crowd guidance and orientation and that it is a formal requirement of the bidding process that the police will commit to compliance with the Convention. The report recommends that UEFA should move rapidly towards digital ticketing and that medical and first aid personnel should always be visible and accessible.

Euro Qualifier, Brussels, October 2023

This year’s Euros has already been hit by a terrorist attack. In October 2023, two Swedish nationals were shot dead in Brussels, Belgium on the same day as a qualifier for the 2024 Euros between the two countries was taking place.

The victims were on their way to the game when they were killed and were wearing Swedish shirts. The attack was carried out by Abdesalem Lassoued, who fled the scene, and was killed the next day by police. He posted a video online in which he claimed responsibility for the attack and said he was inspired by Islamic State. It was later revealed that an extradition request by Tunisia in August 2022 had not been followed up by Belgian magistrates. It was reported that in 2005, he was sentenced to 26 years in prison in Tunisia for crimes including attempted murder.

He escaped prison, travelled on a small boat to the Italian island of Lampedusa, then moved to Belgium, where his application for asylum was rejected. Tunisian authorities put in an extradition request, which was received by Belgium officials but not processed. Understaffing was blamed for this.

The attacker had previously applied for asylum in Norway, Sweden and Italy. Italian intelligence officials identified him as radicalised in 2016 and began to monitor him.

He had also served a prison sentence in Sweden for drug trafficking – two years for possessing 100g of cocaine.

This attack was the fifth deadly Islamist terrorist attack in Belgium since 2014. It was reported that the attacker had targeted Swedish people, possibly in revenge for recent Quran burnings in Sweden.

The second half of the game was abandoned after news of the attack spread, with spectators being held in the stadium until around midnight and then evacuated. Swedish fans are reported to have removed Swedish garments when travelling after the game.

The game was not replayed, and both teams approved the decision as the result would not impact who qualified from that group. Belgium will play in the tournament, but Sweden did not qualify.

The failings here are again cited as understaffing in public authorities and lack of communication between security authorities – this time across different countries.

Champions League, April 2024

As recently as April, there were terrorist threats made against Champions League games. A pro-IS media channel called for attacks against venues hosting quarter finals in England, France, Spain and Germany. Security was stepped up and the games took place without incident.

FA Cup, West Brom, January 2024

There have also been incidences of ‘supporter’ violence over recent years. The most notable of these for British fans would be the clashes between Wolves and West Brom fans at an FA Cup game in January.

The game was the first Black Country derby held in front of fans in 12 years.

Violence broke out in the stands after Wolves scored their second goal in the 78th minute. Opposition supporters were seen fighting each other and others invaded the pitch.

The game was halted and players left the pitch. Footage circulated online showing a man covered in blood being escorted away by police, while opposition supporters seemed to chant “let him die”.

There were flares in the away end, objects thrown at Tommy Doyle as he attempted to take a corner and a ball boy needed treatment after being hit with a missile.

The area that saw the violence, was close to where the families of the West Brom players were seated. Some players ran into the crowd, with Kyle Bartley carrying his child out. When the match resumed, he was substituted so he could remain with his children.

The stand where the violence occurred was supposed to only house the West Brom fans.

However, it is believed the violence began after some Wolves fans revealed themselves by celebrating the goal.

Due to the rivalry between the two teams, the game was deliberately scheduled early to avoid day drinking and also allocated extra police officers.

European football

A month before the above incident, forty-six Legia Warsaw fans were arrested after violence at a European tie with another West Midlands team, Aston Villa. Four police officers were injured in the violence with deputy chair of the West Midlands Police Federation saying at the time, that it was the worst football violence police had seen for decades.

Police horses were punched and kicked and police dogs were injured after walking on broken glass. It is believed the violence began as 1,000 away fans were not given tickets. Aston Villa lodged a complaint with UEFA over the lack of co-operation by Legia club officials.

The game went ahead but, the Legia Warsaw fans were barred from entry. Some did manage to get in, but were kicked out when they were discovered.

A special court had to be set up at Birmingham Magistrates’ Court to hear the cases. In December, fans were banned from all top-flight games in Greece after widespread violence and a riot in which a police officer was left with life-threatening injuries.

Following this, all 14 top-flight clubs will have to install surveillance cameras inside stadiums and use personalised ticketing systems that identify fans before they enter. In France in October, an Olympique de Marseille v Olympique Lyonnais game was called off, when the away bus was hit with stones and beer bottles and the coach was injured.

Looking forward

All of the above are relatively high-profile men’s football matches – other sports do not seem to be the scene of such serious incidents.

Though the men’s Euros will take place in Germany this year, which has not seen such occurrences, there is still understandable concern that similar events may take place. It is hoped that lessons have been learnt from the police response to Wembley and the Stade de France, but the threats to the Champion’s League this year, also targeted Germany, where the threat from terrorism is considered to be high. There will also be football at the Olympics in Paris.

The men’s rugby world cup passed in France last year without serious incident. However, what occurred at the Stade de France – a venue that will be used during this year’s Olympics and Paralympics – is still fresh in people’s minds. There are many British, Spanish and French people, and others who will have seen what happened that would rather stay away for fears over their safety.

Preparing for Paris

The BBC reported that the French government has cut the number of spectators who will be able to watch the opening ceremony of the Olympics from the banks of the Seine, as they were worried about threats such as drone attacks.

Originally free tickets were going to be given to 600,000 members of the public. However, now there will only be tickets for 300,000 invited guests. President Macron even said the event could be moved to the Trocadero Gardens or the Stade de France if the risk was deemed too high.

There will be 20,000 soldiers and more than 40,000 police officers from France providing security, along with 2,000 troops and police officers from other countries. Security services have also begun screening around one million people who will be involved in the games, including athletes, medical staff and volunteers, as well as those who live near the venue. Germany has also stepped up security ahead of the Euros in June, including by introducing land border checks.

Planning ahead for Euro 2028

Robyn Quick — Tue, 13 Feb 2024 16:57:07 +0000

Event Security

David Stewart looks at some of the security considerations for the organisers and decision makers of the UEFA EURO 2028 competition in the UK and Ireland.

On 16 October 2023, a qualifying match for the Euro 2024 Football championships, between Belgium and Sweden in Brussels, was postponed after the killing of two Swedish supporters by a gunman who was later traced, and shot dead by Belgian Police. Islamic State subsequently claimed responsibility with the suggestion being that the Swedish fans had been targeted in retaliation for perceived anti-Islamic protests that had been held in Sweden.

This attack, and the associated postponement of the match, came only three days after UEFA announced that the 2028 Euro Championships would be awarded to a joint bid by the Football Associations of the UK (England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland) and the Republic of Ireland.

In much the same way as the 7/7 attacks in London came in the immediate aftermath of the announcement that London would host the 2012 Olympics, the timing of the 16 October attack served to highlight one of the many challenges involved in delivering a safe and secure event in 2028.

Work on the bid commenced as early as 2019 led by UK Sport, in conjunction with the governments of the four UK nations plus the Irish government and the associated Football Associations. In the summer of 2021, UK Sport appointed Intelligent Risks (IR) a company with expertise in major event security, to deliver a high-level tournament security risk analysis, security concept of operations, reviews of 14 prospective stadia, a security master plan and QS analyses to estimate the required tournament wide security resources and budgets.

Having worked alongside consultants from Intelligent Risks while acting as Interim Director of Security for the Birmingham Commonwealth Games, I was delighted to be asked, representing Taynuilt Associates Ltd to be part of the team of subject matter experts delivering this work on behalf of UK Sport.

Challenges

As with any major event, there will be several challenges that security planners need to be aware of, all of which were taken into consideration during this piece of consultancy.

Terrorism

The events in Brussels obviously serve as a sharp reminder of the threat of terrorism. As this article is being typed, the conflict in Gaza is ongoing and the UK involvement in the attacks in targets in Yemen have resulted in threats of retaliation. The UK national threat level currently sits at Substantial but that can obviously change. Obviously, the threat from terrorism will change in the next four years and, in addition to the national threat level, the UK Security Services will work with the police to develop an event-specific threat assessment, and this will determine the overall security approach for the entire event, potentially venue by venue. The threat level from international terrorism has historically been lower in the Republic of Ireland than in the UK and again, this complexity will require to be taken account of in the overall security planning. However, the current Northern Ireland related terrorism threat is at a higher level than both the UK and Ireland (Severe) and this highlights one of the challenges for the organisers of the Euros – the different countries and jurisdictions involved.

Cross-border coordination

In order to deliver the required assessments, the IR Team engaged widely with representatives of the UK Government, the devolved governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and also the government of the Republic of Ireland. There then followed meetings with the five separate football associations, representatives of the proposed venues and the police. The National Police Chief’s Council (NPCC) coordinate the policing of football across England and Wales so, in addition to this, the IR team met with representatives of the Police Service of Scotland, the Police Service of Northern Ireland and An Garda Síochána.

Different laws can obviously have different impacts – for example, in Scotland, the consumption of alcohol (outside of corporate hospitality suites) within football stadia is banned. Notwithstanding the decision to ban alcohol within venues for the Qatar World Cup, sponsorship by international drinks companies is usually taken for granted at major football tournaments and therefore a decision on this (from a Scottish perspective) will need to be taken nearer the time.

What became clear however was that, despite different laws and jurisdiction, there was a collegiate and common-sense approach being taken between the different governments, police forces and football associations, that is necessary for a complex major event such as this to be delivered safely.

Fan disorder

The final of the last Euros, held at Wembley on 11 July 2021, serves as a stark reminder that fan disorder is still a significant threat to football tournaments. The fact that this was not the result of inter-fan rivalry but was instead a failing of security and policing, as outlined in The Baroness Casey Review, only highlights the critical importance of the role of both the police and the private security providers at the main venues.

Events in Europe will also have to be considered. While Russia are presently still banned from competing in UEFA competitions, this could well change and, depending on the teams who qualify, threat and risk assessments will need to be undertaken continually between now and 2028. What is clear across Europe however is the rise of the ‘Ultra’ fans and this has led to scenes of disorder in recent months during European club competitions.

A great opportunity for learning will come this summer as the Euros take place in Germany and representatives of UK (and Irish) policing and governments will be watching events with interest.

Also becoming more common now is the threat of disruption to major events by protestors. Such protests could be of a political nature and driven by international events potentially outside of Europe (e.g. Israel/Palestine) or could be environmental. In 2022, numerous English Premier League matches were disrupted when individuals representing Just Stop Oil made their way onto the field of play and attached themselves to goalposts. Similar disruption has also taken place at other major sporting events, including Wimbledon, with the main motivation of the protestors being the massive television audience. However, each disruption owing to field of play incursion represents a significant threat to safety and security and the reputation of the organisers.

Security Profile

This then brings us to the question of the security profile of the event. This not only impacts on things such as flow rates for spectators entering stadia but, also important for event organisers, has a budgetary impact. It is now not uncommon to find that the security budget for a major sporting event can be the single biggest cost in the overall budget. The last major Football Tournament, the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar saw every venue equipped with ‘mag and bag’ airport-style security (walk-through metal detectors and x-ray machines). The lessons from Wembley also highlight the need for a suitably trained and experienced security workforce which, immediately post-covid was a challenge but other events, such as the Birmingham Commonwealth Games, suggest that these challenges can be overcome. The 2028 Euros will undoubtedly bring significant security challenges however, with comprehensive planning that started in 2019, and the inclusion of highly experienced subject matter experts, I have great confidence in the overall delivery of a safe and secure tournament for spectators and participants alike.

About the Author:

David Stewart spent 30 years in UK policing, rising to the rank of Chief Superintendent. In 2013, he founded Taynuilt Associates Ltd, providing training in consultancy across a wide spectrum of security and resilience portfolios. He worked in senior security positions at both the Glasgow and Birmingham Commonwealth Games and also spent 2 years in Qatar leading a resilience project related to the 2022 World Cup.

Champions League Final: What Went Wrong?

Freya — Thu, 09 Feb 2023 17:23:52 +0000

Event Security

Lina Kolesnikova, security and crisis management expert looks into the 2022 Stade de France incident including its crowd management, policing, and event management France is one of the longest established and most reliable hosts of major sporting events. However, the security of future events and the country’s way of dealing with big sporting events was challenged on 28th of May 2022 during the UEFA Men’s Champions League Final between English team Liverpool and Spanish team Real Madrid. The event took place at the Stade de France (Saint-Denis), the biggest stadium in France. The high-profile incident involved legitimate ticket holders not managing to get into the match; people without tickets managing to get in, bypassing the controls; and legitimate visitors being confronted by the police or by local gangs (depriving visitors of their tickets and valuable belongings on their way to and from the match). The official reactions, and especially, the early comments on causes and circumstances, were disastrous and led to a loss of confidence. There are many questions to be raised on the incident itself, as well as legitimate concerns on how France will deal with the upcoming men’s Rugby World Cup this year and the Olympic Games of 2024. The observed approach saw supporters regarded and treated as a threat to urban security, no organisation with a clear leadership role in the event management, flaws in coordination, crowd control, basic street security, crisis response and communication and left many people in a profound state of shock. The aim of this article is to look at the sequence of failures at pre- and post-event periods, in the hope that lessons will be drawn and forthcoming events in France will employ different approach(es). Pre-event (before the match): Most but not all issues making up this Paris incident started well before the match. There were even issues which originated far away from the match venue. The following talking points could be listed in no particular order: not-as-intended information and guidance for the route from the RER station to the stadium; access denied to spectators with tickets; re-sale of stolen tickets by personnel; access of ticketless opportunists to the match and access to the stadium by a ticketless mob (what about the terrorist threat?). Other talking points include: slow pre-screening; understaffing and unexperienced staff; no crowd management initiatives from police; excessive use of police force oppressing supporters; delay of the match for 36 minutes and no drinking water for people stuck waiting for three hours. Two fan zones were set up: close to the venue, in Saint-Denis for supporters of Real Madrid (capacity 6,000 people) and, much farther way, for Liverpool supporters in more central Paris (capacity 44,000). At 5pm, fans started to move to the Stade de France. For people from the first fan zone, it was a 15 minute walk to the stadium. This went reasonably well, though there were some attacks by criminal groups on Spanish supporters already reported around that time. Those who were in the centre, many of whom were Brits, had three options for public transport: line 13 of the metro (not as convenient as the RER), RER D, and RER B (“RER” is an acronym for Réseau Express Régional, or Regional Express Network, and refers to the rapid transit system which serves Paris and its surrounding suburbs). Coincidentally, and revealing a lack of control and monitoring, the most convenient and the would be most-used line, RER B, went on strike that day. Assumingly, it still provided a limited service as 6,200 people still used RER B. Meanwhile c.37,000 used RER D to get to the venue. The high-level logistics planned for users of line RER D to use the same route (from the station to the stadium) as passengers of line RER B. This route goes along the rue Stade de France, which is 20 m wide and designed for a crowd. The ticket pre-filtering was also set up on this street. Translation from high-level planning to the actual ground did not go well though, as planners probably did not walk the route to see how it looked and did not ensure the correct guidance and communication. Fans who left the RER D station ended up following a different route. First, they took the presumed correct direction. But 200 m down the road, they “naturally” followed a road sign, which indicated to turn left and had Stade de France marked on it. The law enforcement personnel present at the site did not correct them as they did not consider “providing guidance” to be part of their responsibility, or, possibly, they were not aware they may need to insist on fans taking a certain route. Then the crowd crossed the underbridge passage and arrived at a location that was not the one planned for the main crowd. A bottleneck quickly formed, as fans arrived at the limited throughput pre-filtering location and subsequent controls, equipped with only up to 10 lines maximum. This is where the main troubles began. First of all, the facility was heavily understaffed and those who were hired for the match were rather inexperienced. As people continued to arrive, the lines were not followed. People then dispersed onto the adjacent national road, which was partly blocked by police vehicles. The instructions were very controversial: people at the head of the line were told to push back but people at the rear were instructed to push forward in order to get out of the road. Pre-screening was handled by Stade de France and there were many issues with the technical side of the equipment. A struggling mass of people and chaos… This moment saw the arrival of locals and migrants who provoked fighting, and took the opportunity to mug people with tickets and the use of these stolen tickets to enter the stadium via other entrances, a bit later. The chaos also enabled ticketless opportunists to climb over the fence. There were also reported cases of the re-sale of stolen tickets by stewards. There were also people with disabilities among the spectators, who were robbed. They were left neglected by the organisers. At this moment, the police stepped in. As Paris Police chief Didier Lallement explained later, they were scared that the crowd could turn unmanageable and those who were closer to the fences could be crushed. Police closed the gates and started to push people back from the fences. Police gassed people who did not show any hostility, including families with children and people with disabilities. At least, 2,700 Liverpool fans (with families, kids, etc.) were unable to attend the match even though they had valid tickets and showed up in time. Post-event (after the match) Needless to say, that for thousands of those robbed fans and those who were not allowed in, the match was over and their experience of the event was completely ruined. But for those who managed to get into the match, there were bad surprises to come too. There were reported attacks before the match but there was an avalanche after the match, with criminal attacks on spectators by local gangs and migrants and a lack of police force against criminal groups. Spectators (British, Spanish and others) were attacked both before and after the match, especially those who had to go to the stations or to the carparks. Many people were beaten, mugged, assaulted physically and verbally. Unfortunately, there was no evidence of active police measures to stop this. It has even been alleged that, more than once, law enforcement personnel ignored attacks that they could have seen. The situation leaves a large open question on how France will handle larger and longer forthcoming events, if a one-off event took that turn. On a positive note, the French government has promised to increase the number of police force by extra 1000 agents in Paris before the Olympic Games. Whether or not this will be sufficient for securing larger multi-venue and multi-day events, time will tell. Post-event (reaction) If the above was not enough on its own to raise eyebrows and concerns, the authorities nailed it by revealing the destruction of surveillance footage, which could otherwise serve as evidence; voicing the blame strategy and publishing a questionnaire for British and Spanish supporters, which ignored the issue of excessive use of police force. Some of the most severe criticism was levelled at the French authorities – particularly, the French minister of the interior, Gerald Darmanin, and Paris Police chief Didier Lallement – who, the day after the incident, blamed British fans and ticket scammers for the issues. Darmanin claimed that about 30,000 to 40,000 British supporters had showed up for the match, either without tickets or with fake ones. Such high numbers attracted immediate scepticism from security professionals and football clubs alike. An inquiry was arranged and conducted. On 13 July, the French Senate published its own 14-page investigative report entitled ‘Champions League Final: An Unavoidable Fiasco’. The report says that police used tear gas on the crowd, including children and other innocent bystanders. People had been bitten and pickpocketed, but the police were unable to stop such acts, nor arrest the perpetrators, the report continues. The French Senate went on to say it hopes that the report will help avoid similar incidents at sporting events hosted by France. In democratic societies, the post-crisis phase is increasingly marked by intense politicization. Even while the crisis is still unfolding, the drama of accountability and blame begins. This situation creates a real challenge with regard to accountability and an attempt to avoid blame by political leadership. We might, therefore, witness another crisis in the aftermath of the original crisis event. Early statements by the French authorities, issued shortly after the event, can be regarded from the point of view of a blame game in that there were attempts to find excuses or scapegoats. With emerging evidence and the Senate report, the blame management strategy has once again proven to be ineffective and counterproductive. Could the authorities have anticipated such an outcome, and if so, why did they continue to pursue this course? First, the negative image of British fans could have played a role, even though British organisations have done a lot in recent years to improve fans’ behaviour. That perception legacy could be one of the sources of the early blame, as it is likely that the French authorities did not have their fingers on the pulse of related developments in the football industry preceding the event. Secondly, underestimation of the impact upon the gathered people might have led to a temporary belief that this was about a ‘voiceless crowd’. In reality, modern information dissemination led to the almost instant ignition of comments on social networks and the topic became viral. The ‘crowd’ included multiple prominent individuals from the world of football and beyond, who are used to high-profile events and are not shy of speaking up. Thirdly, many fans are not a bunch of isolated individuals, but members of organised football groups that operate with, and are supported by very rich football clubs. Such organisations, certainly the wealthier football clubs, have legal and communication departments, and these did not leave their organised fans defenceless. They raised their voices in defence of the affected fans and joined the loud public outcry. To draw a line under the blame game, UEFA finally reported only 2,800 fake tickets counted overall, a far cry from the initial claim by French authorities. Something else to pay attention to, too… When we talk about security of a sport event with mass attendance, securing the venue is not enough. One should also look at the area where the sport facility is located. Stadium and event operators can no longer consider the space outside the stadium as the responsibility of others. These areas form crucial elements to the safe arrival and departure of spectators and need full and open discussion with all stakeholders to develop coordinated plans for their safe management. The proof of that was seen last May.

AEV security update: events and venues

Freya — Wed, 08 Feb 2023 12:57:28 +0000

Event Security

Henry Havis, head of security at ExCeL London and chair of the AEV Security Working Group gives an update on Martyn’s Law It’s great to have been asked to provide an update regarding security changes for event venues and a lot has happened in the last six months! �鶹��land Security released an update on the long-awaited Protect Duty in December 2022. The first change being that the government announced that the Protect Duty will now be known officially as ‘Martyn’s Law’ in tribute to Martyn Hett, who was tragically killed alongside 21 others in the Manchester Arena terrorist attack in 2017. Tiers To provide everyone some more clarity on the new legislation, �鶹��land Security have advised that proportionality is a fundamental consideration for Martyn’s Law, which I think will be reassuring for us all. They are proposing a tiered model linked to activity that takes place at a location and its capacity. A ‘standard tier’ will apply to locations with a maximum capacity of over 100. The aim is to drive up use and engagement with existing resources that help teams undertake low-cost, simple yet effective activities to improve preparedness. This can include training, information sharing and completion of a preparedness plan to embed practices, such as locking doors to delay attackers’ progress or knowledge on lifesaving treatments that can be administered by staff whilst awaiting emergency services. An ‘enhanced tier’ will focus on high-capacity locations in recognition of the potential consequences of a successful attack. Locations with a capacity of over 800 people, at any time, will additionally be required to undertake a risk assessment to inform the development and implementation of a security plan to assess the balance of risk reduction against the time, money and effort required to achieve a successful level of security preparedness – a recognised standard in other regulatory regimes (including Fire and Health and Safety). They have stated that nearly all places of worship will be placed within the standard tier, regardless of their capacity and the government will reportedly establish an inspection and enforcement regime, promoting compliance and positive cultural change and issuing credible and fair sanctions for serious breaches. Support and guidance Dedicated statutory guidance and bespoke support will be provided by the government to ensure those in scope can effectively discharge their responsibilities. Expert advice, training and guidance is already available on the online protective security hub, ProtectUK. It is worth stressing the point that the tiers are being set for capacities, not numbers of attendees. Meaning that an event space with the capacity for over 800 but with only 500 attendees, would still need to prepare using the ‘enhanced tier’ requirements. Legislation for the proposed duty will be brought forward as soon as parliamentary time allows. Martyn’s Law will extend to and apply across the whole of the United Kingdom. The events industry What does this mean to the events industry? Over the course of 2022, myself and my peers in the events world, alongside the Counter Terrorism Business Information Exchange (CTBIE), a counter terrorism forum working with the �鶹�� Office, NaCTSO, �鶹��land Security and the SIA as well as many representatives from non-event-industry associations, discussed how we best share direct source information on Martyn’s Law, but also many subjects that affect our businesses regarding terrorism. For the events industry, we identified that there are many associations that may not have a voice in this area, but they do have a desire to learn more about the subject directly from the source. As we know, the Protect UK platform bridges many of the gaps we have regarding CT awareness and preparedness, but associations need to be represented in the early phases of new legislation as well as guidance, trends and changes in the best ways of working. Together with my peers in the Association of Event Venues, specifically the Security Working Group, we spoke to many other event-orientated associations and formed a forum known as the Multi Association Security Awareness Group (MASA). The group came together and represented associations across the events industry to discuss the information disseminated via CTBIE to enhance how we share information. The group is still growing and will have a positive impact on the preparedness of the events industry regarding counter terrorism and security issues in general. Scope At estimate, some 600,000+ venues across the UK, may be classified as small ‘non tier’, larger ‘standard tier’ and significantly larger ‘enhanced tier’ locations”. The most recent information provided from the government demonstrates that Martyn’s Law is likely to affect nearly all event venues in all tiers. We can see that the �鶹�� Office are already providing us with many of the resources we need to do this through CT Policing support and, more importantly, through the Protect UK platform. Where we need to develop ourselves as an industry is through working closely with all stakeholders to ensure we develop a risk-based plan to ensure events like Manchester Arena Attack do not happen again and, if in the worst-case scenario they do, we are prepared to act quickly and decisively to contain the incident and reduce the loss of life. Take action now The output from the Manchester Arena Inquiry so far looks at many steps that could have been taken to protect and prepare venues from terrorist incidents and the aftermath and the learning is already out there for everyone to take appropriate responsibility and start making realistic changes now. Waiting for legislation to take effect could still take several years but with the understanding that is available now, venues, organisers, suppliers, businesses and associations need to take the steps they can to ensure that we are doing all we can, as one entity, to ensure the safe running of our events and protecting the public we open our doors to on a daily basis. The question of how still hasn’t fully taken form and will take time to fully understand but collaboration at all levels will be the key to this endeavour. Those waiting for the Competent Person Scheme to be released by the �鶹�� Office and for Martyn’s Law to be cleared through the government need to see that there is a very real and substantial threat from terrorism in the UK and now is the time to take some realistic and balanced changes within the ways we work as the responsibility for this sits with everyone involved whether directed by law or not. Subtle changes can make a world of difference including working with NaCTSO’s Safer Business team, and completing thorough, but not complicated risk assessments looking at the major threat types. In the current environment, I would like to see every Security Officer thoroughly trained in Behaviour Detection Recognition and First Responder Trauma Care, but this isn’t realistic for every company and every venue, but having robust security plans, preprepared and practiced emergency procedures and conducting rehearsals will ensure that, should the worst happen, everyone is ready to react and reduce the impact. The amount of free training available such as Action Counters Terrorism and See, Check and Notify is incredible and easy to get hold of. There’s a lot more to come from the �鶹�� Office and learning and enhancing our processes, policies and procedures should be an ongoing endeavour however, we are at a point now that change is happening and groups such as CTBIE, MASA, AEV, NAA, AEO, ESSA and many others are working together closely to influence those changes across the industry. It will take time, but the changes have begun, and I am proud to be a part of the changes many of us are making now, for the better.

SECURITY AT A UNIQUE WORLD CUP

Freya — Thu, 27 Oct 2022 10:05:58 +0000

Event Security

With the Men’s Football World Cup coming up in less than a month, David Stewart takes a look at some of the security challenges faced by the organisers and those responsible for making sure it is a success. David Stewart is a former senior UK Police Officer and also the Managing Director of Taynuilt Associates Ltd, who provide consultancy services in major event security, risk, organisational resilience, crisis management and law enforcement via www.taynuilt.org.uk. Next month will see what is undoubtedly the most controversial FIFA World Cup ever. Back in 2010 when the announcement was made that the 2022 event would be held in the tiny Gulf State of Qatar, there was uproar from sections of the English press and media. Undoubtedly, the decision from FIFA was unusual as Qatar is not a country with a football pedigree, either internationally or domestically. At that time it had only a single suitable stadium, meaning that at least seven new stadia would need to be constructed. And then there was the timing of the event. World Cups are always held in June/July to avoid clashes with domestic (and other UEFA/FIFA) competitions but, because of the climate in Qatar this would not be possible and so we have the first ever World Cup to be played in the winter, resulting in the re-scheduling of football fixtures worldwide. From a Qatari perspective, they have the kudos of becoming the first Arab country to ever host the World Cup – a significant achievement for a county with an indigenous population of only 300,000 with the remainder of the resident population being foreign workers. There has also been much focus in the press about the welfare of those workers with repeated suggestions of poor treatment and human rights abuses – all of which have been countered strongly by the Qatari government. In addition, the fact that homosexuality is against the law in Qatar, has brought calls from LGBTQ activists for the tournament to be held elsewhere. LOW CRIMINALITY AND TERRORISM Notwithstanding debate around individual rights, there is no debate about the fact that Qatar is a nation that enjoys low levels of criminality and terrorism. The Global Peace Index, which considers such criteria as the level of Societal Safety and Security, the extent of Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict and the degree of Militarisation, and the Global Terrorism Index see Qatar scoring significantly better than western nations, including the UK and USA. In fact, the last recorded terror attack on Qatari soli was 2005 when a car bomb exploded outside a theatre in Doha killing a British citizen and wounding 12 other people. The culprit was identified as an Egyptian citizen who had lived in Qatar for 15 years with the motive being the 2003 invasion of Iraq by western forces. Since then, there have been no terror attacks in Qatar and the country has actually played a pivotal role in supporting allied forces in hosting negotiations between the USA and the Taliban in Doha. SECURITY PLANNING However, all of this is in the context of ‘normal’ day-to-day life in Qatar and with the eyes of the world truly upon it next month, there is no doubt that the threat level will be significantly increased. Security planning for each of the competition venues, including stadia, training venues, team hotels etc. will all be based on the usual security principles and therefore really should only change with any increased threat. The biggest challenge will likely be outside of the individual venues and in the public domain of Doha itself. Usually a World Cup event would be spread over geographically remote cities within a country (or countries) and so there would be a limit placed on the number of fans from different teams being co-located. This would normally mean the security operation would need to plan for there being perhaps two, three or four (at most) different nationalities of supporters in any one city. Qatar 2022 however will see fans of no fewer than 32 teams all in relatively close proximity. The furthest distance between the eight stadia is only 55km (34 miles) about the same distance as between Sunderland and Middlesbrough. 1.5 MILLION VISITORS Organisers estimate that Qatar will see over 1.5 million visitors during the period of the tournament. Accommodation will include hotels, short-term lets of private homes, tented villages (desert camps are a traditional Qatari custom during their winter months) and cruise ships berthed along the coast. In addition, neighbouring countries, such as the UAE, are now selling hotel and flight packages with plans to fly spectators in and out on a daily basis, greatly increasing pressure on air travel and Hamad International Airport. All of these factors place significant demands on security providers and present their own challenges. Plans are in place to try and encourage fans to remain within fan zones that will be established for them, with entertainment and refreshments available however, the close proximity of stadia, fan zones and accommodation to each other, and to Doha will undoubtedly lead to the mingling of a multiplicity of nationalities of football fans in Doha itself. While private security will be heavily involved at venue level, the public domain element will all fall on the authorities, and this will result in challenges for policing and intelligence services. Despite numerous test events over recent years (albeit adversely affected by Covid), added to significant investment in training of police officers, there is little experience in Qatar of the operational policing of such events (and such a fan profile). As with all these international events, there will be an international policing ‘Fusion Centre’ allowing coordination from a public order/fan policing perspective, as well as an Event Intelligence Centre where information will be shared from the international intelligence community regarding more heinous potential crimes. OUTSIDE HELP However, even police forces with significant experience in major event policing can be challenged during such events (as evidenced by the Metropolitan Police at the 2021 European Football Championship final at Wembley Stadium) and therefore, it comes as no surprise to see that Qatar has agreed to receive operational support from other countries with significant experience. It has been reported that Turkey will provide some 3000 ‘riot police’, 40 ‘security advisors’ and search dogs to support their Qatari colleagues. This will obviously need to be managed carefully by Qatar – they will need to overcome language differences (Arabic is only spoken by 1% of the population of Turkey) as well as cultural differences and, more importantly, operational policing differences. In addition to this, open-source research (all of the following points have been reported in the Doha News – www.dohanews.co over the past 12 months) also highlights the following headlines; “Morocco to deploy cyber security experts to Doha, as well as ‘thousands’ of police officers”; France providing a BASSALT anti-drone system that helps detect and identify incoming drones and one of its Air Force’s four E-3F Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), which can track hundreds of targets; The UK support will include maritime security from the Royal Navy, and advanced venue search training. The RAF will join forces with the Qatari Emiri Air Force and a joint squadron of Typhoon fighter jets will be used to secure air space; The US Department of �鶹��land Security (DHS) signed collaborative partnership with the Ministry of Interior of the State of Qatar (MOI) to identify air passengers linked to terrorism, trafficking, detecting watch-listed travellers, and monitoring potential security risks at Hamad International Airport. The US Transportation and Security Administration (TSA) will also provide support for screening, baggage inspection, insider risk management, and other security-related priorities; NATO confirmed it will help Qatar with security measures including training against threats posed by Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) materials, which will be delivered by Slovakia and NATO’s Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence in the Czech Republic. Turkey subsequently announced that it would also be providing CBRN support to Qatar; Jordan is recruiting former military security experts to be deployed in security roles at the tournament; Switzerland has provided air defence systems, purchased at a cost of $162 million to Qatar; South Korea are providing a number of counter-terrorism police resources; Pakistan is in discussion with Qatar about making troops available to support the security operation. Most of the threats facing the organisers will be exactly the same as for any major sporting event held anywhere in the world; fan violence, terrorism and criminality (including ticket-touting, fake merchandise, pick-pocketing, people trafficking etc.). However, the laws and culture in Qatar, particularly around LGBTQ and human rights issues will also bring the potential for challenges, demonstrations and protests from visiting fans. ALCOHOL Alcohol consumption will undoubtedly present a challenge. It has already been announced (despite the fact that main tournament sponsors include those producing alcoholic products) that no alcohol will be permitted inside the stadium bowl, which is a significant departure from normal World Cup and FIFA protocols. Alcohol will be available at the various Fan Zones that are being established, including those inside the stadia curtilage, but those fans partaking will still need to be aware of the fact that being drunk in public remains technically illegal. This fact has recently been reinforced by the UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) in guidance aimed at fans of the English and Welsh teams. The Qatari government has announced a more liberal approach, with the suggestion of training and guidance for police to deal with such issues in a more western context however, there is no doubt that that will be a challenge for the officers of the MOI and we will undoubtedly see any adverse reaction being widely publicised (and criticised) internationally. The hosts remain hopeful for a trouble-free event with the Foreign Minister of Qatar quoted as saying that the fan experience being delivered in Qatar would ensure that visiting fans focussed on the positives and would act peacefully (Channel News Asia). There is every possibility that the World Cup will run without a hitch, without violence or disorder and the last thing that Qatar would want to see is any adverse event that affects its reputation. There has certainly been significant investment in the security operation, which is probably more complex and comprehensive than any other World Cup has seen and time will tell whether the optimism of the Qatari government is well-founded.

SECURING THE VENUE

Polly Jones — Thu, 20 Oct 2022 08:41:02 +0000

Event Security

Henry Havis, head of security at the ExCeL centre, look as at the implications of the Protect Duty legislation for exhibition venues and the requirements it places on security professionals to provide a safer environment Over the course of the last year, the Association of Exhibition Venues (AEV) has worked closely with its peers in the National Association of Arenas (NAA) security working group, chaired by the brilliant Paul Williams (head of security for the O2 Arena, London) to clearly understand what the potential impacts are from the Protect Duty and what we need to do to prepare ourselves for the future. What is clear is that since the Manchester attack in 2017, through Figan Murray’s determined campaign for Martyn’s Law and further highlighted by feedback from the Manchester Inquiry, counter terrorism risks have not been taken as seriously as would have been expected and this has been seen across the event industry for some time. The inquiry chairman Sir John Saunders made it clear that the key stakeholders had not identified or managed risks effectively and this may have been symptomatic across the industry. The Manchester Arena terrorist attack has provided the UK with a key moment in time, as significant as the Hillsborough disaster in 1989, to focus on the importance of effective security - as Hillsborough did on crowd safety and capacity. So, what the Protect Duty is aiming to do is to provide a legal approach to improve protective security and support organisations preparedness at publicly accessible locations (PALs). If the public can attend, it’s a PAL. This includes event venues of all sizes. The second theme of the consultation looked at what the requirements would be with an expectation that we should make consideration for terrorist threats and methodologies, assess likelihood and the impact of those threats and mitigate those risks by taking forward ‘reasonably practicable’ (a phrase justifiably borrowed from Health & Safety) and appropriate security measures. EXPECTATIONS So what does that actually mean for the events industry given that no law has been passed at this time? In short, there is no legal obligation to do anything yet. However, since the release of certain parts of the Manchester inquiry, we have seen a significant change in expectations regarding protective security from the Police, �鶹�� Office, organisers and the public. Given that it is reasonable to expect that venues would be consulting on the inquiry, it is reasonable to expect that we are now aware that there is an increased expectation to combat the risks that have been highlighted. RESPONSIBILITY The Protect Duty consultation suggests that is was likely to look for a key named individual who will take responsibility for the Counter Terrorism Security plan for an event. Loking at the Manchester inquiry, is an extremely difficult task to pin down the exact individual given the different requirements from venue to venue, and event to event. It is likely that venues themselves will need to lead, ensuring all parties understand their responsibilities and that these are completed to a competent level. The various elements of a security plan brought together through working groups and project teams would be overseen by the venue in accordance with the venue’s security guidance. Using ExCeL as an example, we could have multiple events in the building with multiple security teams working on site looking after their specific organisers. Each of them has a responsibility to their client as well as to the venue. The venue has a responsibility to the security team and the organisers to supply a safe environment for them to be able to host their events. The circle of responsibility continues to widen in to the local area bringing in key stakeholders, local authorities and even Policing teams. All with the same responsibility – the protection of the public. So in answer to who has responsibility, we all do but it is likely the venue will have a key stakeholder requirement to ensure due process is followed and adhered to, with oversight from local authorities. STAKEHOLDER MEETINGS One way of ensuring due process is followed is through regular attendance from all stakeholders to a working group meeting. Using ExCeL as an example, we host a weekly meetings with all security stakeholders. This isn’t to replace event planning meetings but as an additional tie in to ensure information, risks and actions plans are shared and actioned by operational leads. Stakeholders should include local and specialist Policing leads where available. The use of Counter Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs) and Counter Terror Policing Officers (CTPOs) to provide overviews and briefings is a must. They can’t and shouldn’t be expected to provide feedback on every event, but they can help with the overarching security plan for a venue with regular, and where appropriate, real time intelligence. Reliance on the police to provide intelligence is only one source available to venues. At ExCeL, we are supported by a multiple specialists that have a wider understanding of the venues operation and risks and have been used to complete vulnerability assessments. This is just one step that can help protect venues and the public. The realisation that the responsibility for ensuring a ‘Protect Safe’ environment is everyones. TRAINING The Protect duty talks about having a competent person responsible for security. I have heard suggestion that this should be someone who has a higher level of education is this area such as a degree or masters. I have neither, and yet I would class myself as a competent head of security with an experienced background in protective security and proven understanding of the requirements. At present, we don’t know if a NEBOSH style qualification will be created for the security industry as there is in the Health and Safety world but it is something that AEV and NAA are looking at. On top of this, the Security Industry Authority has already launched a much improved enhanced process for door supervisor licenses. Security organisations are already focusing the training of their teams to include Counter Terrorism training as part of the basic package, including See Check and Notify (SCaN) and Action Counters Terrorism (ACT) training as a basic level. Again looking at ExCeL, we are further enhancing our capabilities through Behaviour Detection Training and Hostile Mindset training. All of this will ensure we are providing clients and public with first rate officers who are competent, practiced and have an understanding of counter terrorism issues. There is an impact for organisers and public alike, as the training becomes more enhanced and specialised, the cost of a security officer will increase and this will need to be taken in to account. We should be completing vulnerability assessments considering terrorist threats and methodologies and ensuring these are documented. At present there are no generic documents available for this but it is likely that the �鶹�� Office, on the completion of the Protect Duty or in line with the role out of the ProtectUK App, will be able to supply these. DEVELOPING FURTHER MEASURES Either way, we need to assess the likelihood and impact of the threats that have been identified and mitigate those risks where reasonably practicable with appropriate measures. That shouldn’t mean that everything has to be done immediately or that an inappropriate amount of money should be spent, that’s the point of assessing the risk. There are measures that may form part of a long-term strategy and will take time to develop further. What shouldn’t be expected is that every event will have policing support and a full 100 per cent screening process involving bag searches and screening arches. In some cases, this will not been deemed as appropriate and could even have a detrimental effect on people attending events. It needs to be a measured and risk assessed approach. The positive impacts to the event security industry we are seeing from just the Protect Duty consultation are encouraging and energizing. We are seeing greater cohesion from emergency services, local authorities and businesses throughout the industry. GUIDANCE The Protect Duty still has a lot more to give and a plethora of guidance to be provided by the government to ensure we are working to one goal but already the ethos of the Duty can be seen across the industry and a level of reassurance is starting to arise from this. Protective security risk management should not be confused or merged with other areas of risk and should be managed by a competent people - people with the requisite skills, knowledge and understanding of protective security to ensure that we are protecting the public and creating a safe environment.

CTB Interview: Protecting public spaces against terrorist attacks

Michael Lyons — Fri, 22 Apr 2022 09:50:39 +0000

Event Security

Counter Terror Business (CTB) talks to Lina Kolesnikova (LK), a member of the PACTESUR Expert Advisory Committee, about the influence of Martyn’s Law on the continent and how to better tackle terrorist attacks using vehicles

CTB: You have said that Martyn’s Law can provide some best practices on how to create a security-minded culture. What influence do you think the proposed legislation will have for the European event planning sector?

LK: EU institutions and European security professionals follow the discussion on Martyn’s Law with a great interest. That is the reason why I was asked to write about it for European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS) partners last January. I am sure European countries will continue to follow the developments in security of public spaces in the UK.

As you know EU Member States have varying approaches to and experience in the protection of public spaces. EU supports Member States by providing them for the exchange on relevant expertise and best practices. EU cooperation on the protection of public spaces adds value through development of common guidance, testing of equipment, encouraging harmonisation of standards and exchanging good practices.
I am sure British partners will continue to participate in this exchange and we will be updated on their experience, upon certain time after approval of Martyn’s Law. However, even now, I think Martyn’s Law provides EU Member States with interesting structured approach and suggested practices, such as how to create a security-minded culture and which steps to take to make physical security improvements.

CTB: How can we find a better balance between stricter security protocols and the preservation of the open nature of public places?

LK: I think we should look for a holistic approach here, where urban planners and designers are highly involved together with the public places management (e.g., concerned authorities, tourism sector management, religious and/or cultural facilities etc.), representatives of the events organising industry and other actors who are either involved in public place operations or supply solutions and technologies used in that context. Working together towards making stricter security less visible and intrusive is the approach most likely to reconcile the needs and views of security versus usability and comfort at public places.

CTB: The most significant feature that defined which places should be included in the Protect Duty legislation appears to be capacity. Are there other factors/criteria that you think should be prioritised?

LK: Worth noting that capacity, as well as some other parameters, are effectively a translation of the risk assessment methodology. In fact, capacity is one of the parameters which influences the possible impact of a risk happening. Therefore, I would suggest splitting definitions related to the risk-based approach largely focusing on assessment of possible impact(s) and making budgetary and regulatory decisions in function of such assessment impacts; from possible terms in which the formal requirements and criteria can be expressed in the forthcoming legislation. We should base ourselves on a series of risk related parameters, where capacity of PAL is just one criterion reflecting on risk related parameters.

For example, some people indicate 100 or 303 persons as a threshold for capacity. I would argue that other criteria can be possible, such as social impact (even though, it is not so easy to measure it), presence of children or other groups of population who might be less predictable and manageable in their reactions.

CTB: Martyn’s Law proposes a proportionate approach. What will this likely look like in practice?

LK: I would think that the approach can be defined as a sort of matrix, where there are several qualifying criteria with multiple values. Some sort of combination of these criteria and values could lead to a named (or numbered) profile. Each profile, in turn, is linked to the associated set of requirements, mandatory and recommended controls, as well as the way how subjects (to Martyn’s Law) can assess and report on their compliance.

CTB: Attacks using vehicles have become a challenge for security professionals around the globe in recent years. What difficulties exist for protecting dynamic events and routes to and from a location from such attacks?

LK: Attacks using vehicles have become a challenge for security professionals around the globe and a real challenge is the difficulty in preventing them. Larger cities attempt to secure open public spaces using artificial, physical obstacles. However, it is much more difficult to put barriers in place when talking about dynamic events with moving people, such as parades and marathons, or regular streets used by participants at a large event getting to and from a venue, for example at stadium concerts.

Elements of ‘4G’ (guards-guns-gates-guidance) may come into play here, such as guards and guidance. Police and private security personnel should pay more attention to larger vehicles, especially those that park in and around the same area for several days in a row. Other important measures include increasing scrutiny of the vehicle rent services (in respect to screening those who take cards), and especially those renting large vehicles like SUVs, large vans or trucks. Attention must be paid to the theft of large and heavy vehicles, and notice made of any larger events which might be happening in the area. One of the key parameters in the newly defined approach to the PAL/event security is guidance in its broad sense, including guidance to evacuation, guidance to shelter, guidance to ways people should react, etc.

The main difficulty in realising the approach, even parametrised based on the previously discussed criteria, is for each actor to find necessary budgets, time and resources to get necessary controls available in real life. For example, a city might have sufficient resources to secure perimeter for one event or one important PAL. However, it could be expected that none of cities would have resources sufficient to deliver the same controls at 10-20 PALs with mass events simultaneously. This brings us to a very specific consideration going beyond the topic of Martyn’s Law, namely, how to manage accessibility, events and security with associated controls for multiple PALs at the same time. And that number for a large city can be really significant. Each PAL and event will draw on typically limited resources available within the area, while having all resources for all controls on their own budget continuously would not be feasible for most.

CTB: PACTESUR was born from the escalation of threats and terrorist events across Europe, seeking to better understand how cities and local police forces can better protect their vulnerable public spaces. Can you detail what the main project activities are?

LK: In 2018, The European Committee of the Regions (CoR) welcomed the recognition of the role of mayors in the European Action Plan to help local elected representatives to protect public spaces against terrorist attacks. The CoR - the assembly of elected local and regional representatives of the European Union – made a call on the European Commission to ensure the continuity of the new fund for supporting transnational projects protecting public spaces. It called on the Member States, regions and cities to incorporate the protection of public spaces into the infrastructure investment carried out under the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund.

PACTESUR is based on four pillars:
•   in-depth reflection on standards, legal frames and local governance;
•   the development of specialised training for local security operators;
•   awareness-raising of citizens and politicians on their role on prevention and as security actors;
•   the identification of the most adapted local investments for securing open and touristic public spaces by sharing field experience.

PACTESUR will draw conclusions from lessons learnt and create training materials for security forces, information tools for citizens and guidelines for local authorities to build up knowledge on how to design better policies to secure public spaces.

Activities within the project include: reflection on standards, legal frameworks and local governance for the elaboration of common standard guidelines, response protocols and soft laws; development of specialised training programmes for local security operators; awareness-raising of citizens and politicians on their role on prevention and as security actors; identification of the most adapted local investments for securing open and touristic public spaces by sharing field experience; setting up local pilot sites equipped to prevent and promptly react to terrorist threats while preserving the urban environment; and conducting of three European Week of Security (Nice 2019, Torino 2020 and Liege 2022).

The European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS) is active in other projects as well (PRoTECT, for example) which looks at the developing of new tools and solutions to help local authorities and other local actors to better prevent, respond and react to terrorist threats in public spaces.

Lina Kolesnikova is a consultant in international relations, security, risk and crisis management in Brussels, Belgium, and a member of Crisis Response Journal’s (CRJ) Advisory Panel. She is also a fellow of the Institute of Civil Protection and Emergency Management (ICPEM) and a representative of ICPEM in Europe. Since 2019, she is a member of the PACTESUR Expert Advisory Committee.