Counter Terror Business - Counter Terrorism

CTB's review of 2024

Meghan Shaw — Wed, 08 Jan 2025 17:22:05 +0000

CTB takes a look back at some of the biggest stories this year, including Martyn’s Law, a new government and the riots

JANUARY
In January, the UK parliament declared Hizb ut-Tahirir a terrorist organisation. Belonging to or supporting this group was made a criminal offence, with a potential sentence of 14 years.

The UK and the US announced sanctions for those involved in financing Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).

A new law was introduced to ban the possession, sale, manufacturing, or transportation of zombie-style knives and machetes, in an initiative to protect young people and make streets safer for all. The full ban came into force in September this year.

The new Online Safety Act offences also came into full force, which included criminalising threatening messages, death threats, and encouraging others to self harm, all of which carry a sanction of up to five years in prison.

FEBRUARY
In February, the �鶹�� Office launched a standard tier consultation of Martyn’s Law, building on previous legislation and investigating how the bill would affect smaller premises. The proposals set out different requirements for standard tier premises, with a capacity of 100-799 individuals, and enhanced tier premises and public events with capacities of 800 individuals or more.

Jonathan Hall KC was also appointed independent reviewer of state threat legislation, a new role established as part of the new National Security Act 2023. He will assess and report on the fairness, effectiveness, and proportionality of UK state threats legislation.

For the first time, defence industry spending exceeded £25 billion with spending doubling in Yorkshire and the Humber, and raising by 25 per cent in Wales. 209,000 jobs have been supported by the MOD’s expenditure.

MARCH
In March, Sweden became NATO’s newest member, upping its membership to 32 countries.

The government announced “an updated, more focused” definition of ‘extremism’ “to tackle the ever-evolving threat of extremism in the UK”. This update follows the Community Security Trust recording a 147 per cent increase in antisemitic incidents in the UK in 2023 compared to 2022, and Tell MAMA recording a 335 per cent increase in Islamophobic cases in the last four months.

Latest data released by the �鶹�� Office showed that 2023 had the highest number of terrorism arrests of young people since records began on 11th September 2001, with 19 percent of the 219 terrorism-related arrests being individuals under 17.

Furthermore, the Mayor of London announced £875,000 of funding to empower communities to tackle hate, intolerance and extremism, as part of the fifth year of the grassroots Shared Endeavour Fund to empower Londoners to challenge racist and hateful views in their communities.

APRIL
In April, two men were charged with offences under the Official Secrets Act, for spying for China.

A man was jailed for terrorism offences, after he was found sending hoax packages containing white powder and letters to primary schools, shopping centres, and businesses, telling recipients to “run”.

General Gwyn Jenkins was appointed as the new national security adviser to replace Sir Tim Burrow under the Sunak government. As part of a Counter Terrorism Policing investigation, several people were charged with an investigation into alleged offences under the National Security Act under legislation that came into effect last December.

MAY
In May, Martyn’s Law campaigners, including Figen Murray, Martyn Hett’s mother, finished their walk from Manchester to Downing Street on the seventh anniversary of the Manchester Arena attack. Murray then met with PM Rishi Sunak and then leader of the opposition Keir Starmer.

JUNE
On 3rd June, hospitals across London experienced a ransomware attack, with King’s College Hospital and Guy’s and St Thomas’ among those affected. It was speculated that the Russian cyber-criminal group Qilin were responsible for the attack.

The Metropolitan Police announced they had released 160 football banning orders, the largest ever for a single season, which came as the Euros were about kick off that week. Sanctions included banning people from football venues, their towns, or even requiring people to surrender their passports for European competitions or international fixtures.

On a similar note, Peter Both, the chief of police in Gelsenkirchen, prepared for disruptive Serbian hooligans during the England’s first match in the Euros. Despite violence during the day, the match itself was relatively peaceful.

JULY
Thursday 4th July saw the UK’s general election, with the Labour Party securing 412 seats, an increase of 211 since 2019, and Sir Keir Starmer winning a landslide victory against Rishi Sunak, who lost 251 seats since 2019, leaving the Conservatives’ total seats at 121. Prior to the General Election, Starmer wrote to Martyn’s Law campaigner Figen Murray and promised to introduce Martyn’s Law as soon as possible.

By July, UEFA had handed out a total 1,270,000 euros worth of fines for offences during the group stages of the Euro 2024 competition, with England receiving 12,500 euros worth of these, which was relatively little compared to countries like Croatia (€220,875) and Albania (€171,375).

Later that month, during a speech by King Charles setting out the government’s new plans, Martyn’s Law was listed as the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill, requiring venues to put measures into place to deal with the threat of terrorism. Of the 39 outlined bills, others include the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill, and the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill, also with aims to protect the UK from threats of attack.

The new home secretary Yvette Cooper took the first steps in establishing a new UK Border Security Command (BSC), which will work alongside the National Crime Agency (NCA), intelligence agencies, police, Immigration Enforcement and Border Force to crack down on smuggling gangs facilitating small boat crossings.

Police also recorded a huge increase in violence against woman and girls (VAWG), with an increase of 37 per cent between 2018 and 2023. Comprehensive data and analysis revealed that 3,000 gender-based violence related offences are recorded every day, and policing has subsequently ensured that VAWG is officially classed as a national threat. An updated framework has brought the police response to VAWG in line with counter-terrorism and serious organised crime by adopting the 4P approach (Prepare; Protect; Pursue; Prevent) from counter-terrorism to VAWG.

AUGUST
Following the stabbing of three children at a dance studio in Southport on 29th July, August was characterised by violence, disorder, and riots fuelled by far-right extremism and Islamophobia after misinformation about the attacker’s identity was spread online.Consequently, the PM launched a crackdown on criminal and violent activity, drawing up a new National Violent Disorder Programme to allow the country to share intelligence on the activity of violent groups to aid their swift disarmament.

The government offered emergency security to mosques, allowing mosques to access rapid security to be deployed.

Following violent riots across the UK, prosecutors and police declared that terrorism would be considered for those inciting violence.

As part of Taylor Swift’s Era’s tour, three concerts scheduled to take place 8-10th August in Vienna were cancelled amid security concerns following the government confirmation of a planned terrorist attack. Austrian authorities arrested three teenagers in the following days.

The Sunday Telegraph revealed that the home secretary ordered a review of the counter extremism strategy following a report published by the National Police Chiefs Council on violence against women and girls (VAWG), which it called an ‘epidemic’. Yvette Cooper’s review considered tackling violence against women and girls (VAWG) in the same way as terrorism and far-right extremism, meaning that teachers, healthcare professionals and local authority staff would be legally required to refer pupils they suspect of extreme misogyny to Prevent.

Towards the end of the month, the �鶹�� Secretary also announced new measures intended to strengthen border security to enforce immigration rules and increase returns. The government aims to achieve the highest rate of removals without right to stay, including failed asylum seekers, since 2018.

SEPTEMBER
In September, Martin Hewitt CBE QPM was appointed as the new border security commander.

The government later announced up to £75 million of new investment for the Border Security Command, which would be redirected from the previous government’s Illegal Migration Act, and would go towards cutting-edge new technology, extra officers, and further covert capabilities across the system. Further developments include covert cameras and modern monitoring technology, a new unit to improve intelligence, and more work to tackle organised crime groups.

On 17th and 18th September, thousands of people were injured and 32 were killed after communication devices exploded across Lebanon, many of which used by the militant group Hezbollah.

Yvette Cooper announced new measures to aid the police’s fight against VAWG, which will form part of ‘Raheem’s Law’. A pilot will be rolled out from early 2025, with domestic abuse specialists in 999 control rooms to advise on risk assessments to work with officers on the frontlines.

As part of the government’s initiative to reduce VAWG by 50 per cent within the next decade, a new national strategy to use advanced data analysis as part of its tactics was announced, allowing police forces to use computer programmes to bring together and analyse a range of data to identity and pursue offenders involved in domestic abuse, sexual assault, harassment, and stalking.

From 24th September, zombie-style knives and machetes were added to the list of prohibited weapons in the Criminal Justice Act 1988, as passed in January this year. Zombie-style weapons are defined as those that are over eight inches in length and often have a serrated edge or more than two sharp points.

A cyberattack affected WiFi at 19 UK railway stations on 25th September, and those connected to public WiFi networks were directed to webpages containing Islamophobic messages and details of several terrorist attacks across Europe.

OCTOBER
In October, the Southport attacker Axel Rudakubana was charged with two further offences on top of his already-existing three charges of murder, ten charges of attempted murder, and one charge of possessing a knife. The additional charges are production of a of a biological toxin, ricin, contrary to Section 1 of the Biological Weapons Act 1974, and possessing a pdf file named “Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants: The Al-Qaeda Training Manual”.

Martyn’s Law had its second reading in parliament, requiring venues with a capacity of more than 200 people to have a plan in place should an attack occur, as well as staff being required to undergo training. Bigger venues will have stronger requirements.

NOVEMBER
In November, the government announced another £75 million of funding to boost border security, bringing the total investment in the Border Security Command over the next two years to £150 million, which he revealed at the INTERPOL General Assembly in Glasgow.

Keir Starmer elected Jonathan Powell to be his new national security adviser, to replace Sir Tim Burrow.

Daniel Khalife pleaded guilty to escaping from Wandsworth Prison in September last year, having previously pleaded not guilty. Following the escape, an audit found 81 security failings at Wandsworth Prison.

CTB 60: 14 Years of Counter Terror Business

Meghan Shaw — Thu, 19 Dec 2024 17:15:04 +0000

Counter Terrorism

In our 60th issue, we look back at the last 14 years of terrorism and counter terrorism.

Counter Terror Business was launched in 2010 in response to increased interest in security and counter terrorism coming from PSi's other titles, as well as in government and the wider public.

It was launched as a specialist publication distributed to heads of security, intelligence officers, procurement officials, and department heads in local and central government, to inform the latest in counter terror intelligence, technology, and human resources.

Since then CTB has grown with a magazine, website, and online and in-person events.

2010

2010 was the year of the coalition government. At the time, the government said: “The terrorist threats we face now are more diverse than before, dispersed across a wider geographical area, and often in countries without effective governance. We therefore face an unpredictable
situation, with potentially more frequent, less sophisticated terrorist attacks.

The then-government continued on with the Contest strategy, which is still in place today.

In October 2010, the government published a new National Security Strategy which identified terrorism as one of the four highest risks faced by the UK (the others being hostile attacks on cyber space, a major accident or natural hazard and an international military crisis between states). In the strategy, the government committed to giving top priority to countering the threat from terrorism at home and overseas.

In May 2010, MP Stephen Timms was stabbed by an Islamic extremist at a constituency surgery.

The Arab Spring began from late 2010, leading to the overthrow of leaders including Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia in 2011, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya in 2011, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in 2011, and Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen in 2012. This was followed by civil war in Syria, the rise of ISIS and years of unrest across the area.

2011

In March, two people were killed when a man opened fire at Frankfurt airport.

In April, Ronan Kerr, a catholic member of the PSNI was killed in a car bombing by suspected dissident republicans and in May, Osama bin Laden was killed by US Navy SEALS in Pakistan.

On 22 July, Anders Behring Breivik killed 77 people and injured more than 300 in a bomb and shooting attack. A car bomb near the office of the prime minister killed eight people and injured at least 200. Less than two hours later, on the island of Utøya, Breivik opened fire on youth camp attendees, killing 69 and injuring 32. The attack is believed to be the deadliest mass shooting by a lone individual in modern history. It was also the deadliest attack in Norway since the Second World War.

In July 2011, the government published the third version of Contest, which set out the threat the country faced and priorities for dealing with it through to 2016.

Also in 2011, Lord Carlile of Berriew carried out a review into the Prevent strategy, after which the strategy was updated to deal more proportionately with all kinds of terrorist threat and concentrate on some aspects of non-violent extremism which create an environment conducive to radicalisation.

In December, the Terrorism Prevention and Investigations Measures Act 2011 introduced the new system of terrorism prevention and investigation measures.

These measures were intended to protect the public from people who pose a real terrorist threat to security but who cannot be prosecuted, or in the case of foreign nationals, deported.

In December, six people were killed and 125 injured in an attack in Liège, Belgium and on the same day, two people were killed and 3 injured in a racially-motivated attack in Florence, Italy.

2012

In March 2012, a radical Islamist killed seven people in Montauban and Toulouse in France. In July, a suicide bomber believed to be affiliated with Hezbollah, killed five Israeli tourists and a bus driver in Burgas, Bulgaria.

2012 was the year of the London Olympics, with one of the biggest security operations the country has ever seen. The final cost of the security operation was estimated to be £553 million, and the event played out without major incident.

The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 repealed the stop and search powers known as ‘Section 44’. It also reduced the maximum period that a terrorist suspect could be detained before they are charged or released from 28 to 14 days.

2013

In April 2013, an Isamist attack killed three people and injured hundreds at the finish line of the Bostom Marathon. A police officer was killed later in the day.

In May, Fusilier Lee Rigby was killed in Woolwich.

2014

In February 2014, Russia invaded the Crimean Peninsula and then annexed it.

In April 2014, 276 school girls were kidnapped from a school in Chibok, Nigeria, by Boko Haram and in May, a 22-year-old killed six people in what was described as a misogynistic terror attack in Isla Vista, California. Also in May, four people were killed in an attack at the Jewish Museum of Belgium, in Brussels.

In July, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down over Ukraine, killing everyone on board.

Towards the end of the year, IS carried out a number of high-profile beheadings, including British aid workers, David Haines and Alan Henning.

In December, 17 people were taken hostage in a Lindt café in Sydney Australia. Two of the hostages were killed.

2015

2015 was a horrific year of attacks in France. In January 2015, 12 people were killed and 11 injured in an attack at the offices of satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris. The magazine had previously been attacked in 2011 and would be targeted again in 2020. A couple of days later, a man attacked a kosher market, held people hostage and killed four of them.

In June, an attacker decapitated one person and caused an explosion at a factory in Saint-Quentin-Fallavier.

In November, 130 people were killed and 368 injured in coordinated attacks across Paris. Three suicide bombers attacked outside the Stade de France, during an international football match, while another group of attackers fired at cafes and restaurants in Paris. 90 people were killed at a concert in the Bataclan theatre. This was the deadliest attack in Europe since the Madrid 2004 attack.

In the UK, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act came into power in February. It included powers to help the UK respond to the threat of terrorism.

2016

In March 2016, 32 people were killed in coordinated terrorist attacks around Brussels, claimed by Islamic State. It was the deadliest attack in Belgium since the Second World War. The attackers were members of the same cell that had carried out the Paris attacks in 2014/

In June, the UK voted to leave the EU and prime minister David Cameron announced his resignation.

Also in June, a lone wolf who had pledged allegiance to Islamic State killed 49 people in a shooting at Pulse gay nightclub.

The same month, MP Jo Cox was murdered by a far-right extremist.

In July, 86 people were killed and more than 400 injured after a truck was driven into crowds celebrating Bastille Day in Nice, France. Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack.

In November, the Investigatory Powers Act came into force. The Act introduced new powers, and restated existing ones, for British intelligence agencies and law enforcement to carry out targeted interception of communications, bulk collection of communications data, and bulk interception of communications.

In December, 13 people were killed and 55 injured in a truck attack at a Christmas market in Berlin.

There were other Islamist attacks that year, in Würzburg, Germany; Munich, Germany; Ansbach, Germany; Normandy, France; Charleroi, Belgium; Brussels, Belgium; Hamburg, Germany.

2017

2017 was the worst year in recent memory for terrorist attacks in the UK.

In March, Khalid Masood drove into pedestrians on Westminster Bridge, killing four people and injuring more than 50. He then drove into the gates of the Palace of Westminster and fatally stabbed a police officer.

In May, 22 people were killed and more than 800 injured in the Manchester Arena attack.

In June, 8 people were killed and 48 injured in the London Bridge attack.

Also in June, a man drove a van at pedestrians near Finsbury Park mosque, killing one and injuring 11.

30 people were injured in September, in an islamist attack at Parsons Green tube station.

The Barcelona attacks in August killed 16 and injured more than 150. A van drove into crowds in La Rambla, killing 13 people. One of the attackers fled, killed a man and stole his car, which was then driven into police officers. A few hours later, another group of men, belived to be members of the same cell, drove into pedestrians in Cambrils, killing a woman.

2018

In March 2018, Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia were poisoned with a Novichok nerve agent. Dawn Sturgess was killed after finding the discarded bottle.

In April, 11 people were killed when a van was driven into pedestrians in Toronto, Canada. The attacker was a self-described Incel.

In October, Jamal Khashoggi was killed in Turkey.

In December, there was a shooting near a Christmas market in Strasbourg.

2019

The Christchurch attack in March 2019 killed 51 people and injured 40 at two mosques. The attacker Brenton Tarrant published a manifesto online and cited Anders Behring Breivik as an inspiration.

Theresa May resigned as prime minister and was replaced by Boris Johnson.

Two people were killed by Usman Khan at London Bridge in November.

2020

Following the Brexit Referendum, the UK officially left the EU on 31 January 2020.

In January 2020, two inmates at Whitemoor prison, wearing fake suicide vests, stabbed a prison officer.

In February 2020, a man stabbed two people in Streatham and three people were killed in an attack in Reading.

Covid began dramatically spreading around the world in 2020. Lockdowns became the norm, and conspiracy theories spread quickly.

In October a teacher was beheaded after apparently showing cartoons of the prophet Muhammad to his students.

2021

2021 began with the storming of the Capitol in Washington, following claims that the election had been stolen.

In August, the US troops withdrew from Afghanistan and the Taliban rapidly took control of the country. Since then, they have banned girls going to school, imposed new dress codes on women, banned women from some public spaces and even banned women from talking in public.

In October 2021, MP David Amess was stabbed outside a constituency meeting in Leigh-on-Sea.

In November, there was an explosion in a taxi outside Liverpool Women's hospital.

2022

In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, sparking the largest European conflict since the second world war. Millions of Ukrainians were displaced and tens of thousands of people killed.

In July 2022, following a series of scandals, dozens of staff resigned from Boris Johnson’s administration, Johnson then resigned. In September, Liz Truss became prime minister– two days before Queen Elizabeth II died.

Following a disastrous mini budget, Truss resigned after 45 days. Rishi Sunak became the fourth prime minister in as many years.

Former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe was assassinated in Nara City.

In October 2022, a man threw petrol bombs at a migrant processing centre in Dover.

2023

Finalnd joined NATO in April 2023.

In October 2023, two Swedish football fans were killed in Brussels.

On 7 October, Hamas launched an attack on Israel, killing over a thousand people and taking around 250 hostage. Since then, Israel has killed tens of thousands of people in Gaza and also invaded Lebanon.

2024

2024 saw the return of a Labour government, with the conservatives suffering huge losses. A short while later, three girls were murdered at a Taylor Swift dance class. Misinformation about the attack led to devastating riots across the country, with hundreds of people already having been sent to prison for their part.

Following two assassination attempts. Donald Trump was reelected as president of the United States.

The new government has made progress on Martyn's Law, with it being introduced to parliament and stipulations from the Online Safety Act have come into effect.

Meanwhile, conflict has esclated in the Middle East and Ukraine.

2025.

Giong into 2025, we can expect further progress on Martyn's Law. Conflicts around the world remain onigoing with no sign of any ease.

While we are no longer continuing to publish magazines, CTB will keep you updated on the website, with regular news, features, and events.

Conference agenda released for Counter Terror Expo

Michael Lyons — Mon, 11 Apr 2022 11:27:05 +0000

Counter Terrorism

Counter Terror Expo has announced the release of this year’s conference agenda.

Consisting of two main theatres, the Counter Terror Protective Security Conference and the Counter Terror Congress, this year’s expo will feature an unrivalled speaker line-up. High level briefings will be delivered by those at the forefront of operations, policy and technology, ranging from national heads of CT to leaders in the big tech space charged with countering proliferation of extremism.

The Counter Terror Protective Security Conference 2022

8 June: Protective Security and the Emerging Role of the Private Sector

A robust set of protective security measures remains key to deterring and defeating terrorist attacks. Environments such as mass gatherings, transport networks and busy public spaces represent attractive targets for terrorist organisations and must be secured accordingly. Internationally there is a growing demand for lessons to be learnt from previous incidents and a need for proactive, legally enforceable measures to be taken. Here in the UK, the emerging Protect Duty, also known to many as ‘Martyn’s Law’, refers to a new piece of proposed legislation which advocates that protective and preparatory measures should be considered to make the public safer at openly accessible locations. Public safety is no longer just the responsibility of the security services, first responders etc. An integrated approach must now be taken, one that leverages the private sector, its people and resources to help prepare for and mitigate terrorist threats when they arise.

Day 1 of the Protective Security Theatre will examine the concepts, planning and framework necessary to safeguard public space. It will provide a platform for law enforcement, public safety, the security services and their private sector colleagues to explore this increasingly important subject.

Confirmed speakers include:

Superintendent Adam Thompson, Head, National Counter Terrorism Security Office
Wieke Vink, Director Counterterrorism and Civil Aviation Security, National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV), Netherlands Government
Simon Causer, Head of Security, City of London
Ken Scott, Head of Inspectorate, Sports Grounds Safety Authority
Neil Sharpley, Chair of the �鶹�� Office and Ministry of Justice Policy Unit, FSB

9 June: Understanding the Threat-Terrorist Attack Methodologies and Solutions

Terrorists consistently demonstrate an ability to exploit new concepts and technologies, using them in unanticipated and novel ways. Taking the Paris attacks of 2015 as an example, a complex plot involving multiple operatives and various weapons was coordinated to occur simultaneously. Even when attacks are foiled or fail as they are carried out, lessons are learnt and incorporated into refining attack methodologies of the future. In a similar fashion, security planners must attempt to stay ahead of the curve in this domain, learning from past incidents and mapping trends that may materialise in future. Improvised explosive devices, marauding firearms attacks, edged weapons or the use of vehicles have all been used effectively in the past. As we look to the future, the CT community must remain vigilant to new potential capabilities and methods for their use.

Day 2 of the Protective Security Theatre will examine the threat in detail. It will provide a forum for security planners and practitioners to understand the risks at play, attack methodologies and current terrorist exploitation of technology.

Confirmed speakers include:

Superintendent Lee Kendrick, Head, National CBRN Centre, Protect and Prepare, National Counter Terror Policing
Chris Broadrick, Police Sergeant, British Transport Police
Ville Patrikainen, Director Safety, Security & HSEQ, FRS Ferry
Karin Castro, Security Advisor, The Danish Institute of Fire and Security Technology
Christian Schneider, Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Advisor, INIBSP

The Counter Terror Congress 2022

8 June: Online Threats Focus Day-Combating Terrorism in the Digital Age

Terrorists have become extremely adept at operating in the online space to deliver strategic messaging, recruit followers and enable physical operations through funding and communication. Despite efforts by governments and online leaders in the private sector to crack down on terrorist activity, the problem remains. Terrorist organisations have shifted away from online activity in the public domain and now utilise an array of clandestine platforms to share propaganda, recruit, communicate and enable their physical operations. Ranging from encrypted apps to the dark web activity in the digital space remains a huge challenge for law enforcement and those tasked with restricting the proliferation of extremism online. This is set to grow exponentially with the rise of the decentralised web and alternative platforms in response to increased online censorship and control.

Day 2 of the Counter Terror Congress will focus exclusively on the online element of CT. It will provide a dedicated forum for government stakeholders, digital policing, the tech community and relevant stakeholders to explore proactive solutions to the challenges faced.

Confirmed speakers include:

Dr Richard Thompson, Deputy Director for Online Policy, �鶹��land Security Group, �鶹�� Office
Lucy Calladine, Government Affairs and Public Policy, Google
Dina Hussein, Head of Counterterrorism and Dangerous Organisations, Facebook/Meta
Inspector Paul Birch, Internet Investigations and Intelligence, Counter Terrorism Command SO15
Murtaza Shaikh, Lead, Online Hate, Terrorism & Incitement, Ofcom

Counter Terror Expo’s Conferences are free to attend for all registered show attendees and will provide a great platform for awareness, education and interactive discussion. The full agenda for the two days outlining topics and speakers will run as follows.

The Counter Terror Protective Security Conference 2022

8 June: Protective Security and the Emerging Role of the Private Sector

09.45-10.00: Chair’s Opening Remarks

10.00-10.30: Keynote Address: Improving Protective Security and Preparedness Measures in Publicly accessible Locations
Superintendent Adam Thompson, Head, National Counter Terrorism Security Office

10.30-11.00: Netherlands Counter Terror Strategy
Wieke Vink, Director Counterterrorism and Civil Aviation Security, National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV), Netherlands Government

11.00-11.45: Panel Discussion: Collaboration in the Security Space: Navigating the Implications of Protect Duty
Chair: Nick Aldworth, Former UK Counter Terrorism National Coordinator-Founder and Director at Risk to Resolution Limited
Chris Medhurst-Cocksworth, Head of Risk Consulting, Pool Re Solutions
Simon Causer, Head of Security, City of London
Neil Sharpley, Chair of the �鶹�� Office and Ministry of Justice Policy Unit, FSB

11.45-12.15: Protecting Public Spaces in the City of London
Simon Causer, Head of Security, City of London

12.15-13.15: Lunch Break

13.15-13.45: Protecting Public Spaces Pre, During and After a Terrorist Threat
Vivian Gravenberch, Consultant, Dutch Institute for Technology, Safety & Security

13.45-14.30: Panel Discussion: Protecting Major Events from the Threat of Terrorism
Chair: Pete Dalton MSyl, Protective Security Consultant, PAD Command Consultancy
Ken Scott, Head of Inspectorate, Sports Grounds Safety Authority
Paul Williams, Head of Security, The O2
Noel Painting, Head of Health and Safety, Festival Republic

14.30-15.00: Protective Security Support and Guidance
Inspector Nathan Crinyion, Counter Terror Security Coordinator, Metropolitan Police

15.00-15.15: Chairs Closing Remarks

9 June: Understanding the Threat-Terrorist Attack Methodologies and Solutions

09.45-10.00: Chair’s Opening Remarks

10.00-10.30: Keynote Address: Understanding and Managing the Risk Posed by CBRN Incidents
Superintendent Lee Kendrick, Head, National CBRN Centre, Protect and Prepare, National Counter Terror Policing

10.30-11.00: BTP Specialist Capabilities: Protective Security within the Railway Network
Chris Broadrick, Police Sergeant, British Transport Police

11.00-11.45: Recognising Modern Terrorism: Holistic Approach to Secure Critical and Transport Assets from Hybrid and Emerging Threats
Ville Patrikainen, Director Safety, Security & HSEQ, FRS Ferry

11.45-12.15: Approaches to Hostile Vehicle Mitigation and Securing Urban Public Spaces
Christian Schneider, Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Advisor, INIBSP

12.15-13.15: Lunch Break

13.15-13.45: Physical Security Implementation and CT Work
Karin Castro, Security Advisor, The Danish Institute of Fire and Security Technology

13.45-14.15: Preventing Hostile Reconnaissance: See, Check and Notify (SCaN) – New SCaN for all Staff Film
Sergeant Peter Lucas. Community and Business Engagement, National Project Servator Team, City of London Police

14.15-14.45: Pre-Terror Incident Planning and Execution
Ric Bachour, Director of International Investigations, Five Stones intelligence

14.45-15.00: Chairs Closing Remarks

The Counter Terror Congress 2022

8 June: Online Threats Focus Day-Combating Terrorism in the Digital Age

10.20-10.30: Chair’s Opening Remarks
Dr Erin Saltman, Director of Programs, Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism

10.30-11.30: Industry Approaches to Countering Terrorism Online
Moderator: Dr Erin Saltman, Director of Programs, Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism
Lucy Calladine, Government Affairs and Public Policy, Google
Dina Hussein, Head of Counterterrorism and Dangerous Organisations, Meta

11.30-12.15: Fireside Chat - Tools for Cross-Platform Solutions
Moderator: Dr Erin Saltman, Director of Programs, Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism
Adam Hadley, Executive Director, Tech Against Terrorism

12.15-13.15: Lunch Break

13.15-14.00: Panel Discussion: Adversarial Shifts in Terrorism Online
Moderator: Dr Erin Saltman, Director of Programs, Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism
Dr Shiraz Maher, Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET)
Blyth Crawford, Research Fellow, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation
Professor Stuart Macdonald, Director, Cyber Threats Research Centre
Gareth Jones, Senior Lecturer, The Auckland University of Technology

14:00-14:45: Government, Regulatory and Law Enforcement Responses to Countering Terrorism Online
Moderator: Dr Erin Saltman, Director of Programs, Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism
Inspector Paul Birch, Internet Investigations and Intelligence, Counter Terrorism Command SO15
Murtaza Shaikh, Online Hate, Terrorism & Incitement Lead, Ofcom
Dr Richard Thompson, Deputy Director for Online Policy, �鶹��land Security Group, �鶹�� Office

14.45-15.00: Chair’s Closing Remarks
Dr Erin Saltman, Director of Programs, Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism

Counter Terror Business is the Premier Media & Content Partner for CTX.

www.ctexpo.co.uk

Defending our realm is not just a job for MI5 and the police

Michael Lyons — Fri, 05 Nov 2021 09:59:53 +0000

Counter Terrorism

416 years ago today the ‘Gunpowder Plot’ to blow up the House of Lords was disrupted, accredited to an anonymous letter sent to the authorities.

Centuries later, the provision of information to the police and MI5 is critical in detecting and disrupting terrorism and other security risks. Explosive devices endure as a serious threat, although recent terrorist attacks have often involved less sophisticated weapons to cause casualties. Preventing such attacks and casualties is a key objective of the pending Protect Duty, arguably the most significant change to security in recent years.

With government consultation on the new legislation now closed and civil servants considering the components of the Duty, businesses should not wait for statutory regulation to take steps to protect their buildings, other assets, and people from terrorism. Counter terrorism measures will also benefit a business’s overall resilience by impacting the intent and capability of hostile actors and reducing the business’s vulnerability to the acts they seek to undertake. Three simple steps can help businesses, staff and visitors keep safe, now.

1. Train well.
Make best use of the freely available counter terrorism information and training, particularly ACT e-learning and the PROTECT UK app. This will help staff know more about terrorism, identify security vulnerabilities, suspicious behaviours and how to respond to an attack. Terrorism is a foreseeable health and safety risk, consider the ACT e-learning in your mandatory health and safety training for staff. The training can be completed in modules and the whole course takes around 45 minutes to complete. Less than an hour’s training could help save lives.

2. Identify and manage risk.
Consider a terrorist attack in your risk management process. In your risk register focus on mitigations that can reduce the probability of an attack happening, as well as those controls to minimise the impact it could have on your business. Understand the limitations of your controls, such as any blind spots in CCTV coverage and assess if further mitigations are required to reduce the vulnerability. The police provide free guidance, scalable to businesses of varying sizes, to help risk management.

3. Have a plan and test it.
Have a plan for what you’ll do in the event of an attack and practice it. The government provide free guidance, again scalable to your business needs. The first time you test your plan should not be in response to an attack. If you currently have a schedule of fire alarm and evacuation tests, consider implementing a scheme to practice your response to a terrorist attack too.

Defending our realm is not just a job for MI5 and the police. The festive season is traditionally a time of heightened risk, with the police and MI5 tracking an increased number of threats, with information of varying credibility, thus making assessments difficult. Staff, visitors, and the public should have the confidence to report any concerns or suspicious behaviours to the authorities, as their information could be vital to investigations. Concerns can be reported in several ways, detailed on the Action Counters Terrorism website. Working together we can help our businesses, staff and visitors stay safe from those who seek us harm.

Written by Andrew Donaldson CSyP MSyl, head of Security for Real Estate Management (UK) Limited and former government counter terrorism official.

The Three W’s of Counterterrorism: A Framework for Analysis

Michael Lyons — Thu, 20 May 2021 09:45:53 +0000

Counter Terrorism

On 29 April 2021, the UK’s new Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act was granted Royal Assent. Provisions contained within the Bill include new stricter sentencing guidelines for those convicted of terrorism offences, an end to early release for the most serious offenders, widening the range of offences that can be linked to terrorism, and a strengthening of disruption and risk management tools for counterterrorism purposes.

As the �鶹�� Secretary, Priti Patel, argued at the time: “This legislation will lengthen sentences for terrorists, improve monitoring of these dangerous offenders, and give the law enforcement agencies the powers to strengthen their ability to take action. Those who senselessly seek to damage and destroy lives need to know we will do everything possible to stop them. I will always take the strongest possible action to protect our national security.”

How, though, are we to evaluate such measures and their consequences? Academic research is surprisingly, and frustratingly, thin on issues of effectiveness in this policy domain. Critical perspectives, moreover, challenge the very criteria against which such powers should be evaluated by approaching counter terrorism policy as an example of security theatre intended either to reassure or to frighten publics. In this piece I set out the contours of an analytical framework for evaluating counterterrorism policy that helps us to: (i) Clarify the stakes in any evaluation of such powers; and, (ii) break the task of evaluation into smaller parts that may have greater or lesser significance for particular audiences. This framework – The Three W’s of Counterterrorism – proceeds via three core questions:

Are counter terrorism powers warranted?
The first question to ask is whether there is – actually – a need for specific, or uprated, or proposed counter terrorism powers. In the United Kingdom, for instance, Andrew Neal has shown how the history of counterterrorism lawmaking is one characterised by rushed responses to dramatic events that repeatedly leads to unconstitutional powers with questionable value for countering terrorism. This hasty and repetitive pursuit of new powers contrasts markedly with other countries where existing powers are applied to new threats without the parliamentary theatrics to which we are here accustomed. As Shami Chakrabarti argued in her evidence to the �鶹�� Office Affairs Committee back in 2014, sometimes, in counterterrorism, less is more: ‘Talk is cheap and legislation is almost as cheap. If I were �鶹�� Secretary I might not even legislate. That’s the thing; there is always this idea that legislation will help and often it doesn’t. Sometimes, it makes things worse’.

Asking whether a counterterrorism power is therefore warranted can be broken down further into three subsidiary questions:

1) What threat is being addressed, and how serious is that threat?
2) Are there already sufficient mechanisms in place to address the threat?
3) How problematic would the absence of a new power be?

Answering the first of these questions will always prove difficult to analysts outside the police and intelligence services as we are dealing with a world of classified information to which many of us have limited access. As Marc Sageman memorably argued: ‘we have a system of terrorism research in which intelligence analysts know everything but understand nothing, while academics understand everything but know nothing’. The question is also, importantly not only a statistical one involving calculations of probability and outcomes; all threats to security rely, to some extent, on their being interpreted thus. This is especially true of the politics of terrorism in which any labelling of a bombing, kidnapping, hostage-taking and so on as ‘terrorist’ is notoriously contestable.

Answering the second and third of these questions involves evaluation of the adequacy of existing policy frameworks to deal with new threats as well as reflection on the level of risk with which we are willing to live. This brings us, then, to the likely effectiveness of a proposed measure: the second of our three W’s.

Will proposed counter terrorism powers work?
There is little value in putting in place a counterterrorism mechanism doomed to failure. Few would support government efforts to do something against terrorism – simply for the sake of doing something against terrorism – if we knew that the something would be of no use. So, the second of our questions asks whether or not a particular measure will work: what are the chances of a proposed measure being successful, and how do we go about evaluating that success?

A first issue here is that – perhaps counter-intuitively – the purposes of counterterrorism programmes are not entirely straightforward. Paul Wilkinson (2011), for example, argued that counterterrorism laws may serve a variety of purposes, including addressing underlying grievances, deterring would-be terrorists or their sympathisers, upgrading the tools available to law enforcement officials, reassuring the public that something is being done, and expressing public revulsion toward terrorism. The banning of terrorist organisations through proscription powers, to give one example, is frequently justified on symbolic as well as strategic grounds with advocates seeing such powers as a mechanism for communicating intolerance toward terrorism as much as a tool for preventing terrorism. As James R. Clapper, the former United States Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and chief intelligence advisor to the President, argued, the listing of terrorist groups can be ‘more symbolic, more political, than substantive’.

A second challenge is that assessing the efficacy of a particular measure involves a claim about cause and effect that may be difficult to substantiate. How do we know, for example, that a particular attack was abandoned because of the deterrence effect of a counterterrorism framework rather than due to unrelated reasons. Looking forward – into the future – of course, is even more difficult still with the absence of counterfactuals to aid us. All policymaking involves speculation about the future, and counterterrorism is no different here even if the stakes are so great.

A third issue is that counterterrorism policies are aimed at reflexive actors – ‘terrorists’ and their sympathisers – whose ideas, motives, behaviours and targets are themselves constantly changing (although the level of innovation and creativity within terrorist organisations remains much debated). Efforts to reduce the risk of an attack in a specific time or place, for example, may result in the selection of an alternative target, as happened in response to target hardening efforts in response to aircraft hijackings in the 1970s.

So, taking these together, questions to be considered within the second of our three W’s include:

1) Can we identify the purpose(s) of a specific counterterrorism power?
2) Can we predict the future operation of a counterterrorism power?
3) How confident can we be in linking cause and effect here, such that we can link actions and their outcomes?
4) How will a particular counterterrorism power impact on its targets, and their behaviour?

Are counter terrorism powers worth the consequences?
The final set of considerations refers to the consequences – intended and otherwise – of counterterrorism efforts and activities. Uppermost here might be the costs in manpower, money, and time of an attempt to deter or respond to a terrorist threat. By some estimates, the post-9/11 war on terrorism has now cost an eye-watering $6.4 trillion, to say nothing of the cost in human life in Iraq, Afghanistan and beyond.

Such costs may be less pronounced in the context of less exceptional counterterrorism tools – such as the Bill with which we began our discussion – but they exist nonetheless and may not always be foreseen in advance. Work on the targeting of minority and especially ‘suspect’ communities in the post-9/11 climate, for instance, has demonstrated the widespread incursion of contemporary counterterrorism frameworks upon civil liberties and other fundamentals of citizenship [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00993.x?jo.... And this is to say nothing of the opportunity costs of counterterrorism efforts: parliamentary time spent debating a new counterterrorism bill which could be put to any number of alternative uses, of course.

How we assess such costs is therefore a matter, in part, of economic calculation. As John Mueller (2006: 1) argues, overreaction to the threat of terrorism has ‘led to wasteful, even self-parodic expenditures and policy overreactions, ones that not only very often do more harm and cost more money than anything the terrorists have accomplished, but play into their hands’. It is also, however, a matter of ethical and political decision: not least: Are we willing to trade-off or ‘balance’ liberties for security if we think this will work? Are we willing to trade the liberties of some for the security of others?

As a fundamentally political question, our third W of Counterterrorism again evades any straightforward or simplistic answer. As before, though, we may find it helpful to break the question down further to the following constituents:

1) Is a proposed counterterrorism mechanism worth the costs in time, treasure, and other resources?
2) Is a proposed measure worth the opportunity costs, or could these resources be put to better or more efficient use?
3) Are we willing to justify the intended consequences of such a measure, especially if there are impacts upon civil liberties, citizenship, and so forth?
4) Have we considered, and are we willing to justify potentially unintended consequences – for example, the impact of counterterrorism policies upon social, cultural and other relations between groups, communities and publics within and beyond a particular territory.

These Three W’s of Counterterrorism do not exhaust the kinds of question we might ask when evaluating the counterterrorist activities of executives, legislators, police or other security professionals. What they do, however, offer, is a broad framework for evaluating proposed or actual counterterrorism policies, and for thinking through the questions they raise.

This is an updated version of an earlier piece published on UEA’s Easminster site, available here.

This article was written by Lee Jarvis, Professor of International Politics at the University of East Anglia, UK.

Lee’s work focuses on the construction and communication of security threats, and the implications thereof for social and political life. Lee is author or editor of fourteen books and over fifty articles or chapters, including Times of Terror: Discourse, Temporality and the War on Terror; Security: A Critical Introduction (with Jack Holland); and Banning Them, Securing Us? Terrorism, Parliament and the Ritual of Proscription (with Tim Legrand). His work has been funded by the ESRC, the AHRC, the Australian Research Council, NATO and others. Twitter: @LeeJarvisPols. Email: l.jarvis@uea.ac.uk

Top 10 CTB Features of 2020

Michael Lyons — Thu, 17 Dec 2020 11:28:53 +0000

Counter Terrorism

This year has been a strange one to assess. Because of the global pandemic, in the UK we have seen lockdowns of various extremeties keeping people away from busy places. Working from home has become the new norm, making commuting redundant and our town and city centres less populated. Equally, the ordinarily congested events schedule, whether for sport, music or other entertainment, has been paused, whilst, in many cases, holiday-goers have been prevented from travelling abroad.

However, despite this lack of people movement and gathering, 2020 has still seen a number of terrorist attacks in Europe, most notably in Nice and Vienna. We have also seen multiple warnings from the police that the threat of online radicalisation has never been higher, with school-aged children left with no alternative but to be online for longer periods as schools closed and outdoor activities were taken away from them. The cyber vulnerabilities of companies across the country has never been more noticeable, and the growth of the far-right threat continues to be build.

Throughout this year we have been able to share some brilliant content on how best to address some of these issues, analysing how lockdown has allowed organisations to strengthen their physical and digital security, why initiatives like Martyn's Law are just as important now as they were when first conceived and how best to reduce the risk of terrorist activity online.

Here, as we begin to turn our attentions towards all that 2021 has to offer, we list our top 10 features from 2020.

Secure or not secure? UK Security in 2020

Professor Anthony Glees, from the University of Buckingham, wrote for Counter Terror Business in January considering the various security tools the new government will have at its disposal after 31 December 2020

Recognising those standing up against terrorism in the UK

The Counter Terror Awards acknowledge excellence in the global fight against terrorism. This preview shared the 2020 shortlists, ahead of the unveiling in June. Catch up on those shortlisted here

CTB Interview: Large-scale sporting events

In March we interviewed David Stewart, former Interim Director of Security for the Birmingham 2022 Commonwealth Games, about security planning for the 2022 Commonwealth Games, safety within the ‘last mile’ and stadium security

Security and protection of public spaces

Pilar de la Torre, project manager for the European Forum for Urban Security (Efus), wrote for Counter Terror Business in March about the forum’s PRoTECT project and the role of municipal authorities in protecting public spaces

The 2020 Counter Terror Award Winners

As highlighted previously, the 2020 Counter Terror Awards were held digitally in June. The winners are announced in this piece, with congratulations heading the way of the PSHE Association, Manchester City Council, Heathrow Airport and Figen Murray, amongst others

CT Awards Q&A: Figen Murray

At the start of June, Figen Murray was awarded the Outstanding Contribution to Counter Terrorism Award, as part of the 2020 Counter Terror Awards. In this interview, we managed to get her thoughts on recognition, the progress of Martyn’s Law and venue security

Most students in British universities support Prevent

The Prevent programme, by far the most controversial component of the UK’s domestic counter terrorist strategy, aims to stop people from becoming, or supporting, terrorists. In this article, Steven Greer, Professor of Human Rights at the University of Bristol Law School, explored the issue

Terrorists’ use of electronic communications

Dr David Lowe, senior research fellow at Leeds Beckett University’s Law School, examines in this feature how terrorists and terrorist groups are using and exploiting the various forms of electronic communication to promote their cause, recruit individuals or plan attacks

Counter terrorism and the 2019 British General Election

Another article from the University of Bristol’s Steven Greer, this time looking back at counter terrorism and the 2019 British General Election

Is a standardised biometric database the key to crime prevention?

Undoubtedly, 2020 has seen a rise in cyber crime. Here, James Stickland commented on the rise of cyber crime and terrorism, and how a standardised biometric database can greatly stem this tide

The importance of incorporating counter terrorism measures

Michael Lyons — Wed, 09 Dec 2020 11:14:11 +0000

Counter Terrorism

Alfie Hosker explains the increasing importance of improving the physical security of buildings and incorporating counter terrorism measures into the layout and landscaping of developments

Secured by Design (SBD) is the official police security initiative that works to improve the security of buildings and their immediate surroundings, reducing the opportunities for crime and providing safe places to live, work, shop and visit. It is part of the Police Crime Prevention Initiatives (PCPI) group of initiatives, which also includes the Police Crime Prevention Academy (PCPA) and Licensing Security & Vulnerability Initiative (Licensing SAVI).

Working closely with government, local authorities, architects, developers and builders, SBD looks to incorporate police crime prevention and anti-terrorism measures from the initial concept and design stage through to construction and completion of buildings and developments. This work not only covers the construction of new buildings and developments, but also refurbishment and landscaping projects.

Unfortunately the threat from terrorism is an ongoing concern with recent events such as the attacks on London Bridge and Manchester Arena here in the UK. Whilst the chances of getting caught up in a terrorist incident remain extremely low, it is nevertheless essential that the threat of terrorism is considered by those stakeholders involved at the earliest design stage of a development scheme.

The UK Police Service have a number of specialised staff called Designing Out Crime Officers (DOCOs), whose role includes working with the relevant planner, architect, engineer, security/facilities manager or other stakeholder across both new build and refurbishment projects to incorporate the relevant site specific designing out crime measures into the project. Where applicable, this work is also undertaken alongside a Counter Terrorism Security Adviser (CTSA), who will advise on all aspects of counter terrorism protective security. In addition, CTSAs are responsible for the provision of protective security advice to crowded places - areas where there may be large crowds who could be vulnerable to terrorist attack, such as shopping centres, sporting stadiums, pubs and bars or transport hubs etc.

As part of their professional development, SBD and the PCPA regularly bring together specialist police officers working in the Crime Prevention and Designing out Crime areas, ensuring they keep pace with changing patterns of criminal behaviour and advances in building design and new technology. DOCOs are recommended as a source of assistance by the Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastructure (CPNI) due to their comprehensive, specialist training.

Both the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) and National Planning Practice Guidance (NPPG) promote creating safe and sustainable communities, encouraging pre-application discussion between planners, CTSAs and DOCOs and involving architects, developers and key stakeholders. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is in place between CTSAs and DOCOs to support this measure and ensure they work together effectively to provide formal responses to relevant planning applications.

SBD is referenced in the National Counter Terrorism Security Office’s (NaCTSO) newly released and updated Crowded Places guidance suite of documents (November 2020), directing those seeking advice to the SBD website.

SBD has produced a series of authoritative Design Guides to assist incorporating security measures into developments. These guides advise on all aspects of design and layout that impact on the creation of safe and secure environments. This includes road layout, footpath design, communal areas, dwelling boundaries, car parking and lighting and they cover a range of building sectors, including residential, education, health, transport and commercial. The Guides are regularly updated to keep pace with changing patterns of criminal behaviour and advances in manufacturing design and new technology.

The guides can be accessed and downloaded for free from the SBD website.

Other PCPI initiatives support this work, with the Licensing SAVI initiative for example supporting the owners and operators of licensed premises in managing a safe and secure environment for the benefit of staff, customers and local communities. This initiative was developed in conjunction with the �鶹�� Office and NaCTSO, and assists licensees with their responsibilities around public safety.

Other guidance available includes ‘Protecting Crowded Places: Design and Technical Issues’, which encourages designers to adopt designing out crime methods to effectively develop safer and more secure environments. It also describes the role of the DOCO, how they can assist in the planning and development process and makes reference to the SBD Design Guides and award scheme. ‘Crowded Places: The Planning System and Counter Terrorism’ discusses designing out crime and advocates the use of suitably trained DOCOs as a source of counter-terrorism advice.

Physical security is important in protecting against a range of threats and vulnerabilities, including terrorism. These threats can range from the use of vehicles in the form of Hostile Vehicle attacks to the marauding attacker on foot. Consequently incorporating the appropriate physical security measures into buildings and developments across our communities can either prevent an attack or reduce the potential damage and injuries should an incident occur. Such measures can include but are not exclusively limited to doors, windows, roller shutters, bollards and perimeter security.

For most organisations the recommended response will involve appropriate investments in products that deter as well as detect; measures that will also protect against other criminal acts such as theft and vandalism. However SBD recognise that in some cases, whether due to the nature of the asset being protected, the function of the building or the gathering of large numbers of people associated with the night time economy, more robust security measures that offer better protection, are required. The key to this is to ensure that the products or services which are incorporated into either a new build development, refurbishment projects or the nature of the identified threat, are fit for purpose.

SBD recommends that the products are successfully tested and, where possible, third party certificated by a suitably qualified body, who have the relevant expertise and specialist skills to formally test the product to the security standard required to ensure that the product actually does what it is supposed to.

An example of this might be bollards, which naturally need to be correctly tested, certified and to deal with the perceived risk, which could be a 7.5 tonne lorry or car travelling at a certain speed or range of speeds. One such body is CPNI, the Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastructure.

Whilst all security-related products listed on the SBD website have achieved the Police Preferred Specification standard for their crime prevention and deterrent capabilities, SBD has developed a specific area on the website listing security products that have passed more stringent security tests than those used for traditional residential and commercial purposes, products that may provide greater protection prior to or during a terrorist attack. All products that gain a listing on this page have passed exacting and demanding assessments.

In addition to the security measures incorporated during the design and build stage, businesses and organisations also need to ensure that their protective security measures and plans are kept up to date with the latest counter terrorism security advice, whether it is a town centre shopping arcade or an individual restaurant. This is essential in supporting and underpinning operations like Project SERVATOR, which is a strategic method of policing to deter, detect and disrupt a wide range of criminal activity from pickpocketing and property theft to terrorism and which also provides a reassuring presence for the public and the communities they serve. Action Counters Terrorism (ACT) is another such operation, encouraging communities across the country to help the police tackle terrorism and save lives by reporting suspicious behaviour and activity.

Though this article highlights the importance of physical security, it is essential to understand that this is only part of a robust protection against such criminal attacks. An integrated approach to devising such measures also includes business plans, continuity planning, supporting access control and cyber security measures for instance, which can all be identified and addressed by carrying out operational requirements, risk analysis and/or obtaining advice from a suitably qualified security professional. These must be continually revisited and assessed to update and mitigate any vulnerabilities which may arise and it is worth remembering that CTSAs are available to advise local authorities, businesses, organisations and professional bodies about counter terrorism protective security guidance that should be incorporated into their general crime prevention plans, advice and guidance.

The Police Crime Prevention Academy have developed a range of courses and qualifications to understand current threats posed by terrorism and extremist behaviour, understanding best practice to mitigate such threats and understanding the actions to be taken in the event of an incident. These are tailored to different levels of expertise and responsibility within organisations, and are open to everyone who is engaged in policing, security and supporting safer communities. As part of PCPI, the Police Crime Prevention Academy is affiliated with the Secured by Design initiative, so are the leading experts in delivering Secured by Design standards and guidance.

Contact details for police DOCOs are available on the SBD website.

Further information on the Police Crime Prevention Academy range of qualifications, which can also be delivered virtually, is available at www.crimepreventionacademy.com.

Further information on the Licensing SAVI initiative is available at www.licensingsavi.com.

Alfie Hosker is the Technical Manager with Secured by Design. His area of responsibility is the United Kingdom and International queries. Prior to joining Secured by Design, Alfie served in the UK Police Service for over 20 years across a number of disciplines, including CID, Stolen Vehicle Squad, Public Order, Neighbourhood Policing, Licensing and Crime Prevention. He also spent a number of years within various Planning, Highways and Building Control Departments advising on designing out crime and crime prevention through environmental design, counter terrorism, enforcement, planning policy and applications.

How will Brexit impact on the UK’s ability to counter terrorism?

Michael Lyons — Tue, 01 Dec 2020 15:49:44 +0000

Counter Terrorism

One of the things that the UK and the EU can agree on is that counter terrorism (CT) cooperation must continue beyond the Brexit transition period. This includes protecting CT capabilities, such as mechanisms for rapid and secure data exchange; practical measures to support cross-border operational cooperation; and UK cooperation with EU law enforcement, intelligence and criminal justice agencies.

Yet, time is running out, and the UK is now unlikely to secure a bespoke Internal Security Treaty, providing permanent access to most (if not all) EU information systems. This was always ambitious, given the lack of legal basis or precedent and the UK’s refusal to adhere to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).

Instead, the scenario that the UK will crash out of the EU, losing access to all information systems and databases established on the basis of EU law is more likely. Even if the UK manages to negotiate a deal, this will likely be more restrictive than that awarded to Schengen Area associated states, representing a major loss of capability. The UK will attempt, and may to some extent succeed, in building parallel structures and workarounds. However, the end result is likely to involve more friction and reduced levels of cooperation. The impact on the UK’s terrorist threat picture is, however, likely to be minimal.

Worst-case scenario: ‘No deal’ Brexit
Law enforcement and intelligence agencies in Europe see terrorism primarily through a national lens. Even in the worstcase scenario, relationships between the UK’s security and intelligence services and their counterparts in EU countries will continue to operate on the basis of direct contact between national agencies. The UK will also continue to be a member of the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG), which facilitates CT cooperation across 30 European Intelligence and Security services. The CTG has the capability to undertake CT operations globally and provides valuable proactive and sometimes pre-emptive threat intelligence that would otherwise be unavailable.

In any case, the UK’s most significant and successful international CT collaboration is the Five Eyes community, principally the United States, but also Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Those and other extra-European connections will remain unaltered by Brexit.

This does not fully protect the UK against the loss of access to law enforcement and criminal justice tools resulting from a no-deal Brexit. In this scenario, the UK would see its access to EU capabilities fall below that of other third countries such as the US, Canada and Australia. This potentially exposes the UK to risks in three key areas: 1) identifying terrorists; 2) tracking their travel; and 3) extradition of terrorists to the UK.

1. Identifying terrorists
Even in the event of a deal, the UK will lose membership of Europol – the EU’s law enforcement agency. A hard Brexit would mean losing access to the Europol Information System (EIS), a database containing information on more than 86,000 suspected criminals and terrorists. UK investigators would no longer be able directly to check whether information on a potential terrorist suspect existed in any other member states’ systems. The UK would also be unable to exchange sensitive and restricted data through the Europol Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA).

This would be compounded by the loss of access to the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), which enables rapid exchange of information on criminal records and convictions, including terrorist information, across EU member states. This could cause delays in the retrieval of time sensitive intelligence that is paramount in the wake of a terrorist attack.

2. Tracking terrorists’ travel
A no-deal scenario would mean the UK would be denied participation in the Schengen Information System II (SIS II), losing real-time information on persons of interest, objects and vehicles travelling to the UK. The UK would also lose access to the EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) airline programme and would be unable to identify terrorist suspects in advance of travel, including those travelling under aliases.

In preparation, the UK is imposing stronger border controls, including £20 million of additional funding for the �鶹�� Office. This aims to help improve the intelligence picture about threats moving in and out of the UK, strengthening the multi-agency response to people and goods entering the UK and support investment in new capabilities for Border Force and Counter Terrorism Policing (e.g. improved detection equipment).

3. Extraditing and prosecuting terrorists
A hard Brexit would also mean that the UK would lose access to the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) regime, with no equivalent alternative arrangement in place. EU member states could therefore refuse to extradite their own nationals to the UK. To illustrate the EAW’s value to the UK: before the EAW existed, it took 10 years to extradite Rachid Ramda from Britain to France over his role in the 1995 Paris metro bombing. In 2005 it took just 56 days to bring the failed 21/7 London tube bomber Hussain Osman back from Italy to London using an arrest warrant.

A limited deal is reached
Whilst the UK appears to have accepted that it will lose unrestricted access to the EU’s capabilities outlined above, it is still in the interest of both sides to reach a deal. The level of access would vary by tool, and currently only Schengen Area associated states (Norway and Switzerland) are granted full access to any EU data system.

UK aspirations to maintain the core features of its current membership with Europol are unlikely. The UK could establish an operational agreement similar to the US, Switzerland and Australia, which would allow it to station liaison officers at Europol headquarters, and access Europol’s messaging facility and other services. This would not extend to the EIS. UK investigators seeking information on a potential terrorist suspect would have to make separate requests to member states to check whether they held relevant information. The process of determining whether EU nationals visiting the UK have terrorist convictions in their home countries could also take up to ten times longer in the likely event that the UK is unable to access ECRIS.

It is also not evident that the UK will benefit from real-time alert mechanisms of terrorists travelling into the UK, at least in the short term, given that the EU is unlikely to offer more than basic access to SIS II. There is also no legal basis for the UK’s hope for reciprocal transfers of PNR flight data. Any access is likely to come at a cost. The UK would be paying to use the very same system that it was instrumental in developing.

The UK has already announced that it is not seeking to participate in the EAW but aims to establish a fast-track extradition arrangement, based on the EU’s surrender agreement with Norway and Iceland. This treaty took 13 years to enforce after it was signed in 2006, though it is likely that both sides will want a post-Brexit agreement in place much faster.

What is the overall impact on terrorism in the UK?
The UK will be unable to replicate its existing relationship in any scenario. The main impact will likely be felt in terms of time and efficiency. Even in the event of a hard Brexit, after a period of initial disruption, most challenges would likely be mitigated by strengthening existing bilateral relations with member states and other rapid adjustments.

Anti-Western jihadists have shown relatively little interest in Brexit. The UK leaving the EU is unlikely to have any impact in terms of judging which countries should be targeted in future Islamist attacks. The effect of Brexit upon far right terrorism is more difficult to predict. If Brexit is perceived as a partial victory over ‘liberal internationalism’, this could inspire violent attacks to hasten its demise.

More importantly, the existing capacity of the UK to counteract any form of terrorist violence is unlikely to be greatly damaged. The reality is that neither the UK nor European governments want a terrorist attack that can be pinned, in part, on Brexit having caused a lack of preventive transnational coordination. Counter terrorism security is one of the few areas in which Brexit will ultimately make comparatively little difference.

Written by Emily Winterbotham. Emily is Director of the Terrorism and Conflict group and Senior Research Fellow at RUSI focusing on extremism and radicalisation, countering violent extremism and peacebuilding.

For further research and analysis by Pool Re Solutions, please click here.

CT Awards Q&A: PSHE Association

Michael Lyons — Mon, 03 Aug 2020 14:33:42 +0000

Counter Terrorism

Counter Terror Business talks to Anne Bell, a Subject Specialist at the PSHE Association – the national body for PSHE education, winners of a recent Counter Terrorism Education award for their preventative education work under �鶹�� Office BSBT funding

The topic of extremism and the radicialisation of children and young adults has taken on new importance during lockdown. Deputy Assistant Commissioner Lucy D’Orsi warned a few months ago that the coronavirus lockdown may have led more individuals to become radicalised as they spend more time online. Counter Terrorism Policing itself warned in April that the impact of coronavirus and social isolation could make some of society’s most vulnerable people more susceptible to radicalisation, as the number of people referred to the Prevent programme has fallen.

Merging two previous awards, the Counter Terrorism Project Award and the Education Project Award, the Counter Terrorism Education Award aims to recognise a governmental organisation or public/private partnership which has developed and implemented an effective counter terrorism strategy or awareness campaign.

The 2020 winner of the Counter Terrorism Education Award is the PSHE Association. Recognised for its counter extremism training programme, aimed at providing teachers with the confidence and skills to address key extremism-related topics in the classroom to bring into PSHE lessons, the programme also helps equip pupils with better awareness and understanding of extremist behaviour. A bespoke evaluation survey, carried out by the �鶹�� Office’s Building a Stronger Britain Together programme, found that the training and supporting resources led to significantly increased levels of confidence and improved skills in covering extremism-related topics in the classroom among teacher participants.

Here, we speak to Anne Bell of the PSHE Association about preventative education and a school-wide approach to incorporating radicalisation into teaching.

Just how important is it to address topics such as extremism and radicalisation in PSHE education?

Schools have a moral and legal duty to equip young people with the knowledge, skills and attributes to resist radicalisation and prevent extremism. Recruiters often target young people – particularly those already more vulnerable due to truancy or unstable living situations – so schools must provide opportunities to counter extremist messaging and offer support to prevent radicalisation.

Inspectors from Ofsted and the Independent School Inspectorate (ISI) expect schools to address this as a safeguarding issue and Government ‘Keeping Children Safe in Education’ guidance states that schools should ensure pupils are taught to safeguard themselves, including online.

PSHE (personal, social, health and economic) education is the school curriculum subject ideally placed to address this learning in a planned, safe, maturity-appropriate way. PSHE can teach young people about diversity, foster a sense of inclusion, and develop strategies to recognise and resist persuasive messaging promoted by extremist materials or recruiters.

Well-taught PSHE lessons provide a safe environment in which to challenge stereotypes and myths while fostering protective factors such as high self-esteem and positive relationships. PSHE cannot stop exposure to extremist ideologies, but it can equip young people with the qualities and abilities to help them recognise and resist such influences.

What difference does it/can it make for PSHE education to be taught as preventative education, rather than simply reactive?

There is a limit to what reactive PSHE learning can achieve. After a terrorist attack or extremist incident, emotions are heightened which makes it very difficult to deal with some of the more sensitive aspects of relevant PSHE topics. As discussed in the PSHE Association’s Discussion framework to be used in the event of a terrorist attack, the aim of learning at this stage would be to calm anxieties and challenge unhelpful stereotypes. At this time, non-curricular pastoral support would be a better context than PSHE lessons for any bereavement work, for example.

In contrast, a preventative programme can tackle discrimination before it has the opportunity to arise by promoting inclusion and teaching about the wider impacts of stereotyping and prejudice. It can teach young people strategies for managing feelings and emotions – including those related to grief and anxiety – and signpost relevant support networks, should they be required.

PSHE also has a role to play in reducing the likelihood that pupils will become involved in extremist activities in the future. This includes teaching how to resist influence and ensuring young people are aware of ways that adults and older teens can manipulate others – particularly online. This learning also has the benefit of being relevant to other grooming contexts. And such learning encourages pupils to fact-check and assess others’ statements – and motives – before acting; this includes developing an understanding of the media landscape, the power of peer influence and how social media can amplify falsehoods or dangerous rhetoric.

PSHE can also deliver extremism-specific learning on exiting difficult situations and on reporting concerns.

All these aspects and more can contribute to reducing the possibility of involvement in extremism, and therefore the likelihood of an extremist incident.

In what ways can schools help incorporate teaching and advice on extremism and radicalisation as a school-wide approach?

A 2011 evidence review by the Department for Education recommends a ‘multi-modal approach’ to tackling extremism, where schools work in tandem with youth services and families.

PSHE education is only one part of a wider school strategy on extremism and radicalisation. The most effective schools have a school-wide ethos that promotes inclusion and a sense of belonging to a community. Schools can help young people to develop a sense of purpose and direction which may have a protective effect.

A whole-school approach includes the development of policies (e.g. on anti-bullying, equalities and safeguarding) which promote diversity and address how a school keeps pupils safe, alongside appropriate pastoral support that encourages social inclusion and reduces vulnerability to radicalisation.

There are a number of subject areas that provide relevant curriculum opportunities including Citizenship and Religious Education, so a joined up approach to curriculum planning is beneficial.

How can other skills, often taught through PSHE, such as flexible thinking, effective questioning and separating fact from fiction, help equip students to better identify and prevent being radicalised?

It is important that young people have an awareness of potential radicalisation-related risks and related facts, but knowledge alone is insufficient to safeguard young people. As recommended by UNESCO in its publication ‘A teacher’s guide on the prevention of violent extremism (2016)’, learning must include development of the interpersonal skills to manage disagreements constructively, critical thinking skills to navigate misinformation and assess the validity of extremist beliefs, and the skills to constructively engage in civic society.

Misinformation and conspiracy theories can now spread more easily than ever before. For example, a recent Europol report highlighted increased cybercriminal activity and deliberate spreading of disinformation during the Covid-19 pandemic .

It is therefore important that young people are taught to critically analyse the information they come across – both online and in person. The ability to assess reliability – both of a source and related reporting – can help protect and safeguard young people.

How is the PSHE Association helping educational institutions teach young people how to recognise and protect themselves from radicalisation?

As part of our involvement in the Building a Stronger Britain Together �鶹�� Office initiative on challenging extremism and radicalisation, the PSHE Association delivered a range of training days for PSHE education leads and related staff members – aimed at both primary and secondary phases.

The training updated teachers on the current prevention education landscape and focused on how to embed learning on inclusion and extremism within a broader PSHE education curriculum.

An independent Ipsos MORI evaluation found that this work ’led to significantly increased levels of confidence and improved skills in covering extremism-related topics’.

A key contributory factor to the success of the training was the signposting of quality-assured resources. The PSHE Association, following detailed research and collation of pupil voice, wrote a set of lesson materials aimed at both primary and secondary phases.

Project funding also allowed materials from other organisations to go through the rigorous quality assurance process to provide additional high quality resources to help teachers address this potentially sensitive topic area safely.

Further details of these and related resources can be found on their website at www.pshe-association.org.uk or get in touch at info@pshe-association.org.uk

Is counter terrorism in Britain racist and/or Islamophobic?

Michael Lyons — Fri, 12 Jun 2020 13:21:30 +0000

Counter Terrorism

The killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis on 25 May has once again graphically illustrated the problem of racism and the excessive use of force in US policing. Careful, evidence-based analysis is, however, a key prerequisite in determining its scale and scope, both there and in other places. This is no less true with respect to the claim, which dominates the relevant literature and campaigning worlds, that counter terrorism in Britain, particularly the Prevent programme, is racist and/or Islamophobic.

If true, something urgently needs to be done about it. But, if not, the allegation itself should be challenged. Otherwise cooperation with counter terrorism could be undermined and community relations damaged. But, in order to test it in a scientific manner with legally significant implications, it needs to be reframed in terms of official discrimination – the direct or indirect official allocation of goods or benefits on an unequal basis without adequate justification by reference to the rights and freedoms of others or legitimate public interests.

Official discrimination
Official discrimination can occur in several ways. A law or public policy is ‘discriminatory by design’ if it expressly targets a social group, particularly one with a ‘protected characteristic’, without justification. However, even if not guilty of this charge, it may, nevertheless, be discriminatory for other reasons. Well-intentioned implementation may indirectly, and inadvertently, have this effect. A non-discriminatory law or policy may also be implemented in a discriminatory manner as a result of prejudice, either by the particular agencies involved, or more randomly, on the part of specific officials.

A distinction also needs to be drawn between, on the one hand, subjective perceptions that a law/policy is discriminatory, and on the other, independent evidence that this is the case. The trouble with subjective perceptions is, that no matter how firmly or honestly held, the extent to which they are based on rumour, myth, or prejudice, rather than upon direct experience, objective fact, or reliable judgment, is difficult to determine.

British counter terrorist law and policy cannot credibly be deemed discriminatory by design because it is expressly neutral with respect to the forms of terrorism to which, and the racial and other characteristics of those to whom, it applies. And apart from anecdotes, which may or may not be true, there is also no reliable evidence that it is being regularly and intentionally implemented in a discriminatory manner. Indeed, the evidence either fails to substantiate such claims or points in the opposite direction.

Terrorism and counter terrorism in Britain
From the beginning of the millennium to the end of 2019, terrorism in Britain killed over 100 people. Jihadis were responsible for over 90 per cent of these deaths and just under 100 per cent of the total casualties. By 2003 annual fatalities due to the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland had declined to single figures. Since then, although the risk from ‘dissident Republicans’ has remained deadly, this type of terrorism has caused no death or injury in mainland Britain. Terrorism in pursuit of other causes has also waxed and waned over the past few decades. And, while the risk from the far-right has increased significantly recently, it has not yet accounted for more than a dozen or so casualties including a handful of fatalities.

The two, putatively integrated, principal pillars of the UK’s domestic counter terrorist law and policy are the Terrorism Act 2000 – which consolidated, streamlined and reformed relevant legislation prompted by the conflict in Northern Ireland – and the four Ps of the post-9/11 CONTEST strategy: Prepare, Pursue, Protect and Prevent.

Prepare and Pursue
The Prepare stream of CONTEST – which seeks to mitigate the impact of terrorist attacks by bringing them to an end as swiftly and effectively as possible, and by increasing capacity to recover in the aftermath (‘resilience’) – has, quite rightly, not been denounced as racist or Islamophobic. The majority of those arrested, charged, prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned in Britain for terrorism-related offences over the past few years, core Pursue objectives, have been young, male, non-white, British, Muslims. Since this is entirely consistent with those likely to be involved in the dominant terrorist threat, this CONTEST stream cannot credibly be considered discriminatory either.

Protect
Domestically, Protect is intended to reduce vulnerability to terrorism, particularly as far as national border security, transport systems, national infrastructure, and crowded places are concerned. Its most controversial feature concerns stop and search.

The Terrorism Act provides two principal street-related stop and search provisions. Section 43 requires reasonable suspicion of involvement in terrorism on the part of the police officer exercising this power. The other is provided by s. 47A (as amended). This authorises a senior police officer to designate, for up to 14 days, an area for random stops and searches, where there is reasonable suspicion, based upon intelligence, that a terrorist incident will occur there. Within such an area, uniformed officers can stop and search people and vehicles for evidence of involvement in terrorism without themselves having reasonable suspicion. But s. 47A also provides that, unless the officer has a description of a specific suspect, a person’s physical appearance cannot be used alone or in combination with any other factor as justification.

Exercise of both powers is governed by a code of practice. Amongst other things, this provides that reasonable suspicion cannot be based on generalizations or stereotypes of certain groups or categories of people deemed more likely to be involved in terrorism than others. It also requires officers to take care to avoid any form of racial or religious profiling when selecting people to search. They must also take ‘great care’ to ensure their judgment is ‘not based solely on ethnic background, perceived religion’ or any other characteristic protected by the Equality Act 2010.

No official figures appear to be available about the racial or religious impact of s. 47A which has been rarely used. There are no figures either for the religion of those stopped and searched under s. 43. However, since some 14 per cent of the population of England and Wales is non-white, the hit rate for s. 43 is 400 per million for non-whites and 40 per million for whites. One possible interpretation is that this is discriminatory and that the ‘reasonable suspicion’ requirement and the Code are being ignored. But official discrimination is not simply a matter of numbers. It critically depends upon context and justification. The s. 47A power is expressly location-specific. And while this is not a formal characteristic of s. 43, it may also be applied more in certain places than others. Therefore, while it cannot be ruled out that counterterrorist stops and searches on the streets are racially discriminatory, the lack of vital data renders this unproven.

The amended Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which is also subject to a code of practice, permits ‘examining officers’ designated by the Secretary of State (usually the police) to stop and question, detain and search individuals, and to examine and seize possessions and goods, with respect to anyone transiting through ports, airports, international rail stations, or the border area between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The purpose is to determine whether those concerned appear to be, or have been, involved in terrorism. While ‘some reasoned basis, proportionality … and good faith’ are necessary, no specific suspicion about any given traveller is required.

Official statistics reveal several things about how these powers have been exercised. First, they are also very rarely used. An average of only 0.006 per cent of the 300 million or so transiting through British airports every year are subject to such examinations. And this has also been steadily declining year-on-year, from over 61,000 in 2012 to just over 10,000 in 2019. Ninety-four per cent last less than an hour and, of those examined, 35 per cent are white and 57 per cent non-white. Four per cent are detained, 75 per cent of whom are non-white. There is no information on the religion of those stopped and searched under Schedule 7.

Here again the overrepresentation of non-whites, particularly among those detained, might suggest racial discrimination. But it can also be explained in other terms. Since 92 per cent of Muslims in England and Wales are non-white, and all jihadis are Muslim, the majority of jihadis in Britain are likely to be non-white. This is also likely to be the case globally. On the basis of intelligence assessments, Schedule 7 is also likely to be used significantly more in relation to certain flights than others. For obvious reasons, these have not been officially identified. But it is, nevertheless, well-known that the countries most afflicted by jihadi terrorism are Nigeria, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, all of which have almost entirely non-white populations. The majority of those visiting them is also likely to be non-white.

The manner in which stop and search powers are exercised is also critical. If most are of limited duration, applied infrequently to any given individual, and conducted respectfully, there can be little cause for complaint. Here again the lack of relevant systematic evidence makes it impossible to draw reliable conclusions about racial discrimination either way.

Prevent
Prevent, the most controversial of the four Ps, aims to stop people from becoming terrorists, or from supporting terrorism, by countering terrorist ideology and challenging those who promote it (‘counter-radicalisation’), supporting cooperative individuals who are particularly vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism (‘de-radicalisation’), and working with sectors and institutions where the risk of radicalization in these senses is considered high.

Although the religion of those referred is not recorded, to an extent this can be inferred from the type of extremism concerned. And, while non-whites are overrepresented in the statistics, this is more plausibly attributable to the demography of those likely to be involved in jihadi terrorism than to discrimination. An average of just over 6,500 people are referred to Prevent every year: 50 per cent concern Islamist extremism, 17 per cent, ‘right wing extremism’, and 33 per cent, ‘other extremism’, ‘mixed, unstable or unclear ideology’. It is, however, significant that concerns about Islamist extremism account for only half the total number. Indeed, the referral figure for right wing extremism has also almost doubled from 750 in 2015/16 to just under 1,400 in 2018/19, the steepest increase of any category.

The police select those deemed worthy of a decision by local authority ‘Channel panels’ (18 per cent) which then schedule suitable cases for official support (34 per cent of those considered by Channel, six per cent of initial referrals), acceptance of which is voluntary. Of these: 84 per cent are aged 30 or under, 91 per cent are male, 50 per cent involve Islamist extremism (37 per cent in 2018/19), 39 per cent the extreme right (45 per cent in 2018/19), and 11 per cent other and mixed etc. Ninety-four per cent of initial referrals are filtered out of the programme or diverted to other services without receiving Channel support and 81 per cent leave Channel without further official concern. The cases of those who have left Channel are officially reviewed. Typically, only five per cent are re-referred where concerns have arisen that the risk of radicalization has again materialized. The Prevent programme is scheduled for independent review. But the identity of the reviewer, and the timetable, are yet to be decided.

One final challenge
Those who maintain that counter terrorism in Britain is racist and/or Islamophobic face one final challenge – explaining how jihadi terrorism can be tackled without impacting more upon Muslims and non-whites than upon anyone else, and how right wing terrorism can be tackled without the same effect upon white, non-Muslims.

Steven Greer, Professor of Human Rights, University of Bristol Law School.

This is a summary of a chapter in a book: S. Greer, L, Bell and L. Graham, Counterterrorism and Human Rights in the United Kingdom (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

The author would like to thank Eleanor Zhao for checking relevant figures, and colleagues, too numerous to name, for comments upon an earlier draft. The usual provisos apply.

Counter terrorist figures are derived from the following �鶹�� Office documents published annually: Statistical Bulletin – Operation of Police Powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and Subsequent Legislation: Arrests, Outcomes and Stops & Searches, Great Britain, and Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, England and Wales, Statistical Bulletin.

Steven has written for Counter Terror Business before, covering the topics of Brexit and counter terrorism, counter terrorism and the 2019 British General Election, and an article comparing the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ to global Islamist jihad.