Counter Terror Business - Building Security

Why keeping escape routes clear matters

Meghan Shaw — Tue, 07 Jan 2025 16:48:09 +0000

We take a look at the different ways you can keep emergency exits clear, as well as the importance of drills.

Having well maintained and clear exits in all kinds of venues is essential to the safety of everyone inside, whether it’s to allow for a safe and quick exit during fire drill or an emergency evacuation during a terror attack.

County Durham and Darlington Fire and Rescue Service said that premises that are simple, consisting of a single storey, will require fairly simple measures to protect the escape routes compared to a large multi-storey building, which would require a more complex and inter-related system of fire precautions.

Escape routes in a building should be designed so that people can escape quickly enough to ensure they are not placed in any danger.

The time available to escape a situation will depend on a number of factors, including how quickly an alarm is raised, the number of escape routes available, and the nature of the occupants.

Run, Hide, Tell

In the case of a possible terrorist attack on a venue, Counter Terror Policing advises people to follow three key steps to keep safe.

This was created in 2017 with help from first-hand testimony and case studies from people who have survived weapons or terrorist attacks.

The simple three-word advice is pretty self-explanatory. Start by running to a place of safety. This is a far better option than to surrender or negotiate. If there's nowhere to go then it is better to hide than confront the attacker.

Counter Terror Policing also advises people to turn their phones to silent, as well as (if possible) barricading themselves in. Next, they should call the police on 999.

Drills

While this advice is helpful due to its simplicity, it can also be useful to regularly conduct fire drills to make sure everyone knows what to do in an emergency.

Drills give the users of a premises experience following fire exit routes and procedures, from following signs to finding staircases. For building owners, a fire drill can also help identify measures needed to correct any risks found during the drill.

The responsible person of a building has a legal duty to ‘provide procedures for serious and imminent danger’, as set out in the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005. These procedures must be supported by providing appropriate training and instruction, which includes fire drills.

While the fire drill is taking place, follow a checklist to ensure everything is in proper working order, including fire alarm systems and emergency lighting. All escape routes should be clear, with fire escapes opening easily, fire safety doors closing correctly and all fire exit signs displayed in the correct places.

Legally, these drills must be carried out at least once a year.

The importance of deicing and gritting

Keeping emergency exits clear of any possible barriers or hazards is also very important. People will not necessarily behave the way they are told to in a drill, as they are more likely to panic.

Therefore, it is important to ensure the exits are easy to see and safe to use.

Ice near or outside emergency exits can be especially hazardous as there is a higher likelihood of slipping. You can do this by using preventative measures in colder weather such as deicing or gritting surfaces on or near the exits.

This means the emergency services will have better access to possible casualties.

Ensuring consistent standards for Protect duty implementation

Robyn Quick — Mon, 19 Aug 2024 11:48:17 +0000

Building Security

The Night Time Industries Association (NTIA) discusses the importance of frontline door security in counter terrorism.

In an era where the threat of terrorism looms large, the role of frontline door security has never been more critical.

This role extends beyond simple access control; it encompasses the protection of public spaces, ensuring safety, and maintaining public trust. As the UK moves towards the implementation of Protect Duty, also known as Martyn’s Law, the need for stringent and consistent security standards becomes paramount. However, significant challenges such as tax disparity, inconsistent vetting standards, lack of compliance, and untracked non-Approved Contractor Scheme (ACS) security resource supply companies threaten to undermine these efforts.

Frontline door security is often the first line of defence against potential terrorist threats. Trained security personnel can identify suspicious behaviour, manage crowd control, and respond swiftly to emergencies, thereby mitigating risks. Their presence serves as both a deterrent to potential attackers and a reassurance to the public. In high-risk environments, such as large venues, hospitality settings, and crowded public spaces, their role is indispensable.

Despite the importance of frontline door security, several systemic issues within the private security sector jeopardise the effectiveness of these measures. The recent refusal by the �鶹�� Office to implement business licensing for private security companies is a significant concern. According to the Night Time Industries Association (NTIA) and the UK Door Security Association (UKDSA), this decision weakens the sector’s ability to protect the public from terrorist threats and compromises the future implementation of Martyn’s Law.

Tax

A major issue is the tax disparity across the industry. In particular ACS-accredited companies are required to employ all their operatives via Pay As You Earn (PAYE) schemes. In contrast, a considerable proportion of the businesses within the sector often use Untaxed Trading Receipts (UTR) self-employed schemes, allowing them to maximise their financial positions and offer more competitive rates. This practice not only creates an uneven playing field but also encourages tax avoidance and undermines the financial integrity of the sector, but this is now being addressed through the agency’s act with HMRC now coming down on companies who are not using PAYE Schemes

Licensing

The lack of a standardised vetting process across the industry poses a severe threat. Many companies undergo rigorous checks to ensure their personnel are properly vetted and trained. However, there are a considerable number of companies that operate without such stringent requirements. This gap allows individuals with insufficient training and questionable backgrounds to work in sensitive security roles, increasing the risk of infiltration by malicious actors.

The NTIA and UKDSA estimate that approximately 8 - 12,000 frontline security resource supply companies operate within the hospitality and night-time economy sectors, many of which remain untraceable by regulators and government departments. The current ACS, with only around 800 voluntary members, relies heavily on self-assessment, raising questions about the regulator’s ability to control this segment of the sector effectively. This lack of oversight results in a fragmented industry with varying levels of compliance and accountability. E

F The refusal by the �鶹�� Office to pursue business licensing leaves a significant void in the regulatory framework needed to support Protect Duty. Without mandatory licensing, there is no assurance that security resource suppliers meet the necessary standards of vetting, insurance, and training required to keep public spaces safe. This oversight is particularly concerning as businesses across the UK prepare to implement Protect Duty, designed to enhance the protection of public premises from terrorist attacks.

The Manchester Arena Inquiry highlighted these issues, recommending amendments to the Private Security Act (PSA) legislation to require licensing for companies involved in counter-terrorism-related security work. This change would ensure that only fit and proper companies operate in this critical area, adhering to robust procedures and training to mitigate terrorist risks.

Reforms

The NTIA and UKDSA, along with other industry stakeholders, continue to advocate for comprehensive reforms. They emphasise the need for business licensing to ensure consistent standards across the sector. Southern Ireland and Australia have implemented similar licensing regimes, demonstrating their efficacy in maintaining high security standards and protecting public safety.

Michael Kill, CEO of the NTIA, stresses the urgency of these reforms: “Following the recommendations from the Manchester Arena Inquiry, the refusal by the �鶹�� Office to implement a business licensing scheme for all private security businesses is a considerable oversight. The �鶹�� Secretary and Security Minister have little or no grasp of the issues faced by the sector, particularly one that is on the verge of implementing a new duty to protect premises accessed by the public from a potential terror threat.”

The implementation of Protect Duty is a critical step towards enhancing public safety in the face of evolving terrorist threats. However, without consistent standards and robust regulatory oversight, the effectiveness of frontline door security will be severely compromised. Addressing the challenges of tax disparity, inconsistent vetting standards, lack of compliance, and the absence of business licensing is essential to fortify the private security sector.

The �鶹�� Office must reconsider its stance and work collaboratively with industry stakeholders to ensure that the security infrastructure in place is capable of protecting the public and maintaining trust in these turbulent times.

Smart access control in smart buildings

Robyn Quick — Tue, 13 Feb 2024 16:16:47 +0000

Building Security

While the idea of smart buildings may not have been popular for that long, smart access control has been around for a while – pinpads, keycards, facial recognition etc. and the technology is only getting better.

A smart building utilises advanced technology and automation systems to enhance the efficiency, sustainability, and overall functionality of the building. The systems that are used are designed to optimise certain areas such as energy usage, management, comfort, and security. Access control is an important consideration for any building to protect occupants from physical threats and to protect secure areas and critical infrastructure from unauthorised access. However, it is important that this process is frictionless and efficient, to save time and keep users happy.

There are many different options when it comes to smart access control and it is important to consider what is right for your building. Remember the solution should be scalable, as what is right now, may not be in the future. Access control nowadays incorporates technology such as smart locks, cloud control, biometrics and facial recognition.

The technology can be installed at the front door of a building, but also at floor or room level where different levels of access are required. A simple example of this kind of design would be a hospital, where different people (patients, clinicians, cleaners, porters) would need different levels of access to different rooms. Pharmacists need access to medicines, but cleaning personnel should not have this access. On the other hand, access to cleaning supplies should be reserved for cleaning teams only. Smart access control has the ability to grant or deny access to individuals to any area.

Benefits

Smart access control offers many benefits. First and foremost is better security. The technology keeps a record of exactly who is in the building at what times and can track security threats in real time.

Smart access control offers the possibility of earlier risk assessment and management, with a better idea of potential risks. Smart systems can assess the likelihood of security issues ahead of time.

Smart security systems mean that you don’t always need physical security staff or door teams in the buildings when they are open. While it is still a good idea to have at least some presence should an incident occur, you can consider downsizing or reskilling your team for other tasks.

Should an incident occur, whether this be a terror attack or a fire for example, a smart access control system will let you know who was in the building when the incident happened, so you can make sure everyone is accounted for.

Data can also be used to gather information about the building, for example how many people are there on which days and what time of day. This means you can consider making changes to other aspects of building management. For example, if Mondays are usually quiet, you can schedule maintenance for that day.

Tailgating

Technology is available that can block tailgating attempts in real time. Notifications can also be sent to the security team, so they can take swift action.

Timings

If you have one-off or sporadic visitors to the building, for example interviewees, maintenance workers or delivery people, you can set an expected period of time for their visit. This means they won’t be able to have unauthorised access to the building after their agreed visit. Access control can also be integrated with other aspects of building control. For example, when the first person enters the building or room, the lights go on and when the last person leaves, the lights go off and the heating goes down. This goes hand-in-hand with sustainability and net zero goals.

Touchless

In a post-pandemic world, infection control and people’s health are an important consideration and visitors and building occupants will want to know that this is being addressed by building management. Eliminating the need to make contact with a touchpoint creates a more hygienic environment.

Risks

On the other hand, it is important to consider the negatives of smart access control. Number one being technology failure. Make sure you know what will happen in the event of an internet or power outage. If this renders your system useless, make sure you have a back-up plan. As with any electronic, internet/cloud-based system, there is also the risk of a cyber attack. Make sure that all your cybersecurity processes and systems are up to date and regularly checked to make sure this does not happen. One of the most important benefits of smart access control is making life easier for people, whether this be occupants and visitors or the security staff themselves. Swift and efficient entry is great for those using the building and less time spent on security checks and check-ins can free up staff for other tasks. The data gathered from the system can also be utilised by building management. Where it previously may have been time-consuming to gather data on building occupancy rates for example, smart access control systems will do this for you.

Does your access control system have healthy credentials?

Freya — Fri, 10 Feb 2023 14:43:47 +0000

Building Security

Andrew Sieradzki, group director, Security, at Buro Happold on how to introduce a new access control system Undoubtedly many of the readers of this article have an association with electronic access control systems (EACS), whether through their day to day in gaining unfettered access into their offices, or through the specification, delivery or administration of access control systems into buildings. The initial widescale adoption and deployment of electronic access control systems commenced in the late 1970s; from a practitioner’s perspective these systems have generally had a long life cycle – typically exceeding the traditional electronic system 10-year lifespan model. However, even now there are a plethora of these systems that are running perfectly satisfactorily in their second decade (and sometimes longer) of operation. The administrators of these platforms may not be aware that they have potentially significant exposure in terms of system efficacy due to the gradual depreciating and potentially insecure nature of these systems and the data contained on them. While many systems have gradually been transitioned to modern platforms, there is often a concern in terms of any proposed upgrade, with a veiled nervousness from clients as to the amount of disruption such changes have on their workplace and their workforce. The bigger the organisation, the more complex and intricated the issue becomes – especially in a post Covid-19 world of flexible working. This may be a legacy view that is cast from past card transition experiences; however, there is undoubtably some merit in being cautious about embarking on a task that involves changing the keys to the kingdom of all users; the prospect of mass lockout does not inspire the balance sheet or executive board particularly favourably. Typically, these systems involve everyone concerned, where the individual users get to take a piece of the security platform (i.e. their passes) away from the workplace and are then trusted to look after them. It is hard to picture how this would work if this practice was adopted for every other type of security solution deployed within the workplace (just imagine having the opportunity to take a piece of the CCTV solution home with you). There is therefore nervousness in new technology adoption, and the need for an understanding of the full use case of the access control ecosystem. Adopting a new a system One favourable transition option often considered when replacing a large system is to adopt the existing legacy token/user credential/card estate and build the replacement solution around this with a view of creating a pathway to later adopt a new card downstream of the deployment. This does equate to a more seamless transition, and many successful replacement solution deployments have utilised this method, but this approach is not without its risks. During adoption of this approach, some careful consideration needs to be made as to the legacy credentials encoding and enciphering (if any), where once discovered, typically require importing into the replacement solution. This is not an insignificant task: even if the credentials’ known security vulnerabilities may have been exploited to initially extract its enciphering keys and encoding pattern, did this action breach any originators latent IP? Was there any consideration by the end users in gaining permission from the original credential provider to adopt these formats? Furthermore, any consequential failure at this juncture often leads to adoption of a big bang approach to credential replacement, where you may have a true period of running the old solution in tandem with the new, until you can replace the legacy platform. This is not an insignificant and disruptive task without pre-planning and the hope of a forgiving workforce. Another often overlooked aspect of adopting replacement credentials is their initial configuration and architecture, which may end in circulation for potentially numbers of decades. Indeed, what consideration was made if their enciphering keys were ever compromised, and what type of standards were adopted from the outset? Was the fallback position considered where you can recover from a ‘loss key’ breach and ‘roll the card family keys’ without replacement of the entire card family? Where such breaches are considered serious enough, the alternative is of course to replace the whole card estate; reputationally, this is not a good position to be in. Then there’s the knotty problem of how these keys are stored on the cards – are these static and common throughout your entire card family, and do you care if these get compromised? The alternative is to consider diverse keysets on each card. This, while a complex process to initiate, does ensure that each card in your estate is completely unique from a key material perspective, and that when an individual card is compromised, this generally only equates to that single card and not your entire suite of cards. Once you have decided on the card technology, its architecture and enciphering credentials, do you then want to encode (which is quite distinct from enrolling cards) these cards on site? Or will you farm this capability out to the supply chain, and hope that your most sensitive card aspects (keys which are required for the encoding process) don’t become compromised? In remedy of this vulnerability, a far more manageable approach is to encode your cards on your premises, with your own securely held enciphering key family and production platform. Generally, well designed solutions incorporate these keys on to a third party validated hardware secure module (HSM) and therefore do not expose these assets to the wider supply chain or internet during your card encoding processes. Furthermore, it is entirely possible for the end user to transport these HSMs to trusted card encoding providers (if large scale is a requirement), deployed for the production run and then returned to their originator once the encoding run is completed. There are a lot more of these under-the-hood aspects of credential selection to consider at the design stage, especially if you consider and add mobile platforms to the mix. However, there is also a great emphasis on the type of access control system itself, its features and benefits, and of course cost. Selection consideration should always consider the functionality of these systems, but merit should also be given to the security aspects. For instance, how is the (user) data both in transit and at rest accounted for – is it enciphered? Are the communications between your access reader endpoints and door controllers secured? i.e. Open Supervised Device Protocol (OSDP): who holds the respective enciphering keys? What resilience do you have for system signalling faults – does the system keep running? Larger solutions can typically span many buildings or may even span a global workforce. The security and respective data processing considerations need to be considered, especially where cross jurisdictions are in force. In conclusion, while not promising to be a comprehensive and detailed end-to-end discussion on selection of electronic access control credentials, my top tips are: Dos Do ensure that you know what your exposure is to the supply chain in terms of your credential, equipment and data enciphering keys. Ensure you have full and recoverable ownership of these and can store and use them securely. Also consider the eventual destruction/removal of sensitive data with any end-of-life ACS components. Do ensure you have a well-designed token infrastructure based around an independently validated credential platform that caters for secure encoding practices and uses diverse keysets for each token. Have a plan B, C and indeed D – design in a key rollover capability within your token family to ensure that if there is a key compromise you can recover without an immediate and full card replacement programme. Whenever conducting an ACS transition, plan well in advance for triaging and cleansing legacy user data and provide good clear communications as to how the transition process will take place. Test, test and re-test: build in time and resource to conduct testing of the solution in phases before full deployment, and work with all stakeholders (including fire safety, accessibility and security representatives) in mapping out the whole life cycle of EACS use, including pass production, attesting user data, access rights, failover considerations and end of life considerations. Use advice from reputable trade industry bodies and base your designs on current standards including GDPR. Select equipment from independently attested bodies e.g. CPNI Access Control Assured and CPNI CAPSS assured. Select your system installer and maintainer carefully – make sure they belong to a relevant trade body e.g. NSI, SSIAB etc and that they are familiar with and trained on the equipment they plan to install for you. Make sure you get sufficient training to operate and administer the solution and sufficient consumables to maintain credential production, and never underestimate the time taken for any transitional bulk pass production run. Have a means in place to shred/securely dispose/recycle spent components and consumables (including credentials). Don’ts Don’t share your most critical and sensitive material i.e. enciphering keys with an unknown and attested supply chain. Don’t simply throw away spent card printing consumables (noting that some production techniques genuinely produce truly excellent negatives of all your staff passes as a ‘by-product’). Don’t share user data sets without some form of data sharing agreement that binds the parties contractually to process your data appropriately. End of life components may contain some of your most critical assets; adopt a responsible security minded approach to destruction/recycling of these. In conclusion, the selection, design, installation maintenance and administration of access control systems is a complex web of processes and workflows that involves everyone within an organisation.

Designing out terrorism: a proportionate response

Michael Lyons — Mon, 06 Feb 2017 16:59:15 +0000

Building Security

Having presented at December’s UK Security Expo, Jon Coaffee, professor in the Resilient Cities Lab at the University of Warwick, addresses the impact of terrorism and other security concerns on the design of urban areas

Much has changed since the deployment of militarised forms of urban design in the wake of 9/11. Terrorist attacks have become more sophisticated, employing tactics and targeting locations which negate these traditional deterrents. The challenge for now is to develop innovative counter-responses which balance the security effectiveness and social and political acceptability of designed-in security measures.

The targeting of ‘soft’ spaces
Defending vulnerable urban spaces of Western cities against the ever-changing nature of terrorism has long occupied state security services. But until 9/11 seldom did these have major impacts upon everyday life in the city, or upon the practice of built environment professionals such as town planners, civil engineers, architects and developers. As we have seen most recently from the recent attacks across continental Europe, the modus operandi of terrorists has changed significantly since the millennium. Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices targeting major financial or political centres have been replaced by person-borne improvised explosive devices - especially suicide attacks - and subsequently Fedayeen-style mass shooting attacks and the deliberate targeting of crowds with fast-moving vehicles.

Consequently, traditional territorial counter terrorism approaches – the construction of defensive cordons, or ‘rings of steel’ where access is restricted and surveillance significantly enhanced – are largely inadequate and have been rethought given the increased appreciation of the changing threat. Although debates continue about the relationship between new and traditional threats, the methods and tactics adopted by terror groups are increasingly novel, innovative and focused on mass casualty strikes or multiple coordinated attacks. Such attacks are tactically aimed at soft targets and more generally crowded places that cannot be altered without radically changing citizen experience of such, largely, public places.

The look and feel of security
Over the last decade, processes of urban revitalisation have become increasingly influential in urban policy-making, emphasising inclusivity, liveability and accessibility. However, these ‘quality-of-life’ issues sit uneasily beside concerns to design out terrorism. Attacks against ‘soft’ public spaces have necessitated that in ‘at risk’ areas security becomes part of the urban design process and is proportionate to the risk faced. In the aftermath of 9/11 many unrefined and obtrusive security features were quite literally ‘thrown’ around key sites, as security installations needed to be ‘seen to be doing something’- employing features that are relatively effective at stopping vehicles carrying explosives penetrating defined urban spaces (notably reinforced steel barriers, bollards or concrete ‘planters’) but which were not necessarily socially acceptable nor aesthetically pleasing. Moreover, the ‘guns, guards, gates’ posture adopted was counterproductive owing to the way such measures can serve to enhance fear of attack. To improve this process, over recent years, a range of built environment professionals have been encouraged and trained to be involved in security design, working alongside dedicated security professionals, to provide more specialised input into interventions within the public realm.

As a result, the initial swathe of security bollards and barriers that littered the landscape of many cities after 9/11 is slowly giving way to more subtle alterations in the urban landscape that seek to balance the need to provide effective physical security with aesthetic and social impacts considerations (although in many cases bollard-type solutions still prevail or have been retained). It is now often argued that the introduction of additional security features should not, where possible, negatively impact upon everyday economic and democratic activities. This realisation has led to a predominant view that security features should be as unobtrusive as possible.

In response to this challenge we now see security features being increasingly camouflaged and subtlety embedded within the urban landscape so that to the general public they do not obviously serve a counter terrorism purpose. Examples of such ‘stealthy’ features include ornamental or landscaped measures such as balustrades or artwork erected as part of public-realm ‘streetscape’ improvements that have deliberately designed-in security more attractively and inconspicuously whilst still providing a hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) functionality, with designs capable of stopping a seven tonne truck travelling at 50 miles per hour.

Evolving protective counter terrorist security
Evolving urban security strategies seeking to counter terrorism are attempting to balance the twin aims of security effectiveness and social and political acceptability. Since 9/11 a much more proactive and integrated approach to protective ‘designed-in’ counter terrorist security in cities has emerged where instead of reacting at pace, a more reflexive response is now possible. This takes into account issues such as proportionality and aesthetics of design, as well as developing a strategic framework whereby many more stakeholders - notably planners, architects and designers - are given responsibility for delivering the agenda. Protective counter terrorism is no longer just a police and security services issues as many professional and practice communities, together with the general public, are being enrolled in the fight against terrorism.

Over time the dynamic nature of the terrorist threat and the occurrence of particular incidents has meant that design-based counter terrorist activity have remained in flux, tempered by the increasing cost of urban security in an age of austerity as well as the reluctance of urban developers to consider significant security improvements within their designs. The lack of a regulatory requirement designed-in security has also been re-emphasised by 2016 attacks events in Paris, Nice, Brussels and elsewhere as well as highlighted in an independent report on London’s preparedness for a major terrorist incident. Here it was argued that ‘London becomes a city where security and resilience is designed in and is part of the city’s fabric’. To this end the author argued that government should introduce a statutory obligation for resilience to be designed into new and existing buildings.

Most recently, the international reaction to the attack on a Berlin Christmas market in December 2016 has served to illuminate that the difficulties in balancing reactive and proactive counter terrorism elements within the built environment and in many areas has brought us full circle back to immediate post-9/11 responses. In the wake of the Berlin attack the media has been awash with security experts promoting the virtues of hostile vehicle mitigation measures to restrict access to ‘Trojan’ vehicle attacks whist on the ground, markets and other public spaces across Europe have put in place makeshift security and extra visible policing to quell the fears of the public. For example, those in charge of security at the annual German market in Birmingham, UK, installed a series of concrete blockers, wooden crates filled with earth (although a number were empty) and plastic barriers as temporary security measures.

Moreover, in a repeat of events in the early 1990s, designing out terrorism schemes based on the ‘ring of steel’ principle also resurfaced in the City of London based on armed checkpoints, rising security bollards and crash-proof barricades. This was in response to a report that identified newly established areas of the City as ‘highly sensitive to a hostile vehicle-borne security threat’. Such an area-based approach to physical protective security – a long held aspiration of counter terrorism professionals - represents one vision of how designing out terrorisms might proceed if attacks remain an everyday fear in crowded city locations. But the question remains, how do you proportionally protect soft-targets from terrorism through designed-in interventions?

Protecting people and property

CTB — Tue, 16 Dec 2014 12:37:15 +0000

Building Security

In her recent speech unveiling the new counter-terrorism bill, �鶹�� Secretary Theresa May referred to the IRA’s chilling warning after the Brighton bombing: “Today we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once – you will have to be lucky always.”

This was a timely reminder of the need for constant vigilance, but it is possible to greatly reduce the element of luck when protecting against terrorism and other crimes, using well proven mechanisms to help specify and implement effective security protection. These include the use of security products and systems that have been independently assessed and certificated using recognised standards such as LPS 1175.

Security against forced entry
There is a rule of thumb that says a security system for preventing forced entry to premises should provide four ‘D’s – three of which are delay, detect and detain. When these work together effectively they deliver the fourth ‘D’ which is deter.

The delay, which is provided by physical security measures, must at least match the time required to detect the attempted intrusion and respond to that detection in order to detain the intruder. It is important to remember that thwarting an attack from a terrorist intent simply on destruction, will require a greater delay than that of a burglar wishing to escape with stolen goods.

To counter a terrorist attack a far greater reliance must therefore be placed on the physical security measures implemented.
BRE Global Ltd is an independent third party certification body offering certification of fire and security products under its LPCB brand. BRE Global has developed a broad range of Loss Prevention Standards (LPSs) to address risks not otherwise covered by existing national and international standards and codes. It developed LPS 1175 to cover the resistance to forced entry of any barrier or enclosure designed to prevent unauthorised human access.

These measures include fences and other perimeter barriers, containers, walls, screens, windows, doors and roofs, a wide range of which can be certificated to LPS 1175.

LPS 1175 considers a product’s resistance to forced entry in terms of the size of tools – their concealability and power – used to attack it, plus the availability of the tools likely to be used and the time the intruders may be prepared to spend on the attack.

To take account of these varying factors, physical security products and systems are rated to LPS 1175 in terms of the resistance to forced entry – the length of delay – they provide against different levels of attack.

Security Rating to LPS 1175 Issue 7
The standard assumes that the intruders have full knowledge of the security product and are willing to make proportionate efforts in attacking it – the lower the risk of failure in breeching the physical security and the greater the value of the prize, the more likely they are to invest in the act. That investment could be in time and effort gathering intelligence about the target, planning the attack, obtaining the tools required and preparing their fitness and skills.

LPS 1175 also considers the threat posed by criminals or terrorists willing to conduct their attacks using the most effective methods available to them irrespective of noise – such as that from breaking glass.

These considerations differentiate LPS 1175 from the lower end of the spectrum of the European standard for physical security, EN 1627, which assumes criminals will use stealth and have little knowledge of the products they are targeting. As a result many products approved to EN 1627 may fail to provide very much delay to attacks in which the intruder is willing, for example, to make noise.

A robust testing regime
The demanding requirements of LPS 1175 mean that testing security products to the standard can be quite dramatic. A determined assault is launched on the door, window, panel, lock or other security product being tested by an operative armed with a wide range of tools – hammers, crowbars, chisels, drills, etc – and knowledge of likely weak points.

Not surprisingly, only a small proportion of new products pass this severe test the first time they are put through it. But these initial failures provide valuable, practical information on how the products can be made more effective. They also offer a warning to specifiers that many products and services on the market – which have not been independently tested and approved – could potentially fail to provide the security expected.

Growing use by manufacturers
Despite the challenges of LPS 1175, an increasing number of security product manufacturers now submit their products for testing to this burglary resistance standard.

“In adopting LPCB as our secure design marque,” said Terry Batten, marketing manager at Technocover, which produces a range of steel physical access protection products, “Technocover has aligned with a longstanding and respected authority in third party approval of physical security products.

The testing and certification of security products to LPS 1175 assures specifiers of the consistent levels of quality and durability wherever physical protection is needed.

“Another widely recognised strength of LPCB is that products are subject to on-going appraisal,” said Batten. “Approval is not just based on a one-off test of a sample design. Through regular audits, LPCB certification ensures that the product continues to comply with standards and revisions.”

Certification of products to LPS 1175 can provide a route into the building security markets. Sheet metal and fabrication company, PSF (Wales), for example, had its range of security buildings and doors tested to Levels 2, 3 and 4 of LPS 1175. This opened new markets for PSF, providing the diversity that can help the company to position itself in the best place to protect its future in the current trying market conditions.

Oldham based locking system manufacturer, Tindall Engineering, makes regular use of LPS 1175 for its security locks. “We became involved with LPS 1175 to help us move into the security side of the business,” said David Milne, operations manager at MICO-Tindall.

“We now make extensive use of the standard and it plays a key role in driving our business.”

“Testing our door locks to LPS 1175 helps us greatly with their development,” said Milne, “and produces a lot of information that we are able to pass on to our clients – doorset manufacturers for example – providing them with the confidence that the locking systems will work very effectively, and will not fail when their products are, in turn, tested to LPS 1175.”

While LPCB’s testing to LPS 1175 is often carried out at BRE Global’s laboratories in Watford, the tests can be performed at manufacturers’ own facilities.

As a high proportion of the products tested fail to deliver the performance that companies were hoping to achieve, being able to test the products at their own sites rather than sending them to BRE Global’s Watford test facility helps them to more quickly and efficiently overcome those failures, and develop more effective security products.

Conducting tests at their sites also allows manufacturers to avoid the costs of transporting samples to Watford. Then, if the products fail during testing, they can modify them using their manufacturing facilities and have the modified samples retested later in the programme. This avoids delays that can occur if manufacturers test at BRE Global and have to send away for modified samples or components, and can therefore speed up the certification process.

A number of manufacturers are already taking advantage of this. “Increasingly the process of attack testing of our products by LPCB is being undertaken on site at our Welshpool factory,” said Terry Batten of Technocover.

This is not restricted to the UK, the test equipment is portable and the team has already conducted tests in mainland Europe, and is in discussion with American, Middle Eastern and African companies interested in having tests conducted at their own facilities.

Wide uptake by specifiers
Use of LPS 1175 certificated products has been adopted across many sectors in the UK and now increasingly in other countries, particularly the Middle East. In fact, specification of physical security equipment that is certificated to LPS 1175 and included in the freely accessible list of approved products known as the Red Book (www.redbooklive.com), is spreading right around the globe.

The value of certification requirement to specifiers is emphasised by the fact that LPCB fails 95 per cent of new products submitted  for test, a reflection of the number of products on the market that could potentially fail to provide the security expected when needed.

Further information
www.bre.co.uk
www.redbooklive.com

Structural Resiliance

CTB — Fri, 18 Nov 2011 09:32:08 +0000

Building Security

Terrorism is an ongoing risk in the UK and overseas, and with September marking the 10th year anniversary of the terrorist attacks on the US’ World Trade Center and the Pentagon, national security remains high on the country’s agenda. Although UK government counter-terrorism advice has historically focused mainly on crowded places, which remain highly attractive targets, other places at risk include iconic buildings, government, military and diplomatic installations, infrastructure sites, and any site neighbouring these.

Assess the risk level
The UK is a world leader with a body of growing expertise in creating resilient buildings. When putting together an effective security strategy that looks at making a building blast resistant, the level of protection should vary to suit the risk level of the facility. There are many ways in which security and site management concerns can be integrated with counter terrorism, and where new measures are necessary they can often be designed with this dual purpose in mind.

The starting point of counter terrorism design applied to public buildings should always be a risk assessment, to understand the overall risk profile of the activities and organisations that will be housed in a facility and of the facility environs. It is important to engage with relevant stakeholders as early in the design process as possible to establish to what extent, if any, these enhanced security measures are necessary.

Keep threats at a distance
Improvised explosives devices (IEDs) are the dominant terrorist threat to buildings and their occupants, and can be effectively mitigated by keeping them at a distance. Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Measures can be critical in maintaining the maximum stand-off from large IEDs. Traffic management and parking options with static barriers can eliminate or reduce the need for active barrier systems that can be breached by deception or duress, even if they are designed to resist penetration or encroachment. Static barriers do not need to be intrusive, particularly in new developments. Creative use of hard landscaping and water features can in many cases be designed to prevent vehicle access while remaining aesthetically pleasing.

Area based approaches can also be very effective in counter terrorism protection for both the public realm and the associated buildings and facilities. The pedestrianisation of a square, for example, by using robust street furniture as vehicle barriers can protect both crowded public places and private buildings. Similarly, systems designed for congestion control can be used to reduce the number of active control points required around a high risk area, and allow resources to be concentrated.

Moreover, access control measures, whether at active vehicle barriers, at reception facilities or at rear and escape doors are a key defence to keep IEDs away from and outside buildings. These defences can be strengthened by technical measures such as intruder alarms, surveillance CCTV and automated number plate recognition.

Consider the structure
From a structural point of view, glass facades often require careful analysis because of the extensive and severe injuries that can be caused by glass fragments in case of a blast.

There are two possible solutions to the risk of glass fragments caused by blast. The first is to design the glazing not to break. However, this leads to very thick glass that causes very high reactions and requires very strong frames and structural supports. This results in uneconomic facades that are not a realistic option for most buildings.

The alternative solution is to design glazing that retains the glass fragments after cracking. For new construction, this can best be provided using a PVB laminated glass inner leaf, adequately anchored to the frame. Similar effects can be obtained by applying anti-shatter film to the inside of existing glazing, although usually to a lower level of protection.

Blast design is not fully standardised, so solutions tend to be site or client specific, although some standards do exist, e.g. recipe glazing designs for normal risk levels to UK government buildings. For more severe blast levels, blast testing or dynamic analysis informed by blast testing is the norm, using laminated glass of appropriate make-up anchored into enhanced frames.

Seek advice
General advice is available from government sources and expertise from specialist can also be sought to ensure a meticulous and appropriate assessment is undertaken.

Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSA) in the various UK police forces can give initial advice on risk levels, and provide general advice on practical mitigation measures that are preferred for medium and low risk sites, such as most public buildings. Moreover, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) is a government authority which provides protective security advice to businesses and organisations across the national infrastructure.

Taking on board a reputable and experienced security consultancy is also essential when planning counter terrorism measures for buildings. Members of the BSIA Security Consultancy section meet strict quality criteria, and can provide expert advice and assistance from the initial risk assessment through design considerations and solutions, to design detailing and testing of solutions.

For more information
www.bsia.co.uk/consultancies

Assessing the risk in complex buildings

CTB — Tue, 26 Jul 2011 10:09:15 +0000

Building Security

It can be argued that the subject of risk management in complex buildings is probably beyond the competence of the average fire risk assessor. While this is possibly a controversial observation to make, especially at the start of an article on risk management in complex buildings, as more problems with fire risk assessments arise and become widely reported in the press, it is increasingly becoming accepted opinion.

It is well known that under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order, there are currently no qualification, knowledge or experience requirements for fire risk assessors. Anybody can do it and as a result there are a number of substandard risk assessments in circulation. The more infamous assessments (e.g. those for Lakanal House) have been well documented, but what about more complex buildings such as fire engineered buildings? What special requirements do they have that make them ‘beyond the competence of the average fire risk assessor?’

FIRE ENGINEERED BUILDINGS
Fire engineered buildings are complex and offer a lot of advantages to the building owner, the occupier and the developer/contractor, such as:
•    Innovative design
•    Extended escape distances
•    Reduced fire resistance periods for the structure
•    Increased compartment sizes
•    Removal of stairs resulting in an increase in the useable floor plate
•    Flexibility in the use of space for the end user
•    Reduced construction costs.

To enable this, fire engineered buildings are reliant upon a number of engineering techniques such as hot smoke extraction systems, smoke venting, smoke curtains, extensive automatic fire detection, fire suppression systems, compartmentation of high risk areas and well defined operational procedures.

Such an approach demands a high standard of fire safety management covering the day-to-day operational arrangements for the building; for example, the maintenance of low fire loads and/or sterile areas in foyers or large circulation spaces. It also requires a robust planned preventative maintenance regime in respect of fire safety systems. Whilst this is feasible, is it realistic in the day-to-day running of buildings? What happens over time when, bit by bit, small changes are made to the building which compromise or invalidate the fire safety measures which are essential to a fire engineered building working correctly? This in turn raises another fundamental question, what happens if the building should come under significant terrorist attack by way of an explosive detonation either to the external fabric of the building or within its internal structure?

THE RESPONSIBLE PERSON
The fire risk assessor evaluating a complex building will need to review the Fire Safety Strategy (FSS) in order to be able to undertake a ‘suitable and sufficient’ assessment. Whilst fundamentally accepting its validity, since it will have been signed off by the regulator, the assessor will need to review the FSS for deviations present in the building which will need addressing; either by requiring compliance or developing an alternative strategy. It should be noted that the FSS will often be justified by detailed models and calculations which are outside the scope of a fire risk assessment. They are also likely to be outside the competence of any fire risk assessor who is not a fire engineer.

In order to undertake the fire risk assessment, the assessor will also need extensive support from the ‘Responsible Person’ because he/she must hold all the information on all the fire safety systems that make the building safe. This will include all the passive fire protection (structural or built-in) measures, all the active fire protection (detection, alarm, suppression) measures and for complex buildings, the Fire Safety Strategy including the assumptions made in producing it.

For buildings built since 2006, the requirement to maintain such information is enshrined in regulation 16b of the Building Regulations. This requires that information be given to the Responsible Person so that any fire risk assessor can obtain the information from them and undertake their fire risk assessment. Unfortunately, 16b information is rarely available which makes it more difficult for the Responsible Person and the fire risk assessor to come up with a credible fire risk assessment.

There are four areas that the fire risk assessor will need to concentrate on in conducting a fire risk assessment on a complex building based on the a review of the Fire Safety Strategy. These are now considered in detail.

REVIEW OF BUILDING GEOMETRY
Has the building layout or geometry been changed from that specified in the Fire Safety Strategy? In particular, has the building been modified? Does the compartmentation and use of the building reflect what is stated in the strategy?

In undertaking his/her assessment, the assessor will need to review any modifications to the building or maintenance that could have compromised the compartmentation.   He/she will need to determine if there is a record of such works and the action taken to ensure that compartmentation has been maintained. For example, is there a certificate of conformity from a specialist passive fire protection contractor, or did the responsible person undertaken his/her own inspection to verify adequacy?

The obvious item to look at in any fire risk assessment of passive fire protection is the condition and operation of fire doors as they are readily accessible. Unfortunately fire travels in difficult to access areas and in concealed spaces and cavities. That’s why there is so much guidance in AD-B on fire stopping and subdividing large concealed spaces. Consequently, other questions that will need answering are:
•    Have new services been installed e.g. above suspended ceilings that penetrate fire compartment walls/floors?
•    Has the compartmentation been made good following installation?
•    Have penetration sealing systems been modified or removed?
•    Are fire dampers in situ as required?
•    Are the fire dampers accessible for inspection and/or testing by the local authorities? If fire dampers are not accessible from a grill, an access door in the ductwork is required.
•    Has the operation of fire dampers been compromised by lagging to ducting or other obstruction of the moving parts, or where applicable, the fusible link?
•    Are the dampers maintained and checked at least annually? (Annex W of BS9999 gives guidance on maintenance of fire resisting         ducts and fire dampers).

REVIEW OF FIRE SAFETY SYSTEMS
In the same way that all the passive fire protection measures need reviewing, so do the active fire protection measures. Consider the fire safety systems listed below and ask yourself if the average Responsible Person or fire risk assessor can answer the questions related to each.
•    Fire alarm including automatic fire detection
•    Smoke and heat extract ventilation systems (SHEVS)
•    Smoke control pressurisation systems
•    Fire Suppression systems e.g. sprinklers, water mist and gas suppression systems
•    Evacuation lifts/fire-fighters lifts

OPERATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Operational arrangements covering the management and operation of the building will need to be reviewed as part of any fire risk assessment, specifically to ensure it is in alignment with the Fire Safety Strategy. In doing this the fire risk assessor will have to use his skills and experience to address the following areas: means of escape, control of fire load, displays and temporary furnishings, and housekeeping and the removal of waste. Looking first at means of escape, the risk assessor will need to ask the following:
•    Has the use and occupation of the building changed from that recorded in the Fire Safety Strategy? Consideration needs to be given to the number of people in the building and their distribution
•    Is the fire alarm protocol unchanged, for example, supporting a simultaneous, phased, or horizontal evacuation?
•    Are all the means of escape designated in the Fire Safety Strategy still available? Consideration needs to be given to potential obstructions, checking compartmentation and fire safety systems
•    Is the resource in terms of personnel adequate to support the evacuation strategy?
•    Are personnel adequately trained and instructed?
•    Are personnel shift changes, work rotas and leave adequately catered for?
•    Is adequate equipment provided?

Increased compartment sizes and extended travel distances, often based around a fire engineered solution that requires atrium, balcony and gallery spaces, need to be kept to agreed fire loads complying with the fire safety strategy. Smoke extraction capability is usually also based upon agreed fire sizes and fire loads (typically found in PD 7974) and agreed with the regulator. Management of the fire load is therefore critical to the performance of the systems specified in the FSS, more so than in a building of prescriptive design and consequently, the assessor will need to verify that it has been controlled adequately.

Displays are often located in corridors, entrance foyers and shop floors, and often comprise materials which provide a means for the rapid spread of fire. The risk assessor should assess how these materials could contribute to the development of a fire. Possible control measures include:
•    Avoiding the use of displays in corridors and foyer
•    Minimising the size and number of display areas to discrete, separated areas
•    Treating displays with flame retardants and/or using display boxes
•    Keeping displays away from curtains.
Good housekeeping will lower the chances of a fire starting, so the accumulation of combustible materials in premises should be monitored carefully. It is essential to reduce the chances of escape routes and fire doors being blocked or obstructed. Waste material should be kept in suitable containers prior to removal from the premises. Considerable quantities of combustible waste material need to be managed by the development of a formal plan.

PLANNED PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE
Planned preventative maintenance and the testing of fire safety equipment essential to the Fire Safety Strategy is crucially important in a complex building because the operation of the systems is critical in affording the required level of safety to the occupants.

The greater variety of systems in complex fire engineered buildings, such as smoke extraction and pressurisation systems require detailed PPM programmes. Complex ‘cause and effect’ matrices are often linked to the automatic fire detection. Changes to the building, its usage, or the procedures, may render these inappropriate. Consequently, systems of scheduling PPM and record keeping are very important in ensuring the relevant systems are maintained in working order. The fire risk assessor will need to investigate these as part of his risk assessment.

CONCLUSION
This article highlights the many special factors that need to be considered in undertaking a fire risk assessment in a complex fire engineered building. There are a myriad of specialist questions under each of the four areas of: passive fire protection, active fire protection, operational requirements and planned preventative maintenance that need detailed answers. Undertaking such a risk assessment is not for the feint hearted and can probably only be undertaken by a qualified fire safety engineer.

Simpler buildings also need qualified and experienced people (although to a lower level) to undertake fire risk assessments.   Consequently the ASFP fully supports efforts being made by the fire risk assessor industry to develop a set of agreed competencies, experience and qualifications in preparation for a national register of fire risk assessors.

The ASFP, in line with its policy promoting third party certification for the manufacture and installation of passive fire protection products, supports those schemes which require full third party certification, either for individual assessors under a personnel certification scheme, or for companies who employ assessors under a company scheme. Any such schemes will need to be accredited by UKAS – the UK body responsible for accrediting certification bodies – to ensure credibility. It is only in this way will we see the status of the profession of fire risk assessor rise to the level that it deserves.

Mitigate the threat from shattered glass

CTB — Sat, 19 Jun 2010 13:21:13 +0000

Building Security

Written by Scott McLachlan, 3M United Kingdom PLC, Window Film Business

According to Dr John Wyatt MBE MIMgt MIExpE PhD, the United Nation’s blast consultant for Europe and North Africa, the British Council’s Consultant worldwide and a Member of the London Olympic Group, glass is by far and away the most likely and dangerous element to fragment from blast. “A graphic illustration of this is that in each of the City of London bombs over 500 tons of glass was swept up from the streets,” Wyatt says. “Without a doubt reducing glass fragmentation reduces the number of casualties in a bomb incident. It’s worth remembering that being predominantly liquid, our bodies are remarkably resilient to blast. You would have to be very close to the explosion to be killed or seriously injured solely from blast effects. It is generally not the blast itself that injures or kills you, but being hit by fragmentation, either primary – the bomb casing itself – or secondary – where the blast has damaged objects such as window glass – that then becomes lethal.”

Weak material
To some extent it is obvious that glass is the biggest problem; it is the weakest material of a building structure and therefore the most vulnerable to breakage and shattering. When it fails, as a result of an explosion, it creates thousands of razor sharp shards driven at hundreds of miles per hour. In the light of this, most counter terrorism (CT) guidelines prioritise glass protection as the first measure to be taken when protecting a building against the threat of explosion and, in many cases, the protection is mandatory.

Extensive explosive effect studies have identified the blast risk to differing glazing constructions and analysed the available solutions, seeking to minimise the degree of shattering. These solutions take account of different thicknesses and types of blast resistant glazing, but of note is the significant degree of protection offered by security/blast mitigation film. Such film can significantly reduce the hazard created by flying glass and, additionally, is extremely cost-effective compared with other measures. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, it has become a very popular CT product. To put things in context; the greatest threat to the safety of the building occupants (from flying glass) can be reduced for less than the cost of a few security bollards!

Of course, for new construction – or substantial refurbishment projects – the correct glazing to suitably reduce the hazard should be installed and the involvement of Police Architectural Liaison Officers is invaluable in the approval process of planning applications, especially where the potential for vulnerability to attack has been identified.

Commonly available glass types and glazing systems can reduce the level of hazard greatly, but equally a thin single pane of float glass could be vulnerable to breakage up to 150 metres away from a small car bomb.

Current �鶹�� Office guidelines recommend specifying laminated glass with a minimum polyvinylbutryal (pvb) interlayer of 1.5mm, fitted within an adequately strong framing system. Where double glazing is used, the preferred standard is still a 7.5mm laminated glass inner pane with a 6mm toughened glass outer pane, framed with deep rebates. However, actual thickness and pane size to meet a specific classification must be confirmed by the laminated glass supplier.

Toughened glass may also resist high blast pressures without damage provided it is well supported in a strong and rigid frame. Yet, if the blast is sufficient and it does eventually break, driven fragments may cause huge damage, even though the glass breaks into supposedly safe chunks. Consequently, where toughened glass is installed, it should have an anti-shatter film applied and, because under these conditions glass retention within the frame is also potentially compromised, edge retention is crucial.

Of course, where either specification has been inadequate or where economic considerations have diluted the original intent, film is regularly used to enhance protection.

When you consider that of the total building stock expected by the year 2050, 85 per cent of it is already in existence, this means that most of the glazing also already exists. Whilst most old window systems generally do not afford a level of adequate hazard protection, improvements in glazing products over the last 20 years or so have gone some way to offer either compliant protection or to reduce the risk of the glazing creating a danger to the occupants.

Duty of care
Ideally all hazardous glazing should be protected, however, today’s commercial realities can impede the immediate and wholesale completion of the required upgrading works. Building owners must inevitably balance the statutory duty of care, available intelligence and CT advice against their budgetary constraints, but the issue cannot simply be ignored and a process of highlighting the most at-risk glazing is therefore required.

The first stage of the protection process involves completing a glazing audit to establish the current level of protection or hazard offered by the glazing, measured against the likely potential threat. As it is impossible to visually identify the multitude of glazing configurations, these surveys should be completed using electrical testing equipment that analyses the glass. This enables the glazing that already affords compliant or adequate protection to be omitted from the recommendations and identifies the glazing that is judged to be hazardous.

The assessment should also take account of factors such as internal safe areas and protected evacuation routes, or change of use. For example, simply changing airport terminal buildings associated with certain flights may alter radically the threat level to the surrounding buildings and services. In the same way, the 2012 Olympics will place higher CT requirements on particular areas, since with such a predicted influx of tourists and attendees there is likely to be a plethora of newly created ‘crowded places’.

A competent glazing assessment report prioritises the remedial actions, based on many factors such as the occupancy of the area and the risk of the glazing creating a hazard. Where finances are limited this enables the protection process to be started, the risk in the highest priority areas to be reduced and the project not simply being shelved because it is deemed too expensive.

Mark Towner, government contracts manager for Durable Ltd., comments: “We have held security window film contracts with the UK Government for the past 20 years and they have been the largest user of the product because of the protection it offers for relatively low cost. What we have noticed in the last few years, however, is a change in how the protection of glazing is being viewed. Whereas 15 years ago all non-compliant glazing had a film applied regardless of location or occupancy, there is now a desire to risk assess this protection.”

Blast mitigation film is a passive contributor to safety. It is unobtrusive, but should not be taken for granted. Whilst modern films generally carry a ten-year warranty, our recommendation is that any building with film fitted eight or more years ago should be checked to establish whether it still provides an adequate level of protection. The correct specification of film to glass is the start point. Standard polyester film, such as 3M™ Safety & Security Films Safety S70 (175 micron) is the minimum �鶹�� Office recommendation, with more robust film applied to larger panes.

The unique ability of the premium grade 3M™ Ultra Films to resist blast pressure lies in their patented multi-layered construction and their increased ability to absorb energy is due to a considerably higher stretch factor than standard polyester constructions. It is this combination of tensile strength, elongation, break strength and anti-tear/puncture propagation that makes 3M Ultra Films the ultimate blast mitigation product. Remember, air-blast is not the only consideration; debris will inevitably be driven on the blast wave. It is also worth pointing out that it is easier, quicker and more cost effective to clean up glass held together by the film in the event of an incident.

According to newly revised Glass & Glazing Federation guidelines, the use of a certified edge retention system may be used to mechanically affix films to the frame, such that the protection is enhanced and the hazard level minimised. This is especially true where broken glass may otherwise be propelled out of the framing structure. The combination of both the film and edge retention system should carry the relevant levels of certification for use in blast protection.

As world leaders in the manufacture of window films, including blast mitigation film, 3M’s experience goes back to the 1960’s when the company developed products to meet the terrorist threat in Northern Ireland.

Enhanced protection
3M works alongside independent, specialised installation partners to provide the most effective enhanced protection to glazing. My role, as national sales executive responsible for 3M Window Film business in the UK, necessitates close liaison between our partners, involved CTSA’s and those responsible for the technical delivery of the product to the client. Given the significance of the forthcoming London Olympics, I anticipate that our involvement will escalate rapidly over the coming months.

Many embassies and overseas missions also rely on 3M Safety & Security films. That sector of 3M’s business is managed by my colleague Dave Cox, who currently holds the presidency of the European Window Film Association.

Finally, it is worth pointing out that where the security budget is squeezed, combined solar/blast protection films may realise energy savings with a potentially short payback with the added benefit of making buildings more comfortable to work in during hot weather. Thus, much of the total security cost can be borne from a shared purse and carbon footprint targets can also be addressed.

For more information
Contact: Scott McLachlan
Mobile: 07836 557 199
E-mail: smclachlan@mmm.com
Customer Information Team: 0870 536 0036
or visit www.3mconstruction.co.uk