Counter Terror Business - Border Security

Clearing border bottlenecks with smarter, faster digital solutions for travel

Polly Jones — Tue, 03 Jun 2025 08:00:00 +0000

Ahead of IBMATA's Border Management & Technologies Summit Europe 2025 in Tallinn, Andy Smith explores how digital innovation can help border agencies ease congestion, enhance security, and deliver a smoother experience for travellers across Europe.

We all want travel to be secure, safe, and easy. But as traveller numbers surge to record highs and governments aim to �鶹�� tourism’s full economic power, border agencies face a critical challenge: how do you handle rising demand without compromising security?

This week, European and global leaders in border security, technology, and policy meet in Tallinn, Estonia, to tackle exactly that.

Europe’s in-tray is full. From large-scale migration to evolving security threats, the continent’s unique geographic and cultural diversity demands solutions that balance security with the need to keep legitimate trade and travel flowing.
Demand is booming, are borders keeping up?

Travel and tourism are the lifeblood of European prosperity. And they’re only growing. Last year, passenger numbers across Europe soared nearly 10 per cent, with capacity up by more than 9 per cent, according to IATA.

In response, European airports are investing billions to expand and modernise. Governments, too, are stepping in to back infrastructure improvements. But shiny new terminals alone won’t deliver the benefits, not unless border systems evolve alongside them.

From static to smart: why border modernisation matters
Border security can’t lag behind. It needs to embrace the same tech-driven advancements shaping traveler expectations and responding to today’s fast-moving threats.

Right now, many passengers face long queues and repeated document checks, with IATA reporting over 70 per cent encounter delays. That’s frustrating for travellers and a strain on agency resources, especially when most people pose no risk.

But it doesn’t have to be this way. Digitalised, interoperable, and dynamic borders can transform the experience, letting governments adapt policies and procedures in real time, strengthen security, and boost their country’s appeal as a destination for trade, tourism, and investment.

Integration is the key
Effective border management is never just one agency’s job. It brings together immigration, customs, public health, intelligence, and law enforcement. Siloed systems create gaps and inefficiencies; integrated systems, on the other hand, offer a unified, real-time view of travellers and goods, allowing faster, smarter decisions and keeping resources focused where they matter most.

Creating a better border experience
By using secure digital identities and pre-clearing travellers before they even arrive, border agencies can reduce congestion and speed up processing. And because the border experience shapes a visitor’s first and last impression, improving it also strengthens a country’s global image.

Start small, scale big
The path forward doesn’t require sweeping overnight change. In fact, the most successful transformations often start small, with modular, collaborative approaches.

Digital travel credentials (DTCs) are a prime example. Worldwide, demand for faster, contactless processes is skyrocketing, with over 60 per cent of passengers saying they’d pay for a DTC. In Aruba, a DTC pilot cut border processing time to just eight seconds, while improving data accuracy and compliance.

Immediate wins, long-term gains
Governments can make meaningful progress by tackling immediate pain points now while laying the groundwork for broader transformation. It’s about asking: what can we improve today with minimal disruption, and how does that fit into the bigger vision of a fully digital, integrated, and secure border?

Thoughtful, incremental action builds momentum for larger change.

Building the borders of the future
Borders will always be about managing risk. But by rethinking how people, goods, and information move across them, European governments can create systems that are not just more secure, but also more efficient, adaptable, and aligned with the needs of a fast-changing world. Crucially, these systems can balance the demands of security with the economic benefits of growing travel and tourism.

Andy Smith is Director for Industry & Innovation at SITA, the global air transport industry-owned IT-tech organisation that works with over 75 governments – including every G20 nation – to modernise airport and border operations.

The International Border Management and Technologies Association (IBMATA), a not-for-profit international NGO committed to the safe and secure movement of people and goods across international borders, holds its Border Management & Technologies Summit Europe 2025 in Tallinn from 4-6 June.

Taking back control of our borders: Where are we now?

Michael Lyons — Fri, 16 Oct 2020 07:52:49 +0000

Border Security

In January 2019 I wrote a piece in these pages about Brexit and the UK government’s quest to ‘Take Back Control’ of our Borders. At the time it was still unclear how or when the UK would actually leave the EU, or when ‘free movement’ would end.

Fast forward two years. On 1 January 2021, the Brexit Transition period will come to an end; as will the freedom of EU/EEA citizens to come to the UK to live, work and settle here without prior permission. We will finally ‘take back control of our borders’. Or will we?

On 13 July 2020, the �鶹�� Secretary published further details of the new UK Points Based Immigration System. This will take effect on 1 January 2021, whereupon the free movement of EU/EEA nationals entering and remaining in the UK will theoretically come to an end. Citizens of all countries (except the UK and Ireland) will thereafter require a ‘permission’ to enter or remain in the UK.

Over four million EU/EEA citizens already residing in the UK have now applied to stay here under the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS), with the vast majority having been granted. The Scheme will remain open to those who enter before 31 December 2020 and apply for it before 30 June 2021; whereupon it will close. Otherwise, EU/EEA visitors will still be admitted at the border without visas for six months; but those coming for more than six months (eg to work/study/settle in the UK) should apply ‘on-line’ for permission to do so, in the same way as non-EU/EEA citizens do now.

According to the government’s plan, all visitors and migrants (including EU/EEA nationals) coming to the UK will ultimately require either a visa or a new electronic travel authorisation (ETA) to enter. It says that who are given permission to stay will be given ‘written confirmation’ of their immigration status; but they will not be issued with any physical token or permit. The plan also suggests that to work/rent/study etc will be verifiable by a new ‘on-line’ service - thus reducing the need for employers/landlords to check paper documents.

With just three months to go until the end of the transition period, it is still not clear how these changes will work in practice, either at the border or inland. At the border, the UK Border Force continues to rely heavily upon ‘e gates’ to admit EU/EEA passengers to the UK. Even with the huge reduction in traveller volumes caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, there is no indication that they intend to diverge from this course. Indeed the government has demonstrated in the past that it has been willing to extend the use of e gates to cohorts of passengers who are already subject to immigration control, and would normally require an examination and leave to enter in writing from an immigration officer at the UK Border.

It is hard to see how this strategy aligns with the concept of ‘taking back control’, at least in the short term. Leaving aside the very visible means of evading UK Border Control via small boats on the English channel, or the less visible means of entering illegally by way of false or counterfeit documents, the most common method to evade immigration controls is to enter as a visitor and then overstay and work illegally.

In my day as an immigration officer at Heathrow, all foreign nationals (including EU/EEA nationals) needed to obtain permission to enter from one of my colleagues or myself to enter the country. This would only be given if we were satisfied that (a) the passenger had a valid passport (and entry clearance if required); and (b) that they met the requirements of the immigration rules. In the case of visitors this meant finding out how long they were going to stay and why; and whether we believed they were going to stick to their time limit. If we were so satisfied, leave to enter would be given in writing by way of an entry stamp in the passport, which was plain for all to see. If we were not so satisfied, the passenger would be refused entry and returned quickly whence they came. Indeed, many of my early refusals were passengers a from European countries who were seeking entry for a short period; when further examination indicated that their true intention was to remain in the UK permanently.

Which brings me back to today. E gates cannot do the job I used to do; interrogate passengers as to purpose and duration of stay. They cannot grant or record leave to enter. They were designed specifically to verify the nationality and identity of passengers who were not subject to immigration control. The only eligibility test to pass through an e gate is the possession of an ‘e passport’ (to check the holder’s face against the image on the digital chip in the passport) and age (because facial recognition technology only works above a certain age). The gates can conduct checks against the UK watch list, and the date of entry and name record may be retained. But any passenger wishing to avoid letting on the real purpose and duration of stay could easily meet these requirements, pass through the UK Border and remain undetected in the UK for an indefinite period.

In normal times we would expect to see about 30 million EU/EEA passport holders coming to the UK, with the vast majority entering by way of an e gate. The �鶹�� Office has conceded that under the current system it is impossible to say how many people are staying in the UK illegally. Estimates suggest that there may already be over a million people remaining in the UK without permission, with an additional 100,000 overstayers added to the total each year. This is before we even consider the prospect of EU/EEA overstayers when freedom of movement ends, and how to deal with them.

A national identity register
Which brings me to the vexed question of immigration enforcement. Although records are kept of those who have been granted temporary or permanent permission to remain under the EU Settlement Scheme, no physical evidence has been issued to them. There may well be many more who have been living in the UK for many years who have not yet applied for settled status. With the �鶹�� Office still smarting from the Windrush scandal, this raises concerns that there will still be categories of people in the UK (including EU citizens) who will not automatically feature on the new ‘digital register’; and may improperly be denied employment or accommodation under the new system.

I have long argued that the only effective way to control illegal migration in the UK is to build a national identity register. The idea of everyone clutching an ID card - and it being demanded by sinister officials – was always nonsense and is out of date now. We have the means of providing everyone with on-line ‘accounts’ to manage the evidence of their existence – a virtual version of the tin box stuffed with the papers that live under our stairs. Like that box, its contents belong to the individual; and they can share it with whomsoever they choose. This would ensure that everyone residing in the UK had some form of token or credential which recognises their status as either a British or Irish citizen, or as a foreign national who has temporary or indefinite permission to remain in the UK. Then – and only then – could the government consider a return to a compliant environment whereby third parties such as employers and landlords could reasonably ask to make judgements as to whether their employees or tenants have lawful status in the UK. Without this, we are already seeing signs that some EU/EEA nationals may be denied tenancies because they cannot show lawful residence in the UK - and the potential development of a second wave Windrush disaster.

As things stand, there is little that border officials or enforcement officers can do to verify how long or how many times EU/EEA nationals have been here. In most cases they will not be given the opportunity to examine passengers to determine admissibility on arrival, like I was. Their best hope is that the promised ETA system will deliver a more rigorous form of examination prior to travel; but that is still some two– three years away.

Equally, it is reasonable to suppose that immigration enforcement will not arrest and deport thousands of EU/EEA nationals for failing to produce evidence that they have never needed before, even where there is no other independent evidence of their lawful status in the country. A readily accessible register of all foreign nationals (including EU/EEA nationals) lawfully residing in the UK would be required to enable them to do so; and that still seems some way off.

So, it is hard to see how we will be ‘taking back control’ of EU/EEA immigration on 1 January 2021. More likely we will see ‘business as usual’, with virtual free movement continuing, at least until the UK ETA is implemented. A more likely target date for delivering effective immigration controls over EU/EEA migration is 2025, assuming that the new strategy can be implemented by then. Meanwhile, we can only conclude that taking back control of our borders – at least insofar as EU/EEA immigration control is concerned – remains very much a ‘work in progress’ rather than a ‘fait accompli’.

Written by Tony Smith CBE. Tony is a former Director General of the UK Border Force with over 40 years’ government experience in immigration and border control. He is now an independent border management consultant, managing director of Fortinus Global Ltd, and chairman of the International Border Management and Technologies Association.

www.ibmata.org

Brexit: Taking back control of our borders?

Michael Lyons — Mon, 28 Jan 2019 11:08:30 +0000

Border Security

By Tony Smith CBE, Chairman, International Border and Technologies Association.

One of the standard political catchphrases in the ongoing saga of the UK’s exit from the European Union is ‘taking back control of our borders’. This is alongside ‘taking back control’ of a few other things, such as our money, laws, fishing and farming. So, what do we mean by border control – and how will this really change after Brexit (assuming Brexit ever happens, that is)?

In fact, the UK already has a pretty comprehensive border control in place. Every passenger arriving in the UK goes through passport control where identity is verified and watch lists are checked. A great many of them are in fact checked before arrival, through the submission of Advanced Passenger Information (API) by the transportation company bringing them. Electronic exit checks are also in place. The only exception to this is at the UK/Irish border, where the Common Travel Area allows free movement of persons between the UK and Ireland. And the Channel Islands, for that matter.

Unlike most of the other EU Member States, neither the UK nor Ireland is part of the ‘Schengen Acquis’ which allows the free movement of people within the Schengen zone. In fact, both the UK and Ireland have a specific ‘opt out’ of Schengen – something no longer available to other EU Member States. This means that all EU and EEA passports holders will still go through passport control upon entry to the UK or Ireland; and may be refused entry in certain circumstances relating to public health, public security or public policy. Equally, ‘third country’ nationals require a permission to enter the UK when arriving from another EU Member State; and this includes a visa if they are citizens of a country on the UK visa list.

So, what is the additional element of ‘control’ that Brexit will bring to the UK Border? The CTA will be preserved, so, contrary to some opinion, there will be no need for passport controls between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, although customs controls are more problematic. Everybody arriving from elsewhere will still go through passport control. What difference will Brexit make?

EU migration
The key distinction will be the UK proposal to end ‘free movement’ of people within the EU. This means in effect that EU and EEA (and Swiss) passport holders will in future need a ‘permission’ to enter the UK. You might argue that they already need that now – and you might be right, to a point. But under current law there is an expectation that all EU/EEA/Swiss passport holders will be admitted at the UK Border, regardless of their purpose in coming to the UK or their proposed duration of stay. That is not the case for other ‘third country’ nationals. They need ‘permission’ (currently described in law as ‘leave’) to enter the UK; and this may be refused if they do not meet the requirements of the immigration rules. So – at some point in the future – all EU/EEA/Swiss passport holders will require leave to enter the UK, in the same way that ‘third country’ nationals require leave to enter now. And they will need permission to stay. Indeed the EU registration scheme is already underway, inviting those EU nationals wishing to stay in the UK post Brexit to register for a permission to so.

So, when we talk about ‘taking back control of our borders’ what we really mean is ‘taking back control of EU migration’. This is beyond doubt a response to rising immigration figures from the EU; and the consequential impact upon UK population growth and pressure upon social services, accommodation and infrastructure in the UK to cope with this.

Ironically, since the decision was taken by the British people to leave the EU in 2016 net migration from EU countries has dropped from a high of 180,00 in 2015 to 74,000 in 2018; suggesting that many EU citizens voted with their feet when they felt unwanted. Oddly, net migration from ‘third country’ citizens rose to a record high of 248,000 in 2018; the highest figure since 2004. Yet this is an area over which the UK government already has control (or should have control)?

So, you might say that the government could ‘take back control’ of its borders (and by that they really mean immigration, which doesn’t have the same ring to it) without leaving the EU at all, but by issuing rather less visas and permits to stay than they do now. Something they vowed to do some years ago, with a policy intent to reduce overall net migration to less than 100,000 a year. Small wonder there has been a row in Cabinet between the new �鶹�� Secretary Sajid Javid and the former �鶹�� Secretary and now Prime Minister Theresa May over this policy; and a change of tone to reduce immigration to ‘sustainable numbers’ rather than a set figure.

In fact, many politicians argue (with some justification) that leaving the EU will compromise UK border control. That is because UK membership enables access to several EU systems such as Europol, Eurojust and the Schengen Information System (SIS2) for background checks.

But perhaps things are rather simple. People will always disagree on immigration and asylum policy, numbers and so on. But the majority still need to feel that they have ‘control’; and policy can be adjusted in tune with the elected government of the day. This becomes more difficult when the elected government of the day cedes power in contentious policy areas such as this to an unelected supra national authority such as the EU Commission. Which is itself wedded to fundamental freedoms of movement of goods, people, capital and services. And woe betide any Member State who dares to challenge that.

The UK Border Force is one of the best in the world, training border agencies across the globe on detection, intelligence, targeting and the like. To say that we don’t have control of our borders undermines them and the great work that they do both overseas, at our ports of entry, and inland. But like anyone else they need to understand who is calling the shots on immigration and asylum policy in the UK; and what tools will be provided to them to enable them to deliver their mission.

There will never be complete agreement on Brexit. It is hard to imagine a topic that has created greater division in UK society than this. But endless squabbling in the UK parliament - and between the UK and the EU - is not helping, regardless of your position on leave or remain. The restoration of very clear powers to the UK parliament, coupled with consistent messaging and actions from our political leaders, is the most likely vehicle to satisfy people that the government is really in control of its borders – or anything else, for that matter.

Tony Smith CBE is a former Director General of the UK Border Force with over 40 years’ government experience in immigration and border control. He is now an independent border management consultant, managing director of Fortinus Global Ltd, and chairperson of the International Border Management and Technologies Association.

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www.ibmata.org

Brexit and borders: a lack of clarity

Michael Lyons — Fri, 07 Dec 2018 12:22:25 +0000

Border Security

Following the referendum vote to leave the European Union in June 2016, much of the weight behind the Leave vote was attributed to control of British borders. The NHS bus may have been ridiculed for it’s apparent funding lie, but it was undoubtedly immigration that burdened people’s minds. Now, only four months away from our official departure date, details of what Brexit will actually mean to the UK are finally being revealed.

Only recently, analysis of the EU withdrawal agreement suggests that Britain would lose GDP growth equivalent to the annual economic output of Wales by 2030, Chancellor Philip Hammond has conceded that the UK will be worse off under all possible scenarios and former Defence Secretary and long-term Theresa May ally Sir Michael Fallon said that the ‘worst of all worlds’ deal must be renegotiated. So far, not looking as shiny as Number 10 would have hoped for.

One issue that has remained in the headlines is that of the UK border, especially in Ireland, and what it will mean for UK security, trade and migration. Lessons taken from the border between Norway and Sweden showcase how tough it would be to achieve a frictionless soft border, irrelevant of how strongly Downing Street believe it can be negotiated. The �鶹�� Affairs Committee chair, Yvette Cooper, has claimed that �鶹�� Office officials are ‘not being straight’ with MPs over the security implications of no-deal Brexit, highlighting the possible information lost to Border Force if the UK were to be excluded from the Schengen Information System database in March. Estimates report that the database, which contains details of terrorists and criminals, is currently checked by British police officers, border and immigration officials 1.4 million times every day.

That followed a warning from the National Audit Office that argued that border disruption following a no-deal Brexit could create serious security weaknesses, especially given that new border infrastructure at ports, airports and other sites could take up to three years to construct. As we are all too aware, it would not take organised criminals long to exploit any perceived weaknesses or gaps in security, and three years is a long time.

Leaving the EU needn’t be a reason for a more inward facing UK, and given that air traffic is set to double over the next 20 years, and freight set to triple over the same period, any agreement and security arrangement must account for not only a freer flowing international border but also for an increasing range of threats. Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu has already warned that UK police forces are not a match for the threat of Islamist and extreme far-right terrorism, and that outlook is unlikely to improve in the next four months.

The most successful border security programmes don’t make the news. It is those that fail which hit the headlines. With a heightened focus on UK activity and borders, as well as the threat of more terrorists returning from the Syria, let’s hope for an uneventful year for our borders that excludes the issue from the front pages.

The future of border security: a paradigm shift

Michael Lyons — Wed, 27 Sep 2017 13:38:03 +0000

Border Security

With air traffic set to double over the next 20 years, and freight set to triple over the same period, the time has come for another paradigm shift in the way we manage border controls. Tony Smith explains why

More people are crossing international borders than ever before. The vast majority are perfectly innocent travellers, going away on holiday or business. Some are moving for temporary or permanent migration (students, workers etc). Others are displaced through no fault of their own, due to conflict or persecution at home. In some countries, people live adjacent to a land border and even commute daily across it.

In general terms, the mass movement of people and goods across the globe is a good thing. It encourages trade and tourism, which in turn fosters growth. Some would say it is the lifeblood of the global economy. Others will argue that it is unsustainable to allow mass migration from the developing world to the developed world. More controls are needed to protect national interests such as economic prosperity and security. Either way, border controls have never been under greater pressure than they are today. And things will only get tougher for the agencies responsible for managing them.

Since 9/11, the more advanced countries have recognised the need to adapt their border controls to cater for a range of threats, rather than just for immigration or customs purposes. I was the director of Citizenship & Immigration Canada when 9/11 happened. US Customs – who had hitherto had limited responsibility for national security and anti-terrorism at the US Border, let alone on domestic flights – found that within 24 hours of the attacks they were able to identify and link all 19 of the perpetrators through their access to airline passenger reservation systems. I witnessed at first hand the creation of the Department of �鶹��land Security, and the implementation of the Patriot Act in the United States. I worked on the ‘Hands Across the Border’ initiative, creating joint targeting units between myriad of US and Canadian enforcement agencies to develop intelligence led controls. There was a clear and pressing need for government agencies to share data and intelligence; to work with the travel industry, where a good deal of the required data was located; and to develop technology which was capable of refining data into actionable intelligence to identify and disrupt threats at the border. A paradigm shift in border control was born.

When I returned to the UK Immigration Service and became director for Ports of Entry, I found the �鶹�� Office to be totally preoccupied by immigration pressures. Asylum figures had reached record numbers; backlogs were piling up; and there was a public outcry to get a grip of immigration numbers.
Then – just six months into my tenure – 7/7 happened. The worst terrorist attack in UK history. Perpetrated on this occasion not by foreign nationals who had exploited weaknesses in our immigration and visa systems (as was the case with 9/11); but by a new breed of ‘homegrown’ terrorists who had turned upon their homeland. Terrorists had become more sophisticated. They were building global networks of their own, where border agencies were not. They were crossing borders as ‘low risk’ travellers – no threat to immigration controls, because they were already entitled to enter. But they were travelling to far off places to meet with other terrorists, to train, and to come back and kill.

Thus, we recognised the need for a paradigm shift in the way we viewed the UK border. We should be just as concerned with our own nationals crossing our borders as we were with foreign nationals crossing them. This meant bringing our police and security services much closer to the border than had hitherto been the case; and developing a new strategy (PROTECT) to ensure that all agencies and communities worked together to combat the threat of terrorism. The UK Immigration Service was dissolved in favour of a new UK Border Force, which combined the immigration and customs functions into a single agency within the �鶹�� Office. We developed our own data eco system, including a national border targeting centre. And we joined up our enforcement agencies like never before behind a common Border Strategy; using similar tools and processes to those I saw emerge just a couple of years earlier in North America.

So where does this leave us today?
We continue to see terrorist atrocities across Europe. Many have been inspired and perpetrated by people who have crossed international borders to fight for terrorist organisations; and then returned to cause massive harm at home. The United Nations has passed resolutions calling upon border agencies to do more to prevent terrorist travel; and to share data and intelligence with one another on terrorist movements. But the problem remains. After every attack, there is an immediate media inquest into who did it; what the law enforcement community knew about them; and why it wasn’t stopped. And if any of the perpetrators crossed the border, why weren’t they stopped there in the first place?

In fact, the UK border is one of the best in the world in this field. Our Border Force, police, and security services work closely together to ensure intelligence is shared to maximum effect, to minimise risk. We check every person entering the UK against watch lists; we receive and analyse passenger data in advance, working closely with airlines and other transportation companies to acquire it; and we use enhanced data analytical systems to give our enforcement agencies the best risk assessment tools around.

But this is not enough. With air traffic set to double over the next 20 years, and freight set to triple over the same period, the time has come for another paradigm shift in the way we manage border controls. This comes not through the injection of more physical checks into an infrastructure already struggling to cope with volume; but through much greater investment in new and emerging technologies.

Since leaving public service I have been fortunate enough to witness some of the very best technologies now emerging at borders around the world. Much more so than I ever saw when I was running the UK Border Olympic Security Programme, or the UK Border Force. Artificial intelligence, the ‘internet of things’, biometrics, blockchain, the Cloud, digital technology and the like are all developing at huge pace. Fortunately for us, the UK government has not been idle in recognising the value of these technologies; and it is now embarked upon an ambitious and exciting programme of implementation across Whitehall departments and agencies.

The introduction of these technologies into future borders will, in my view, lead to the next paradigm shift in border security. But regardless of the capabilities of such technology, this can only be realised through collaboration. That means bringing together all the key ingredients of the eco system that surrounds border management. Control agencies, airlines, airports, rail and sea carriers, port control authorities, academics, policy makers and technology providers (big and small) must unite behind this common purpose. They all have a role to play.

In my experience, the most successful border security programmes don’t make the news. It is those that fail that hit the headlines. I have seen my share of failures; but I have also been fortunate enough to have been involved in some excellent national and international border projects over the years. I travel the world attending border security conferences, expert panels and workshops arranged by an array of different organisations. I would not claim to be an expert in new and emerging technology – far from it. But of one thing, I am certain. We will only be able to deliver the border of the future if we work together across national and international boundaries to do so. Then – and only then – we will see the paradigm shift in border controls that is so urgently required.

Tony Smith CBE is a former Director General of the UK Border Force and managing director of Fortinus Global Ltd, an international Border Management Consultancy. Smith is also chairman of the International Border Management and Technologies Association (IBMATA).

www.ibmata.org

Securing UK borders from terrorist threats

Michael Lyons — Tue, 21 Feb 2017 14:38:45 +0000

Border Security

Whether Brexiteer or remainer, the UK’s decision to leave the European Union in June 2016 will have a major impact on the way the country deals with and handles migration. In the first of its monthly reports for the Security & Counter Terror Expo, Counter Terror Business looks at how border security will help ease the migration flow to the UK and keep terrorism at bay

The topic of border security has been a prominent theme in the discussions of government over the last few years. Magnified by both European migration concerns and the close proximity of terrorist attacks across the English Channel, the public opinion on the nation’s safety has ensured that Prime Minister Theresa May, in her first year as premier, will need to settle the problem with more speed and certainty than her predecessor. Moreover, the weight that border security carried in the European Union referendum campaign once again served to show public discontent and discomfort with the perceived vulnerability of our shores.

Border security is crucial to the level of national security that the UK enjoys. Protecting our borders from the illegal movement of weapons, contraband and people is essential to UK safety. As an island nation, the UK is somewhat separated from the threat that countries such as France, Germany and Belgium face. For example, the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and Saint-Denis, which left a death toll of 130 civilians, highlights the difficulty that mainland European countries face in monitoring terrorist activity. With Islamic State claiming responsibility for the attacks, in retaliation to French airstrikes in Syria and Iraq, the investigation following the acts showed that the terrorists planned the attack in Syria, but organised the details in Belgium. It is believed that a number of those responsible had entered Europe among a growing flow of migrants and refugees. But there is another issue to contend with, which is that of homegrown terrorism.

From homegrown to Syria
Many of the Islamic State terrorists involved in the Paris and Brussels attacks were what are considered homegrown terrorists. As of January 2015, an estimated 440 Belgians had left the country for Syria and Iraq, creating the impression of the nation as a hub of terrorist activity and jihadist recruitment. Molenbeek, a municipality surrounding Brussels, was described by one Belgian authority as ‘a breeding ground for violence’. Salah Abdeslam was one of the terrorists accused of involvement in the attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, and was the centre of Europe’s largest manhunt following the attacks. The profile of Abdeslam emphasises the risk that border control authorities in Europe face. Prior to the Paris attacks, Abdeslam is understood to have freely travelled to six counties in an effort to transport individuals, who would later be involved in the attacks, into Europe.

Within our own borders, British authorities suggest that approximately 850 people from the UK have travelled to support or fight for jihadist organisations in Syria and Iraq, with about half having since returned to the UK. Most people can remember when Bethnal Green Academy found itself in the spotlight in early 2015, when three of its students, Shamima Begum, Amira Abase and Kadiza Sultana, flew from London to Turkey, before travelling to Syria to join Islamic State. The girls were aged 15 and 16 at the time, and put a firm spotlight on how easily they managed to leave the UK unquestioned and unresisted, despite evidence showing that UK authorities were aware that Shamima was in contact with Aqsa Mahmood, who left Glasgow for Syria in 2013 to marry an Islamic State fighter, before travelling.

The perception of border security as an essential force to prevent terrorists entering the country is unfairly weighted, as preventing those susceptible to radicalisation from leaving is equally important. The Prevent stream of the UK counter terrorism strategy CONTEST aims to stop people becoming attracted to terrorism domestically and suffocate communications and support from overseas. Individuals suspected of posing a terrorism-related threat may be prevented from travelling from the UK under powers in the Counter Terrorism and Security Act of 2015. This is maintained by carrying ‘no fly’ schemes to cover individuals who pose a terrorist or terrorism-related threat and are seeking to leave the UK. But what about those seeking to come to the UK?

Mass migration
The European migrant crisis hit its peak in 2015, when five boats carrying almost 2,000 individuals to the continent sank in the Mediterranean Sea, killing over 1,200 people. Aside from that April event, figures show that the migrants primarily arrived from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. The extent of migration led to increased funding for Mediterranean border control, the creation of Operation Sophia, a military operation with the aim of neutralising established refugee smuggling routes in the Mediterranean, and even the reintroduction of border controls within the Schengen Area.

According to a survey commissioned by the Pew Research Center, the majority of Europeans believe the influx of refugees across the continent had led, and will lead, to an increase in the likelihood of terrorism. Those surveyed in Hungary (76 per cent) and Poland (71 per cent) were the top nations that expressed concerns that refugees will increase the likelihood of terrorism in their country.

Hungary, in fact, claim that seven of the attackers from the 2015 Paris attacks slipped through Hungarian borders while posing as migrants, despite having their names registered in counter terrorism databases across Europe. Abdeslam is believed to have made four trips to Hungary in August and October 2015 in which he picked up other terrorists linked to both the Brussels and Paris attacks.

Mujtaba Rahman of the Eurasia Group, a political risk and consulting company, said of the issue: “There is a growing perception among European public opinion that E.U. leaders are not in control of the Continent’s terrorist threat. Combined, these attacks [in Brussels] will increase xenophobic and anti-immigration sentiment across the E.U., which has already been rising in light of the E.U.’s ongoing refugee crisis.”

This opinion was evident in the popularity drop of Angela Merkel who opened the country’s borders to more than one million migrants last year. It has been further inflated by the rhetoric used by U.S President elect Donald Trump, who frequently associated terrorism with immigrants, particularly Muslims, and threatened to build a wall between the United States and Mexico.

Weapon carrying
In October 2016, Lord Toby Harris of Haringey launched his independent report into the steps that should be taken to improve London’s resources and readiness to respond to a major terrorist incident. Following the scale of large terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels and during the Bastille Day celebrations in Nice, Lord Harris’ review made 127 recommendations or the Mayor of London, the government and other agencies to consider.

Among the recommendations were a number of border control suggestions, including for security measures on the river Thames to be strengthened and for the Metropolitan Police to further explore the use of temporary barriers to protect against a Nice style attack in London.

Lord Toby Harris said: “A serious terrorist attack remains highly possible and we cannot be complacent. London needs to become a city where security and resilience is designed in and is part of the city’s fabric, and where everyone who lives and works here sees security and resilience as their responsibility just as much as it is for the emergency services and civic authorities.”

Lord Harris’ report suggested that the most significant terrorist threat affecting the UK was a marauding terrorist firearms attack (MTFA), such as that seen in Mumbai in 2008, Nairobi in 2013, Paris in 2015 and Orlando in 2016. This form of attack would likely involve shootings, fires, explosives and possible hostage takings. As seen in Paris, this form of attack can be carried out by a small number of attackers, perhaps working individually, which means that multiple, simultaneous attacks are a possibility - stretching response teams and emergency services and increasing the likelihood of casualties.

All of this beggars the question - how are terrorists equipping themselves with the firearms necessary for such an attack. The National Crime Agency (NCA) warned this month that half of the terror plots prevented in the UK over the last two years involved extremists attempting to purchase guns from criminal gangs. Of the estimated 6,000 organised criminal groups in the UK, 750 have access to guns, or are trying to access them.

Lynne Owens, chief of the NCA, warned: “Criminal networks, who think nothing about who they sell firearms to, present a significant route by which extremist groups will try to access the sort of weapons used in recent attacks in Europe."

Mark Rowley, assistant commissioner for Specialist Operations in the Metropolitan Police Service, added that the Met is also concerned by an apparent upsurge in guns on the streets in London and some other big urban areas, with law enforcement officers seizing at least 884 firearms last year, including Czech-made Skorpion submachine pistols, Uzis, and Mac-10 weapons.

Lord Harris suggests that weaknesses in Britain’s border security could possibly be allowing terrorists to get the guns they need to attack London. The report highlights that, given the current specific threat relating to MTFA or similar terrorist attacks, ‘much more should be done to strengthen the ability to prevent the importation of firearms’. It recommends that the Mayor of London should seek ‘assurances that the routine screening and searching of cars and freight entering the country is being significantly enhanced’. It continued that ‘the aerial surveillance capacity available to the Border Force, the NCA and the police enabling them to monitor and control the border needs to be enhanced given that existing capacity is already fully utilised’.

The Brexit impact
Having seen the UK public vote in favour of exiting the European Union, by 52 per cent to 48, Prime Minister Theresa May knows that a lot of pressure rests on returning full border controls. The media build up to the referendum was overwhelmed with stories detailing the flood of refugees entering Europe from Syria, Africa and elsewhere in the Middle East. It has been reported that since 2012, the UK ha received an average of 300,000 immigrants annually, with half of the immigrants in 2015 arriving from non-EU nations.

A large portion of the Leave campaign rhetoric focused upon regaining control of the immigration flow. But the post-Brexit landscape makes for complicated border control. Northern Ireland would essentially form the UK’s only land border since Ireland proper is an EU member. Historically contentious, the Irish border extends over 300 highly porous miles. The common travel area (CTA), agreed between the three administrations of London, Belfast and Dublin, has existed since the 1920s. With may critics viewing this as a potential backdoor for immigration, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland James Brokenshire has claimed that entry points to the Irish Republic will become a new front line for combating illegal immigration once the UK withdraws from the EU.

Then there is the complicated possibility of establishing border controls on the England-Scotland border. Despite voting in their 2015 referendum to remain part of the UK, First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has published a draft bill giving Scotland the ability to reconsider the question of independence before the UK leaves the EU. If the value of remaining part of the EU outweighs the value of remaining part of the UK, not only would more land border controls need to be established between England and Scotland, but maritime border protections would have to change at ports of entry to process EU-origin vessels in addition to other foreign vessels, as well as EU passengers arriving on ferries from Ireland and France.

How technology can help secure Britain’s borders
Following concerns being raised about gaps in British border security and the rise in the number of guns found on the streets in many major cities, Neil Basu, the new national co-ordinator for counter terrorism policing, has said that an increase in biometric scans and tamperproof passports would do more to protect the border.

In an interview with the Press Association, Basu said: "Just in the same way you can smuggle illegal firearms into a country, you can smuggle people into a country. And if one of those happens to be a terrorist, that's a big problem. Society needs to debate what's required. But in law enforcement, I'd say if you want security, you need to improve your biometrics at the borders.

"Everybody's identity should be checked as they come through a border in a way that is foolproof. Fingerprints, iris scans, the documents need to be tamper-proof. What we need is a debate about what border security really means."

Moreover, a briefing paper entitled The border after Brexit: How technology can help secure Britain’s borders, published by the Adam Smith Institute, looks at why, in light of Brexit, it will become even more important for Britain’s borders to be secure. The authors of the report, Sam Bowman and Ed West, argue that, at present, Britain’s Border Force is not equipped to quickly, accurately and securely monitor passengers in and out of Britain, claiming that the Border Force Warning Index and Semaphore systems are outdated. With 7.5 per cent of high risk flights not being scanned appropriately, this has consequently allowed known terrorists to leave the country without being detained properly.

Post-Brexit Britain will undeniably take a new form to that which it has held for a number of decades. As relationships within the European Union and between European countries begin to stretch under political tension, the landscape of border security will become more scrutinised than ever before. The full extent to which Theresa May will change our border control is yet to be revealed, but is is likely that its tightening will please the British public. With new lines being drawn within the EU, it is an opportunity to strengthen our border control - both of people coming in and out, and weapons.

This article first appeared in submission to Security and Counter Terror Expo as part of Counter Terror Business’ monthly market reports. As media partner to the event, Counter Terror Business will be providing six reports covering the show’s six security capabilities in detail: border security; policing and law enforcement; major events; cyber security; critical national infrastructure; and security services.

www.counterterrorexpo.com

Border security: Getting back to basics

Michael Lyons — Wed, 11 Jan 2017 14:46:13 +0000

Border Security

Tony Smith, global border security consultant and former director general of the UK Border Force, looks at the pressures upon our border agencies and how how technology is both aiding and challenging border security efforts within the UK

A lot has been said and written about border security over the past 18 months. The horrendous attacks in Paris, Brussels and Berlin have reminded us that a primary function of border control is to protect the indigenous population from harm. Yet time after time we see fundamental flaws in border security which have allowed terrorists to travel unchallenged across international borders; and around the borderless Schengen zone, often with no identity papers and sometimes with lethal weapons.

So what can be done? Are modern day border controls fit for purpose? How can we continue to promote free travel and trade – and all the good things that globalisation brings – whilst at the same time protecting our people from harm?

There is no doubt that pressures upon our border agencies are greater than ever before. With predictions of a doubling in global air traffic over the next 20 years, and a quadrupling in the amount of freight by 2050, volume continues to rise inexorably. Civil war and unrest in many parts of the world means that a record 65 million people have now fled their homes, in search of refuge elsewhere. The decision of the British people to leave the European Union after 50 years – based significantly around fears of immigration and population growth – has led to significant turmoil about the future of Schengen, the Customs Union and the EU itself. The presidential election in the United States was won largely on a nationalist philosophy; with promises of much tougher border controls and enforcement than ever before. And meanwhile terrorist attacks of various size and complexion continue to threaten our way of life.

Of course, there is no easy answer to any of this. But there are lessons we can learn from the past; indeed lessons that we ignore at our peril. Having been in leadership roles in government during times of severe crisis, I can see some substantial parallels between the challenges facing us today and those we have faced before. Having spent a good deal of time attending expert conferences and events around the globe over the past two years, I know full well that modern day border management demands that we must make best use of all the assets, people, technology and intelligence at our disposal to deliver the three fundamental principles of border management.

Adopting strong strategies
Firstly, we need to espouse the multiple borders strategy wherever and whenever we can. Simply put, this means checking everyone and everything we can – and as thoroughly as we can – at the earliest possible point in the journey. By working together to build systems and processes to share and analyse data in advance of travel. Not just between the control agencies themselves – but also with the airlines, the shipping companies, the airport authorities, the freight companies and so on. With the use of better and smarter technology, this is much more achievable these days than it was in the past.

Secondly, we need a proper strategy for managing identity. This means that we must embrace the sensible and proportionate use of biometrics in the traveller continuum. Developments in passport technology – and especially the capacity to store biometric and biographic data on machine readable chips – opens up a vast array of opportunities for border control that were also not available in the past. Increasingly, more and more countries are demanding biometrics from travellers in their visa, border and immigration systems. Capturing and verifying an identity from the outset – and being able to verify it at each stage of the journey, and even in country for entitlement purposes – provides huge opportunities to facilitate genuine travel whilst at the same time deterring unlawful, harmful or illegitimate travel. Which is ultimately the vision for all of us.

And thirdly, countries must embrace the principles of integrated border management. This was a major failure identified in reports about the worst terrorist attacks in history. The 9/11 report identified that as many as 15 of the 19 hijackers were potentially vulnerable to interception by border authorities. Analysing their characteristic travel documents and travel patterns could have allowed authorities to intercept four to 15 hijackers; and more effective use of information available in U.S. government databases could have identified up to three hijackers. Yet in the Paris attacks over 14 years later, at least seven of the attackers were believed to have travelled to Syria to fight for ISL and return undetected. All the attackers were known to the police – some for crime, some for terrorism, some for both. And two of the attackers were fingerprinted at the Greek border six weeks earlier, posing as refugees in the migrant crisis.

Border control and home grown terrorism
Integrated border management doesn’t take place just at the border. It demands a clear and consistent strategy for joint agency working - both at national and international level - between immigration, customs, police, military and security sectors who are united behind a common purpose to protect the �鶹��land.

Following the attacks on the London underground system on 7/7 the UK government committed its departments and agencies to the CONTEST strategy, recognising that border control was not just about foreign fighters, but also about the enemy within. The 7/7 terrorists had been undertaking training exercises for Al Qaeda; but because they were British nationals we had not been focusing upon their travel patterns. Since then there has been very close collaboration between the security services, the police and the UK Border Force to identify home grown terrorists and to track their movements. Something that has effectively deterred terrorist attacks in the UK ever since, including during the London 2012 Olympics. Most of the Paris attackers lived in residential areas in Paris and Brussels which were known to be breeding grounds for ISIL; yet information about their movements was not shared either at national or international level.

The recent case of the Berlin attacker on the Christmas market in Berlin in December 2016 only serves to illustrate the point. Anis Amri was a convicted criminal before he even arrived in Italy, but was nonetheless admitted. Following conviction of a serious offence in Italy he was released without deportation; and despite his criminal record he was allowed to travel freely to Germany. Once there he registered with the authorities and continued to operate in criminal circles; and was even identified as a security threat. Yet despite being liable to deportation he remained at liberty and was able not just to perpetrate this attack but also to escape the scene and travel across EU borders – despite a manhunt – with no identity papers and a gun in his bag. We can continue the political rhetoric about Schengen and free movement; but the fact is that even Schengen countries can (and do) erect internal border controls at times of crisis. The fact that they failed to do so on this occasion continues to raise questions about the capability of control agencies to track and intercept terrorists – both before and after the fact.

To be fair, the EU Commission has now recognised the need for a much greater integration of enforcement systems under the Smart Borders programme; and the value of entry/exit checks (and even biometric checks) at the external frontier in future. But it still has some way to go to demonstrate that it is fully embracing the fundamental principles of multiple borders, identity management and integrated border management within the Union itself.

Encouraging collaboration
Of course, the most important ingredient in all this is collaboration. Border leaders - and the politicians that govern them - need to look outwards for support. Not just to other countries - but also to intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations working in this area; to all of the stakeholders in the travel and transportation business; and to the world of technology, where many of the tools to deliver the aforementioned principles are developed. This means getting back to basics. Then – and only then – will we they be able to face up to the significant challenges that lie ahead.

Tony Smith retired as director general of the UK Border Force after 40 years’ service with the UK �鶹�� Office. He is now a global border security consultant; managing director of Fortinus Global Ltd; and deputy director general at BORDERPOL.

www.fortinusglobal.com

Protecting borders and enhancing collaboration

CTB — Fri, 18 Dec 2015 14:16:59 +0000

Border Security

The World Borderpol Congress is the only multi-jurisdictional transnational platform where the border protection, management and security industry policy-makers and practitioners convene annually to discuss the international challenges faced in protecting borders. This year’s event received over 150 delegates from more than 47 countries for the most successful Congress to date.

Despite being called to an emergency meeting in Greece, Klaas Dijkhoff, The Netherlands State Secretary of Security and Justice and Minister for Immigration, still managed to deliver his opening keynote presentation via a prepared video, which was followed by the delivery of a keynote presentation by Brigadier General Pieter Simpelaar, Commander of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee Schiphol District.

The operation of today’s border security, traveller and migration management community is being stressed by geopolitical, social and economic events. Our world is fully interdependent, and it is becoming ever more challenging to find solutions which include the utilisation of border services and agencies to protect national security.

As a number of regional crises continue to escalate, economic sanctions and travel bans are being increasingly employed by the USA, EU, and Russia, as well as their allies. Border services are front-line responders for monitoring these sanctions and bans. As the challenges of mass illegal migration across the Mediterranean Sea peaked during the summer period, Italy and Greece, among other European countries, have seen tens of thousands of refugees seeking sanction on the Continent. Many more come via the Balkans or Eastern European countries to seek the ‘sanctuary’ of the European Community.

Border services
Whether asylum seekers or economic migrants, the numbers are proving a challenge for the European Community and its border and law enforcement agencies, as well as the problems of identifying those genuine asylum seekers arriving without any form of documentation. As the post-World War One borders of Iraq evaporate and a new entity known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) emerges, hundreds of thousands of persons are being displaced and are fleeing the region. Border services are now front-line responders for monitoring, recording and directing the movement of these people, most of whom will be refugees.

ISIL will continue to look for soft western targets wherever it can and by so doing de-stabilise vulnerable states like Tunisia and Algeria, dependent on Western tourism or oil for their economy. It will continue to attract foreign youth who can one day return home as trained terrorists and the growing challenge for agencies is identifying and restricting the movement of such people. While the United States deals with an unprecedented and clearly well-orchestrated movement of tens of thousands of people – mostly children and adolescents from Central America – arriving at its border with Mexico, its border services are monitoring, detaining and caring for these people in unprecedented numbers.

As China, the world’s most populous nation, develops a formidable navy and air force and is poised to succeed the US as the world’s number one economy, it is flexing its economic and political muscle in Asia and beyond. Border services everywhere are now being pressed to be front-line responders monitoring the import and export of strategic goods and services to and from China.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a deeply-held belief within the developed world that political and economic integration is the best way to improve global security and avoid potential conflict everywhere. This has created a paradox: an interdependent world is supposed to make it less likely that extreme conflict between nations or groups of nations will occur. This very interdependence makes it imperative that nations cooperate, communicate and consult with one another in a multi‑jurisdictional and inter-disciplinary manner.

World Borderpol Congress
The 4th World Borderpol Congress brought together the like-minded leaders of the world’s border security establishments, to contribute to making the world a safer place and discuss some of the latest issues and challenges facing our borders and agencies tasked with protecting and managing them.

The Congress programme included situational overviews in the opening plenary ‘Trafficking: Human, Drug, Contraband and CBRNe’ and explored how trafficking remains one of the major issues for border security and management agencies. Whether humans, drugs, contraband or CBRNe proliferation, trafficking provides major challenges that affect peoples lives and national economies, whilst proving hugely profitable for organised criminal gangs. Different regional issues provide global challenges. On the opening day of the Congress, Louis Voiron, director of strategy for Borderpol, chaired a discussion asking from where do these activities transpire and what can be put in place to mitigate the problems?

This years Congress also saw discussions on ‘Big Data and Cross Border Cyber Crime’. Hosted by Tom Tass, director general at Borderpol, the session asked delegates to consider how our borders of tomorrow will be protected when the borders of today fail to serve as protection against illegal immigration and cross-border organised crime? Revealing that 80 per cent of all big crime is now conducted on internet and organised crime has now become immune to prosecution, Ricardo Baretzky, president of Cyberpol, Krum Garkov of EU-LISA and Chris Brown of Basis Technology debated how agencies can share information and manage big data without being compromised by cyber policy, law or security issues.

Topical discussions
Borderpol also held many topical discussions, including a discussion on ‘Land Borders: The Challenges and Solutions’. Land borders provide great challenges for border agencies to monitor and protect lengthy borders with limited resources. For extended land borders, this challenge is enhanced, giving greater opportunities to the organised criminal gangs. Borderpol’s Zoltan Szabo addressed the latest challenges facing our agencies and whether it is possible to enhance the protection and management of land borders.

Elsewhere, ‘Maritime, Port and Coastal Border Security’ was explored by Ken Richardson, deputy director general at Borderpol. Coastal border security has become an increasing challenge for coast guards and border agencies, with long sea borders and busy ports proving difficult terrain for surveillance and monitoring. Richardson analysed the latest challenges facing our maritime border agencies and how we can best guard the coast and major ports from international organised criminal activities.

Additionally, Richardson also addressed ‘Speeding Up the Screening Process: Trusted Travelling, Profiling, Programs and Solutions’, which explored the current challenges in the identification and tracking of terrorists and criminals and the solutions for curtailing their movement, whilst trying to promote a smoother and speedier experience for genuine trusted travellers.

Another interesting discussion at this years show was ‘Curtailing the Movement of International Terrorists and Criminals’. Tony Smith, director of International Relations at Borderpol, suggested that spotting a terrorist and stopping them travelling is a challenge. Often the intelligence on such persons is discovered after they have boarded or crossed the border.

The use of intelligence analysis and national security information sharing can greatly assist border agencies upstream intelligence to prepare for such events prior to their movement. Smith asked what are the current challenges in the identification and the tracking of terrorists and criminals and the solutions for curtailing their movement?

The next gathering of border and migration management professionals will take place Athens, Greece on 6-8 December 2016.

Further information: world-borderpol-congress.com

Securing the UK border at a commercial level

CTB — Mon, 17 Aug 2015 14:45:32 +0000

Border Security

With thousands of migrants currently residing in Calais while making attempts to cross the English Channel, the government has begun to reassess its security strategy in order to better police the areas they are responsible for. At the time of writing the number of migrants waiting in the encampments in Calais exceeds 3,000. Every night hundreds of them attempt to breach perimeter security and stowaway in order to gain entry into the United Kingdom. There has been significant loss of life in their fight to get across the border.

A strong strategy should be employed by the border force and contracted security firms in order to combat the influx of migrants trying to cling to heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) and trains, to also prevent human trafficking and other illegal activities that currently threaten the United Kingdom. Currently, the UK border is secured by a variety of security measures taken to address these issues. However, the most difficult areas to police are the busiest.

As Theresa May recently outlined, perimeters to staging areas in ports should be secured with two hardened fence lines to create a sterile catchment zone. All persons found within the catchment area should be treated as suspicious. Advanced access control points should be placed at limited intervals throughout the fence line to allow access to security services.

Before the border
Security does not only start at the border itself, with security services now utilising CCTV systems in around the perimeter of the port at Calais. Although these systems are primarily used to detect direct breaches, this will provide security against potential contraband items being smuggled into the country either for criminal or terrorist reasons. With advances in technology, CCTV can now provide evidence in ultra-HD; ensuring prosecutions can be carried out.

Furthermore, to better secure the sterile area, the deployment of thermal imaging cameras at regular intervals along the fence line would provide a superior system to legacy CCTV to alert security personnel to potential threats. Thermal imaging is also an effective method used to spot intruders in darkness and adverse weather conditions, and can also be used at ports to detect stowaways and other unauthorised personnel. At the Port of Calais, this technology has historically been used to detect people swimming in the water who may be intent on attacking a moored vessel, but it can also be used on land to detect night-time intruders. Detector-activated CCTV can also prove useful in providing 24-hour alerts to site managers responsible for large-scale sites.

Looking in more detail at remotely monitored, detector-activated, CCTV which complies with the revised BS8418 standard, this is finding favour with businesses across the UK wishing to keep a watchful eye on vulnerable properties, out of hours, by linking in CCTV cameras and detectors, strategically positioned on the perimeter, to a privately-run RVRC (Remote Video Response Centre). In this case, should someone attempt to scale a fence, for example, they are liable to be picked up by a detector with images from the associated CCTV camera sent to an operator at the RVRC for review. If required, the operator can even issue a verbal warning through on-site speakers to stop the intruder in their tracks. Experience shows that this is a sufficient deterrent in over 90 per cent of cases. Of course sometimes an audio challenge may not be advisable due to the location of a site; however, in this case, an operator can covertly direct police to the scene to catch the unsuspecting intruder.

When discussing border protection it would greatly benefit the ranking security officer to step back and assess it as being built on three interrelated pillars. A weakness in any one of these pillars will, potentially, bring the others tumbling down. These are, in turn, prevention, preparedness and resilience. The large expanses of unmanned perimeter at ports and airports often pose a major security challenge, and in such cases fence detection systems, UGS (unattended ground sensors), radar or passive infrared detectors (PIRs), etc. are often deployed along such a perimeter, reducing the number of active recording CCTV cameras required to monitor the area.

The Iron Ring Approach
Protecting the UK border is of course no easy task, in light of the geographically extensive nature of it. Given this it is perhaps not surprising that we are seeing a diverse array of ever more sophisticated security techniques being employed in the field. The most visible are physical asset protection measures like perimeter fencing, security checkpoints and lighting.

A so-called ‘onion ring’ approach is often recommended for sensitive areas, which could be implemented in areas near to the Channel Tunnel. This approach involves the most at-risk area being strategically positioned at the core of a layered defence system, whereby several layers of security are used starting from the site’s perimeter all the way back to individual building security or main asset security in order to deter would-be intruders. The outer perimeter layer represents a key starting point in terms of physical protection combined with electronic and/or security patrols. Patrols with dogs can also be used. This approach is commonly deployed on large, sprawling sites with many separate buildings and elements, including ports and airports.

Integrating physical security measures with electronic systems provides an early warning and speedy response to potential breaches, especially for sites that do not have the resources and manpower to ensure that the whole site is being monitored 24 hours a day.

The security industry is working to enhance the performance of technology for screening heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) and for monitoring the safe movement of goods from the beginning to the end of the vehicle’s border crossing. Threat assessment reports should be conducted for all potential penetration points in order to have an overall awareness of where the perimeter around important facilities is weak. Gates should be opened and closed rapidly and under-vehicle scanning can also be conducted as HGVs pass through security checkpoints.

Video Content Analysis
With the increased threat level that terrorism presents to the UK, security is paramount at every border crossing to be secured. Video Content Analysis (VCA), also known as Video Analytics and Smart CCTV, is the technology within video surveillance that analyses and detects temporal and spatial events. This can and should be deployed at ports or other border crossings to recognise repeat offenders and those on ‘wanted lists’.

VCA has many beneficial functions that can help security services to raise an alarm faster and more efficiently. Through the creation of ‘virtual tripwires’, perimeter security can be increased. VCA can be especially effective around the perimeter of an easily breached secure area. Securing a perimeter can be seen as one of the most crucial steps in any security plan; an early detection of a threat at a perimeter means there is more time and space available to formulate the necessary response, potentially preventing an intrusion all together.

Counter Terrorist Activity
With increased alert levels in most of the western world, a robust physical security presence should be deployed in order to reassure the public that all is being done to counter illegal and terrorist activity. The private security officers that have recently been deployed to Calais should never allow themselves to lose focus or relax a vigilant attitude from the task at hand of protecting a nation.

It is not easy to plan security for borders, where open and multifaceted spaces characterise the area in question, but the key is to have in place a number of security measures that can complement each other. Combining CCTV with advanced access control and physical security measures such as fencing, bollards, doors and locks, backed up with security patrols can provide an overall security solution that is effective and intimidating to would-be criminals.

Whether a border crossing to be secured is part of a larger publicly available site such as an airport or port, or whether it concerns the perimeter of these areas, careful planning and consideration is a must to ensure no unauthorised access occurs.

The deployment of advanced security measures should not only be implemented to stop criminals and terrorists, but also for the sake of commercial efficiency. Personal injury claims can have a large detriment to a business or organisation if individuals continue to attempt to gain access by high risk means. Employees, especially HGV drivers in Calais, are also being affected. The stress could impact their work but worse, their health or judgement while they are driving. Increased and advanced security protocols will give peace of mind to the transport industry.

The European security sector recognises the pressing requirement to produce a framework that can help governments and the UK border force, across the continent, to ensure that they have the right measures in place to provide the right level of protection to British citizens.

The British Security Industry Association is the trade association covering all aspects of the professional security industry in the UK. Its members provide over 70 per cent of UK security products and services and adhere to strict quality standards. For more information see www.bsia.co.uk, email info@bsia.co.uk or telephone 0845 389 3889.

Further Information
www.bsia.co.uk

The information game

CTB — Tue, 26 Jul 2011 11:40:00 +0000

Border Security

Is imposing ever more stringent checks on passengers really the way to secure national borders against the threat of terrorism? The EU recently announced plans to capture even more passenger information under the Passenger Name Record Directive. But will this initiative really deliver effective counter intelligence when it is just another stand alone information source? What is the point of collecting vast amounts of information throughout a journey, from departure to destination, if there is no way of reconciling this information in real time?

Secure queues
Over the past decade, air passengers have been subjected to ever more stringent security controls. Limits on liquid, requests to remove shoes and belts, and increasingly personal security questions have extended queues and created a stressful travelling environment. In some countries (particularly the US), fingerprints and retina scanning are now standard procedures; while additional delays are being caused by scanning baggage after arrival as well as prior to departure.

The result is the collection of a huge amount of information at every stage of the journey. Airlines record information that extends from passport details to payment card number, travel companions, seat number, onward flight itinerary, meal request and price of ticket; while hotels routinely request passport and address details from customers.

This information collection is increasingly being shared with the respective governments. Under the Passenger Name Record Directive, EU member states will be expected to gather this information from airlines – a move that builds on the Advanced Passenger Information (API) already demanded by the US Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBP) for travel to a large number of countries, including the Caribbean and others. This information includes, full name, gender, date of birth, nationality, country of residence, travel document type (passport) and travel document number.

But does this current model make our borders any more secure? While, in theory, this information will be made available to those investigating criminals, the information is not being used proactively to identify travellers as they enter the airport. The result is that every passenger is subjected to the same stringent security controls and checks – and delays – irrespective of the risks they pose.

Integrated approach
Gathering passenger data is a positive step for securing our borders and preventing terrorism – notwithstanding privacy and sovereignty concerns. However, the current approaches being adopted globally, including the Passenger Name Record and forthcoming UK e-Borders development, appear fundamentally flawed by the lack of integration with other databases.

In almost all national governments, customs, police, immigration and similar agencies all act autonomously with no automatic sharing of information. Contrast this approach to the continued shift towards information sharing across every other aspect of government – from social services to the justice system. It is possible today in the UK, for example, to renew car tax online with real time checking of a vehicle’s MOT and insurance status.

Of course, tracking passengers’ movements across national borders is essential. But surely instead of relying on disparate sources of stand-alone information it is far better to integrate the sources of related data to provide a complete passenger picture. Critically, these integrated data sources should be used to verify the legitimacy of a journey before departure.

What is the value of collecting limited personal data from travellers’ passports in one place, while address details of where passengers are staying in the destination countries are manually collected on arrival and stored elsewhere? There is minimal correlation and no checking of the veracity or legitimacy of the address. The only value is the chance for security agencies to review this information to track passenger movements after the event. Great for reviewing strategy, but no good for proactive, preventative security.

Instead, passport data and precise destination address details should be gathered before departure, verified through integrated criminal systems and stored in such a fashion that relevant countries can access the data when necessary: one set of highly integrated local databases, accessible to authorised governments and agencies, that track and authenticate in advance cross-border journeys and passengers’ identities.

With such an interrelated process, complete pictures of individuals’ current and previous cross-border movements can be constructed in a timely manner. Without such integration, as is the current case globally, the ability to prevent terrorism is thoroughly undermined.

Better solutions
Continually expanding airport queues may provide a perception of safety and security. But with limited cross-agency and real-time information, current processes are flawed. In reality, today’s tedious security demands are forcing 99.999 per cent of passengers to pay for the problems created by just a handful of individuals.

This approach is damaging the economy. Growing numbers of individuals – both business and leisure passengers – are eschewing airline travel; and not just due to the escalating fuel-related costs. The inquisition, time in queues and luggage limits are making the entire process of airline travel increasingly unappealing, at a time when the industry is already struggling to make a profit.

The vast majority of security experts agree there are better ways of delivering border security. With faster first time checks, border security can identify people in a timely manner. But unless governments can move beyond ever-expanding data collection techniques towards true cooperation and collaboration between all vested parties, passengers will continue to bear the brunt of terrorism fears.

Written by Peter Forrest, managing director, DPM Systems