Counter Terror Business - World

Crisis Comms: Countering the Russian narrative

Michael Lyons — Wed, 02 Mar 2022 16:48:28 +0000

Russia has always had a firm grip on its domestic news agenda and has been adroit at managing its international audiences. President Zelensky, who has provided an astonishing lesson in crisis comms, has called Russia’s actions in Ukraine ‘state terrorism’. He is also one of the reasons why media control appears to be slipping from the Russian bear’s grip.

In the UK broadcasters have a statutory obligation to present the news in a balanced manner. On the Ofcom website the regulator makes it clear that news in whatever form must be ‘reported with due accuracy and presented with due impartiality’. In Russia the opposite view prevails where broadcasters are required by their media watchdog, Roskomnadzor, to toe the government line.

The BBC Monitoring service has been looking at what Russians are watching and the Ukrainian narrative they disclose is the reverse of what we are seeing in the West.

Russia's two most popular television channels, Rossiya 1 and Channel One, are full of anti-Ukrainian news. Their forces, viewers are told, are responsible for war crimes in the Donbas region while Russian soldiers were sent in to ‘demilitarise and denazify Ukraine’. Typically, events in the region are not referred to as a war but rather as a ‘special military operation’.

President Putin recently claimed Ukraine is using women and children as human shields and this was echoed by a correspondent on Rossia 24 who said: ‘They behave like fascists, in the very sense of this word: neo-Nazis put their hardware not just next to residential houses but where children take shelter in basements’. This segment was captioned: ‘Ukrainian fascism’.

Social media news
In Russia, as elsewhere, elderly members of the population tend to get their news from TV whereas younger people rely on social media and online sources. The Russian state is doing its best to control online news and has made moves to restrict Facebook which has been used by activists to counter the state narrative and as a tool to organise protest events.

Former UK deputy prime minister and now Facebook president of global affairs Nick Clegg said: ‘Yesterday, Russian authorities ordered us to stop the independent fact-checking and labelling of content posted on Facebook by four Russian state-owned media organizations. We refused. As a result, they have announced they will restrict the use of our services.’

At the time of writing, Russian officials have just taken the radio station Ekho Moskvy off air and blocked the website belonging to the internet TV channel Dozhd.

The UK government has hit back branding Russian state-controlled international television network RT ‘a tool of Kremlin disinformation.’

Currently if you try to access RT in the UK this is the online message you receive: ‘403 - Forbidden. That’s an error. Client does not have access rights to the content so server is rejecting to give proper response. That is all we know.’

The long table
Sometimes the Russian government doesn’t help itself. Look at the photos of Vladimir Putin sat at one end of a massively long table with his anxious looking generals at the far end. Compare them with the pictures of Ukraine’s president dressed in fatigues photographed with his troops.

Remember at the start of the invasion Russia said President Zelensky had fled the country, making it hugely important for Zelensky to remain visible. We will return to the Ukrainian president shortly. Was it likely that a former comic actor could become a wartime leader? The Kremlin clearly didn’t think so.

Rule number one
Across the pond the US are playing an aggressive and unusual media game. To rebut Russia’s narrative President Biden’s government has released pictures and information that would once have been classified. Think of the pictures of the 40-kilometre convoy of Russian troops bearing down on Kyiv.

Before the invasion was underway and while most people were hoping it would never happen, Biden said all the security information he was seeing pointed inevitably to a Russian invasion. The US government’s intent has been to rob Putin of any element of surprise.

Daniel Fried, former US Ambassador to Poland, told The Hill: "Control of the narrative is important for setting the background against which governments will make decisions. So, high marks to the Biden people, they’re all in. This is crisis mode, all the senior officials are all in on this. I don’t think Putin expected that."

Rule number one when it comes to crisis communications is to fill the information gap. The Russian government understands that, hence their widespread use of misinformation, including doctored pictures to push their narrative of events. But the US have been equally agile by flooding both traditional and new media with information. Not leaving an information vacuum for your opponent to fill has left the Russian’s playing catch-up.

Google reviews
But it’s not all about what governments say and do. Tech savvy young people are all over this. Who would have thought Google reviews and Trip Advisor could have a role to play in the information war? The hacking group Anonymous called on people to leave reviews on Russian restaurant and business sites explaining what is happening in Ukraine.

A suggested restaurant review ran as follows: ‘The food was great! Unfortunately, Putin spoiled our appetites by invading Ukraine. Stand up to your dictator, stop killing innocent people! Your government is lying to you. Get up!’

This has been picked up by many with one advocate warning people not to leave any personal data and tweeting: ‘The point is to push information to the Russian civilian population being lied to by Putin.’

Another post on Twitter reads: ‘Every single restaurant I have clicked on so far had at least one of these reviews. The power of social media.’

Staying with Google, there have been concerns raised that Russian troops are using Google Maps to co-ordinate military activity and to pinpoint their intended targets. A Google spokesperson told BuzzFeed News: ‘Out of an abundance of caution, we are removing user contributions like photos, videos, reviews and business information and all user-submitted places from Google Maps in Ukraine, Russia and Belarus since the invasion began, and are temporarily blocking new edits from being made.’

Social media heroes
As the Ukraine crisis unfolds, social media heroes have emerged in many forms. The brave woman who confronted Russian soldiers saying they should put sunflower seeds in their pockets which would bloom when they died. As the world now knows the sunflower is Ukraine’s national flower which has since become a symbol of the country’s resistance.

Then there were the Ukrainian soldiers defending Snake Island in the Black Sea who were ordered to lay down their weapons by those on board a Russian military vessel. Their response was blunt to say the least: ‘Russian warship, go f*** yourself.’ It was at first understood that all those involved had died but that is now not thought to be the case.

President Zelensky
And finally, we come to President Volodymyr Zelensky, the comedy actor turned war hero. He was well known in his home country for playing a fictional president on television and was the Ukrainian voice of Paddington Bear before becoming the very visible defender of his country. There’s no doubt that his bravery and sense of what it takes to be a wartime leader has surpassed all expectations. He has galvanized public opinion and almost overnight become one of the most recognisable people in the world. This is something the Russian state is struggling to deal with and was certainly not something baked into Russian thinking when planning the invasion.

Ultimately the Russian military might and their willingness to engage in brutal war as seen in Aleppo and Grozny means they could crush Ukraine, but right now the war of words is slipping from their hands. It’s often said truth is the first casualty of war. President Zelensky is helping make sure that’s not the case where his country is concerned.

Written by Jim Preen. Jim is a freelance crisis management and communication consultant. He designs and delivers crisis simulation exercises, writes crisis communication plans and presents crisis management webinars. In another life he was a journalist working at ABC News (US) where he covered stories including the Gulf War, the Bosnian conflict, and the Concorde crash. He won two Emmys for his work.

Contact: jim@jimpreen.co.uk

Hong Kong and China: A perspective

Michael Lyons — Mon, 14 Sep 2020 09:10:36 +0000

World

Amy Pope explains the cyber security, geopolitical, and global business impact of UK opposition to China’s moves in Hong Kong, and what companies can do about it

The recent national security law imposed by China on Hong Kong has fuelled the ongoing concerns around human rights abuses within the region, as well as raising serious concerns around data privacy, business continuity, and autonomy across the global community.

Indeed, following promises of amnesty for Hongkongers fleeing the conflict by the British Government, China warned the UK would ‘bear all consequences’ should it grant residency to those seeking to escape Hong Kong.

The backlash from the conflict is far-reaching, with tensions spilling over into the business world, as the security law continues to put pressure on Hong Kong-based organisations to publicly back the law’s sanctions.

The security law’s impact on business
From a national security point of view and from a business security perspective, the law should give businesses and governments some serious pause. It cements concerns that China has little intent in respecting traditional expectations around the safeguarding of information or protecting of intellectual property.

That’s not to say that every single Chinese business is on a one-stop mission to sweep up all information from their users and put them in a compromised position. Chinese businesses represent a significant lynchpin upon which much of the world’s economy is growing.

The real issue is the point at which the Chinese Government decides to interject and demand or appropriate user information without meaningful fear of repercussion. It is increasingly apparent that Chinese businesses have very little leverage to push back on these demands.

It is for this reason that so much conjecture exists around Chinese-owned brands like TikTok and Huawei. The polemic isn’t centered on the services these brands offer, or even necessarily their corporate governance. The fear arises from the Chinese Government possessing the ability to use them as a conduit for accessing information that would, ordinarily, be secure and private.

Underpinning this concern is the broad arrest authority under the new law with little regard for due process, as well as provisions allowing suspects to be sent to the Chinese mainland for trial. The vague wording of the law raises serious concerns about its potential impact on the business world, leaving little recourse to individuals caught in its crosshairs.

Time to take a stance: How should businesses safeguard?
For businesses operating in Hong Kong, an immediate first step is to cordon off their Hong Kong branch and establish some blue water between their Hong Kong based businesses and their global houses. Businesses must assure their clients, investors, and governments that their affiliation with Hong Kong based entities does not fundamentally compromise their users’ data or other sensitive information. Some businesses are taking a step further and relocating their employees to nearby countries outside of Chinese jurisdiction.

More fundamentally, businesses must weigh the short-term monetary ramifications of maintaining their business in Hong Kong with the long-term impacts of a policy that allows the government to put a heavy hand on business practices. The issues will not go away. It is more likely that the ability to conduct business in a country that lacks transparency, due process of law, and sufficient respect for privacy and safeguarding of intellectual property will become untenable. While businesses will be reluctant to get involved in Chinese politics, it is nonetheless important to communicate that these privacy and security risks can negatively impact foreign investment and investor confidence.

For businesses outside Hong Kong and China, the most pressing concern is the Chinese Government – or affiliated state actors – backdooring access into their infrastructure – a threat made more real in the face of the British government’s response to Huawei, the Hong Kong protests, and Covid.

In my experience in both government and the private sector, Chinese state affiliated actors may sit inside an organisation’s server, undetected, scraping information without opposition.

Businesses need to be alive to the fact that they are likely targets, especially if they operate within a sector that represents particular interest to the Chinese Government, such as travel or banking.

Increased collaboration between the public and private sector
Aside from the obvious basics (regular cyber health hygiene checks, employee training on phishing attacks, routine software updates), one of the strongest defence mechanisms against cyber attacks is improving the connectivity between the private and public sector.

I was working on the National Security Council at the White House at the time of the Sony Pictures hack of 2014. That breach (which was not attributed to a Chinese state affiliate) yielded 100 terabytes of sensitive data as well as proved reputationally damaging to the company, forcing us to reconsider and improve information sharing between the private sector and US Federal Government entities. Ultimately, as a result of that and other hacks, we wrote new policies on how the US Government should work with the private sector to proactively share information about cyber targets. We recognised that the only way to counter the threat was to do so hand-in-hand with the private sector.

The United States has certainly not mastered the art of information sharing, but unfortunately, there are precious few examples of governments finding ways to proactively share this information with the private sector targets of the attacks. For countries – and businesses -- to have the best chance of fending off such attacks, there must be much better flow of information between the two entities. It’s mutually beneficial -- the government learns about the most common intrusions targeting the private sector, and businesses are privy to vital information about the tactics and methods being used within their industry.

This approach means fundamentally changing the ‘name, shame, and blame’ culture that’s rampant in the business world when it comes to cyberattacks. In the UK, the ICO plays an incredibly important role in ensuring businesses are taking seriously their responsibility to protect data. If a breach occurs, the ICO can come down hard, with serious fines and business-crippling consequences.

Absolutely, there must be consequences – especially if a company has failed to take basic cyber security precautions. But the government should not shift the responsibility entirely onto the shoulders of business – especially when these attacks are instigated by sophisticated foreign state actors. Instead, we must encourage higher levels of collaboration between the regulators, the private sector, and government bodies.

By joining forces, rather than resorting to harsh punitive measures, we can learn from each other and prevent similar breaches from taking place in the future. That’s the balance that needs to be struck.

About the author
Formerly US deputy homeland security advisor to the president of the United States, Amy Pope has managed a range of high-profile, diverse challenges at the highest levels of US government from countering violent extremism to promoting refugee resettlement to leading its comprehensive effort to combat Zika, Ebola, and other public health threats.

As a partner at Schillings, she now advises corporate and individual clients on responding to and mitigating crisis. Prior to joining the White House, Amy worked in several positions at the US Department of Justice and served as counsel in the US Senate.

Tackling extremism in the Middle East and Africa

Michael Lyons — Wed, 29 Apr 2020 16:34:36 +0000

World

Although there are many different types of extremism, for the past two decades, Islamic extremism has dominated headlines around the world.

Of the 10 countries worst affected by extremism in 2018, only two (India and the Philippines) were outside of the Middle East and Africa. The remaining eight — the Democratic Republic of Congo, Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Syria, Nigeria, Iraq and Afghanistan — have all suffered significantly at the hands of Islamic radicalism.

But why are these regions so badly affected?

The blame game
People often attribute the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 as the catalyst for extremist insurgence across the Middle East. Indeed, many would agree the Islamic State emerged out of Al Qaeda in Iraq as a response to the invasion. However, the groundwork for ISIS was arguably laid long before US troops occupied Iraq.

Much of the conflicts still visible across the Middle East and northern Africa can also be traced back to the Arab Spring in 2011 — a loosely related group of protests throughout the region.

Although the protests culminated in positive regime changes in countries like Tunisia, not all of the movements could be deemed successful.

In some cases, these protests morphed into full-scale civil wars. For many countries enveloped by the revolts of the Arab Spring — such as Libya, Syria and Yemen — the period since has been beset by increased oppression and instability, which are both key hallmarks of extremism.

The root causes of extremism
Conflict (in various forms) remains the primary driver of radicalisation and extremism around the world. In Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, extremist groups have flourished during the civil wars there. This trend has also spread across most of North Africa, including in Libya.

Both these regions contain all of the conditions conducive to extremism. Firstly, many of these countries are polarised along sectarian lines, which have been intensified by civil war. The more polarised a society, the more likely you are to find individuals willing to fight and die for a cause. These extreme ideologies give rebel groups a recruitment advantage.

Most countries in the Middle East and Africa also have a history of repressive governments and dishonest leaders. If the population is distrustful of its government, this creates an opening for rebel organisations to use extreme ideology to reassure people they will remain honest once in power.

When you have multiple rebel factions competing with each other for support, groups will also use extreme ideologies to set themselves apart from rivals and motivate potential recruits. The civil wars in Syria, Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq have all contributed to the emergence of a significant number of rival factions across the Middle East and Africa.

Preventing extremism
The most dangerous extremist groups tend to be relatively young. The likes of ISIS and Boko Haram didn’t even exist a decade ago. Now, they are major global terrorist organisations.

So, how do we prevent extremism from spreading? First, it is vital to make the distinction between ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’. All types of terrorism are inherently extremism; not all extremism is terrorism.

Extremism tends to refer to both violent and non-violent forms of political expression, whereas terrorism is predominantly violent. While the concepts have much in common, they require two different approaches. Terrorism needs a short-term and hard security-driven strategy. Violent extremism needs a more long-term and soft security-driven approach.

To prevent extremism, the root causes of conflict in the region also need to be addressed. Going forward, rebuilding trust between the population, governments and security services will be critical if marginalised people are to reject the extreme ideologies of radical groups.

This article was written by Frank Baldwin, CEO of 2X Systems.

East Africa: knowing the risks and opportunities

CTB — Tue, 02 Jun 2015 14:39:55 +0000

World

The development of 3D seismic exploration capability combined with ever advancing engineering technology brings gas finds and oil prospects in the East Africa footprint of Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique, in excess of those found in Qatar.

Key players from the world’s energy sector are positioning to assist respective nations to realise, refine and market their natural resource, bringing global experience gained from the challenging technical and physical environments of the North Sea, Brazil and Kazakhstan, where such challenges have proven to be fertile learning platforms for the engineering community.

Potential Risks
Africa is a large, diverse and formidable continent consisting of 54 countries. The region is often considered volatile due to a range of factors including tribal, political, health, geographic, migration and environmental. Discoveries of mineral wealth – oil, diamonds and water – have been sighted burdens rather than assets, are often identified as the root cause of historical conflicts.

There are many risks to operational security. Recent events in Africa highlight loss of life and hostility by ongoing Boko Harem activity in Nigeria, the In Amenas terrorist attack in Algeria (2013) by Al Qaeda (AQ) linked terrorists and the Westgate attack in Kenya (2013) by Al Shabaab. 2015 has seen further Al Shabaab atrocities, one killing over 140 students in Kenya. Stability and security across Africa is often presented as unsafe or as a reason which prohibits international operations. But to put this in context, the UK has had its fair share of terrorism since the late 1960s – the Lockerbie bombing in 1988 killed 259 and the London bombings in 2005 killed 56.

Regional dynamics in Africa are fluid and have changed significantly over the past decade. More recently in the North, the Arab Spring had a dramatic impact which toppled governments. The previous safe regions of the 1990s of Libya, Egypt and Tunisia are, in the eyes of many insurance companies, no-go areas today. The Central African Republic (CAR) is yet another hostile zone, as is Syria.

Noting such events, one can begin to realise the challenges faced within the continent where porous borders, inconsistent police or military forces and poor communications add further challenges for governments who may lack transparency or legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.

Terror incidents
The In Amenas and Westgate incidents highlighted inadequate government responses to terror attacks, which arguably caused greater damage and loss of life than they saved. Responses seemed ill conceived, ill prepared and ill advised. Military gunships were used to attack the Algerian base, with media footage showing uncoordinated firing at seemingly any person that moved.

In Kenya, media showed soldiers cowering outside the shopping centre, latterly there was footage of government forces carrying bags of looted goods and stepping over dead civilian bodies inside the shopping centre. Libya, Tunisia and Nigeria government forces have also responded poorly to hostile events in respective countries. The common thread forms that Forces being poorly trained, equipped and paid are unlikely to provide appropriate emergency response.

A 2015 snapshot finds evidence that Al Shabaab are actively recruiting in Kenya. In Libya, the militia numbers continue to grow as the country grows deeper and deeper in to lawlessness, with AQ or Islamic State (IS) affiliated groups now deeply rooted in the North East. South West Libya is believed to be active training grounds for collaborating banditry, including Hamas, IS and AQ as the military tourism model previously witnessed across Afghanistan, Chechnya and the Balkans reappears.

Planning & Prevention
This is the context from which operational planning begins. With the appropriate risk scoping and planning, Africa operations can not only be a viable business option, but brings the added bonus of assisting developing nations. Training opportunities, supporting international partners and developing local skills through determined, committed and courageous learning programmes, provide learning and engagement forums for all stakeholders to grow and benefit. Morally, Africa offers wonderful opportunities where all stakeholders can win.

Planning for operations in such environments can be challenging and a common oversight within the energy sector is the oft-seen defaulting to Health and Safety (H&S) leaders to scope and manage in hostile environments. The flaw in this model is that H&S models may only scope risks within the parameter of any given site on a compliance basis, meaning the likes of Westgate, In Amanas or the Arab Spring would be unlikely to be considered in any risk scoping exercise.

There are other incidences where I have witnessed engineering project managers leading the preparation for an Africa operation, with absolutely no regional insight or input other than technical engineering knowledge. The consequences of such oversight can be fatal. I would recommend employing the services of an experienced Africa hand for the scoping of any operation, as well as an academically qualified individual who considers action to be taken if the worst possible ‘what if’ should ever occur.

Risk scoping may include bordering regions where, due to porous and unpoliced borders, local conflicts can quickly escalate to be international. Examples of cross border incursions include recent Somali attacks in Kenya. Poorly paid government forces are unlikely to risk their lives in the face of armed conflict.

Companies should avoid overloading H&S professionals who may be unfamiliar or unsighted with African cultures and trends and instead utilise experienced risk and security professionals who have operational experience in Africa.

An excellent example of contingency planning in action was Tullow’s ability to extract trapped employees and their family from within the Westgate shopping centre as the terror siege was ongoing. Private security teams (ex UK military) extracted employees and other shoppers quietly and efficiently days before government forces entered the building.

Police incidents of expat harassment on fabricated charges can bring significant financial reward to corrupt officers. Yet, if one pays, it endorses a successful business model for the culprit. I encountered this in many countries and, in Angola, started recording all such incidents and providing monthly reports to the British Ambassador who in turn passed to the Angolan government with the message that such harassment was preventing the international community from helping Angola. After a few months, the incidences decreased.

Physical threat scoping should consider the ease of access to weaponry in Africa and the unpredictability factor where, 9 times out of 10, a road or junction may be safe, yet on the 10th visit an aggrieved local (or police) with an AK47 may be attracted to your shiny expat 4x4 vehicle.

How does one handle the situation? A swift move for the handbrake or to remove seatbelt may be perceived as reaching for a weapon.

Nervousness may stall the vehicle, giving the perception of attempted escape. Such scenarios should be considered and drivers trained accordingly including with anti-hijack and first aid skills.

One should be prepared for the significant cultural differences between working in the West and working in Africa. Locally, the day may start when the sun rises and ends when it sets. Additionally, priorities may differ and tribal hierarchies are incredibly significant.

Hotels and support services also differ in quality and ability and a number of questions need to be considered, such as Does your travel company check on food hygiene practices? Are fire exits padlocked closed for security, or is there a clear route for escape? How capable is the local fire service, can their hose or ladder reach above the 3rd floor?

Moving Forward
The points I have detailed above are not show-stoppers, far from it, they are platforms from which contingency and operational plans can evolve. We now have a baseline to develop corporate and training plans which can grow and engage within local communities. Consider within plans that, unlike the West, it is not viable to rely upon local national government forces for support, therefore organisations must develop individual robust and workable plans.

Where new-build complexes are being developed, safe rooms, fire-fighting and escapes along with practical security and protection methods should be considered and information relating to building infrastructure should be protected; both In Amenas and Westgate attacks benefited from insider knowledge. Engage local communities with security, fire-fighting and medical training and extend corporate facilities to support the community should a local emergency arise. Local engagement is key to success.

Having worked across perhaps a quarter of Africa on and off for roughly 15 years, I encourage organisations to overcome their fears and seek to develop business opportunities. Companies that scope well and understand the challenges will undoubtedly reap business reward. Bringing organisations to Africa can lead to growth, developments and benefits at all levels from community to government.

The new world disorder

CTB — Thu, 09 Apr 2015 09:44:19 +0000

World

The most significant trends in global risk and security are revealed in the annual RiskMap from consultancy firm Control Risks. It provides a detailed view from the markets that will matter most in 2015, and forecasts the major challenges and opportunities of doing
business in the world’s most complex environments this year.

CEO Richard Fenning said: “The coming year will see the news dominated by turmoil, from Iraq to Ukraine to the South China Sea and beyond. RiskMap 2015 explores many of these issues, looking past the immediate political theatre to examine the forces that are reshaping international relations and the global economy.”

Key trends
The report highlights a number of key risk trends for 2015. It describes how transnational terrorism continues to be a threat, spurred on by competition for leadership of the global jihadist movement between al‑Qaida and Islamic State (IS).

Maritime piracy remains a threat, but onshore threats of crime, corruption, labour unrest and conflict are more risky to shipping companies. Piracy in East Africa will continue to decline but West Africa will become a piracy hotspot.

The RiskMap report also highlights how technology is changing the face of kidnapping and extortion, through ‘virtual kidnapping’, social media reconnaissance and cyber extortion, and how cyber threats will continue to grow.

Global terrorism outlook
Competition for leadership of the global jihadist movement will drive further fragmentation and reward high‑profile attacks, Jonathan Wood explains in this section of the report: ‘On the strength of its military exploits and effective propaganda, IS in 2014 emerged as the first credible challenger to al-Qaida for leadership of the global jihadist movement. Its declaration of a caliphate and demands of allegiance directly peeled some groups away from al-Qaida. Others, including key al-Qaida franchises, were convinced to at least hedge their bets by making statements supportive of IS’s project. Even if al-Qaida and IS reach some kind of tactical armistice in Syria, they are likely to remain global strategic competitors. In the year ahead, this competition is likely to fragment the global jihadist movement and increase the likelihood of high-profile attacks.’

The report gives two reasons for this. Firstly is the likelihood for IS to use its influence abroad, stating that if it can consolidate territorial control in Iraq and Syria, it may seek to expand by funding and training foreign militant groups. Alternatively, local and international military pressure in the Middle East might force IS to diversify and pursue asymmetric retaliation abroad. ‘Either way, expansion would aggravate the schisms within the jihadist movement over leadership and legitimacy,’ the report states.

The second reason given is the fact that IS has damaged al-Qaida’s credibility and legitimacy: ‘Some jihadist groups and sympathisers still respect al-Qaida’s theological credentials and historic pedigree, but many prefer IS’s tangible accomplishments and want to replicate its successes. The jihadist movement has always been a fluid constellation of local groups; inspired by IS, more of these might strike out on their own as independents.’

Both of these factors could increase the threat of high-profile attacks, the report says, with local commanders and al-Qaida franchises possibly wanting to announce and assert themselves with demonstrative violence.

�鶹��grown attacks
The report explains how increased incitement of homegrown attacks is likely in response to expanded global counter-terrorism efforts and jihadist propaganda.

Returning foreign fighters are a concern, the report says, and equally, counter-terrorism activities in Iraq and Syria could
provoke attempts at retaliation in Western countries.

The report says the rise of IS may result in more ‘lone wolf’ style attacks. It states: ‘IS has crafted its image around intimate, explicit videos of attacks distributed by social media. Sophisticated production and searing imagery send a message that – for maximum impact – the style of an attack is as important, if not more important, than its scale. IS has learned from groups such as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and appeals specifically to Western sympathisers using targeted media outlets.’

Government Intervention
Government intervention will be an important driver of the terrorism threat in 2015, the report says. Airstrikes and other military operations in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Somalia and elsewhere will increase the intent of jihadists – not just – IS to target Western and allied interests.

Sponsorship of foreign militant groups is also likely to become a bigger concern in 2015. This is partly because powerful militias will remain the most influential political and security players in fragile states from Libya to Afghanistan. The report states: ‘In several contexts, mainly in the Middle East and South Asia, they are already the shock troops of national and sectarian competition. As the global power vacuum continues to expand geopolitical space to play, more states will seek to strengthen ties with – and pursue strategic objectives through – non-state armed groups.

State sponsorship – funding, training, supply, strategic guidance – will increase the capabilities of some groups to conduct attacks. Otherwise, the main terrorism trends affect intent, implying that in 2015 ambitions will continue to exceed capability, particularly in Western countries.’

Maritime Risk Outlook
Piracy is likely to remain the primary security concern for the maritime industry in 2015, though the outlook differs for two of the world’s hotspots – East and West Africa.

Tom Patterson, who authored this section of the report, explains how levels of pirate activity are likely to remain low off East Africa over the next year, reflecting a decline in hijacking-for-ransom by Somali pirate groups since mid-2011. The report explains: ‘The reduction in successful attacks – no large merchant vessel has been hijacked since May 2012 – can be attributed to three external factors that are by now well-known: a better educated maritime industry, a more robust naval strategy and a better protected merchant fleet.’

But despite this success, piracy in East Africa could re-emerge because Somalia’s pirate networks remain largely intact. What’s more, the security measures that have proven so effective in combating piracy are already showing signs of being dismantled: ‘Understandably, cost-squeezed operators are seeking to dispense with expensive guards, hardening measures and re-routing. Meanwhile, politicians ponder redeploying naval assets elsewhere,’ the report says. So could 2015 see the risk-reward ratio swing back in the favour of Somali pirate groups?

West Africa
The report says that Nigeria is likely to remain the global hotspot for piracy in the year ahead, stating that the February 2015 general elections may influence longer-term trends. The report says: ‘The fate of the government amnesty programme for Niger delta militants after the polls will be perhaps more important to determining the trajectory of Nigerian piracy. The continuity of stipend payments to rank-and-file
members – and of business opportunities for influential former militant leaders – will be key.’

The report goes on to predict that ‘The absolute number of incidents registered off Nigeria will rise marginally in 2015, following a relative decline in 2014, with periodic small peaks in attacks largely driven by the activities of certain key pirate groups. Kidnapping is likely to remain concentrated off the southern Niger delta. However, as recent trends have shown, the increasing range of such groups threatens personnel operating across a wider area encompassing the waters off Cameroon, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea.’

The report also pinpoints South-East Asia as an are of concern for piracy, as the region continues to register high levels of activity. But in most cases the severity of incidents is low, as it will opportunistic theft in nature.

Cyber Threats
Another security issue identified by the report is the growing risk of cyber attack, claiming that it will continue to evolve rapidly in 2015.

John Nugent, senior analyst for cyber security, explains that the cyber threat can be broken down into three principal categories: cyber espionage, cybercrime and cyber activism (or ‘hacktivism’) – with each meaning different threats to business.

The report says that despite the contrasting goals of the attackers, one of this year’s main threats will be the continued spread of capability among different types of assailants. It states: ‘What happens, for example, if cyber jihadist factions start to use the relatively advanced hacking capabilities of cybercriminals? The technology is available for purchase online in criminal forums on the dark web (a subsection of the unindexed areas of the internet collectively known as the deep web). These outlets provide particularly fertile ground for the development and distribution of increasingly advanced malicious software (malware) and may also have facilitated the repurposing for criminal use of malware used initially in state‑sponsored espionage campaigns.’

The increasingly routine recruitment of skilled elements from cyber activist communities and ‘hackers-for-hire’ offering espionage as a service is a trend that will continue.

The role of geopolitics in shaping the cyber threat environment will be another core trend to monitor in the year ahead, the report reveals. During 2014, cyber espionage, cyber activist and seemingly cybercriminal campaigns were initiated in response to developments in Ukraine, Hong Kong, Israel and the Palestinian Territories, Iraq and Syria, and the South China Sea. In 2015, sustained geopolitical tension is expected to spur on further targeting of the industrial control systems at the heart of critical national infrastructure.

What’s more, the report predicts the emergence of new, seemingly independent, cyber activist groups created by nation states to further their foreign policy objectives.

This section of the report concludes with two final developments to watch out for: ‘First is the increased focus of attacks on multinational companies’ supply chains.

As companies’ security becomes more robust, complex supply chains can be a point of vulnerability, allowing attackers to ultimately seize data belonging to the company. Second is the creation of malware able to operate across a range of operating systems, taking advantage of consumers’ reliance on an expanding array of different devices.’

Kidnapping and extortion
Technology is changing the face of kidnapping and extortion, the report reveals. In this section, analyst Tom Newell explains how criminals are extorting ransoms from families without even kidnapping a victim. ‘A fast‑growing extortion technique known as ‘virtual kidnapping’ is one of the clearest examples of how the communications revolution has fostered innovation in criminal activity. Virtual kidnaps – most common in Latin America – typically involve criminals contacting a family by phone and claiming to have abducted a loved one. The criminals often purport to be members of an organised crime group, and threaten to harm or kill the victim if a ransom is not immediately paid by wire transfer. In reality, no abduction has occurred, and the ‘victim’ is usually going about their business safely in another location, temporarily out of reach in a place such as a cinema, airplane or hotel. Virtual ‘kidnappers’ are simple extortionists, hoping that the person on the other end of the line will fall for the scam without verifying that a kidnap has actually taken place.’

The report goes on to explain how kidnappers and extortionists have benefited from social networking websites, using them as a way of obtaining personal information that can be leveraged for financial gain.

But kidnappers can use social media for more than just research. They can also exploit it to make demands, intimidate families of their victims or propagate their ideology. For example, prominent Islamist militant groups in Africa and the Middle East have tweeted details of attacks in real time and uploaded footage of foreign victims on YouTube. These online media strategies have enabled militants to put pressure on foreign governments and attract new supporters on a global scale.

What’s more, according to the report, the ‘borderless’ nature of the internet gives criminals a vast amount of opportunities to extort individuals and businesses remotely. The report explains: ‘A burgeoning form of cyber extortion uses ransomware, a type of malware that blocks access to an infected computer system and demands a ransom for the restriction to be lifted. CryptoLocker was among the best known and most lucrative ransomware applications, generating millions of dollars in illicit funds before it was taken offline in June 2014. Expect newer versions to emerge in 2015 as increased competition between developers results in the production of new forms of malware that are harder to detect and disrupt.’

Political Violence
Changes in how groups involved in political violence operate and raise funds are complicating the risks for business, the report says. This section of the report, by Zachary Rothstein, explains that: ‘Over the last decade, the international clampdown on terrorist financing, coupled with a decrease in state sponsorship and private financing, has taught political violence groups an important lesson: crime pays. More and more, criminal activity has become the primary means of funding political violence.’

And the trend is sharply gaining momentum, even in areas where criminal financing of political violence is well established. The report explains: ‘For the Afghan Taliban, which arguably would not exist in its current form without the cash from its smuggling and drug trafficking networks, organised criminal activity has become even more widespread. Other organisations have gone the route of Somalia-based extremist group al-Shabab, which has consciously abandoned its ideological opposition to crime and instead embraced it as a practical means of solving its financial difficulties.’

The report goes on to say that the process also works in reverse, where criminal groups use terrorist‑style tactics. ‘Criminal groups in northern Kenya use grenade attacks on food storage facilities to deter humanitarian aid,’ says the report. ‘Bacrim (paramilitary successor) groups in Colombia deploy small explosive devices in retaliation for unanswered extortion demands. For businesses in regions marked by this brand of conflict, the overlap between political violence and organised crime means that examining tactics alone won’t help identify who is behind an individual attack.’

Changing motives
The RiskMap report suggests that the growing links between political violence and organised crime have altered the motives of terrorist organisations. Sometimes, crime and ideology fuse. ‘In Somalia, for example, warlords seeking economic and political power temporarily align themselves with terrorist groups when it is in their interest to do so.

Prolonged blending of ideology and crime, though, tends to transform the identity of a group and dilute its political motives. Myanmar’s United Wa State Army opposes central rule, but only because that stance protects its (legal and illegal) business interests, rather than because it genuinely believes in local government,’ the report states.

The risk to business
Introducing RiskMap 2015, Richard Fenning, ceo of Control Risks, commented: “2015 will be a difficult year for business as the lines between what have always been considered ‘safe’ and ‘risky’ opportunities blur. Opportunities will continue to abound for ambitious international companies. But uncertain economics and volatile politics will make 2015 more than usually challenging.”

“The US and Europe will exercise waning international influence and leaders will continue to focus on national issues and politics. Business culture and practices of multinational companies will meet resistance from the emerging powers and their powerful supply chains. National governments will find it more difficult to protect their companies from this.

“Increasing technological sophistication and weak state power will combine to render the threat from cyber-attack, kidnap and terrorism more severe. How one deals with the inevitable attack, as opposed to how one stops it, will become the key question.

“Global governance’s failure to deal with the above issues will continue in 2015, leaving business to navigate these pitfalls against a backdrop of continuing conflict and fragmentation of global political consensus.”

RiskMap’s assessment of political and security risk encompasses the potential negative impact on business operations through political instability and intervention; the influence of societal and structural factors; as well as actions that harm the financial, physical and human assets of a company.

Further information
Download the report at www.controlrisks.com

Safety in the waters around West Africa

CTB — Wed, 02 Apr 2014 13:20:26 +0000

World

Since 2008, there has been a wide range of international efforts to counter piracy within the Indian Ocean, particularly around the Horn of Africa, Somalia and Gulf of Aden. There is now a shift in attention to insecurity in the waters around West Africa, in particular, the Gulf of Guinea. The annual Human Cost of Maritime Piracy reported in 2013 that more seafarers were attacked in the waters around West Africa than those of Somalia in 2012.

Maritime organisations, such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) have been monitoring the situation in West Africa for years, but it was the United Nations (UN) Security Council adoption of Resolution 2039, in 2012, which emphasised the importance for states to combat piracy at national and regional levels. In response to the UN Security Council, institutions including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) have held joint discussions regarding the construction of a regional strategy, documents of which were endorsed at a summit meeting of heads of state and government in June 2013.

Despite calling on regional commitment to addressing maritime security, Resolution 2039 also recommends regional support through international partnerships and bilateral agreements, already signed by countries such as the United States (US), Britain, France and Spain. The European Union is also due to publish its own strategy. International attention on West Africa, as with the problem of piracy around the Horn of Africa, demonstrates acknowledgement that maritime security threats have damaging impacts beyond the immediate affected region. With Nigeria and Angola amongst the top ten exporters of crude oil in the world, ensuring the security of the Gulf of Guinea’s waters is of regional and international interest in terms of trade and flow of revenue.

Preventative measures
Several factors have contributed to the decline of piracy in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden including naval patrols, best management practices and private armed security personnel aboard commercial shipping. The Gulf of Guinea has seen maritime insecurity manifest in activities other than piracy. These include trafficking of counterfeit items, people, narcotics and weapons, allowed to occur by the lack of adequate regulation and corruption. Criminal activity also occurs more frequently in territorial waters and in ports along the coastline. This is a significant difference to Somali piracy, which predominantly occurred on the high seas, beyond any state’s boundaries.

The disruption and deterrence to piracy in the waters of East Africa has been effective because of several methods including naval patrols, presence of armed private security personnel aboard commercial shipping and the following of best management practice (BMP) guidelines by operators to optimise levels of self protection.

So how effective would these measures be in the waters around West Africa? It is clear that the principles of such measures are relevant in responding to West African maritime insecurities, but it is how these are applied that will determine the level of success that is achieved.

Cooperation between regions
The predominance of piracy in international waters and the political situation in Somalia allowed a large degree of flexibility for conducting operations, by international navies, to disrupt and deter piracy in the Indian Ocean.

In comparison, many West African states have established naval infrastructure that can already contain maritime threats.

Furthermore, because much of the illegal activity occurs in territorial waters, confronting this will be the responsibility of national resources and law enforcement such as the police or coastguard. This does not eliminate the need for state cooperation and resource sharing due to the trans‑border nature of maritime crime and we have already seen evidence of this. Benin’s and Nigeria’s navies launched Operation Prosperity, a joint naval patrol in 2011, which was successful in reducing the number of pirate attacks along the coasts of both countries. However, the number of attacks increased in the less well patrolled waters of neighbouring Togo, emphasising the importance of extensive regional interaction between states if there is to be an effective solution to the problem.

International support, recommended by Resolution 2039, is also evident. The US Naval Forces Africa conducted an exercise in 2012, named Obangame Express, which was designed to enhance cooperation amongst naval training from Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe and Spain. In March, Ghana’s Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral GW Biekro, is convening a conference of senior international admirals, including those from the EU and naval experts to derive solutions that will further enhance security in the Gulf of Guinea. The Ghanaian Navy is also establishing specialised units, funded and trained by foreign partners, to confront security challenges and to protect off-shore oil and gas resources. Thus, we can see that unlike in the Indian Ocean, it is the long term aim of West African states to lead the security operations.

More regional consensus is needed on establishing a system to process suspected criminals. A current lack of this has resulted in few convictions.

In similarity to East Africa, agreements need to be established on which states accept suspects and are supported to ensure that there is an adequate legal and justice sector.

Enhancing regional consensus will contribute to optimising other security initiatives.

Guidelines
Security measures on a regional and national basis are important in supporting protective measures for shipping operators.

For example, BMP guidelines to protect against Somali piracy relied significantly on the collection and sharing of information between all interested stakeholders.

In the Gulf of Guinea, interim guidelines based on BMP have been published by a consortium of shipping operators and naval forces, supported by the NATO Shipping Centre.

These also emphasise the importance of information distribution, which are also dependent on regional and national capabilities.

Security lapses
The nature of commercial shipping in this region limits the effectiveness of self‑protection measures. In the Indian Ocean, the majority of shipping was transiting en route to the Middle East and Asia. In comparison, shipping in the Gulf of Guinea, makes regular calls into ports along the coastline. As a result, there is a greater need for port infrastructure security, which can be undermined if such operations are not ensured by the responsible state or authority. Recent reports indicate that there are a range of port security oversights in West Africa.

US authorities have already issued a warning that shipping conducting business with the US could be banned from Nigerian ports after it was observed that the IMO’s International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) code was not being properly adhered to. Corruption is also a significant obstacle in security efforts. For example, in 2013, Nigeria’s Chief of Naval Staff blamed the continuing problem of attacks on ships in Nigerian waters on insiders. He reported that investigations into previous incidents revealed that individuals working for shipping companies were providing pirates with information regarding the location of vessels and cargo.

Tackling corruption
Corruption undermines confidence in established systems and procedures to combat maritime crime and leads to reluctance to report incidents. Currently, maritime crime in West Africa is widely unreported to authorities. Problems like corruption indicate that states need to address differences and problems at national level as part of the process of developing and introducing security measures and relates to the issue of establishing a more uniform approach. This can be seen as an added obstacle in that it complicates matters further. Conversely, tackling of social problems enhances confidence between stakeholders, facilitating greater consensus and uniform focus on security strategies. In relation to this, there is no dedicated centre for collecting and sharing information in the Gulf of Guinea. Plans to establish an information sharing centre in Ghana have also been delayed. Despite gaining support regionally, and from the IMO, it had not been recognised as a national priority, thus reiterating how differences at national level need to be addressed in parallel to regional strategies.

The lessons that have been learnt in responding to maritime security threats in the Indian Ocean are extremely relevant in containing similar threats in the Gulf of Guinea.

However, threats in the Gulf of Guinea are diverse, compared to those in East Africa. These threats and the implementation of measures to contain consist of interrelating factors which need to be addressed in order to guarantee the long term success of maritime security. Whilst extremely relevant, the lessons from the Indian Ocean cannot be implemented in an identical fashion in West Africa.

The nature and location of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea means that West African states will require close collaboration in sharing resources and implementing the necessary strategies to combat threats. However, differences at national level in prioritising issues of maritime insecurity have proved detrimental to regional efforts.

It is critical therefore, to provide closer integration between regional and national agendas, when championing security strategies to ensure a more effective system. This includes addressing social factors such as corruption.

As with Somali piracy, regional and international policy makers need to devise strategies that disrupt and deter maritime threats, but importantly address the underlying root causes of these activities. This will be in the form of capacity building and ensuring the necessary international support is available to states which require this.

Long-term goals
If these lessons are applied effectively, then West African security initiatives could have a significant impact. The activities of ECOWAS and ECCAS is indicative of the strong intergovernment support within the region and more importantly, there is a long-term objective for regional security resources to lead the security operations.

Coordination with international bodies will also serve to benefit stakeholders beyond West Africa and with the importance that the Gulf of Guinea has regionally and internationally, greater security here will enhance economic and social factors considerably.

Further information
www.ecowas.int

Piracy: more than a maritime problem

CTB — Fri, 18 Nov 2011 11:38:15 +0000

World

The first quarter of 2011 was the worst on record with 77 attacks and hijackings having taken place. This is happening even with the presence of a multi-national task force patrolling the world’s maritime hot-spots. The areas where the greatest numbers of pirate attacks are occurring are the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. When combined, this covers such a large area it is proving impossible to police all of it effectively.

This is putting more of the responsibility on the shipping companies to provide their own protection. By the time an alarm has been raised by a ship’s captain that a pirate attack is imminent, there is every possibility that the pirates will have boarded the ship before the task force arrives at their location.

Normally the pirates have a window of between 15-20 minutes to board the ship after the alarm has been raised and before the arrival of the task force. If the pirates are on board the ship, there can be no engagement by the military, in case any of the crew are injured or killed during any armed exchange that takes place between the task force and the pirates. At this point the situation becomes the sole responsibility of the countries flagship and government.

Pirate incidents
Somali pirates currently hold about 30 vessels and over 700 hostages. The following are examples of incidents reported in one week in April 2011:

On 1 April on the Gulf of Aden, a chemical tanker was attacked after a skiff was launched from a suspicious fishing vessel. The pirates fired RPG and guns towards the tanker but aborted the attack after a security team returned fire.

Again on 1 April, off Somalia, a bulk carrier was attacked and boarded by armed pirates. The crew took shelter in citadel. Waiting for more information.

On 2 April in Yemen a skiff with three pirates came alongside a bulk carrier but moved away when a security team fired warning shots.

On 3 April in Tanzania two skiffs armed with RPG and guns attacked a bulk carrier, but aborted after the captain raised the alarm and increased speed. Also on 3 April, in Indonesia, robbers boarded a general cargo ship and stole the ship’s store while at anchor.

On 5 April in Indonesia five robbers came alongside and tried to board a chemical tanker, but aborted the attempt after crew members gathered on deck.

On 5 April on Socotra Island two skiffs attacked a tanker, the security team fired rocket flares but the skiffs kept approaching. Only when warning shots are fired did they finally move away.

Alternative security
The use of private security companies on board ships could now be an alternative that shipping companies find themselves resorting to. This presents its own problems as an armed response to the pirates by the security company on board could easily escalate the seriousness of the situation. This could result in a fire fight causing unacceptable injuries and fatalities to both the crew and members of the security team on board the ship.

Another direction being taken by ships’ owners is the investment in security equipment for use by the ships’ crews to protect themselves and the ship against attack. Long range hailing deterrents and on-board water cannons have been used in the past with some success. A more recent addition to equipment available for use by either the ships’ crews or a private security company is the shoulder-mounted laser defence dazzler (SMU100), built by Photonic Security Systems (PSS) which is capable of taking effect at 500 metres which is outside the 250-350 metres range of an AK47 or RPG, allowing effective protection in a non-lethal manner.

Photonic’s managing director Paul Kerr said: “PSS recognised a gap in BMP3/BMP4. It was our aim to build an effective non-lethal defence system that was capable of neutralising a threat at a safe distance. The SMU100 was designed for use by security teams on board. At 500 meters it paints its target with a wide scanning laser making the ship too uncomfortable to look at.

“We believe properly equipped and trained security personnel are the keys to safe passage as they allow the crew to go about their normal duties, leaving the security of the ship to the specialists.”

A growing problem
The problem of piracy is growing on a day-by-day basis. It is no longer limited to the Somali and Nigerian coastal waters. Attacks are now happening on a more regular basis in the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. A worrying factor is the increase in the use of intimidation and unnecessary violence by the pirates against ships’ crews. There is also a noticeable increase in the amount of ransom being demanded by the hijackers. A recent ransom of US $9.5m was paid for the Samho Dream and US$2.5m for the release of a Syrian owned and Togo-flagged ship hijacked earlier this year.

There are also reports that the Somali government recently seized two aircraft with over US $3million dollars on board, believed to be a ransom payment intended for the pirates who were holding the Chinese owned cargo ship Yuan Xiang, which was seized last November along with 29 of its crew members.

The rewards for the Somali pirates are now reaching tens of millions of dollars through seizing tankers, dry bulk carriers and general cargo ships in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden, even with the presence of foreign navies patrolling these high risk areas. These areas patrolled by the task force are now being expanded to include locations where attacks are becoming more frequent.

Following an agreement by the International Bargaining Forum (IBF), made up of the ITF and Joint Negotiating Group (JNG) it was decided that as from 1 April 2011 an extended zone of risk has been added to the designated high risk area in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. The IBF agreed vessels transiting the zone should adopt increased security measures which should include appropriate personnel or systems to reduce vulnerability.

Expensive business
The cost of piracy to shipping is now estimated globally to be between US$7b and US$12b per year to the industry. There is also now a difficulty of finding crews that are willing to transit the high risk areas, a problem that will have to be addressed by the shipping companies perhaps by paying a larger bonus to crews who are willing to transit high risk areas. Together, these complications could, along with the continuing increase in the number of pirate attacks, create a situation where a blockade of the danger zone could be inevitable, creating a no-go area in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean for shipping.

If this happened, it would mean all of the ships that normally use these routes would have to transit around the Horn of Africa. This additional distance would add extra days on to their voyages and greatly increase all of their transport costs, raising the cost of fuel for the ships to a much higher level than it is at present, the consequences of this would have a knock on effect on the world’s delicate economies, as the world’s trades and industries would pass the extra expenses charged by the operators on to the consumer.

Approximately 7.5 per cent of world trade uses the Suez Canal. It would also have a direct effect on 40 per cent of the world’s seaborne oil shipments which equates to 20 per cent of the world’s entire oil shipments. Geographically, the Straits of Hormuz lead to the Arabian Sea, through which an average of 17 million barrels is transported every day. Any disruption to this vital supply to the world’s trade could have a disastrous effect on the global economy.

A lucrative business
Evidence is now showing that Somali pirates are now better trained and more organised than they have been in the past. This could be an indication that terrorist organisations have probably infiltrated into what has become a very lucrative business. Meaning that the pirates/terrorists are not only looking for the rewards of piracy to satisfy their own needs but are now helping to finance their related terrorist organisations, creating a much greater and better coordinated problem for the authorities to deal with.

It is thought that Al-Qaeda may be training these gangs of pirates in camps in secluded areas of Sudan and Somalia into a militia, increasing the Al-Qaeda presence in the area by using converted young members of the local population to greatly boost their numbers. Now that the gap between terrorism and piracy is narrowing, plus a growing availability of terrorists with local knowledge, it is becoming more obvious that the international community will have to provide both Sudan and Somalia with the same level of assistance that is given to other vulnerable countries in their war against terrorism.

In order to achieve this, the level of support to these nations would have to be more than just a military presence. Education, basic humanitarian needs, hospitals are all as important if not more so than a military solution. Without these countries having properly elected and nationally trusted governments, any help will be shortlived, meaning any solution will be a long way off allowing terrorism to get an even stronger foothold in the African continent.