Counter Terror Business - Protecting Public Spaces

Life after Martyn’s Law

Polly Jones — Thu, 02 Oct 2025 15:46:29 +0000

Nick Aldworth explains what he is doing since Martyn's Law received Royal Assent.

Although there is still work to do in holding the �鶹�� Office to account for the delivery of Martyn’s Law, it no longer consumes my life in the way that it once did. It will always be the one professional thing of which I’m most proud, but it’s time to move on.
Martyn’s Law left a huge hole in my life, and a lot of my purpose disappeared after Royal Assent. That is until my boss, Paul Evans, said ‘why don’t you build me a consultancy inside Carlisle Support Services?’
Never one to pass on a challenge, I got to work and today I’m delighted to tell the world that we are ready to go.

Unlocking potential
We’ve built a specialist team composed of a select group of subject matter experts. This approach marks a strategic evolution in Carlisle’s commitment to delivering bespoke, high-impact security services across a range of sectors.
This team of seasoned professionals has a collective expertise spanning law enforcement, counter-terrorism, risk management, and corporate security. Their deep knowledge and hands-on experience empower Carlisle to expand its current service lines, with strategic insight and tailored solutions that address complex security challenges.

Strategic intelligence meets operational excellence
One of the most significant benefits of this new consultancy is its ability to bridge the gap between strategic planning and operational execution. Clients often face evolving threats – from cyber vulnerabilities to physical breaches – that require, agile and experienced thinking. Carlisle’s experts provide comprehensive risk assessments, threat modelling, and mitigation strategies that are both proactive and pragmatic. This ensures that security measures are not only robust but also aligned with the client’s business objectives and regulatory requirements. Aligned to credible and experienced systems’ providers, as well as our own experience in delivering human security solutions, we are able to provide operational outcomes alongside strategic recommendations.

Meet The Team
I wanted to work with the best people I could find and didn’t have to look much further than a list of people I’d met in the past. Alongside me, our key contributors are:
Steve Grainger – Events specialist, and former head of security at Wimbledon. Steve brings insight into what makes a safe and secure event.
Sarah Dever – An experienced and versatile counter-terrorism security advisor with significant experience in making the built environment secure from a range of threats.
Russ Phillips – Probably the most experienced and widely respected expert in hostile vehicle mitigation strategies and tactics. Russ’s extensive experience in this field keeps hundreds of thousands of people safe in the UK, every year.
Michael White – With decades of risk and contract assurance, Mike supports customers in ensuring they get value for money out of their security contracts.
Allan Gregory – A former Assistant Chief Constable in British Transport Police, Allan supports our rail customers by ensuring they have the best strategic security advice we are able to provide.
Ilker Dervish – Formerly the chair of the national CCTV User Group, Ilker’s lifetime of experience in the field of CCTV operations and governance, means that our clients can build security surveillance capabilities in the knowledge that they are effective and legally compliant.
Lewis Loveless – Lewis brings a critical eye to security systems and processes through penetration testing, exercising, and policy and procedure reviews. His unique ‘live-feed’ testing model can be integrated into critical incident simulations.

There is so much more to do and so much to build for the future. Watch this space for what comes next.

Enhancing Public Safety: Navigating Zone-Ex in Light of Martyn's Law

Meghan Shaw — Tue, 07 Jan 2025 16:34:42 +0000

Protecting Public Spaces

As event venues adapt to evolving security needs, Martyn's Law presents an important opportunity for safeguarding public spaces. As venue owners and event organisers strive to prepare for these new measures, many are seeking further clairty on their specific responsibilies within the complex Zone-Ex area, says the Perimeter Security Suppliers Association.

A recent LinkedIn Poll that we conducted asked the question: “When putting on a public event, who should be responsible for assessing the risk of a terrorist attack and implementing security measures?”

Option A: The Venue/Landowner?

Option B: The Event Owner/Organiser?

The results came back with 73 per cent of respondents saying the responsibility should be with the Event Owner/Organiser, and 27 per cent saying the Venue/Landowner, this poll has clearly divided opinion – and exposed a disturbing lack of clarity about where the responsibilities for ‘Zone-Ex’ lay.

Zone-Ex and its considerations

The concept of Zone-Ex, or the ‘grey space’, surrounding an event venue has increasingly become an important focus in discussions of public safety and counter-terrorism. This extended area, often reaching beyond the venue’s perimeter into nearby streets, car parks, and public spaces, presents a security challenge that, while difficult to manage, is essential for ensuring the safety of attendees.

The introduction of Martyn’s Law, also known as the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill, will provide an opportunity to enhance security measures in these areas. As owners and operators consider new guidelines, there is a need for further clarity on how to best secure this complex space and who is responsible for comprehensive and effective mitigation strategies.

Zone-Ex: a complex and overlooked risk

Zone-Ex is, by its very nature, a transitional space. Whether outside a football stadium, concert hall, or major public event, it is the area where people congregate, queue, and move between public transport or car parks and the event itself. Unlike the highly regulated and secure environments inside the venue, this ‘grey space’ often falls outside the jurisdiction of the venue owner, creating a patchwork of security responsibilities.

For terrorists, this area presents a soft target. It is often less monitored, with fewer visible security measures than within the venue, and offers a high concentration of people. In recent years, high-profile terrorist attacks, both at home and abroad, such as the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing – where the terrorist had easy access to the public foyer of the arena – and the Berlin Breitscheidplatz Christmas market attack in December 2016, where a stolen HGV was driven into unprotected shoppers and market stalls in a Publicly Accessible Location.

As Martyn’s Law moves through Parliament, the government will need to address the gap in responsibility and ensure that venues and public authorities can work in unison to secure these vulnerable spaces.

Martyn’s Law, named in memory of Martyn Hett, a victim of the Manchester Arena attack, seeks to address this by imposing a legal duty on venue operators to mitigate the risk of terrorism. While the legislation will be a much-needed step forward in enhancing security, it still leaves significant gaps regarding how the grey space is to be managed, especially when it comes to shared or public areas outside the direct control of venue operators. Clarifying responsibilities in these zones will be essential to fully realising the protective potential of Martyns’s Law.

For example, Section 5, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) draft Bill states that:

(1) For the purposes of this Act— (a) the person responsible for qualifying public premises is the person who has control of the premises in connection with their relevant Schedule 1 use; (b) the person responsible for a qualifying public event is the person who has control of the premises at which the event is to be held in connection with their use for the event.

(2) If more than one person is responsible for qualifying public premises or a qualifying public event — (a) references in this Act to the person responsible for the premises or the event (as the case may be) are to each such person, and (b) two or more such persons may act jointly in pursuance of a requirement imposed on them by or under this Act.

This gives no direct instruction, or allocation of responsibility, to the space between the premises – Zone-Ex/Grey Space – or the Publicly Accessible Locations (PALs) en route to the venue, such as public footpaths, or areas where event-goers would be queuing, or milling around.

In 2022 (before the latest version of the draft Bill was published), the National Police Chief’s Council (NPCC) published a document entitled ‘Events National Guidance 2022’, authored by DAC Laurence Taylor, NPCC Events Lead, which further muddies the waters by stating: “Legal opinion suggests that the responsibility for public safety rests with the organisers of an event, the owners of the land on which it takes place and the local authority if the event takes place on a road. However, other persons or agencies who undertake actions regarding other peron or agencies who undertake actions regarding public safety at an event may assume a duty of care and, therefore, also become responsible."

Martyn’s Law and its reach: who is responsible for Zone-Ex?

The central tenet of Martyn’s Law is to mandate that venues have a strategy in place to assess and manage the risk of a terrorist attack. This includes training staff, conducting risk assessments, and ensuring effective communication during emergencies. However, what is less clear is the extent to which this duty extends beyond the immediate surrounding area of the venue.

For instance, a football stadium may have security protocols in place for entry gates and the stands, but who is responsible for ensuring the safety of fans milling about in the streets outside? In this liminal space between public and private ownership, security responsibility often becomes fragmented. Local authorities, private contractors, and the venue itself may all have a role to play, yet the lines of accountability are blurred.

The Sports Ground Safety Authority (SGSA), in its article of June 2024 ‘Mitigation of threats during ingress and egress’ , deferred to the NPSA document ‘Mitigation of Terrorist Threats at Venues During Ingress and Egress Guidance document’ by stating: “In the case of both ingress and egress from a venue, the problem centres around the congregation of people who are vulnerable to attack in areas where there are limited safety and security measures in place.

“This is particularly relevant in areas that may be outside the direct control of the venue. Keeping people safe during the ingress and egress phase of a venue’s operation is a security challenge. Add to that the complications of long queues, checking tickets, bag searches, etc, and the need to identify the vulnerabilities and control or manage the risks becomes clear. Being prepared is key to combating any threat. Hostile actors may identify the entry and exit points at a venue as ‘soft targets’ if security is poorly developed.”

In fact, the NPSA refers event organisers to several sources, without issuing definitive guidance on Zone-Ex/Grey Space: “This issue is not covered in this guidance, but further information can be found on the ProtectUK website and within the Sports Ground Safety Authority (SGSA) Green Guide and Supplementary Guidance ‘Event Safety Management’. Also, the Purple Guide is a comprehensive document outlining safe standards for the running of outdoor events. Lastly, for small to medium size venues, there is a good practice guide called ‘Safer Crowds Safer Venues’ that focuses on crowd management in UK performance and licences spaces.”

This lack of clarity is particularly problematic for venue owners and event organisers, who will be legally required to consider terrorism risks but may not have the authority or resources to secure adjacent public areas. The grey space thus remains a significant blind spot, one that terrorists could continue to exploit unless a more coordinated and clearly defined approach to security is adapted.

The challenge of coordinating security efforts

One of the key challenges that will be posed by Martyn’s Law (as the draft bill currently stands) is how to coordinate security measures across multiple stakeholders in Zone-Ex. In many cases, this area involves a mix of private property, public streets, and transport hubs, all of which fall under different jurisdictions. While venue owners will be expected to have comprehensive anti-terrorism plans, they cannot unilaterally control these areas without the cooperation of local authorities, transport operators, and law enforcement agencies.

For example, securing the perimeter of a stadium involves not only monitoring entry points but also managing the flow of people through surrounding public spaces. In practical terms, this could involve a range of measures from increasing the presence of security personnel and CCTV surveillance to deploying Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) barriers that prevent vehicle-borne attacks. However, implementing such measures often requires the approval and coordination of multiple agencies, each with their own priorities and constraints.

Without clear guidance on how to manage this process, venue operators may face challenges in meeting their legal obligations to mitigate risks, while lacking full control over external spaces. Addressing this disconnect between responsibility and authority will be key to ensuring Martyn's Law achieves its full potential in enhancing public safety.

The financial and logistical considerations for event organisers

One important consideration for smaller event organisers is the potential financial and logistical impact of implementing Martyn’s Law. Upgrading security infrastructure, training staff, and conducting regular risk assessments may present challenges, for smaller venues or one-off events. However, it is crucial that the measures for these venues remain proportionate to their size and risk level. By seeking the right advice, smaller venues can better understand their vulnerabilities and implement appropriate training and mitigation strategies that are not cost-prohibitive. While larger stadiums and arenas may have the resources to invest in robust security systems, ensuring that smaller venues can access support and guidance will help them comply with Martyn’s Law in a way that balances security with practicality, without imposing excessive financial burdens.

Moreover, the grey space around venues often requires additional measures, such as hiring more security personnel to patrol adjacent streets, installing additional CCTV, or even installing permanent or temporary HVM barriers. These costs, coupled with the logistical complexity of managing public spaces, highlight the need for a balanced approach that ensures all venues, regardless of size can effectively comply with Martyn’s Law, without facing disproportionate challenges.

A path forward: clarifying the law and strengthening partnerships

For Martyn’s Law to be truly effective, a clearer framework is needed to address the security challenges posed by the grey space around event venues. One potential solution lies in fostering stronger partnerships, and lines of communication between venue operators, local authorities, and law enforcement. By creating a more integrated approach to security, stakeholders can ensure that Zone-Ex is properly monitored and protected, reducing the likelihood of terrorist attacks in these vulnerable areas.

Furthermore, the government must provide more detailed guidance on how Martyn’s Law will apply to areas outside the immediate control of venue operators. This could involve extending the legislation to cover public spaces around venues or creating incentives for local authorities to invest in additional security measures. By clearly delineating responsibilities and providing the necessary resources, the law can help ensure that all parties are equipped to address the risks posed by the grey space.

In addition, there is a need for greater public awareness about the role that Zone-Ex plays in event security. Just as venue operators are now required to take steps to protect against terrorism, the public must also be educated about the risks and how to respond in an emergency. This could include more visible security measures, such as public information campaigns or increased police presence in high-risk areas (such as used for Project Servator exercises), to reassure event-goers and deter potential attackers.

The ongoing challenges of Zone-Ex security

Martyn’s Law will represent a significant step forward in the fight against terrorism, and it also presents an opportunity to enhance security in the grey space surrounding venues. While the current ambiguity regarding Zone-Ex poses challenges for event organisers and venue owners, it also opens the door for collaboration among stakeholders. By working together to establish clearer guidelines, we can implement effective security measures that protect public spaces.

As the threat of terrorism continues to evolve, so too must our approach to securing the spaces where people gather. Zone-Ex, though often overlooked, is a critical component of comprehensive security strategies. By addressing its unique challenges with proactive policies and strengthened partnerships, we can enhance public safety and create safer environments for all attendees.

Effective command and control

Robyn Quick — Mon, 19 Aug 2024 11:42:49 +0000

Protecting Public Spaces

The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) explains how control room operators can best prepare for a terrorist attack.

Imagine a situation where you work in a security control room in a venue that has large volume of crowds entering and exiting at certain times and a terrorist incident occurs. Is your control room ready to deal with this effectively? Are you prepared? Do the team know their roles and responsibilities?

In the event of a terrorist attack or a serious incident, effective command and control is critical to mitigating the impact of such an attack. In many cases, the security control room is key, and the ability to communicate effectively and to co-ordinate an effective response to an incident is essential.

For control rooms to effectively manage an incident, operators require a range of skills to be able to assess the rapidly evolving situation, make quick, but important decisions to protect crowds and members of staff from the threat, and to manage a coordinated response.

Research by the National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) has shown that security control room operators are often unclear on what time-critical tasks need to be completed and whose responsibility each task is, resulting in duplicated effort at a crucial moment. NPSA’s SCR Operators course has therefore been designed to focus on the roles and responsibilities of operators working within a security control room to increase their readiness to deal with incidents.

This five-day course, created using specialist modelling software, incorporates several immersive exercises. The newest of these exercises is set within a stadium environment. It allows operators to practise responding to a realistic stadium attack situation where the operators’ responses affect the outcome of the incident. This helps enhance the operator’s understanding of the impact of any decisions and actions taken and prepares them for potentially the worst situation they might face in a control room.

As one participant commented: “There are control room courses out there, but they don’t go into all of the areas needed for staff to be able to get the knowledge of what goes on in an operational incident and enable them to deal with it swiftly and effectively.”

A separate one-day course for managers or individuals with overall responsibility for security control rooms and incident management is also available.

To save lives, minimise harm, and lessen the overall consequences of a terrorist attack on or in the near vicinity of a premises, it is vital to be prepared. NPSA’s 'Responding to Terrorist Incidents – Developing Effective Command and Control' guidance provides a wealth of information on the planning and preparation that security control room staff should undertake in advance of an attack.

NPSA have also produced a suite of further guidance documents, focusing on building relationships with internal staff, internal departments and neighbours, so that key elements are in place as soon as an incident occurs. Working with neighbours and staff alike, organisations can ensure that plans for responding to incidents is tested to make sure they work, including plans for building evacuation procedures during a terrorist incident.

Protecting people

One piece of guidance highlights the main security concerns around the entry (ingress)

and exit (egress) points at venues and events. The entry and exit points are particularly vulnerable because the start and finish times of events are usually predictable. Crowds can become targets of terrorist attacks, especially during events at popular venues where there will be increased crowds due to people entering and leaving. This can apply to any venue where crowds are likely to form during ingress and egress, including stadiums, concert venues, exhibition centres, theatres, nightclubs, shopping malls, theme parks and temporary festivals.

Keeping people safe during the ingress and egress phase of a venue’s operation is a key security challenge and being prepared is vital to combating any threat. Hostile actors could identify the ingress and egress points at a venue as ‘soft targets’ if security is poorly developed.

This guidance can work in conjunction with the See, Check and Notify (SCaN) guidance, which aims to help businesses and organisations maximise safety and security using their existing resources.

SCaN training empowers staff to correctly identify suspicious activity and know what to do when they encounter it. It helps ensure that individuals or groups seeking to cause an organisation harm are unable to get the information they need to plan their actions.

A range of security measures are key to mitigating the impact of a terrorist attack or major incident. NPSA has guidance available to help small business, large organisations, popular events and venues protect their staff and customers.

About NPSA

NPSA is part of MI5 and is the National Technical Authority for physical and personnel protective security. By making the UK more resilient to national security threats, we help to keep the country safe. NPSA helps organisations understand the range of threats they and the UK face, for example from terrorism, espionage, and state actors.

Based on our world-leading research and development programme and the latest intelligence, we provide guidance, training and tools to enable organisations to minimise their risk through how they operate day to day. NPSA works to keep citizens safe, protect the economy and the UK’s scientific and technological advantage, as well as the infrastructure.

In March 2023, NPSA absorbed the responsibilities of the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), but with a broader remit, reflecting the fact that the threats the UK faces today extend far beyond critical national infrastructure.

Strengthening security standards

Robyn Quick — Fri, 03 May 2024 11:53:25 +0000

Protecting Public Spaces

Founded in 2009 on the directive of the UK Government, the Perimeter Security Suppliers Association (PSSA) initially aimed to consolidate UK-based Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) manufacturers.

Our mission was to enhance communication and strengthen connections with government bodies, ensuring a coordinated approach to national security threats. Over the years, our focus has broadened significantly in terms of geographical reach and market scope. Today, PSSA is a pivotal global entity encompassing all aspects of high-security perimeter solutions, from hostile vehicle mitigation and advanced fencing solutions to Perimeter Intrusion Detection Systems (PIDS) and beyond.

As a not-for-profit organisation, PSSA is dedicated to elevating industry standards and safeguarding ethical practices within the sector. Our members, who are rigorously vetted, adhere to a strict code of conduct that mandates quality, transparency, honesty, and integrity in all business dealings. This commitment is not just about maintaining reputation; it’s about assuring consultants, contractors, and end-users that PSSA members are reliable, their products are high quality, and their business practices are sound.

Hostile vehicle mitigation installers scheme

One of the critical initiatives reinforcing our commitment to best practices is the Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Installers Scheme (HVMIS). Introduced as a recent code of conduct, HVMIS sets stringent standards for training, installation processes, and overall professionalism in deploying critical security assets. This scheme, auditable and free for members, also opens its doors to non-members, extending our reach and impact in ensuring industry-wide best practices.

The PSSA takes accountability seriously. Complaints against members are extremely rare, but when they occur, they are investigated thoroughly, with outcomes reported and necessary actions taken. This rigorous approach has been instrumental in promoting a culture of excellence and trust, which is why PSSA membership has increasingly become a pre-requisite in numerous tender specifications globally.

The value of PSSA membership extends beyond compliance and ethical business conduct. We have instituted a comprehensive and ongoing vetting process for new applicants, which includes evaluating financial stability, quality control systems, website transparency, as well as quality and health and safety policies.

This thorough review ensures that only the most credible businesses join our ranks, enhancing the overall quality of offerings available in the market. Our not-for-profit status allows us to focus solely on elevating industry standards rather than expanding membership numbers indiscriminately. Communication and continuous learning form the backbone of our association.

Through initiatives like the Interact Day seminars, regular newsletters, active participation in exhibitions, and robust social media engagement, we facilitate ongoing dialogue among manufacturers, installers, government agencies, academia, and end-users. These platforms encourage collaboration and innovation and enable our members to showcase their achievements and innovations to over 10,000 followers worldwide.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The PSSA also values and promotes international cooperation by welcoming security associations from around the globe as reciprocal members. This inclusivity is crucial as it enhances global security networks and supports the development of our regional chapter structure, making the PSSA a central figure in the ever-changing security landscape. Members of the PSSA take great pride in their affiliation, recognising the association as a representation of quality and excellence in the high-security perimeter market.

Our collective efforts raise the bar for security products and services and contribute significantly to the safety and security of societies worldwide. As we look to the future, the PSSA remains committed to leading from the front, ensuring that our members and their offerings meet the highest security and reliability standards. By adhering to our principles and continuously evolving to meet the challenges of a dynamic global environment, we are setting the standard for security and integrity in the high-security perimeter market.

PSSA

If you are interested in the future of global security standards – the PSSA is a hub for professionals in the industry, whether you’re a manufacturer, installer, consultant, or a company in need of high-security perimeter solutions.

The PSSA is dedicated to promoting excellence and integrity within the industry, and you can get involved by applying for membership, attending our Interact Day seminars (next day is 12th June 24), or following us on LinkedIn. Your participation can help elevate safety and effectiveness standards worldwide.

To learn more about our community and how you can contribute, please visit our website pssasecurity.org or contact paul.jeffrey@pssasecurity.org

Enhancing urban safety - integrating HVM strategies in retail environments from supermarkets to department stores

Polly Jones — Fri, 23 Feb 2024 11:23:00 +0000

Protecting Public Spaces

In the UK, the safety of our shopfronts and public spaces, particularly in heavily populated pedestrian areas, is becoming an increasingly pressing concern. Following on from the Perimeter Security Suppliers Association's (PSSA) recent interesting article on ‘designing out crime,’ it is clear that Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) is a crucial step in safeguarding our streets and shopfronts. HVM strategies aim to prevent or minimise the damage caused by vehicles crashing into shop fronts, whether these incidents are accidental or deliberate acts of aggression. The role of PSSA members in this endeavour is both vital and multifaceted, offering expertise and innovative solutions to businesses looking to protect their premises.

Physical barriers such as bollards, planters, and reinforced street furniture play a key role in HVM by stopping or slowing down vehicles before they can cause harm. These measures, when thoughtfully implemented, do not detract from the aesthetic of our urban landscapes but rather can enhance them. They are the first line of defence in creating safer spaces for both shoppers and shop owners alike. Also, the design of our urban environments can contribute to safety, with planning and architecture that guide vehicles away from vulnerable areas, subtly integrating security into everyday life.

Traffic calming measures further ensure that vehicles move at speeds that allow for greater control and reaction time, significantly reducing the likelihood of accidental crashes. Access control systems, both electronic and manual, restrict vehicle access to high-risk areas, allowing only authorised vehicles at specific times. These measures, comprehensive in their approach, not only protect individuals but also the structural integrity of our shop fronts.

PSSA members are at the forefront of implementing these HVM strategies. Their expertise is not just in identifying potential threats and vulnerabilities but also in providing innovative solutions tailored to specific locales and needs. From consultation and planning to the installation and maintenance of HVM products, these members ensure that safety measures are not just implemented but are also effective and maintained over time. They also play a crucial role in educating businesses and local authorities on the importance of HVM and the best practices for maintaining and operating these security measures.

The need for such measures has been highlighted by various incidents across the UK and globally, where vehicles have been used as weapons in attacks or have crashed into public spaces due to loss of control. Notable examples include the 2017 London Bridge attack, where a van was deliberately driven into pedestrians, and the 2014 Glasgow bin lorry crash, which tragically illustrated the catastrophic potential of vehicles losing control in crowded areas. These incidents, among others, highlight the critical need for effective HVM measures to protect our public spaces and the people who use them.

Whether it is a bustling supermarket, a small-scale corner shop, or a sprawling department store, Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) plays a crucial role in safeguarding shopfronts and everyone inside. By integrating HVM strategies, businesses of all sizes can protect their premises from the potential threat of vehicles being used as weapons or accidental crashes. This not only ensures the structural integrity of the building but also makes a safer environment for customers and staff alike. The versatility of HVM solutions means they can be tailored to fit the specific needs and layouts of different retail spaces, ensuring that safety measures enhance, rather than detract from, the shopping experience.

Paul Jeffrey, Chairman of the PSSA, stresses the need for forward-thinking actions: "As the threats to our public spaces and shop fronts change, we must keep ahead with creative and cohesive security measures. Our members are not just creating but also putting into place HVM solutions that fit right into our cities and towns, making sure safety does not take away from how our streets look and feel.

The PSSA is an international organisation and has chapters around the world, showing our dedication to working together across the globe. This international network lets us exchange ideas, advice, and new approaches, making sure we are all ready to face any new challenges. Working together across countries, we aim to make a real impact, uniting to ensure our public spaces and commercial areas are safe."

As we continue to strive for safer urban environments, the collaboration between businesses and PSSA members is essential. By working together, we can implement effective HVM strategies that not only protect our shop fronts but also preserve the bustling, vibrant character of our streets. This partnership is not just about security; it is about creating spaces where commerce can thrive and where the public can feel safe and welcome. For those interested in protecting their premises, talking to a PSSA member is the first step towards a safer future for all.

Designing out crime: building safer communities through collaboration in crime prevention and counter-terrorism strategies

Polly Jones — Fri, 02 Feb 2024 11:45:49 +0000

Protecting Public Spaces

Integrating safety and crime prevention into large-scale project planning is essential, particularly when considering the infrastructure's long-term security and resilience. A practical approach involves local authorities working closely with the police, specifically Designing Out Crime Officers (DOCOs), who play a pivotal role in advising on how to design environments that deter crime and terrorism. These officers, alongside Counter Terrorism Security Coordinators (CTSECOs), bring valuable insights into the planning process, not as a legal requirement but as a highly beneficial practice for creating safer public spaces.

The emphasis on consulting with the Perimeter Security Suppliers Association (PSSA) members cannot be overstated. Their involvement would be a key factor in bolstering the effectiveness of safety measures in urban development projects. The PSSA member companies can provide expert guidance and support in crime prevention and counter-terrorism strategies, making it a sensible step for local authorities to engage with both the police and PSSA members from the outset. This collaboration ensures that projects are not only aesthetically pleasing but also secure, addressing potential threats before they arise.

Paul Jeffrey, PSSA Chairman said “Incorporating insights from the PSSA should be considered a crucial step in urban planning. While engagement with PSSA members is progressing, embedding it more systematically into planning strategies could significantly enhance the development of safer urban spaces.

Collaborating closely with Designing Out Crime Officers (DOCOs), Counter Terrorism Security Coordinators (CTSECOs), and PSSA experts from the outset, I feel is essential for creating urban areas that are not only functional but also resilient against crime and terrorism.”

Paul added, “This engagement suggests a move towards a nuanced crime prevention strategy that surpasses traditional security measures. By involving PSSA members, DOCOs, architects, and local authorities early in the planning process, a holistic safety strategy is developed. This strategy goes beyond the basics of lighting and secure public spaces, incorporating architectural designs that deter criminal activity and demonstrating a sophisticated approach to police involvement in safety and design processes. Such collaboration ensures that urban infrastructure is not only visually appealing but inherently secure.”

The increasing involvement of the police force, demonstrated by the specialised training received by DOCOs and CTSECOs on UK terror threats, signifies a move towards more proactive engagement in planning and safety discussions. This approach goes beyond the simple installation of lighting and physical barriers, embracing a comprehensive understanding of security that weaves crime prevention into the essence of urban design. By doing so, local authorities can ensure that every element of the urban landscape contributes to creating spaces that are secure, welcoming, and resilient against crime and terrorism threats. This sophisticated strategy not only enhances physical security measures but also promotes a sense of safety and community well-being.

This pragmatic and forward-thinking strategy highlights the importance of collaboration between local authorities, the police, and security experts. It demonstrates a commitment to not only developing infrastructure that meets today's needs but also anticipating and mitigating potential future threats. By prioritising safety and crime prevention from the beginning, these partnerships pave the way for creating urban environments that are secure, welcoming, and resilient.

Protecting the Berlin Christmas market attack site

Polly Jones — Wed, 07 Sep 2022 14:23:56 +0000

Protecting Public Spaces

Christian Schneider, Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Advisor gives a brief introduction and summary of the HVM measures applied in Berlin following HVM attacks in 2016 and 2022. Barely five years after the despicable attack on the Berlin Christmas market in 2016, another rampage occurred in June 2022, only a few metres away from the first attack site. This makes the German capital Berlin, after London, the second Western city to have suffered two vehicle ram attacks at almost the same location. This article is intended to give a brief summary of the two incidents and to show what measures have been taken in the meantime to protect the public there from further attacks. A golden zigzag line made of brass is embedded in the pavement of the busy Breitscheidplatz. This line was created as a memorial in remembrance of the terrorist Vehicle as Weapon (VAW) attack that took place here on 19 December 2016, killing 13 people and seriously injuring another 67. At the time, an Islamist rammed a stolen 40-tonne articulated lorry into the packed Christmas market. The gold-coloured monument that is now embedded in the ground of Breitscheidplatz not only commemorates the victims of the attack, but also stands for the mental rift that has been running through German society since the attack. It symbolises a turning point in the threat of terrorism in Germany. Unlike in the UK, the US and France, a terrorist attack on soft targets carried out by a heavy lorry had not been seen in Germany until December 2016. It was only afterwards, however, that attacks using this modus operandi began to accumulate on a significant scale. The latest Vehicle Ram attack took place on 8 June 2022, in the immediate vicinity of the symbolic Breitscheidplatz. Here, the perpetrator drove his car onto the pavement of the neighbouring Tauentzien Street in order to deliberately drive into the pupils of a school class and then ran over passers-by. In doing so, the perpetrator even manoeuvred in reverse gear in order to hit even more people. At the end of his drive, he tried to run over tourists sitting in a street café and finally drove into a perfumery, where his vehicle then got stuck. The perpetrator killed a teacher and injured 32 other people. However, the second crime scene was not yet part of the Breitscheidplatz Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) Scheme, which is why the protective measures set up at Breitscheidplatz could not have any effect here. Both attacks have in common that they killed and injured unprotected pedestrians in Publicly Accessible Locations (PAL). However, they differ significantly in the way they were carried out, because while the Islamist attacker of 2016 drove his lorry at high speed and in a straight line into a densely packed group of people enjoying themselves at the Christmas market, the perpetrator of 2022, however, first drove slowly onto the pavement of the attack site and then zigzagged in a very targeted manner to run over his victims. But why are more and more perpetrators using vehicles as weapons? Terrorist organisations have answered this question themselves by calling ramming vehicles the "ultimate mowing machine” (The Ultimate Mowing Machine. (2010, 10). Inspire Magazine (02), pp. 53-54.). The reasons for this are both obvious and pragmatic from the perpetrators' point of view, because the use of a vehicle as a weapon unfortunately causes a large number of victims, but requires neither special planning nor competence, nor does it carry the risk of being discovered early by the security authorities. Added to this is the incredible momentum and penetrating power of vehicles. Truly effective measures against VAW-attacks are therefore reliable, physical barriers serving as the "last line of defence" against the immense force of the approaching vehicle. It should be noted, however, that the approach to protecting soft targets / PALs from ram attacks differs significantly from that of protecting hard targets/buildings and infrastructure. This is because while penetration of the vehicles is in the foreground for hard target protection in order to bring Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Devices into the target, the consideration of lethal dispersion, however, is the main parameter for the protection of people at soft targets on PALs. My task as Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Advisor (HVMA) and planner of the security measures at Berlin's Breitscheidplatz was therefore to develop, together with the Berlin police, several standard-compliant HVM Schemes in accordance with the relevant ISO IWA 14, which not only protect the people there from intruding vehicles, but in particular also keep out deadly dispersion that is being caused when a vehicle crashes into a vehicle security barrier (VSB). This task was not easy to accomplish, especially considering that the location of Breidscheidplatz allows heavy goods vehicles to approach at a tremendous impact energy of up to 7,400kJ (Equals a PAS68 or ISO IWA 14 Performance Rating of V/30000[N3G]/80/90). Furthermore, the special architecture of Breitscheidplatz had to be taken into account, which should not be disturbed by the appearance of the VSBs later on. In addition, the existing underground tunnels and diverse underground facilities had to be taken into account in the planning. Furthermore, future issues of climate change, urbanisation and the traffic turnaround also played a decisive role in the conceptual design of the HVM-Scheme. Here is a brief summary of the project parameters for "Berlin Breitscheidplatz"; the task was to lock-out the hostiles without locking-in the public; the location is a memorial of national importance and a world-renowned symbol for Germany; the location is insular in between two 6-lane main roads, with two particular attack boosting approach routes and a large number of stakeholders are involved. Furthermore, there are 4 HVM schemes (temporary, semi-permanent, permanent), more than 40 potential trajectories and more than 1,200 vehicle dynamics assessments (VDA). The potential kinetic impact energy is up to 7,400 kJ. Finally, the HVM scheme and subsequent application shall be fully compliant with ISO IWA 14 and all VSBs used shall be ISO IWA 14-1 / PAS68 crash test approved. Implementation With a time horizon of several years and implementation in different construction phases, we have developed a total of four special schemes to protect the Breitscheidplatz site against Vehicle Ram Attacks by means of portable and stationary barriers. Each of these schemes has a slightly different task. The first scheme uses portable high-performance barriers to protect different areas of Breitscheidplatz quickly and flexibly. Later, these will be gradually replaced by stationary barriers. Finally, a concept of stationary perimeter barriers and upstream portable barriers provides the highest level of protection for very special situations and occasions. Learnings Several learnings resulted from the process. The application of ISO IWA 14-2 was an excellent guide to lead through the HVM planning and application process (ISO IWA 14-2 will soon be superseded by its successor norm ISO 22343-2.) The CPNI's "Catalogue of Impact Tested Vehicle Security Barriers" provided the decisive and impartial overview of suitable VSBs. It was found that early focus on certain types of barriers without having carried out the appropriate VDAs beforehand will lead to poor decisions, and impartial project management is essential to facilitate interdependent HVM tasks. It was also learnt that dispersion is most important when protecting PALs but is often underestimated and that portable barriers and deflecting measures significantly reduce dispersion. Finally, early PR for temporary measures is important to gain positive public opinion and visible HVM measures have a positive impact on public perception of security (Schipper-Kruse, D. (2020). Wahrnehmung von Zufahrtsschutzmaßnahmen und erkennbare Effekte auf das Sicherheitsempfinden. Berlin: Berlin School of Economics and Law.). Summing up the Berlin Breitscheidplatz HVM, one can say the project has generated positive feedback and great public interest not only in Berlin itself but in other German-speaking countries too. Since then, many other projects have benefited from the learnings gained and thus have contributed to the public security. About the author Driven by the terrible Vehicle Ram Attacks of Nice and Berlin, Christian Schneider founded the INIBSP “Initiative Breitscheidplatz” in 2017 as a non-profit expert forum aiming to provide relevant HVM know-how to decision makers in Germany. Since then, his enterprise has developed into the leading consultancy on the topic in German-speaking countries. Together with international experts and local authorities, he developed and implemented numerous HVM schemes for the protection of entire city centres, airports, critical infrastructures, stadiums and public spaces. Schneider also is member of HVM standards and norms committees, and author of multiple articles on the topic of HVM. Christian Schneider will be speaking at the London International security conference on 27 September 2022.

Security and protection of public spaces

Michael Lyons — Thu, 19 Mar 2020 15:09:20 +0000

Protecting Public Spaces

Pilar de la Torre, project manager for the European Forum for Urban Security (Efus), discusses the forum’s PRoTECT project and the role of municipal authorities in protecting public spaces

Over the years, strategies to protect public space against terrorism have strengthened and evolved, mainly focusing on protecting critical infrastructures. However, terrorist attacks are evolving as well. As a result of new contexts and opportunities, public space has recently become an attractive target for terrorist attacks. To illustrate, the latest terrorist attacks in European cities such as London, Paris, Manchester, Stockholm, Berlin, Brussels, Barcelona… all targeted public areas. These areas are considered as ‘soft targets’, crowded public spaces as metro, shopping centres, sports stadiums, bars, restaurants, clubs and commercial sidewalks, that are easily accessible to the public and an easy target for terrorists with high negative societal impact. Soft targets are targets because attacking them can aid terrorist organisations to obtain their goals, such as threatening the safety and quality of life of the public.

Following the resolution of the European Commission, in the Action Plan to support the protection of public spaces, which states that ‘local and regional authorities are also important stakeholders in the protection of public space’, PRoTECT project aims to raise the awareness of municipal authorities on their role in protecting public spaces and provide them with tools, good practices, access to technology concepts, and the knowledge to tailor them to their needs to better prevent this kind of threat and to act more effectively in case of attacks.

The European Forum for Urban Security (Efus) has more than 30 years’ experience, working with 250 local and regional member authorities from more than 16 European countries, in the promotion of a balanced vision of urban security, combining prevention, sanctions and social cohesion, to obtain recognition of the role of local and regional authorities in drafting and implementing national and European security policies. It has the capability to foster the exchange of experiences between authorities for the benefit of long-term security and to support local and regional authorities in the conception, implementation and evaluation of their local security policy. As such, it adds value in its participation in the PRoTECT project for the protection of public spaces against terrorism threats, as well as other initiatives such as the Partnership on Security in Public Spaces of the Urban Agenda for the European Union. The later is one of 13 Urban Agenda partnerships, in which the cities of Nice and Madrid and partners of PACTESUR project that is coordinated by the city of Nice and which aims to empower cities and local police forces to better address current vulnerabilities in public spaces.

Important actors in the protection of public space
Terrorism is �鶹�� in many European countries and a continuous threat to a number of European cities. It seriously threatens the safety and values of democratic states and the rights and liberties of their citizens. Acts of terrorism bring about long-term negative effects for cities and high social costs. Not only from a financial, but also from a psychological point of view in the sense of an increased feeling of insecurity among locals and visitors.

It is the duty of cities to be responsible for the safety and security of their citizens. Local authorities play a key role, in terms of the immediate response in cases of a terrorist act and crisis management, as well as in being aware of the vulnerabilities their public spaces might have in order to be able to adopt appropriate measures to prevent and mitigate terrorist attacks and their consequences (European Commission, 2017). The EU Commission is thus committed to reinforcing the involvement of these stakeholders by promoting dialogue and exchange between national, regional and local authorities and supporting the development of operational projects.

Local authorities in Europe have taken a number of steps needed to protect and prevent their citizens against terrorist attacks. Some municipalities across Europe have made progress in counter terrorism and have adopted measures to prevent and prepare against a terrorist attack in public space. However, in examining the role of cities in the protection of public spaces against terrorism, further steps in this direction are to be taken. Development of common guidance and the exchange of good practices are indispensable elements of sustainable and effective solutions. In correlation with these considerations, local authorities can play a significant role in the improvement of the protection of public spaces if they are able to: identify and mitigate vulnerabilities of their public spaces, have the specific skills to do so, have knowledge about existing solutions both technological and human-centred that meet their needs, and foster coordination and cooperation between key stakeholders.

Provide local authorities with tools to prevent and intervene more effectively - PRoTECT
PRoTECT project seeks to strengthen local authorities’ capabilities in public protection by putting in place an overarching concept where tools, technology, training and field demonstrations will lead to situational awareness and improve direct responses to secure public places before, during, and after a terrorist threat. The five EU cities (Eindhoven, Malaga, Larissa, Vilnius, Brasov) are being supported by the Dutch Institute for Technology, Safety and Security (DITSS), the Lithuanian Centre for Cybersecurity (Lietuvos Kibernetiniu Nusikaltimu Kompetenciju Ir Tyrimu Centras) (LT), the Meleton Asfaleias Centre-KEMEA (GR), the Romanian police Inspectorate (RO), the Spanish Ministry of the Interior (ES) and by networks as the European Network for Law Enforcement Technology Services (ENLETS) and Efus.

The project aims to provide cities beyond the project with an actionable perspective on the protection of their public spaces and other soft targets, by equipping them with good practices and access to technology concepts, and the knowledge to tailor them to their needs. It aims to build a closer, permanent collaboration between municipal authorities and law enforcement agencies via existing networks (ENLETS, Efus). Expected outcomes are risk and cost reduction related to the protection of public spaces for municipalities and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and implementation of a pan European technology capability assessment tool for cities.

The project has been implemented for more than a year and already has a series of tools which are being tested by the partner cities to facilitate the protection of public spaces, providing city partners with tools to conduct both a vulnerability self-assessment and technology assessment in their municipalities.

Vulnerability self-assessment
The PRoTECT project is based on the EU Vulnerability Assessment Tool (VAT), developed by the DG HOME (2019), the objective of which is to support actors engaged in counter terrorism strategies at the national level to assess the vulnerability of a specific public space. PRoTECT has developed a Manual of the VAT addressed to Municipal staff that is responsible for safety and security in public space and other local stakeholders involved in the security management of public spaces. It aids them in identifying vulnerabilities as a result of the risk identification and risk analysis processes. The areas identified as public space have to be areas where regular and/or incidental masses of public come for an activity. The activity at the main site can lead to other congested areas around the main site (e.g. an access road to a sports venue). These surrounding sites should also be taken into consideration when conceiving a security plan for the main site. In the project, the main site, together with the surrounding sites associated with the activity, are called the Public Space of Interest (PSOI).

The manual provides the steps that have to be taken, to do a vulnerability assessment as part of the security management process. Actors using the tool will be able to identify the following elements necessary to assess vulnerabilities of a PSOI: characteristics of the site, existing security measures, potential threats, consequences and probabilities. These elements will contribute to analysis and take measures in terms of technologies, infrastructure and human resources etc.

Technology assessment framework
In order to ensure that the most adequate and fit solutions are selected to respond to the specific needs in a city, a technology evaluation framework (the EU TEF) has been developed. This tool is derived from previous EU H2020 projects.

The EU TEF is meant for municipal staff responsible for safety and security in public space and other relevant stakeholders, such as municipal police, urban planners, security department or crime prevention units, event organisers, tourism and transport operators etc. The TEF aids municipalities in the whole process of building on specific vulnerabilities and gathering potential technologies, evaluating these for specific vulnerabilities at a specific public space of interest against terrorism. It consists of eight steps which aid in focusing on relevant vulnerabilities from their own EU VAT results, deciding on relevant criteria, setting up the terms of reference for technology requirements, evaluating the (technology) results and performing demonstrations in their cities. The EU TEF provides an overview of how to go from one prioritised vulnerability to asking the market for solutions to protect a public space of interest against a terrorist threat.

Conclusions
In this context, the involvement of local and regional authorities through targeted guidance (provided both by private sector actors and peer local authorities) on the protection of public spaces plays a key role in the operationalisation and implementation of good practices and thus in the development of effective solutions.

Based on the assumption that for efficient protection of public spaces it is necessary to involve a wide range of stakeholders from the local level, PRoTECT develops a tailor-made methodology outlined in four steps: vulnerability assessments; identification of needs in terms of technologies to launch a request for solutions; evaluation, validation and verification of technological solutions to mitigate vulnerabilities with the support of a hypothetical scenario; and hold demonstrations of proposed technological solutions.

Through the proposed PRoTECT methodologies, local authorities will be able to engage in a decision-making process that involves other relevant local stakeholders usually not present in the local security strategy. This relationship has already been established throughout the Vulnerability Assessment Workshops and will continue during the Technology Evaluation Workshops.

The methodology of this project will be translated into knowledge, attitudes, and skills for local actors in the protection of PSOI. Local security actors will also be able to coordinate the process by themselves. This implies the identification of site attributes, involved stakeholders and actors, considered vulnerabilities, threats and potential consequences, the applicable regulatory framework that will have to be pre-considered by the potential participants of the request for solutions process in order to foresee the technological solution(s) and how these could be used for preventing and/ or strengthening the response capacity of municipalities in a corresponding incident.

In the long term, the expected outcomes are to be seen in four areas:

• Research community and industry level. The outcome expected is that municipalities, one of the actors responsible for citizens’ safety, will be able to influence the research community and that industry technological solutions will respond better to their needs complying with the legal and ethical framework in place. In this way, technological solutions from industry will be more sustainable and easier to exploit.

• Transfer of knowledge. The work of PRoTECT has built actions and allowed lessons to be learned in different categories of PSOI, such as commercial areas, main squares, places used for specific events such as concerts, festivals, demonstrations or cultural events and concerning the preparedness against different threats such as attacks with sharp objects, firearms, and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) among others. These lessons learnt will benefit local authorities beyond the project in enhancing their knowledge on the protection of PSOI and will contribute to the spread of good practices.

• Cooperation and awareness raising. In the long term, PRoTECT will foster cooperation with a wide range of stakeholders involved in security at the national and European levels to increase the awareness of managing authorities, local authorities and beneficiaries.

• Cost reduction for technology adoption. The evolution and/or transformation of problems related to urban security makes it necessary for public policy makers to continually adapt their response capacity to terrorist threats. However, the decreased resources to carry out actions call upon the need for municipalities to adopt the best fitting technologies to be able to do more, and better, with less. PRoTECT equips them with tools to effectively evaluate the solutions by themselves and thus reduce the costs for such solutions to be put in place.

A call for solutions to be launched as part of PROTECT
A call for available technological solutions (termed Request for Information or RFI) will be launched as part of the project. The selected ones will be evaluated on the ground by the five partner cities: Brasov (RO), Eindhoven (NL), Lariseon (GR), Málaga (ES), and Vilnius (LT).

For more information about the RFI visit: https://protect-cities.eu/

For more information about the European Forum for Urban Security visit: https://efus.eu/en/

This article includes the contributions of: Tatiana Morales (Efus), Puck va Brink (TNO), Patrick Padding (National Police of Netherlands), Peter van de Crommert (DITSS),George Kioumourtzis (DITSS), Ioannis Chasiotis (KEMEA).

Physical security solutions and non-violent protests

Michael Lyons — Mon, 04 Nov 2019 15:20:48 +0000

Protecting Public Spaces

With the Extinction Rebellion protests dominating headlines recently, Iain Moran discuss how physical security solutions can protect non-violent protestors without unduly draining public resources

Non-violent protests have been a prominent feature of 2019, with demonstrators calling for the declaration of a climate emergency, the delivery of Brexit and even expressing their displeasure at the arrival of President Trump. While preserving freedom of speech and legitimate protest is of course imperative, attention must be paid to how both policing and protecting protests impacts increasingly-stretched police budgets.

Indeed, it was recently revealed that Extinction Rebellion protests have cost the Metropolitan police £37 million so far in 2019; more than double what is spent each year trying to reduce violent crime in London. This has highlighted the need for alternative security solutions that local authorities can implement to protect non-violent protests, while also preserving valuable police resources.

What are the security risks?
Crowd management is the primary focus of policing at large-scale national and regional events, whether it’s a protest or a football match for example. This is because crowded events present a wide range of potential hazards, including people being crushed (against both fixed structures and one another), people falling and being trampled on, and risky behaviour such as people climbing onto structures or throwing objects.

There is also a high likelihood of illegal behaviour, including criminal damage and the obstruction of highways, along with the possibility of fights breaking out. This is a particular issue with protests, as there can be clashes between protesters and the general public.

Large groups of people are also unfortunately a potential target for terrorist activity, including hostile vehicle attacks. These attacks, in which a perpetrator deliberately rams a vehicle into a crowd of people, have the potential to cause significant casualties and are particularly dangerous as they can be very hard to predict.

As a result, large crowds of people such as protestors are not only a danger to themselves; they also put passers-by and any police presence at risk.

How are protests policed?
While recent events have been met with some frustration, with calls for the police to use greater force against demonstrators, peaceful protests are legal and can be an effective means of inspiring positive social change. The right to peacefully protest is protected under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), with Articles 10 and 11 outlining an individual’s right to freedom of expression and assembly, through participation in static protests, marches, parades, processions, demonstrations and rallies.

However, while the ECHR does not protect participation in violent protests, even peaceful protests can cause serious disruption to local communities and businesses. This puts extreme pressure on police resources and leaves them to conduct a difficult balancing act.

ECHR Article 11 clearly outlines the duties of the police when it comes to maintaining public order at peaceful assemblies. They must work to facilitate peaceful protests wherever possible and maintain an open and constructive dialogue with demonstrators.

On the other hand, section 12 and section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 do allow the police to impose conditions on a public assembly if they believe that it may result in serious public disorder, serious damage to property, serious disruption to the community, or that the purpose of those organising it is the intimidation of others.

In addition to general powers to arrest those suspected to have broken criminal law, in this situation they can issue conditions on a protest which direct where it should take place, for how long it should last, and how many people can be involved.

The police exercised these powers to restrict protests in October 2019, when conditions were put in place asserting that any assembly linked to the controversial Extinction Rebellion ‘Autumn Uprising’ had to cease by a particular date and time.

Police resorted to these firmer measures after previous conditions, which stated Extinction Rebellion could lawfully protest in the pedestrianised area of Trafalgar Square, were repeatedly breached over a nine-day period. The decision was described by the police as ‘proportionate and reasonable’, with the aim of helping them to ‘get London moving again’.

Temporary physical security
With it looking likely that we will continue to see frequent protests taking place across the UK in the coming months, the police and local authorities must work closely together to ensure the safety of all in the vicinity, while also preserving stretched police budgets as much as possible. The greater implementation of physical security solutions could help greatly in both regards.

In many cases, police and local authorities have advance warning about the location of a protest, or route of a march. In others, as in April and October 2019, they are able to restrict assemblies to designated areas and contain protestors to some extent. This makes it possible for local authorities to put in place temporary security measures, such as barriers and bollards, in order to pedestrianise the areas and help to manage crowd movement.

Previously, local authorities would not have been able to erect effective barrier systems at such short notice due to their design. In city centres, the most common type of temporary security product used to protect crowded events tended to be large, surface mounted concrete barriers. While these do not require any kind of foundation, so can be installed relatively quickly and easily, they have some significant flaws which make them far from the ideal choice.

The design of the blocks means that points of entry and exit are extremely limited, with people only able to walk through certain designated gaps in the perimeter. This severely restricts the flow of pedestrians and can result in large queues and crowds of people on both sides of the barriers. Not only does this leave any people queuing on the outside vulnerable to attack, but it has been shown that some of these blocks slide on impact, which means they have the potential to create a crushing effect that would be incredibly dangerous for those on the inside too.

Fortunately, there are now a range of temporary surface-mounted bollards and barriers available that have been specifically designed to protect crowds from external threats, such as vehicle attacks, and can be deployed by just a few people in a matter of hours.

These lightweight systems can be rented for either short-term or longer-term leasing, making them suitable for all local authorities, whether they need to deploy them regularly or on a one-off basis, and their compact, modular design means that they are easy to transport and store as needed.

The barriers are designed to allow people to flow in and out of an area with minimal disruption, which prevents the unnecessary build-up of queues and crowds. Vehicle access points can also often be added to allow authorised emergency service vehicles to gain access in just minutes in the event of an emergency. As an additional benefit, while all barriers should be physically supervised and are not a substitute for police presence, the use of barriers can reduce the number of police required.

Deploying temporary physical security measures is just one of the ways that local authorities can support police officers when it comes to securing non-violent protests. Ensuring the safety and security of all involved – whether part of the protest or not – should be a key priority, and will help to keep disruption to the community to a minimum.

www.atgaccess.com

Counter terrorism resilience for crowded places

Michael Lyons — Thu, 18 Jul 2019 11:06:13 +0000

Protecting Public Spaces

The threat of terrorism towards businesses and crowded places has evolved significantly over the years. As new technologies emerge and shifts in the social and political context occur, this is unlikely to change, writes Gareth Hulmes

Terrorism has the potential to make people feel very vulnerable when they are in public places, at work or away from home. In fact, a recent survey conducted by BRE Global revealed that approximately two thirds of participants believed recent acts of terrorism have made them more security-conscious when out and about.

Furthermore, the majority of participants considered security a factor when deciding: whether to attend an event, concert or festival; when deciding which hotel they will stay in; and when deciding which property to rent or buy.

This anxiety rightly raises questions (both of and from) those involved in the management and operations of buildings, infrastructure and public places dealing with issues of security and counter-terrorism resilience.

Like any other risk-based business issue, security demands a holistic, evidence-based approach in order to provide assurance to end users. Simple questions, such as ‘Are we a target?’ or ‘Are we secure?’, can be difficult to answer objectively without a structured approach in place. Those asking such questions are typically seeking assurance, some confidence that the arrangements in place (or planned) are likely to address the current (or envisaged) threat.

Understandably, business leaders have a range of competing issues to address to make their businesses successful. However, if a business values security and the benefits it can bring to the organisation, it needs to place security high on the agenda and commit to operating securely for the benefit of staff, customers and other valued stakeholders.

Businesses already doing this are readily identifiable in specific sectors such as energy, aviation and communications; those where security is core to the success of the business activity. These organisations appreciate that the failure to establish effective policy, compliance procedures and give stakeholders confidence in their ability to operate safely and securely, could jeopardise the future of the business.

These businesses are recognisable by their corporate strategies, financial reporting, and the transparency they exercise when communicating the security credentials they hold.

In other sectors, where security is not a principle service offering and is considered to be lower on the agenda, there will naturally be a less integrated and more ad-hoc approach to security, with greater focus on operating profit and loss. However, given the evolving threat, and the recent push for greater legislation around protective security - specifically at ‘crowded places’ as proposed by ‘Martyn’s Law’ - can any organisation, irrespective of their size or sector, afford to ignore the business risks associated with today’s security challenges?

All businesses from SMEs to large corporates need to be security conscious for a range of reasons, not least due to the health, safety and data protection legislation which apply to all. As a result, security performance, like finances, should be monitored, assessed, evaluated and reported.

How can we improve?
The following points apply whichever type of organisation you represent. They will help you assess your current situation and what might need to be done in the future.

Understand your security needs
It’s vital to document the factors associated with your business and/or estate that contribute to your security profile. This will inevitably include, but not be limited to, considerations such as:
the assets to be protected; the activities taking place at your facilities and the associated operational requirements; who needs access to your premises; and whether there are any requirements filtered down from regulators.

Understand your security risks
With the contributing factors identified, you will be better placed to document the threats and associated risks facing your organisation. This may require consideration of: whether the geographical location and local context of premises could influence the likelihood of an incident; whether your premises are iconic or have attributes that make them attractive targets;
who might target you, when and how; the vulnerability of your premises to these types of incidents; and the consequences that may result from these types of incidents.

Through the analysis of these issues, you will be in a position to determine whether any action is required. If you have not considered these factors, then there can be little assurance that your security is appropriate, proportionate and effective, or that investment in security arrangements will deliver real improvement.

Security managers will also be in a better position to communicate the need for action to senior management, should they find themselves in an organisation reluctant to invest.

What security improvements should you implement?
Your approach to securing your premises will naturally be dependent on the results of your risk assessment and should be focused on reducing vulnerabilities and consequences. Never implement security for security’s sake. Doing so will not lead to improved security, will deprive the organisation of valuable resources and may even lead to the creation of a false sense of security. Remember, if in doubt, you should always seek professional advice.

At BRE Global, our experience in supporting organisations to improve their approach to security has identified a number of common characteristics amongst top performers:

Focused
Many organisations hold a policy for ‘Health & Safety’, ‘Quality’ and ‘Environment’. Security should be treated no differently. By maintaining a written security policy and a supporting security strategy, setting out what you are trying to achieve, helps to ensure that security measures continue to meet operational requirements. This will allow you to remain focused on your objectives and ultimately measure and improve performance.

An integrated approach
Be sure to examine the benefits of adopting physical or technical solutions over personnel and procedural solutions. Whilst often effective, physical and technical solutions can quickly absorb your available security budget. Recent events have shown how quickly the threat can change, and how you might be attacked tomorrow may be very different to the methods used previously.

It is therefore important to balance the deployment of physical and personnel security; the latter of which can be reconfigured more quickly and easily, and usually at less cost.
Whatever solution you arrive at should be demonstrably suitable for the risk it is designed to address and complementary to organisation’s operational needs.

Systematic approach
Establishing a security risk management system will help you get the most out of your security budget. It will provide a framework for effective security and enable you to evidence the steps you have taken to mitigate risks. In a security conscious organisation, there may be an enterprise level risk management system. In this case, your local management system should be aligned with that of the organisation. Where this is not the case, you may wish to establish your own system.

Incident management & recovery
Far too often, security planning stops at the point of incident detection or an incident plan may rely solely on the police for incident response. It is important that having detected suspicious behaviour or a loss at a facility, that there is appropriate infrastructure and procedures in place to communicate and manage an incident to a successful conclusion.

Assurance
Having invested significant time and resources in mitigating security risks, it is important that you are able to communicate your facility’s security credentials and provide stakeholders with assurance of your capability. This might be required internally within some organisations, it may be a regulatory requirement for your sector or act as a differentiator that offers competitive advantage.

Industry Solutions
BRE Global has developed SABRE, a security assurance scheme to help organisations demonstrate their commitment to security. Launched in 2017, SABRE is complementary to the ‘Protect’ strand of HM Government’s counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, in seeking to help premises’ owners reduce their security risks - including those posed by terrorism - so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.

The SABRE approach can be adopted in two ways:

Self-assessment
Organisations may self-assess their premises using the SABRE Online platform. This enables the end user to understand current likely performance against the SABRE standard and target improvement as necessary before identifying premises suitable to take forward to certification. SABRE Online can also be used to measure and compare performance across a portfolio, with a built-in function for internal reporting.

Certification
This involves third party verification of your security management system and provides the most robust form of approval available. Certification is suitable for those wishing to communicate performance externally or to interested parties (such as tenants, regulators and insurers) and is the approach many organisations adopt for approval of management systems.

Assessment is delivered by independent SABRE Registered Assessors, with supporting advice available from SABRE Registered Professionals – a list of which is available at www.redbooklive.com.