Counter Terror Business - HVM

Is HVM just for Christmas?

Polly Jones — Tue, 17 Feb 2026 16:01:24 +0000

Severe vehicle borne attacks pose an increasing threat to our public security, while the growing use of unsuitable countermeasures often exacerbates the problem rather than alleviating it. This article from Christian Schneider outlines how a simple misunderstanding can have fatal consequences, which common misconception results in mere placebo security, and how the consistent application of proven standards can protect us far more effectively against hostile vehicle attacks.

The number of vehicle as weapon (VAW) incidents targeting publicly available locations (PAL), squares and critical infrastructure has been rising steadily for years — and forecasts suggest this trend will continue. Although more vehicle security barriers (VSB) are appearing in our cities and around major events, the question remains: what happens when hostile actors recognise the weaknesses of poorly conceived hostile vehicle mitigation schemes and exploit the minimal stopping capability of unsuitable barriers? And what if attackers increasingly receive guidance from hostile professionals, enabling them to simply overrun the many incorrectly deployed temporary barriers that are all too common around events?

This leads us directly to one of the primary causes of ineffective hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) measures frequently observed at event sites: the unfortunate confusion — or conflation — of hostile vehicle mitigation with event safety management. This confusion often results in serious errors at every stage of qualification, planning and implementation. Such errors are not only costly, but also carry potentially grave consequences for public security. Effective hostile vehicle mitigation is not a matter of placing barriers at random close to an event site; it requires a technically sound, legally robust engineering design, delivered with appropriate, certified protective systems.

Recent vehicle attacks have made three essential points abundantly clear: vehicle borne attacks are now a firmly established tactic among politically, ideologically, or religiously motivated extremists; poorly planned or inadequately implemented protective measures can harm the public rather than protect it by creating a dangerously false sense of security; barriers must not only be certified, but also suitable for their specific operational environment.

The tragic attacks on the Christmas market in Magdeburg, Germany, on 20 December 2024 — resulting in six fatalities and more than 300 injured — and on the New Year’s celebrations in New Orleans, USA, with 14 deaths and 57 injured, have shown with brutal clarity that hostile vehicle mitigation measures must be designed exclusively by suitably qualified and experienced specialists. Such specialists understand that only crash tested, certified barriers suitable for the specific site may be used. Certification alone is never sufficient; an unsuitable or under specified barrier can itself become a lethal hazard during an attack. Unfortunately, numerous Christmas markets again demonstrated this in 2025. A notable example was the actual Magdeburg Christmas market, which initially failed to obtain official approval because the appointed planner obviously lacked sufficient HVM qualifications and relevant engineering accreditation, and had proposed non certified, unsuitable and severely under specified barriers. The consequences for public safety, the victims and their families, the city’s reputation, political stakeholders and local businesses were profound.

HVM v event safety
Hostile vehicle mitigation must therefore never be confused with event safety. It requires dedicated engineering expertise provided by qualified HVM specialists. HVM protects sites, not events. Events may take place on those protected sites — indeed they should — but the primary purpose of professional HVM planning is to secure the location itself, regardless of whether an event is in progress.

Clear separation of HVM engineering from event safety management not only demonstrates competence and professional responsibility, but also ensures that people remain protected in everyday environments — in pedestrian zones, city centres or around arenas — even when no event is taking place. A crucial lesson from recent years is the need to recognise distinct professional competencies, strictly separate HVM from event safety management, and never trivialise specialist expertise.

Hostile vehicle mitigation is not a new discipline; it has evolved continuously since the 1980s. Generations of engineers have refined techniques in accordance with JASPAR principles (Justificable, Archievable, Suitable, Practical, Affordable, Reasonable). There is no reason to reinvent established processes; on the contrary, there are compelling reasons to rely on the extensive expertise already available. Qualified specialists work in accordance with the latest HVM norm, ISO 22343 2, supported throughout by the proven project methodology of the RIBA Plan of Work. Effective HVM design also requires professionals trained not only in engineering and construction, but also in policing, threat mitigation and counter terrorism — and who maintain continuous professional development (CPD) in these fields.

To ensure this level of competence, the National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) supports Chartered Security Professionals (CSyP) and the Register of Security Engineers and Specialists (RSES), enabling recognised experts to serve as Specialist Security Advisors – Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (SSA HVM). Those tasked with protecting soft or hard targets can draw on the extensive experience of organisations such as NPSA and NaCTSO, adhere to relevant standards including ISO 22343 2, use the RIBA Plan of Work, and engage both independent Counter Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSA) and RSES accredited HVM specialists.

The real question, therefore, is no longer how we can better prevent future vehicle as a weapon attacks — but whether decision makers recognise the proven structures already available and are willing to adopt and rigorously apply them.

Temporary HVM of Christmas markets and outdoor events

Robyn Quick — Mon, 12 Feb 2024 16:58:09 +0000

HVM

On 19 December 2016, the worst attack ever recorded on a Christmas market took place at Breitscheidplatz in Berlin, a very popular venue in the centre of the German capital. Since then, Christmas market and outdoor event operators have been applying advanced physical security measures in order to protect their events from hostile vehicles.
In this article, Christian Schneider, a Germany-based Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Advisor who became responsible for the HVM measures at the Breitscheidplatz in 2018 discusses applied Hostile Vehicle Mitigation, lessons learned and best practices.
As extremists increasingly use hostile vehicle tactics to perpetrate attacks on publicly accessible locations (PALs), we are confronted with new security challenges that underline our need to improve the protection of these public spaces. Christmas markets and other outdoor events are a particularly vulnerable type of soft target embodying those challenges. A key aspect in the evolution of hostile vehicle tactics is the transition from the use of vehicles as weapon carriers to using the vehicle itself as the weapon.

Vehicle attacks

This is hardly surprising, as various terrorist organisations have been calling on their followers to use vehicles as effective weapons since 2010 (“The ultimate mowing machine”, INSPIRE (2010)). For among the many means of attack, vehicles may be considered as a kind of a disruptive technology and thus offer extremists a multitude of extraordinary advantages (“Truck Attacks “, Rumiyah (2017)). The increased use of this tactic is confirmed by statistics, which demonstrate a significant increase in vehicle as weapon attacks since 2014. This phenomenon affects all communities equally, regardless of whether they are large cities, small towns or villages. Whilst vehicle-as-a-weapon attacks, such as those in London, Nice, Barcelona and Berlin are well known in the public domain, lesser-known European towns like Volkmarsen (Germany), Strépy-Braquegnies (Belgium) or Marbella (Spain) have also made headlines as a result of ramming-attacks. Or were you aware of those towns’ existence prior to the attacks?
In addition to vehicle ramming attacks, we must also contend with accidents that occur in PALs, as was the case in August 2022, when a heavy lorry accidentally crashed into a street party near Rotterdam (The Netherlands), with fatal consequences.

Protection

Hence, protecting PALs from accidents and vehicle-ramming attacks is increasingly important. Fortunately, the protection mechanisms required to meet these challenges are already well-known best practise.
If we take a closer look at physical protection against hostile vehicles, it quickly becomes obvious that the reliability of any measure is inextricably linked to the quality and care of its prior planning. True to the motto “He who fails to plan is planning to fail” (Sir Winston Churchill (1874 – 1965)), good planning is the key to sustainable success. Seriousness, competence, experience and impartiality are the essential requirements for the planners of any security and protection measure. Of course, serious planning includes the elaboration of a threat, vulnerability and risk assessment, comprehensive operational requirements (ORs), as well as adherence to the relevant guidance standards but also requires an effective planning process. Here, the RIBA Plan of Work has long proven to be a particularly helpful guidance for effective planning. And this holds true for both, permanent AND temporary measures. Following RIBA’s Plan of Work not only enhances the planning process with a clear and effective structure, but also supports the project manager and all those involved in the project to do the right things in the most effective order, and timing. It also helps to resist the common “quick-fix” impulse to prematurely think of deploying certain types of VSBs before the planning process begins by first and foremost keeping focus on producing prerequisite operational requirements.

Process not product

The reason behind this simply is the fact that security is not a product, but the result of a process carried out prudently, that leads to comprehensive, well thought through, and proportional measures.
In general, there are three main concepts to apply physical protection measures: Installing permanent VSBs that require permanent foundations, deploying portable barriers that are usually surface placed, or a side-by-side combination of both. Naturally, each of these three methods has its particular advantages and disadvantages, and unfortunately there is no magic VSB that will always lead to the best result in every situation and certainly never will without a detailed analysis of the local conditions, needs and operational requirements. But again, the good news is that though there is no “one-size-fits-all” solution for all protective areas, the assessment and planning process described above, conducted in close collaboration with dedicated specialist security consultants will almost always lead to the most optimised solution, i.e. safe, secure, economic, aesthetic and practical.

However, more often than not, sites for Christmas markets and other open-air events need to be protected on a short notice, thus asking for the deployment of temporary protective measures, e.g. surface placed VSBs. Such portable measures are neither worse nor better than permanent measures, but they are fundamentally different in vehicle impact performance, and, most notably, vehicle penetration distance and debris dispersion. Thus, surface placed measures require particular design and application, because these types of barriers usually do not possess their own foundations, thus require a comprehensive knowledge of their engineering characteristics, surface needs and civils constraints, such as ground conditions, drainage, weight, deployability, recovery, etc. Hence, a deep understanding of their interaction with the surface of the installation is vital in order to predict the VSBs likely performance in case of an impact. That said, it is essential that only impact rated barriers are applied, i.e. VSBs that have been awarded with a matching performance rating of an internationally recognised crash-test standard (ISO 22343-1 (2023); ISO IWA 14-1 (2013); PAS 68 (2013))! Also bear in mind that a VSB is designed for a specific application and should only be deployed if its performance rating meets the requirements of the particular Vehicle Dynamic Assessment (VDA) carried out for the very site of deployment. This means that a VSB that was rated to stop a standard car at low speed is most unlikely to work against a lorry or worse, a heavy-duty vehicle.
While in the United Kingdom, thanks to the work of the security authorities over many years already, one sees impressively well thought-out security measures in place at many sites, elsewhere, however, there often still is a lot of room for improvement.
There are useless and highly dangerous block-out attempts around, that are not only doomed to fail but are even causing an increased level of latent and operational hazard to the crowd. This is why those who rush to think of HVM just being bollards, concrete blocks and alike quickly find themselves in a very dangerous dilemma, because premature measures compromise on people’s safety and security rather than improving them.
Therefore, by following good guidance, applying relevant standards correctly and using the services of suitably qualified and experienced HVM security consultants, the risks of deploying ineffective security solutions will be greatly reduced. Even the temporary protection of rarely used publicly accessible locations is nowadays quite easily achievable by qualified experts! Misapplications can usually be traced back to the widespread misconception that Hostile Vehicle Mitigation measures are simply a matter of erecting barriers.

In a nutshell, expertise and experience are key to achieving a reliable level of protection. There is no need to take the risk of trial and error, but seek advice from your local Police, CTSAs, and specialist HVM security consultants. Well trained support is just a mouse-click away.
HVM is not a product, but a joint best practice process of security, engineering planning, and architectural engagement, comprising of organisational, technical, and personnel measures.
Well considered Hostile Vehicle Mitigation provides a win-win situation for all the stakeholders involved. It results in providing reliable protection for temporary and permanent venues and sites, contributes to the visitor’s individual perception of safety and security, and thus is significantly increases the attractiveness and success of the events taking place there.
For all readers and interested decision-makers who would like to learn more about how to plan, design and implement reliable protection measures, I recommend browsing through the comprehensive and easy-to-understand guides offered by the NPSA and ProtectUK, which are available on the internet. Here you will not only find the important references to the standards and guidelines, but also a lot of best practise, good tips and most valuable and impartial advice.

About the author:

Christian Schneider has a strong background in engineering and mitigation of dynamic loads.
He founded the INIBSP “Initiative Breitscheidplatz” in 2017 after the terrible Vehicle Ram Attacks of Nice and Berlin, as a non-profit expert forum aiming to quickly provide relevant HVM know-how to decision makers in Germany.
Since then, his enterprise has developed into the leading consultancy on the topic in German-speaking countries. Together with international experts and local authorities, he developed and implemented numerous HVM schemes for the protection of entire city centres, airports, critical infrastructures, stadiums and public spaces. Schneider is member of HVM standards and norms committees, and author of multiple articles on the topic of HVM. His commitment and devotion to protecting people form hostile vehicles earned him the nickname “Poller-Pabst” (Bollard Pope) in Germany.

Enhancing safety in vehicle barrier systems: Insights from PSSA and HSE Guidance

Polly Jones — Thu, 21 Dec 2023 16:12:20 +0000

HVM

A recent tragic incident in the UK has brought to the forefront the critical importance of safety in the management of security barriers. In this sobering case, a worker lost his life when his van collided with a partially open security barrier, resulting in the barrier spearing through the vehicle's windscreen and causing fatal injuries. This tragic event, which has gained significant media attention, and is the latest in a growing list of similar incidents, highlights the potential dangers associated with improperly managed security barriers, whether manual or automated.

The implementation of swing car park barriers in various settings, from retail spaces to leisure complexes, necessitates a rigorous approach to safety and compliance. The Perimeter Security Suppliers Association (PSSA) champions this cause, emphasising the crucial need for correct product selection, professional installation, comprehensive training, and diligent maintenance. These elements are vital in safeguarding against the significant risks these barriers can pose if not managed properly, as evidenced by several incidents across the UK.

The importance of correct product selection

The first step in ensuring safety is selecting the appropriate barrier for the specific environment. Not all swing barriers are suitable for every setting. Factors such as the barrier's height, visibility, and locking mechanisms must be carefully considered to match the location's unique requirements. PSSA member companies who supply these barriers play an integral role in advising on the best fit for each scenario, drawing on their extensive knowledge and commitment to quality assurance.

Professional installation and compliance

Installation by qualified professionals is non-negotiable. This ensures that the barriers are not only installed correctly but also comply with all relevant safety standards and regulations. The HSE's guidance stresses this point, highlighting that improper installation can lead to barriers becoming unsecured or malfunctioning, posing severe risks to public safety.

Training and correct usage

Educating staff and users on the correct operation of swing barriers is a critical component of safety. This includes understanding how to lock and �鶹�� the barriers securely and recognising signs of potential malfunctions. The HSE advises that regular training sessions be conducted to ensure all users are aware of the proper procedures and safety measures.

Regular maintenance: A key safety measure

Ongoing maintenance is crucial in ensuring the longevity and safe operation of swing barriers. The HSE emphasises the importance of periodic checks to identify and rectify any wear and tear or mechanical issues. These checks should be conducted by professionals who can ensure that the barriers continue to meet safety standards.

Learning from past incidents

Several cases have highlighted the consequences of neglecting these safety measures. For instance, the tragic incident involving a man fatally injured by an unsecured swing barrier resulted in significant legal and financial repercussions for the responsible local authority. Another case involved a postal worker who sustained serious injuries due to a poorly maintained barrier at a sports club. These incidents serve as sobering reminders of the potential dangers and underline the importance of adhering to safety guidelines.

Paul Jeffery, PSSA Chairman, “The importance of specifying the correct product for the intended purpose, its professional installation, correct usage instructions, and regular maintenance cannot be overstated.

The PSSA members are duty-bound to adhere to strict safety and quality standards, providing an additional layer of assurance. These measures are not just regulatory obligations but moral imperatives to prevent tragic incidents and ensure the safety of all users.

By learning from past incidents and continuously improving safety practices, we can significantly reduce the risks associated with swing car park barriers. This not only protects individuals but also upholds the reputation of organizations and businesses that implement these security measures.”

Implementing HSE Guidance

The HSE has provided specific guidance on managing the risks associated with swing barriers. This includes:

Conducting comprehensive risk assessments: Identifying potential hazards associated with the barriers and implementing measures to mitigate these risks.

Securing the barriers: Ensuring that they are locked in position, whether open or closed, to prevent accidental movement.

Enhancing visibility: Marking the barriers with high-visibility colours and installing adequate lighting to ensure they are easily seen by drivers and pedestrians.

Regular inspections: Conducting frequent checks to ensure the barriers remain in good condition and function safely.

The role of PSSA members

Members of the PSSA are committed to upholding the highest standards of safety and quality in the installation and maintenance of vehicle barriers. They are well-versed in the latest HSE guidelines and legislative requirements, ensuring that their practices not only meet but often exceed the minimum safety criteria.

Mark Dachtler, Managing Director of PSSA member Avon Barrier, said “Avon Barrier withdrew swing barriers from its range many years ago due to concerns over the risks associated with operators of the manually controlled barriers failing to secure them in the open or closed positions and thereby creating exactly this risk.”

Conclusion

The effective management of swing car park barriers is a multifaceted endeavour that requires careful consideration of product selection, professional installation, ongoing maintenance, and user training. The PSSA's role in promoting these practices, alongside adherence to HSE guidance, is invaluable in mitigating the risks associated with these barriers. By learning from past incidents and continually striving for improvement, we can significantly enhance the safety of these common yet potentially hazardous installations

Hostile Vehicle Mitigation – a ‘specialist’ shield in Counter-Terrorism Strategy

Polly Jones — Tue, 31 Oct 2023 11:24:33 +0000

HVM

The PSSA discuss their Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Installers Scheme (HVMIS)

In an evolving security landscape where threats are always looming, understanding the pivotal role of Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) in counter-terrorism (CT) is imperative. It is crucial to debunk a common misconception: HVM is not traffic management (TM) —it is a meticulously designed defence against terrorism. The strategy centres around implementing robust, independently tested, and rated equipment that acts as a formidable barrier against vehicle-led attacks, ensuring the preservation of lives and assets.

The Perimeter Security Suppliers Association (PSSA) strongly believes that the Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Installers Scheme (HVMIS) - a critical initiative by the PSSA - should be reinforced through formal legislation. Currently operating as an essential, yet non-statutory scheme, HVMIS plays a crucial role in our strategic approach to perimeter security. The PSSA is advocating for the elevation of this scheme to a legislatively mandated initiative. The architecture of this proposed legislation aims to ensure the selection of the precise skills and knowledge necessary for effective HVM installation and operation.

Choosing the right person or company for HVM is like picking the right doctor for a specific medical problem. You need someone with the right skills and knowledge for the job. It’s not a one-size-fits-all situation; the person or company you choose must have specific expertise in HVM.

This specificity and specialisation are essential. Imagine entrusting an electrician with plumbing repairs or expecting a tree surgeon to perform a medical operation. Such a mismatch of expertise could yield disastrous outcomes. In the field of HVM, the stakes are immensely high. Entrusting non-specialists, with the supply and installation of HVM equipment, risks the integrity of the system, thus compromising the safety it vows to uphold.

Paul Jeffrey, PSSA Chairman commented “The PSSA strongly advocates for the implementation of more robust and mandatory legislation surrounding the Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Installers Scheme (HVMIS). We believe that the guidelines and standards proposed within the HVMIS should not just be recommendations, but firmly enforced by law, obligating all installers to uphold these stringent standards rigorously.

By instigating this crucial legislative action, we aim to ensure that the deployment of Hostile Vehicle Mitigation systems is executed with the utmost precision and effectiveness, guaranteeing enhanced compliance and the reinforcement of our perimeter security solutions against any potential vehicle-based threats or attacks."

Diligence and due consideration are the bedrock of effective HVM. The end-users and installers must foster a keen understanding of the CT threat landscape, ensuring that the HVM strategies echo the identified vulnerabilities and risks. The domain of HVM is varied, extending beyond the mere installation of barriers for road closures. It needs a great understanding of strategic placement, ensuring maximum delay in the face of threats, and allowing time to put necessary protective measures in place.

Paul Jeffrey added, “Due diligence of the end user is crucial in perimeter security. Always ensure that your HVM (Hostile Vehicle Mitigation) provider/installer comprehensively understands your CT (Counter-Terrorism) threat, vulnerability, and risk

Accreditation stands as a cornerstone in optimising the efficiency of HVM installations. Ensuring that the HVM equipment is installed as per the tested specifications is vital. Incorrect installations cast a shadow not only over the installer and the manufacturer but over the integrity of the entire industry. It fuels misconceptions regarding the effectiveness of HVM measures, thereby undermining public confidence in the protective mechanisms aimed at safeguarding crowded spaces.”

The PSSA’s HVMIS emerges as a beacon of a comprehensive approach towards hostile vehicle security. The scheme, embroidered with stringent guidelines and processes, focuses on aligning installations with physical constraints and the budgetary considerations of clients without compromising on safety and functionality. The emphasis on mandatory maintenance, operational training, and third-party verifications such as those through CTSA’s, NPSA, NaCTSO, and CT SecCos underscores the commitment to maintaining a consistent standard of quality and compliance across the board.

The development of HVMIS is the result of thorough assessment and collaboration among various groups, including government agencies and the PSSA Council. This joint effort shows a strong dedication to improving security strategies with a shared vision.

In conclusion, the emphasis should be on recognising HVM as a specialised profession that plays a pivotal role in counterterrorism strategies. It is not just an auxiliary component of traffic management but a crucial line of defence against hostile threats. A collective endeavour towards tighter legislation, diligence, and enhanced professionalisation within the industry is imperative to protect our defences, ensuring that our public spaces remain places of safety in the face of evolving threats.

“Do what’s right to protect fellow human beings,” warn HVM experts

Freya — Wed, 26 Apr 2023 08:20:35 +0000

HVM

Event organisers have a Corporate Social Responsibility to take immediate action to protect members of the public, leading hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) experts have warned While the Martyn’s Law legislation may not be in force for months, organisers are being strongly advised to review their HVM measures immediately and make the necessary improvements right away, instead of waiting for the law to change. “The legislation may not be introduced for some time yet, but that doesn’t mean event organisers should wait until then before making vital improvements to their event security practices,” said Niall Griffin, of Hardstaff Barriers, one of the UK’s leading suppliers of HVM solutions. “It’s about doing what’s right to protect fellow human beings, rather than waiting until the last possible moment before making improvements, because the law tells you to,” continued Mr Griffin. His warnings are echoed in the company’s White Paper - ‘Time to Act Now: Hostile Vehicle Mitigation and the Responsibilities Facing Event Organisers’ - published earlier this year. The guidance document encourages event organisers to “do the right thing” and consider their corporate social responsibility, as well as their ethical and moral duty above all else, rather than wait for the impending legislation to come into force. Hardstaff Barriers, part of Hill and Smith Infrastructure, is responsible for delivering the Government’s National Barrier Asset (NBA) framework and employs leading experts in the field. Mr Griffin, a former police officer, is one of less than 300 Chartered Security Professionals on the Register in the UK, making him one of the most knowledgeable and qualified specialists working in the hostile vehicle mitigation industry. He added: “Anyone who attends an event – from a small gathering to a sports game attended by thousands of spectators – has the right to be safe and protected. Nothing can be more important than this. “Organisers have a duty to ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare of all attendees and those working within their event environment. “This includes the grey area immediately outside the venue where people are often held for search and screening or ticket checks. The reality is they would not be in that area if they were not attending the event.” The need for Martyn’s Law There is currently no legislative requirement for organisations or venues to consider E  or employ security measures at the vast majority of public places. Martyn’s Law is new legislation announced by the Prime Minister in December 2022. The new law will improve the safety of venues and publicly accessible spaces and will see people better protected against terrorist attacks. Previously known as Protect Duty, it was established in honour of Martyn Hett, one of the 22 victims tragically killed in a terrorist attack at the Manchester Arena in May 2017. More than 800 other people received physical or psychological injuries in the explosion, which occurred after an Ariana Grande concert. Protect Duty proposes five key requirements: 1. A requirement that spaces and places to which the public have access engage with freely available counterterrorism advice and training. 2. A requirement for those places to conduct vulnerability assessments of their operating places and spaces. 3. A requirement for those places to have a mitigation plan for the risks created by the vulnerabilities. 4. A requirement for those places to have a counter-terrorism plan. 5. A requirement for local authorities to plan for the threat of terrorism. Mr Griffin added: “What is clear is that we do not need to wait for Martyn’s Law to become law before acting. We already have legislation and guidance, which should be sufficient for event organisers to act now to ensure the safety of those working or attending their event in any publicly accessible space.” A publicly accessible location is defined as ‘any place to which the public or any section of the public has access, on payment or otherwise, as of right or by virtue of express or implied permission.’ “It won’t happen to me” Most organisations embrace Corporate Social Responsibility and recognise that there must be accountability when things go wrong as a direct result of their action, or inaction. But research by psychologists over the years has shown that humans generally possess an ‘optimistic bias.’ It is commonly defined as the mistaken belief that one’s chances of experiencing a negative event are lower than that of others. More often than not, people believe ‘it won’t happen to me.’ Nobody directly involved in a terrorist or accidental incident ever expected it to happen. But clearly, these incidents do happen and they have to affect somebody. Leading by example In recent years, the All England Lawn Tennis Club has made a number of proactive steps to increase protection for fans visiting the Wimbledon Championships. HVM barriers are now routinely installed outside the venue as part of “enhanced measures” to provide “visible physical security” at the event. Tournament organisers say there has been a “proportional uplift” in measures introduced in past years. Many of these measures go over and above the legal requirements and have been implemented because it was the right thing to do. The importance of seeking expert advice When selecting an HVM solution, it is essential to seek the expert advice of an industry specialist. This expert can advise on the most appropriate HVM solution, based on the specific needs of the event and the likely risks. Many different HVM systems are available, including portable, lightweight and movable barriers - often used at open air events to limit the potential of hostile or errant vehicles interacting with pedestrians or event attendees. Others are heavy surface-mounted vehicle gates, pedestrian portals or access points - often used where protection from vehicles is required and where legitimate access for delivery or emergency response is still required. Linear HVM barriers are often utilised to prevent the vehicle pedestrian interaction, where queues form adjacent to live traffic flow, for instance. Invest in training It is vital to ensure that every team member responsible for managing the event and the public in attendance, should be properly trained to handle situations if they do go wrong. These individuals have a huge responsibility in the event of an incident. It is only fair to them, and to the people they have a duty to support in the event of an incident, that they are properly equipped to respond. Become an HVM Champion “Nothing can be more important than keeping people safe, so be proactive, proud and become a champion for event security,” added Mr Griffin. “Taking these proactive steps well before the introduction of Martyn’s Law will not only put public safety at the top of your priority list, but it will also tell the world how seriously you take this vital issue. “What could be a better boost for your event’s reputation, than publicly demonstrating your commitment to keeping people safe?” There is a range of information available in the public domain to support event organisers, wherever they are on their event security journey.

Synergizing future urban design

Freya — Thu, 09 Feb 2023 16:05:20 +0000

HVM

Christian Schneider, hostile vehicle mitigation advisor, explains how HVM can be integrated into towns and cities and address other problems besides security The competition for coveted residents, visitors and businesses has always been won by those cities that, as innovative pioneers, offer their clientele the highest level of quality of life. Those cities prevail because they are perceived as more innovative, secure, sustainable and healthy than their counterparts. Urban quality of life is inextricably linked to a high level of perceived security, which gives people the sense of well-being they often crave in order to be carefree, creative and productive. As such, even the slightest emotionally perceived inkling of terror and crime is diametrically opposed to this desired state, a situation that underlines the importance of urban security. Hence, this article discusses an important aspect of urban security, the structural protection of urban spaces against the growing threat of hostile vehicle attacks and its intelligent implementation to also overcome a number of further urban challenges simultaneously. How do innovative cities fund their ambitions in the face of scarce resources and ever-growing tasks? Perhaps, just in the same way as successful business enterprises do, through the constant search for innovations and the prudent use of simple, multifunctional and self-supporting systems! However, it would be rather silly to assume that in an increasingly complex world, adding more complexity will lead to more sustainable solutions. Most of the time, the opposite holds true. This applies to all areas of future cities, regardless of whether we are talking about highly complex requirements in the implementation of pedestrianisation or protecting publicly accessible locations against terrorism, extremism and the growing use of vehicles as weapons (VAW) in acts of violence. In all cases, the solution is to look at many municipalities most important challenges in a comprehensive way and then tackle them with most simple and cross-sectoral measures. This not only saves time and money but also ensures the smart (multi)use of valuable resources for installation and maintenance. solutions to city problems Most cities are currently facing an overwhelming number of urgent demands. These include an increased desire for perceived security, urbanisation, climate change and urban warming, particulate pollution management, outdated infrastructures, ageing populations, pedestrianisation, social tensions and a growing number of despicable attacks against police and emergency services. In addition, staff shortages, inflation and falling revenues are not really helpful to cope with these mammoth tasks. It is therefore essential to find sustainable solutions to simultaneously solve as many of the above-mentioned tasks as possible while at the same time requiring as little of the scarce urban resources as possible. HVM A promising way of killing several birds with one stone has recently emerged in the field of Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM). While HVM’s primary task surely is to protect people from extremists who are misusing vehicles as weapons to run people over or harm them through shrapnel dispersion. Still, modern HVM schemes also ought to offer the very opportunity to combine the potential resources of a city, nature and technology in such a smart and cross-sectoral way that solutions to the plethora of demands can in fact benefit from it. Hence, we smartly solve five issues with just one solution. Anyone who nowadays is just thinking of hostile vehicle mitigation in terms of bollards, barriers and steel constructions is kindly advised to get an update from a national Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA) or an experienced and impartial Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Advisor (HVMA). Modern, innovative Vehicle Security Barriers, so-called VSBs, are now much more efficient than they recently used to be. Whereas in the past, HVMAs had to apply expensive and space-consuming additional measures to compensate for sometimes insufficient retention capacity of standard VSBs (usually Ekin approx. 1,850kJ), the latest barriers are now four times as powerful (Ekin 7,400 kJ), so that they effectively stop all heavy lorries (24t. plus) approaching at full speed within a few metres. Moreover, they now no longer require deep foundations that interfere with subterranean infrastructure to achieve this impressive performance. Ultimately, this is an immense economic and architectural advantage! However, compared to the latest generation of multi-use-planters these new barriers still are just an evolution in terms of performance and foundation, without offering any other additional benefits. A real revolution, in the sense of our initial question of increasing the quality of life in modern cities, however, comes with this new generation of multifunctional, and greenable planters, the so-called “Green Beans”. These are an impressive innovation of high-performance raised beds, that are not only architecturally largely free in terms of shape and dimensions as well as choice of materials and appearance but also offer significantly more benefits than just keeping vehicles out. Urban planners, security authorities, emergency services and security architects may now make use of the multitude of “Green Beans” additional positive technical, climate-protecting, water-storing and, of course, economic capabilities that can be optimally adapted to the respective local needs. The many benefits of these barriers could well be considered a disruptive technology, that now opens up entirely new and creative possibilities for urban planners and security professionals. Cross-sectoral cooperation However, the key to success, as so often, lies in the cross-sectoral cooperation of different offices and authorities, which still goes somewhat beyond the pure consideration of security and urban design. Synergies can be created through comprehensive cooperation, which can even range from the promotion of inner-city biodiversity and spontaneous, virtual unsealing of urban areas to urban climate cooling, the creation of resilient sponge cities, or the relief of the city sewage system during heavy rain falls. But before we now go to deploy this new generation of VSBs, it is particularly important to understand that security is not a product but a process. Hence, security is not resulting from merely placing barriers somewhere but from their proper application. Hostile vehicle mitigation is an instrument of vital security and therefore is regulated by standards and guidelines. Thus, its application is much more demanding than just an installation of simple traffic control measures, e.g. aiming to avoid car park search traffic or the like. More often than not this still is being confused and therefore leading to serious consequences in terms of effectiveness and cost explosion. Hence, the question that rightly arises here is; “how can such a project, which is supposed to simultaneously address so many requirements of future-oriented cities, be planned and implemented properly”? The simple answer is “with foresight and balance”. In this context, “balance” is about constantly keeping the three core principles of security design in mind and bringing them into synergetic harmony with one another. For without balance and synergy, the full potential of an action can neither be fully recognised nor exploited. In the successful handling of security-relevant projects, “foresight” means that at any preparation of a project the three core principles of process, cooperation and proportionality are duly taken into account. Legislation The core principle of “process” focuses on the task of clarifying the project aims, expectations, limitations, budgets, stakeholders, project participants, project structure and process organisation as well as compliance with relevant legislation, standards, and guidelines. In Europe, the relevant standard of Hostile Vehicle Mitigation currently still is ISO IWA 14, which will soon be superseded by its updated version, ISO22343. Just Germany, due to its federal structure and recent extremely negative incidents, got its own HVM-regulations, DIN Spec 91414 guideline, stipulating that any HVM measure must be supervised by an impartial, experienced and trained HVMA or CTSA. The core principle of “cooperation” considers the fact that almost every successful security architecture owes its success to the good cooperation of experts from all affected areas, who were involved in the project from the very beginning in order to jointly find balanced solutions in the sense of project aims and best user experience later on. And so, the third core principle, “proportionality”, is indispensable, because throughout the entire project, the parameters of security level, aesthetics, utility and added value, sustainability and costs shall always be balanced. Securing the urban future increasingly is a question of taking a holistic view on urban tasks and the art of bringing them together; synergistically and economically. Fortunately, nowadays, perceived security and a high quality of life are no longer about dominant “fortress designs” but can once again become central elements of aesthetic urban design, have an inspiring effect and at the same time exert a positive influence on a multitude of other municipal tasks. All that is needed is a commitment to make use of the potential of available innovations and to fully exploit it through cross-sectoral cooperation between municipalities, security professionals and business. Modern HVM therefore is an active contribution to the well-being of people and a liveable, urban future. About the author Christian Schneider founded the INIBSP “Initiative Breitscheidplatz” in 2017 after the terrible Vehicle Ram Attacks of Nice and Berlin, as a non-profit expert forum aiming to quickly provide relevant HVM know-how to decision makers in Germany. Since then, his enterprise has developed into the leading consultancy on the topic in German-speaking countries. Together with international experts and local authorities, he developed and implemented numerous HVM schemes for the protection of entire city centres, airports, critical infrastructures, stadiums and public spaces. Schneider also is member of HVM standards and norms committees, and author of multiple articles on the topic of HVM. His commitment and devotion to protecting people form hostile vehicles earned him the nickname “Poller-Pabst” (Bollard Pope) in Germany.

HVM - A VITAL PART OF PROTECT DUTY

Freya — Fri, 21 Oct 2022 15:14:28 +0000

HVM

Seven in ten respondents to the Protect Duty consultation agreed that those responsible for publicly accessible locations should take appropriate action proportionate measures to protect the public from attacks. How does Hostile Vehicle Mitigation fit into this? CTB talks to Debbie Heald MBE, managing director of Heald, which has high-security products in some of the world’s most high-profile locations “HVM is a critical part of the overall protection of a site or location/venue. It is important to have a full view and take a multi-pronged approach with HVM being a vital part. Venues are responsible so training of staff and education is critical to ensure lives are protected. It’s also important to consider that HVM extends beyond the threat of terror attacks. They can be a result of a driver under the influence of drink or drugs, being distracted or as a result of a traffic collision which spills into pedestrianised areas.” The Protect Duty will see venues needing to consider how HVM can protect the full perimeter of a location while ensuring a controlled entry point for authorised vehicles. Products such as Heald’s Matador can provide a quick easily deployable solution which offers crash protection against unauthorised/rouge vehicles and is tested to stop a HGV truck travelling at 50mph, installing equipment that has been proven is extremely important. Another key factor often forgotten is; will the barrier work again after impact? This is essential to prevent secondary attack situations and also to allow emergency services to gain access in the event of an Incident. CTB: As Figen Murray notes, a lot of organisations are not waiting for the outcome of the Protect Duty - they are already implementing measures as best as they can to comply with the law when it comes in. What, in your opinion, are the first steps that responsible persons should take to get ready? The first step an organisation or venue should undertake is a full site survey including a vehicle dynamic assessment of the location by an expert in this field. There are many different types of perimeter protection products available which a qualified professional should be able to advise on. It is however refreshing that people are taking this seriously and beginning this process before the Protect Duty becomes law. CTB: Access control - how does the access control element of barriers / HVM tech work? How does the system ensure swift deployment in the event of an attack? Within HVM there are many types of protection available, however, sometimes access control is overlooked and insecure access methods are chosen that can be easily bypassed. With HVM in particular it is so important to consider the security of the product in conjunction with a robust and secure tamper-free access control system. Ensuring the barrier is in its secure position and operated for individual drivers would be my advice, too many times I have seen barriers open and the operator relying on Emergency fast buttons to raise/close the barrier when there is a threat detected, these EFO access controls are helpful to secure the barrier, however, they should not be used as a standard method of operation, in reality, human reactions do not happen as quickly as we think, an EFO (Emergency Fast Operation) maybe 1 or 2 seconds however it may take the operator much longer to act. It’s quite difficult to pinpoint terrorist attacks that have been thwarted as a result of having HVM measures in place. Ultimately, bollards are generally installed as a visible deterrent that prevents such attacks from happening. What is worth noting, is that of all the attacks that have occurred in recent years, they have been in locations where no or poor deterrents are in place. However, you will often see videos doing the rounds on social media and in the news of cars driven by the general population falling foul of such measures which demonstrates they really do stand up to the threat of vehicle attacks while protecting pedestrianised areas. CTB: In your opinion, what are the best ways to encourage a security-minded culture in the workplace generally? “Education Education Education” is key to ensuring all within an organisation take security seriously. It should be a part of everyday training and consistency is key, unfortunately when everyone is safe complacency tends to creep in. It is critical to make this part of regular workplace training.

Protecting Europe from vehicle attacks

Marianna Christou — Tue, 22 Aug 2017 15:56:30 +0000

HVM

Following a number of large scale terrorist attacks in the last few years, Counter Terror Business looks at the current state of terrorist security in Europe and how the EU is improving its anti-terrorist security systems. While Europol’s 10th publication of its EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT), published in June this year, reveals a decline in the number of failed, foiled and completed terror attacks in Europe since 2014, it also shows that the number of deaths associated with such attacks has spiked over the last few years from just four to 142. It seems as though tactics have changed; the focus is no longer on how many attacks terrorists can orchestrate, but how many fatalities they can cause at any one time. In previous years, perpetrators have used bombs, suicide vests and guns to cause as much destruction as possible, especially on public transport. The most memorable attacks of this kind include the 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings, which left 191 dead and 1,841 injured, the 7 July 2005 London Underground bombings which killed 25 and injured 750, and the 22 March 2016 Brussels subway bombings which caused 21 fatalities and 130 injuries. Each of these attacks were carried out by groups of four or more - Madrid having the largest organisation with 21 suspects. Although bombs, suicide vests and guns are still used in terrorist attacks, terrorist tactics have undoubtably changed. It has become a common trend to use everyday objects, such as vehicles and knives, as weapons, and to execute an attack alone. The 2016 Nice vehicle attack on 14 July seemed to set the trend. 31-year-old Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel drove a 19 tonne cargo truck into crowds of people celebrating Bastille Day on the Promenade des Anglais in France, killing 86 people and injuring 458 others. The attack ended following an exchange of gunfire, during which Lahouaiej-Bouhlel was shot and killed by police. Five months later, a similar attack occurred in Berlin. 24-year-old Anis Amri drove a truck into a Christmas market next to the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church on 19 December, killing 12 and injuring 49. The trend continued into 2017, with vehicle attacks happening in London and Sweden. Attacker Khalid Masood left five people dead and 50 injured when he drove a hired SUV into the railings in front of Parliament Yard on 22 March. He then burst through the gate to the Palace of Westminster with two large knives and fatally stabbed PC Keith Palmer. Rakhmat Akilov, 39, was suspected of carrying out the Sweden attack, in which a truck ploughed into pedestrians in a busy shopping street in Stockholm. Five people were left dead and 14 injured. And although the latest vehicle attack in Europe involved more than one perpetrator, on 17 August in Barcelona, leaving 15 dead and more than 100 injured, it is clear evidence that the trend is unfluctuating. These incidents, although set in different locations and at different times, are all the same: they involve a minimal number of perpetrators but ‘weapons’ with maximum effect. It is attacks like these that counter terror networks must swiftly identify and foil. Physical security Less than a year after the Nice vehicle attack in 2016, and a week after the London Bridge vehicle attack, Nice completed a €16.5 million anti-terror project to keep tourists safe from another vehicle attack. The first section of the city’s Promenade des Anglais, which re-opened in the beginning of June, is now heavily defended with reinforced bollards which run two metres into the ground and can withstand up to 20 tonnes, and steel cables. The two inch steel cables and reinforced bollards, which can stop a speeding truck in seconds, have been placed along the busy road for nearly a mile. In the south of France, security chiefs splashed out €16.5 million fitting ‘anti-ram’ retractable terminals placed at points along the Promenade des Anglais alone. Christian Estrosi, President of the Nice region, said: “The bollards have foundations which are more than two metres deep, and can resist up to 20 tonnes. Only authorised vehicles can get access to the area behind the bollards, and they are only allowed in after visual verification by cameras which check number plates. We had always wanted to do the work, but it was done much faster after the tragedy of 14 July.” France also extended its state of emergency for three months after the vehicle attack, which was initially put in place following the November 2015 Paris attacks which left 130 dead and over 350 injured. The country currently remains in a state of emergency, with the latest terror attack in the country again involving a vehicle, in which 36-year-old Hamou Bachir drove a BMW into six soldiers in a Paris suburb. Similarly, some German cities reacted quickly to the Christmas market carnage on 19 December 2016, with the Christmas markets of Hamburg, Stuttgart and Dresden installing concrete bollards following the vehicle attack. Angela Merkel, German Chancellor, also passed a package of security bills that the cabinet said was in response to IS attacks on Germany. They included a measure to broaden video surveillance in public areas, body cameras for federal police officers and the use of automated devices to read vehicle registration plates. Security barriers were additionally installed between the road and pavement on three London bridges following the London Bridge terror attack, namely Waterloo, Westminster and Lambeth - but not before being criticised for failing to put any security measures there earlier following the Westminster Bridge attack. The UK also deployed more police on the streets following the attack and London Bridge was closed for one day but opened the next as people made their way to work, refusing to be defeated by terrorism. The UK has also introduced new laws for those trying to rent vehicles. Following the latest Barcelona vehicle attack, the Department of Transport is working with the police and vehicle rental industry to decide whether customers should be cross-checked immediately against terror watch lists before hiring a vehicle. Although hire companies are already vigilant for potential criminal activity, with an industry database of suspect customers and checks regarding identity, credit and insurance, UK counter terror groups are exploring what more can be done to prevent the malicious use of hire vehicles. Taking further action Measures were taken as early as 2006 by the United Nations to deter terrorists from causing as much destruction as they hope. On 8 September, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy to enhance national, regional and international efforts to counter terrorism. Through its adoption, all Member States agreed for the first time to a common strategic and operational approach to fight terrorism. Their united stand sends a clear message that terrorism is unacceptable in all its forms and that they are dedicated to its abolition. The strategy is composed of four pillars: Pillar I involves addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; Pillar II focuses on measures to prevent and combat terrorism; Pillar III is concerned with measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard; and Pillar IV concentrates on measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism. The General Assembly reviews the strategy every two years, making it a living document attuned to Member States’ counter-terrorism priorities, and keeping it as up to date as possible. The G20 referred to the four pillars and their measures at the 2017 G20 Hamburg summit held on 7-8 July. In the Hamburg G20 Leader’s statement on countering terrorism, the Group of Twenty called for the implementation of existing international commitments on countering terrorism, including the four pillars, and committed to continuously supporting UN efforts to prevent and counter terrorism. It also recalled UN Security Council Resolutions 2178 of 2014 and 2309 of 2016, pledging to address the evolving threat of returning foreign terrorist fighters from conflict zones as well as aviation security systems. The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and G20’s statement on countering terrorism are proven to work - to an extent. The number of failed, foiled or completed attacks in the last three years has steadily decreased from 226 in 2014 to 142 in 2016, while the number of suspects arrested quickly climbed from 774 to 1077 in 2015, and then came down again to 1002 in 2016. These numbers demonstrate that while terrorism is still very much alive, police and counter terrorism forces are on the ball to keep terrorism at bay, and are able to prevent disasters from happening. More, however, needs to be done in order to prevent terrorists from planning an attack in the first place. The police and MI5 came under heavy criticism after it was revealed shortly after the London Bridge terror attack that one of the attackers, 27-year-old Khuram Shazad Butt, was known to the authorities and even appeared in a Channel 4 documentary called The Jihadis Next Door. The Metropolitan Police said that although they knew of his extremist beliefs, ‘there was no intelligence to suggest that [the London Bridge] attack was planned and the investigation had been prioritised accordingly’. Margaret Gilmore, an expert in counter terrorism at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), revealed two days after the attack that authorities were told that there are more than 20,000 extremists in the UK, but they are not watched all the time. She said: “If they did anything out of the ordinary - if they weren’t in their normal location, if they were acting in an odd way and it was brought to somebody’s attention, or they did something criminal - then they would be looked at doubly”. But what of Butt, whose worryingly extremist beliefs were made known to the thousands of people watching Channel 4’s documentary? He was still able to tear families apart. Gilmore also admitted that there is a list of 3,000 people that the MI5 is ‘very concerned about’. These people, according to Gilmore, are ‘under pretty regular surveillance and watched a lot of the time’, but since they cannot be charged if there is no evidence, authorities cannot simply arrest them. Nor can they wait for a terrorist to strike before doing anything about it. Police surveillance needs to be tighter and those reported to authorities need to be taught that terrorism is intolerable.

How should cities respond to urban vehicular attacks?

Michael Lyons — Tue, 22 Aug 2017 14:11:18 +0000

HVM

Last week, a van was driven into pedestrians on Las Ramblas in Barcelona, killing 13 and injuring at least 130 people, and the driver then killed a 14th victim in order to steal his car and escape. Later in the same day, five men from the same terrorist cell drove into pedestrians in nearby Cambrils, killing one woman and injuring six others. Here, Martin Coward, reader in International Politics at the University of Manchester, discusses these attacks, and how cities can respond to them From Nice last July to the attacks in Spain last week, the last 12 months have witnessed an upturn in violence attributed to or inspired by so-called Islamic State (IS) across Europe. While the statistical threat of injury in such violence remains very small, the increased frequency and visibility of these attacks gives rise to the sense that a new and particularly effective form of terrorism has emerged: the urban vehicle-borne attack. Cars and trucks have been used as vehicles for explosives throughout the history of modern political violence. However, what appears to be new in this wave of attacks across Europe is the use of cars/trucks as weapons themselves. As some have noted - given that cars and trucks cause thousands of deaths on Europe's roads every year - it is surprising that it took violent extremists so long to identify and adopt such a method of attack. The type of weapon used often corresponds to a particular from of violence. The emergence of the urban vehicular attack could therefore mark a trend in extremist violence in Europe. What forced such a tactical evolution, what exactly does this trend show and how might we respond? Analysing trends Firstly, the urban vehicular attack arises in a particular strategic context: the sustained attack waged on IS in Syria and Iraq. Over the past year, there has been a shift in gravity in the international efforts against IS. As a consequence, IS - currently besieged in its base of Raqqa - has lost key cities and territory. This has had two implications for IS: on the one hand it has become less practical to encourage recruits to travel to Syria, creating a pool of sympathisers in Europe; on the other it has reduced the capacity to train recruits in the techniques required for attacks (such as bomb making). In this strategic context, there is a shift from sponsoring complex transnational plots to encouraging local sympathisers to launch whatever attacks they can with the means at their disposal. The car or truck attack is ideal in this regard - once the engine is running, all it requires is that the attacker drives to a crowded place. Secondly, there has been an increased focus on indiscriminate attacks against ordinary citizens enjoying themselves - this makes the public spaces of cities an obvious place to attack. Public spaces have long been the focal point of European cities. Attacks on such spaces are, therefore, a way to strike at something inextricably linked to contemporary urban European identity. It is a way to assert IS presence by making Europeans fear that a way of life they take for granted is unsafe. Cities are, by definition, places of density and plurality, where crowds mix and mingle. Vehicular attacks are unsophisticated and require precisely this density - to cause multiple fatalities the vehicle must be driven into a dense group of people who do not have the ability to disperse rapidly. As such, the public spaces of the city are the ideal target for such attacks. Thirdly, because urban vehicular attacks require no assembly and little planning, they are unpredictable, which suits a form of terrorism that seeks targets of opportunity. Urban vehicular attacks are flexible - ready to go at short notice and easily deployed if an opportunity is seen. If it is correct that the initial plan in Barcelona was a bombing, then the switch to a vehicle attack after the explosion in Alcanar was rapid and effective. However, this makes urban vehicular attacks very hard to prevent. Intelligence broadly seeks to detect plans during development, and is thus geared to detecting attacks at the planning or assembly stage. However, all the urban vehicular attack requires is one individual and a car/truck. As the Westminster attack shows, this means there may be no trail for intelligence to detect prior to the attack. Despite the UK government's attack on encrypted messaging, there appears to be nothing that could have been detected to indicate the attack was coming. Finding the right response In the wake of such attacks, it is logical that discussions turn to what might be done in response. The initial question is usually whether the urban environment can be redesigned to stop vehicular attacks. Many European cities now have bollards (some retractable) or street furniture (more or less cosmetically disguised) to stop cars and trucks entering public spaces. It appears that there had been discussion of such measures for Las Ramblas. However, such measures are not foolproof. Retractable bollards are widely used to control the entry of cars, trucks and buses to urban areas such as pedestrian shopping zones. However, if a vehicle has the relevant tag, then it will gain entry. All that is required is that an attacker steal an authorised vehicle. Moreover, do city-dwellers want more hardening of their public spaces? Hard barriers make it harder for crowds to disperse and communicate a feeling of threat. In some ways hardening city spaces would mean sacrificing precisely what city-dwellers and tourists see as their virtue - their plural, open character. Moreover, it will be too expensive to harden every place and so there is a risk that town planners simply drive attacks elsewhere. As such, it needs to be done carefully. This raises is the perennial spectre of the kind of interventions necessary to prevent violent extremism prior to its execution. These broadly fall into two categories - intelligence and countering-extremism. Neither have unblemished records: increased intelligence gathering comes at the expense of privacy and counter-extremism can easily slide into the creation and victimisation of suspect communities. The pathways the individuals involved in urban vehicular attacks took to violence will be examined at length. Some similarities might emerge, though there are few common denominators that cover all perpetrators of extremist violence. One thing all share is a willingness to commit violence in service of an ideology of sorts. The forms of violence committed will evolve to suit the strategic context - just as the urban vehicular attacks has. What we need to think about is innovative - rather than intrusive - ways to counter the motivating ideology. If the urban environment is key to understanding the success of such a tactic, the response lies not in new barriers, but with the city's inhabitants.

www.manchester.ac.uk

Keeping hostile vehicles  away

CTB — Tue, 06 May 2014 15:04:56 +0000

HVM

Protective perimeter security must continue to adapt and evolve to meet the changing threats to national and business infrastructures. New requirements from clients looking to protect both tangible and intangible assets must be accommodated. Against a backdrop of the need for reliable and consistent Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM), new technologies and innovations need to be accommodated. All this must happen whilst the perimeter security industry faces severe cost pressures.

Things are changing, wherever you look. Here are just some of the developments that I have noted in my discussions with perimeter security suppliers, government agencies, trade associations and organisations seeking to reduce and manage their security risks.

Organisational resilience
As individual disciplines evolve and security practitioners look for solutions that are multi-layered, integrated and complex enough to defeat attacks, it is, perhaps, inevitable that areas once thought of as separate are seen as part of an interconnected whole. Areas such as protective security, disaster management, business continuity management and risk management are being brought together under an organisation’s single management system. This in turn is leading to development of thinking, not only about mitigation of a disastrous event but also about how an organisation should be designed to be more resilient in the first place. As with other capabilities, designing in security has always made better sense than retrofitting later. Hopefully, we will soon have some authoritative guidance on organisational resilience in the form a framework standard from BSI, BS 65000, which is currently under development.

Looking at the same problem from two different perspectives can often yield different but complementary answers. This is the case with security risk management. The more traditional way of looking at risks is by identifying threats and vulnerabilities, assessing likely impact and then designing mitigation measures to eliminate or reduce the organisation’s risks. Business continuity practitioners, however, work from the other direction by looking at what is vital to an organisation, how it could fail or be defeated and then devising a plan to protect key assets. A combination of these approaches in an organisation’s security risk management processes would seem to be beneficial.

Evolving requirements
New requirements combined with industry know-how can often result in new solutions. As I look across the products on offer from members of the Perimeter Security Suppliers Association (PSSA), I have noticed three particular trends. Firstly, there are a growing number of combined solutions now on offer. Whether from a single supplier or from a collaborative initiative between suppliers, products are now available that address multiple risks, including for example, protection against manual attack and HVM.

Secondly, whether it is in a combat zone or at a major event, clients are demanding more rapidly deployable solutions, without the sacrifice of security integrity.

Thirdly, with the wide choice of products available from a variety of sources, demand is increasing for more interchangeable systems. In addition, the increasing use of information and communications technologies to control this kit will also prove to be interesting, to say the least.

Barriers to barriers
Some challenges in HVM are not directly related to the problem or the solution but are more systemic in nature. Three in particular seem to continually work against the implementation of successful perimeter security solutions.

The first of these concerns health and safety. Why is it when there is only one law of the land (albeit with multiple parts!) and supplying companies essentially only have one management system providing internal controls that the construction industry insists on having nearly forty different sets of requirements for demonstration of health and safety competence? To look at some company’s web sites and vehicles at the range of health and safety ‘badges’ on display, you could be forgiven for not understanding the real focus of their business. Now don’t get me wrong, I am a regular recipient of HSE notifications and admire their approach to information provision. I also sympathise with the health and safety myth problem, but when I see the cost endured by most SME’s funding needless administration because their (larger) customers require HSE evidence presented in their own preferred format, it does make me sigh.

The, so far ineffective, measures such as BSI PAS 91 and Safety Schemes in Procurement are noted; but perhaps it is time that industry itself got more involved?

Whenever I attend industry gatherings, two interlinked issues are always raised – poor specification and sub-optimal procurement. The fragmented nature of the perimeter security supply chain exacerbates these problems, with HVM supply knowledge being separated from user requirements. Clearly, security needs must be taken into account but assurance across the entire value chain is required for HVM applications to be successful.

Revised international standards
CPNI continue to drive the HVM standards agenda both nationally and internationally. In the UK PAS 68:2013 – Impact test specifications for vehicle security barriers systems and PAS 69:2013 – Guidance for the selection, installation and use of vehicle security barriers have superseded earlier versions, which have now been withdrawn. The revisions incorporated changes in best practice and are mainly technical in nature. The classification codes, used to convey performance, have been updated.

Although the above represent routine review and updating of existing standards, perhaps of more significance is the publication of two International Workshop Agreements.

IWA 14-1:2013 – Vehicle security barriers – Part 1: performance requirement, vehicle impact test method and performance rating according to ISO “specifies the essential impact performance requirement for a vehicle security barrier (VSB) and a test method for rating its performance when subjected to a single impact by a test vehicle not driven by a human being.”

Its companion document IWA 14-2:2013 – Vehicle security barriers – Part 2: Application “provides guidance for the selection, installation and use of vehicle security barriers (VSBs) and describes the process of producing operational requirements (ORs). It also gives guidance on a design method for assessing the performance of a VSB.” The IWAs bring together both UK and USA requirements for the first time.

The threat from terrorism is not reducing but adapting and evolving. HVM counter measures must also continue to do evolve to stay ahead of these threats and provide the degree of security and safety required to protect people and critical assets.

Further information
www.pssaverification.com
Email: stephen.munden@pssaverification.com