Ahead of the International Security Expo, Counter Terror Business talks to Erika Brady, from the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews, on the Prevent scheme, monitoring terrorism and understanding radicalisation
You are speaking at this year’s Education Security stream of the International Security Expo on the Prevent scheme. How is Prevent currently embedded in UK universities?
There has been a significant amount of controversy around Prevent, much of which precedes the implementation of the Prevent Duty in 2015. The Prevent Duty itself made it a statutory requirement for various public bodies to contribute to the effort of preventing the radicalisation of vulnerable individuals. The bodies affected by the Duty include educational institutions of all levels. To be honest, if we remove the emotive debate around Prevent, I think most people would not have a fundamental problem with stopping people from becoming terrorists.
The problem, my research tells me, is in how Prevent, as a counter-radicalisation strategy, was developed and implemented. My research has indicated that there has been a clear move by university leadership to abide by the legal requirement and policies have been written and published. However, there is significant variation on how the Prevent Duty and its policies are understood and received by various affected groups such as administrative and academic staff and students. There are also challenges of implementation, and significant push back has been seen from student bodies across the country, much of which has been led by the National Union of Students (NUS) who have organised the opposition to the legislation. In particular, the NUS celebrated the outcome of a High Court ruling in July 2017 that said that universities did not have to follow Prevent Duty guidance which had been issued by the government to assist universities in the implementation of the Duty. The ruling was based primarily on the clarity of Prevent itself as opposed to the guidance presented to assist in its implementation. So, there is some legal precedent that the Prevent Duty was ill-conceived and has been open to criticism.
What inspired me to focus on this aspect for the conference lay predominantly in my twofold experience, first as a PhD candidate where I am studying CONTEST broadly and aware of many of the policies, and secondly through my experience as a student where I have heard very little about the Prevent Duty. While the University of St Andrews has a robust policy in place, I was unaware of any communications in this regard. So, when I looked into it in more detail, I found that, even as recently as August, staff had been informed of Prevent training which was taking place. So, it is in effect, but never seems to be a big talking point among students, that I am aware of at least. I think it is therefore important to look at it in a little more depth and see if more can be learned about the changes, or lack thereof, over time.
My main issue with the reporting on this, both from media and student bodies, is that it appears to me to be a roll-on effect from the negative reception of Prevent as a whole. The arguments are not new, but are renewing issues raised in the past, and much of the ‘evidence’ is anecdotal. I have no doubt that poor procedure has led to misunderstanding and misrepresentations of radicalisation among students. However, it becomes far more difficult to see, at first glance, whether these issues have been remedied. Perhaps at first there were issues, but universities improved their implementation. Or perhaps they didn’t. So, what I am attempting to understand from my research on the Prevent Duty in universities is what policies have been implemented, what procedures are in place for review, how are communications developed (both to and from students and staff) and is the negativity warranted, even now, three years on.
Given the growth in ‘home-grown’ terrorism in recent years, and the increase in attacks within the UK since 2015, can we deem the CONTEST strategy as having been successful?
This is a good question, and something that is, perhaps unsurprisingly, not easily answered. It all depends on the data you are looking at. For example, if you are including terrorist activity in Northern Ireland, there are indications that that has been consistently high, although to some extent perhaps on the increase over the past few years. The attacks in Northern Ireland don’t often result in mass casualties, however, and so they are less likely to be on peoples’ radar, outside of Northern Ireland. However, if you take the data in the rest of the UK, I would argue that it’s not so much an increasing trend as it is a series of dissociated events which stand out. In the bigger pattern, there were successful events in 2005, 2013, 2016 and 2017. However, the killings of Fusilier Lee Rigby (2013) and MP Jo Cox (2016), although horrifying, were single incidents and did not result in mass casualties, so they need to be understood a little differently. In my view, the idea there is an increasing trend in terror attacks throughout the UK is somewhat misleading.
That being said, I think you can tell a little more about the success or failure of a counter terrorism strategy by what doesn’t happen. By all accounts, several substantial terror plots have been prevented from taking place each year. Over the past few years, more information is being released on these numbers, which gives us some ability to see the extent of the work being undertaken by the security services. So, on some levels, yes, I do believe CONTEST has been successful.
That being said, CONTEST is one of the biggest and most complex strategies being implemented by the government. It has many moving parts, and it would be naive to assume that all of these parts are working at the same level of effectiveness at all times. Not only are some programmes implemented poorly, but changing political, social and global contexts impact terrorist activities and the responses of the authorities. So, a very cursory look at Pursue, for example, might indicate that it is working as well as can be expected given the complexity of the threat we are facing. Conversely, a very cursory look at Prevent gives us the opposite view. Yet that negative impression is not usually informed by data, but by public perception, historical failings and negative media coverage which all perpetuate a notion that Prevent has completely failed. I don’t think this is necessarily the case, but rather it needs to be continually assessed and improved to meet the changing needs and to learn from past mistakes.
On the whole, I think CONTEST is working, but new challenges, such as low-tech terrorism tactics are becoming increasingly challenging to prevent. I think casting CONTEST in a success-failure dichotomy is an over-simplification of a complex problem. Whether CONTEST itself has reduced the threat from terrorism in the UK is an ongoing question, and one I am currently looking to answer through my research.
How organised is the process of monitoring terror suspects in Britain, compared with other countries?
Unfortunately, this is also not an easy question to answer. Details on the monitoring of suspects is hard to find and is predominantly in the realm of the intelligence services. For this reason, there is limited open source data available. Certainly, some statements have been made regarding general numbers of those being monitored, particularly in regard to returning foreign fighters. There is no easy way to verify this information, and clearly the intelligence services are motivated to alleviate the public’s concerns. That being said, I also believe that they have no good reason to deceive the public. My mind on this is eased to a great extent by the reports of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IRTL). This position allows the IRTL to see classified reports and data, and so, in terms of non-intelligence personnel, the individual holding this position has an incredible level of access. Tied in with this, the IRTL produces both annual and ad-hoc reports, and while oftentimes sensitive details are not published in the public sphere, there is every indication that as much as is possible is in fact published. In addition, while specifics might not be published, the IRTL can relay generally what they have found in the data and can support public statements made by intelligence officials. So, I think this role allows for more scrutiny than that which exists in other countries. The role of the IRTL is relatively unique, with only Australia having anything similar and even then, that role is slightly different.
My overall impression is that the UK is doing a good job of monitoring suspects, on the whole. However, this view only really holds up until an incident takes place. The complexity involved in monitoring suspects, who have not committed any crime (yet) is incredible. It is a resource-heavy and diffuse issue that is not easily done. And as soon as someone slips through the net, a negative backlash ensues. I am not saying this to defend the intelligence and security services, nor to criticise them. But I do consider the challenge of the job to be immense and, in the context of this challenge, there are strong indications that the public is being protected as can be reasonably expected.
An interesting point to raise here is in regard to the review report on the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in 2013, which was undertaken by the Security and Intelligence Committee and published in November 2014. In this review, the security services were generally commended for their work in preventing terrorist attacks. However, the Committee noted several key failings regarding the actions of the security services in relation to the perpetrators, Adebowale and Adebolajo. An example is the fact that there was a procedural delay in the request for additional monitoring through ‘intrusive techniques’ of Adebowale, and had these been implemented in the correct timeframe, he may have been under surveillance before carrying out the attack.
In addition, issues arose with regard to terrorism suspects who, at a given point and time, are deemed to no longer be a threat, and taken off surveillance, but years later come back on the intelligence services’ radar. These individuals are called ‘recurring subjects of interest’ and the process of actioning surveillance on these individuals was seen to be flawed, primarily because of scarcity of resources and the need to prioritise urgent and imminent terror threats. The data provided by the security services indicated that thousands of individuals had, at one point or another, been under surveillance for terrorist activity, but had been deemed subsequently to no longer be a threat. Following the Committee’s Report, the security services stated that they would update their processes in this regard and improve their regular monitoring review capabilities. If we take this on face value, it can be hoped that there are effective monitoring procedures in place.
Do you think Brexit will have a direct impact on the scale of threat, or the capability of CONTEST to deter the threat?
It’s always very difficult to predict future outcomes. Unfortunately, when it comes to Brexit, we are all in the dark. No state has ever left the European Union and so a lot of the political chaos we are currently seeing is a symptom of this. I think CONTEST will continue to work, on the whole, as it has been doing. It’s not as though, suddenly, the system will collapse. It is important to note that a lot of the elements of CONTEST have informed the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy, so there is a commonality of understand and purpose. I don’t doubt that the EU and the UK will continue to communicate and collaborate on the threat from terrorist throughout the continent.
That being said, I think the biggest impact from Brexit on both the terrorist threat and the ability of CONTEST to function will be the transition period, and this could take years to work out. How the processes of the UK are going to extricate themselves from the EU is not something that has been answered yet. Everyone agrees that security issues will remain a priority and everyone will work together to ensure public safety. But how this is implemented or worked out remains to be seen. Counter terrorism tactics such as protecting public spaces, arresting suspected terrorists and training for emergency services, in other words domestically-focused policies, will all continue as normal. However, issues such as border security and the movement of people may actually be negatively impacted during the transition.
I think that it is important to note that the most recent iteration of CONTEST was published in June of this year and, I don’t doubt, the timing of this publication was designed by the government to show a sense of purpose, to indicate that the government has the situation in hand, and there will be an updated and robust counter terrorism strategy in place both during and after the transition. However, this particular iteration was already long overdue, given the previous iteration, published in 2011, related to a policy timeline of 2011-2015. As we know, during that timeframe, Daesh, in all its various forms, became a significant player internationally and for three years there was no new strategy to deal with this altered threat.
So, a couple of things can be said about that. First, why do we even need a strategy if the counter terrorism apparatus, on the operational level, continued on regardless. But more importantly, did the delay in publishing a new strategy leave gaps in the system which had been designed to deal with a different type of threat and in a different context? The answers to these questions are difficult, and beyond the time we have here to discuss them. But I think the transition period for Brexit is going to be challenging, and there is a high possibility that those committed to carry out terror attacks will continue to do so, or may even increase their activity to take advantage of perceived chaos.
The biggest concern will be the public’s frustration with the transition, which will give those on either end of the extreme political spectrum the opportunity to turn economic uncertainty and hardship into an active and dissatisfied electorate, and very small elements of these groups could spill into violent backlash which could in turn result in other communities responding in kind. Terrorists such as Anders Breivik of Norway, a lone terrorist actor, carried out his attacks in response to a perceived unwelcome integration of Muslims in Norway and focused his attacks on the political party he held responsible.
So, the threat does not need to come across borders necessarily, but the uncertainty and challenges raised by Brexit can potentially result in an increase in homegrown and lone actor terrorism. The deal that is reached for Brexit will cause dissatisfaction among many – those who feel it goes too far and those who feel it doesn’t go far enough, and so civil unrest will be inevitable. It just remains to be seen whether this will spill over into violence, and what kind of violence that might take. And of course, the Northern Ireland border could have a significant impact on the situation there, both from a political perspective and a security perspective. That shouldn’t be underestimated.
Do you think that the definition and understanding of ‘extremism’ is helping or hindering efforts to prevent home-grown radicalisation?
I think ‘extremism’ is a useful term in the abstract, so that academics and level policy-makers can categorise and understand the ‘phenomenon’. It is so important to clearly understand what is being referred to when we use a particular term, especially in regard to terrorism and counter terrorism. Academics and policy makers have for years tried to come to a consensus understanding of what ‘terrorism’ means, with limited success. Each country has its own very legalistic definitions, which have some areas of commonality but just as many divergences. Do you include state actors when you are describing terrorism? Does it only relate to violence or to the threat of violence also, and are these responded to in the criminal justice system in the same way? These are just a few of examples of the problems that come up and the development of appropriate answers to these questions is not an arbitrary process; the responses to terrorist activity is guided and driven by the understanding gleaned from these terms.
So ‘extremism’ has become the new challenge in this area. It is a hotly contested term, and many feel that the UK government has not clearly outlined what it means by the term. The risk of human rights abuses is significant if clarity of what ‘extremism’ means cannot be reached. So, I think it is essential to outline a clear and precise definition of what ‘extremism’ means and who exactly can be considered to be an ‘extremist’.
That being said, I don’t believe that a solution will come about any time soon, given the challenges with the term ‘terrorism’. I don’t believe that it is hindering efforts to prevent home-grown radicalisation, but this is where the crux of the matter lies – the differences between those who are working on this understanding and those who are being communicated with (the public). I believe that it is essential that policy-makers and academics understand the changing landscape of terrorism, and controversial terms such as ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’, because they are subjective, and result in more heated debate. The public, usually through the media, receive a perception of chaos from these debates, but this is the process of understanding a highly complex and challenging problem. Every effort to understand these terms, from the perspective of academics and policy-makers, is, in my view, worthwhile and important.
However, it is equally important to understand the public’s view on these issues. I don’t doubt that the public considers the ongoing debate on terminology as pointless or detracting from the real issues. And this is understandable. People do struggle to understand the term ‘extremism’ and because it is not related to an action, but rather a state, it becomes one more concept that most people may never fully understand. This means that misperception and heightened tensions can absolutely result. And I believe many experts would agree that this perceived ‘obsession’ with definitions is not going to get the job done. But I consider it essential in understanding the complexity of the issue. On one level, you have the person who leaves their house on a given morning with a backpack loaded with explosives and decides to blow themselves up in a crowded place – that is the worst case scenario and one extreme end of the scale. On the other end of the scale, you have individuals who may or may not move into the realm of committing a violent terrorist attack, but who nonetheless enable an attack to take place. This level is that of the extremist, who dances within the law, but enables others to carry out the criminal act of terrorism itself. And the results of the activities of this so-called ‘extremist’ may not be immediate; they may take as little as days or may take as long as years to develop. So, governments are struggling to address this end of the scale. And this is why we are seeing ‘new’ terminology develop and seeing the heated debates arise because of the subjective and complex nature of the issues.
You have previously stated that: 'Until we can assess why people become radicalised, what motivates them to take the next step into criminality and what leads them to fight for a cause on distant territories, we will not be able to completely negate the radicalisation process’. Can you expand upon this?
Of course. To be honest, I think it sounds nice and neat when we make statements like this, but as is often the case, in reality it is very challenging. Ultimately, I think it is always the case that in order to address an issue, you first need to understand the issue as fully as possible. Questions such as what are the pull and push factors which set individuals along the path of radicalisation? In an effort to understand the process, academics and practitioners have used the pyramid model, where the broad base contains all of those who may have extreme political views but would never act on them and the pointed top represents those very few individuals who actually commit a terrorist act. All the way up the pyramid are different steps that a person could take which would move them closer to the top and to carrying out a terrorist act.
So, the challenge becomes at what point to you intervene? To respond appropriately to this question, you need to understand what makes someone go from reading content online (the base), to communicating with others on the topic, to organising and planning an event, to actually leaving their house and committing a terrorist act (the tip)? And, of course, the biggest challenge in that is that everything up until the terrorist act itself is not necessarily a crime and is certainly not easy to prove in a court process. The criminal justice process in the UK applies to acts of terrorism – there is no special terrorist court or process – and this means that clear evidence needs to be provided in order to get a conviction. However, much of the information obtained prior to an act of terrorism being carried out is part of a much wider intelligence picture, a significant proportion of which cannot be presented in a trial. Therefore, it becomes extremely challenging to prosecute successfully.
So instead, we need to understand each step, and what impacted on each individual at each step of the process of radicalisation. Because the same issues are not going to impact everyone in the same way all of the time. ‘Radicalisation’, whether you agree with the use of the term or not, has been around for as long as human history, it is just that it has been called different names. I think the main challenge is in identifying where and when the changes are taking place. And this relates to changes in understanding the term itself, the process and the range of causes behind that process. Al Qaeda played such a big part in our understanding of terrorism and the radicalisation process for a considerable portion of the beginning of this century. When Daesh came to the West’s attention, we started to see a younger organisation take a different path to its ‘rival’ or ‘predecessor’ (depending on your view). By tapping into the new technologies which have developed over the past decade, Daesh has succeeded in spreading its message on an even wider platform than Al Qaeda, and encouraging individuals around the world to carry out attacks in their own countries, without necessarily collaborating with others and through methods that cannot easily be identified in advance of an attack. So, we can’t easily look back on academic articles from the 1980s and the 1990s, although clearly they have something to contribute, because they can’t easily answer to technologies and communication systems that were not in existence at the time of writing. This is what makes studying radicalisation particularly difficult, and while there are of course elements of commonality over time such as political grievances and revenge, there is a different understanding of the world than existed before the technology revolution that has impacted both terrorism and counter-terrorism measures.
So, understanding the radicalisation process is essential in order to prevent an individual getting to the stage where they open their front door with the intent to kill as many people as possible. How can we stop that? What can we do to help that person take a different path? Is that even the right approach to the issue? And who should take the lead in the ‘counter-radicalisation’ process? These types of questions must be answered before we can negate the process of radicalisation.